More HIT than Miss in India-Nepal Ties

Published in the Hindu on June 22, 2023

On his return to Kathmandu after concluding his four-day official visit to India, Nepal Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ described it as “successful.” He has reason to be satisfied. This is Prachanda’s third stint as Prime Minister and compared to his earlier official visits in 2008 and 2016, the visit in 2023 delivered many more concrete outcomes. More important, many of controversial issues were successfully skirted.

Prachanda’s politics

Under Prachanda’s leadership, the Maoist Centre had fought the elections last year in coalition with the Nepali Congress (NC). There was a falling out over claims to the post of the Prime Minister, and Prachanda switched sides to team up with K P Sharma Oli-led UML. Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister on December 26. However, the NC decided to support Prachanda in a vote of confidence, suggesting that since he had emerged as a consensus PM supported by 268 members in a 275-member House, he should also go for a national consensus apolitical President. Though Prachanda had earlier agreed to support UML candidates for the post of President (due for election in March) and Speaker (in return for making him Prime Minister), he began to backtrack.

Relations between Mr. Oli and Prachanda turned sour with Mr. Oli accusing Prachanda of ‘betrayal’ and Prachanda claiming that he wanted to ensure political stability by taking all parties along. The opportunistic Oli-Prachanda alliance collapsed and by end-February, UML withdrew support. In order to stay in power, Prachanda went back to NC, ready to support its candidate for President. On March 20, NC returned the favour by helping Prachanda win a freshvote of confidence, with UML sulking in the opposition. 

A complex power sharing arrangement has been worked out with Prachanda continuing as PM for two years, followed by Madhav Nepal (CPN-Unified Socialist) for a year and then NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba for the remaining two years. Nepal’s transition to a federal republic (it began in 2008 with the abolition of the monarchy and the election of a new Constituent Assembly) has been politically tumultuous, but largely peaceful. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, two rounds of elections have been held, in 2017 and last November. Hopefully, the current coalition has enough incentive to hold together, providing an opportunity to the government to focus on the economy.

During his pathbreaking visit to Nepal in August 2014, Prime Minister Modi had invoked ‘neighborhood first’ to denote a new beginning in relations. To highlight the focus on connectivity, he coined the acronym HIT, covering Highways, Infoways, and Transways. However, relations took a downturn in 2015 with the economic blockade. Repairing the relationship has been a slow process but results are now visible, leading PM Modi to recall and revive the old acronym. 

Hydropower cooperation

For years, there have been statements about cooperation in the hydropower sector but gradually, things are looking up. Nepal is endowed with an economically viable potential of 50000 MW of hydropower, but till a decade ago, had an installed capacity of barely 1200 MW, making it dependent on electricity imports from India. Today, Nepal has an installed capacity of 2200 MW and in season, can export power to India. A 400 KV transmission is now operational. In 2021, Nepal made a modest beginning by exporting 39 MW; the following year it went up to 452 MW earning Nepali Rupees 11 billion in export earnings. In the lean season, Nepal does import power from India but its dependence has dropped from 20% to 10% during the last five years.

Both sides have finalized a long-term power trade agreement targeting export of 10000 MW within a 10-year time frame. The 900 MW Arun III project started in 2018 by SJVN (formerly the Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam) will be operational later this year. In addition, it signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the 695 MW Arun IV project last year. The National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) signed two projects last year totaling 1200 MW. During the visit, announcements were made about SJVN signing the 669 MW Lower Arun and NHPC, the 480 MW Phukot-Karnali projects.

To keep pace, work has begun on a second high voltage transmission line between Butwal and Gorakhpur and two more are planned under a Line of Credit of $679 million. By agreeing to the Nepali demand for the facility to export electricity to Bangladesh using the Indian grid, India has highlighted the prospects for sub-regional cooperation.

To facilitate movement of goods and people, the Rupaidiha-Nepalgunj Integrated Check Post was inaugurated, work begun on the Sunauli-Bhairahwa ICP and an MOU signed for another at Dodhara Chandni. The Jayanagar-Kurtha railway line, inaugurated last year is planned to be extended while more links are to taken up. After the Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline was operationalized in 2019, work has begun to extend it to Chitwan and an MOU for a new pipeline between Jhapa and Siliguri signed including terminals and other infrastructure.

Negotiations on these projects have been time consuming; the challenge is to ensure timely implementation.

Avoiding irritants

The fact that both sides successfully avoided controversial issues and public disagreements went a long way in keeping the focus on economic ties and ensuring a successful visit. Of the three difficult issues, two are of recent origin and the third is a legacy issue.

The latest issue is the Agnipath scheme that impacts the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian Army’s Gurkha regiments, a practice that began in 1816 by the British Indian army. This was continued under a 1947 treaty based on ‘equal treatment’. The Agnipath revision of the terms needs to be discussed between the two armies and the concerned defence and finance officials. But a resolution is possible given the traditional ties between the two Services.

The second is the Kalapani boundary issue that was deliberately stoked as a nationalist cause by Mr. Oli in 2020 when his position as Prime Minister was under threat. He pushed through a constitutional amendment and unilaterally changed Nepal’s map. Resolving this will need time because a lasting solution will need political wisdom and understanding.

The legacy issue is the !950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In Nepal, a conviction has taken root that the Treaty is unfair to Nepal as it was imposed somehow. This ignores the reality that in 1949, the Nepali regime was perturbed by the Maoist revolution in China and the subsequent takeover of Tibet. It sought an understanding with India and the 1950 Treaty, in large measure, reflects the provisions of the 1923 Treaty between Nepal and British India. In fact, the Treaty enables Nepali nationals ‘equal treatment’ in terms of employment and permits them to apply for any government job, except for the Indian Foreign Service, Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service. Nepali nationals work in the Indian private and public sector, have joined the revenue services and in the Army, have risen to become two-star generals.

The demand to review the Treaty was officially raised first in 1995; in 1996, it was on the agenda of Foreign Secretary’s meeting. Subsequent summits have included a reference to ‘review and update’ it but no substantive talks have taken place. However, some of the cobwebs of history need to cleared so that discussions can take place in an objective manner that addresses the concerns of both countries.

For the present, as Mr. Modi and Prachanda have demonstrated, the focus on HIT will go a long way in rebuilding trust.

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Global Implications of Erdogan’s Historic Win

Published in Hindustan Times on June 12, 2023

Last month, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won his second term in the most contested election in the last two decades, and cemented his place in Turkish history by becoming its longest-serving ruler. So far, that distinction belonged to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish republic and its first president from 1923 till his death in 1938.

The 2023 election took place against two negative developments. First, a weak economy, with inflation running at over 40% and a weakening lira that has depreciated by 80% since 2018. The second was the devastating earthquake in February this year that claimed 50000 lives and exposed that building codes had been violated with impunity by the contractors and builders because of widespread corruption.

For the first time, six Opposition parties came together determined to end to Erdogan’s autocratic rule. The emerging opposition front led by the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) evidently rattled Erdogan, and the government revived an old case against Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul.

After considerable political manoeuvrings, 74-year-old Kemal Kilicdaroglu, became the Opposition candidate. A soft-spoken former civil servant who entered politics in 1999, he made it clear that his goal was to transition Turkey to a parliamentary system and restore independence and integrity of institutions like the central bank and the judiciary.

In the run-up to the elections, opinion polls gave a slight edge to Kilicdaroglu. But in the first round on May 14, Erdogan led with 49.4% of the vote with Kilicdaroglu trailing at 45%. Since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) coalition retained its majority in parliament, Erdogan made it clear a Kilicdaroglu victory would only lead to political paralysis. In the run-off on May 28, Erdogan maintained his lead, obtaining 52.2% of the vote.

Even though Erdogan controls 90% of the print and audio-visual media, leaving the opposition to rely on social media, Kilicdaroglu was able to push Erdogan to a second round for the first time in the last twenty years. His votes came from the major urban areas, the developed coastal areas in the south and the west and the Kurdish areas in the east. His open acknowledgement that he is an Alevi and fighting on a liberal platform failed to make a dent in the rural majority Sunni heartland that remained Erdogan’s stronghold. The result is a polarised country with deep divides, on issues of Western influence and traditional culture, religion and secularism, values and identity, manifest in growing nationalism.

Erdogan’s nimble foreign policy during in recent years helped him establish an image as a nationalist. Even as he expanded Turkey’s influence in the areas that were once part of the Ottoman empire, he balanced concerns with his North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, with traditional rivals like Russia and Iran, while seeking a pole position in the Islamic world. It required brinkmanship but that appeals to the nationalist sentiment that cuts across the political spectrum.

Erdogan is closer to China and applied to join SCO but also criticised its treatment of Uighurs; is a member of NATO but bought the Russian S-400 missile defence system; seeks to improve ties with Russia but opposes it in the conflicts in Libya and Armenia-Azerbaijan; created an Organisation of Turkic States reflecting shades of neo-Ottomanism; maintains close ties with Qatar and after a downturn in ties with Saudi Arabia on the Adnan Khashoggi murder, successfully restored ties with the Arab world.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have bailed him out by providing $5 billion each to the central bank and Russia postponed a gas payment of $600 million to 2024 while agreeing to fund a $10 billion Akkuyu nuclear power plant.

Now that Syrian President Assad has beaten back resistance and is there to stay, Erdogan’s major diplomatic challenge is to reconcile with him. However, his real challenge is to stabilise the economy that has been rocked by his upside-down policies. To tackle inflation, he has been lowering interest rates and pumping in dollars to lower the Lira’s decline but reserves are trending into negative territory. He appears confident of Western support since he managed to broker the Black Sea grain export deal between Ukraine and Russia and curbed the flow of refugees into Europe.

Historically, relations with India have been low-key, with Turkey sympathetic to Pakistan on Kashmir, and countering UN Security Council expansion in the permanent category by proposing an expansion only of the non-permanent category. Despite the personal empathy between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Erdogan, borne out shared experiences of their struggle to get to the top, their recourse to nationalism and invoking a grand past, a deep religiosity and exceptional communication skills, given each leader’s current challenges, the bilateral relationship is likely to remain low-key.

*****

It’s Time to Tweak the Nuclear Policy

Published in Hindustan Times on May 15, 2023

India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, stunned the world. This was not the first; in 1974, India had tested but called it a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). This time, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared that India was now a nuclear-weapon-state. Addressing parliament on the subject on May 27, he also placed a paper – “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy” – that provided the rationale for the tests and spelt out the elements of India’s doctrine that defined India as a reluctant but responsible nuclear power.

When India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, its “nuclear option” was born. In subsequent decades, preserving the option became the primary political and diplomatic objective. Through more than three decades of domestic political changes, policy continuity was sustained.

Meanwhile, Pakistan pushed ahead with its programme and by early 1980s, it was enriching uranium at Kahuta and by late 1980s, had weaponised its deterrent with Chinese help. As the frontline state in the United States’ covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to make the U.S. turn a blind eye to its nuclear developments.

There was a growing realisation that given technological advances since the 1974 PNE, the “nuclear option” could no longer remain viable and needed to be exercised. Post Cold War global developments with tightening dual-use export controls were also squeezing the Indian option. In 1995, the NPT was extended into perpetuity, freezing a nuclear order that India had long considered arbitrary and discriminatory. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in 1994 with the Clinton administration pushing to complete it in 1996.

In 1995, France and China were still undertaking tests to validate designs and acquire data that would help sustain their capabilities with ‘zero-yield’ tests in their laboratories. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao gave the green light for tests and preparatory work began at Pokhran. In early December, days before the tests were scheduled, U.S. satellites picked up imagery of activity at Pokhran. The tests were postponed till after the general elections and meanwhile, Indian stand on the CTBT negotiations hardened.

Prime Minister Vajpayee toyed with the idea of the tests in 1996 but decided against it as his tenure was a mere 13 days. The next opportunity arose when he became PM again in 1998, and the die was cast.

The 1998 declaration of India as a nuclear-weapon-state marked a decisive break. It generated its own challenges, both domestic and external. A new kind of policy continuity was crafted. Domestically, it related to the nuclear doctrine and the configuration of the nuclear arsenal into the defence and decision-making structures. Externally, it was to gain acceptance as a responsible nuclear power and second, to stabilise deterrence relations with India’s adversaries.

After 25 years, the domestic challenge is still a work in progress. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad was considered necessary. The land-based missile force has now inducted Agni IV with an estimated range of 3500 kms. Agni V and Agni VI are expected to extend the ranges to beyond 6000 kms. The nuclear submarine programme has made slow progress with Arihant having undertaken its firs patrol last year. However, it currently carries K-15 (Sagarika) missile that has a limited range of 700 kms. Longer range missiles are under development.

Though India has no intention of embarking on a nuclear arms race with any other country, it must factor in technological developments that can have an impact on the credibility of its deterrent. Increasing use of dual use systems like hypersonics and cruise missiles, conventional precision global strike weapons blur the dividing line between nuclear and conventional systems. Digitisation renders both early warning systems and command and control systems vulnerable to counter-space and offensive cyber action.

These developments have led to questions as to how to define the ‘minimum’ and whether the no-first-use policy needs review. Some critics point to Kargil in 1999 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as evidence of failure of nuclear deterrence and would advocate a more robust posture. However, such criticism is ill founded. Indian doctrine is intended to deter threat and use of nuclear weapons. Dealing with Kargil-type attacks or terrorist strikes requires building conventional and intelligence capabilities that can offer a range of response options.

The external diplomatic challenge of gaining acceptance as a responsible nuclear power has been achieved in great measure. The Vajpayee government was proactive in reaching out to key countries, particularly the U.S. since it had taken the lead in condemning the tests and calling for sanctions.

The dialogue between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh between 1998 and 2000 remains the most intense phase of bilateral engagement with 18 rounds of talks in 24 months. It remained inconclusive in not meeting either side’s stated objectives; yet, it was immensely productive in clearing the path towards the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and eventually the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement following the exceptional waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008 – another milestone that completes 15 years in 2023. The NSG waiver legitimised India’s civilian nuclear trade and has enabled over a dozen cooperation agreements to be concluded.

This has been possible because the post-1998 policy too has been marked by a similar continuity that characterised it in its early years. Today, changing geopolitics has revived rivalries among major nuclear powers even as the geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Navigating these challenges may need policy adjustments that will be strengthened by consensus and continuity.

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A Ground View of the Indian Space Policy 2023

Published in the Hindu on May 11, 2023

On April 20 this year, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) released the Indian Space Policy 2023 that had been in the works for some years. The document has been received positively by industry; however, it needs to be followed up with suitable legislation, accompanied by clear rules and regulations. Just preceding this, this writer wrote the article, “Awaiting lift-off into the Second Space Age” (April 10, 2023), which said that India’s modest entry into the First Space Age followed by its many gains should be used to help the country tap the vast potential in the Second Space Age.

Until the early 1990s, India’s space industry and space economy was defined by ISRO. Private sector involvement was limited to building to ISRO designs and specifications. The Second Space Age began with the licensing of private TV channels, the explosive growth of the internet, mobile telephony, and the emergence of the smartphone. Today, while ISRO’s budget is approx. $1.6 billion, India’s space economy is over $9.6 billion. Broadband, OTT and 5G promise a double-digit annual growth in satellite-based services. It is estimated that with an enabling environment, the Indian space industry could grow by 2030 to $60 billion, directly creating more than 2 lakh jobs.

Yet, it is the enabling policy environment that has proved elusive. The first SATCOM policy was introduced in 1997. It contained guidelines for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the satellite industry that were subsequently further liberalised but never generated much enthusiasm. Today, more than half the transponders beaming TV signals into Indian homes are hosted on foreign satellites resulting in an annual outflow of over half a billion dollars.

A remote sensing data policy was introduced in 2001, which was amended in 2011; in 2016, it was replaced by a National Geospatial Policy that has been further liberalised in 2022. Yet, Indian users including the security and defence agencies spend nearly a billion dollars annually to procure earth observation data and imagery from foreign sources.

To streamline matters, a draft Space Activities Bill was brought out in 2017 and went through a long consultative process. It lapsed in 2019 with the outgoing Lok Sabha. The government was expected to introduce a new bill by 2021 but appears to have contented itself with the new policy statement.

What is different

To be fair, the Indian Space Policy 2023 is qualitatively different from previous efforts. It is a short 11-page document, which includes three pages devoted to definitions and abbreviations. The Vision is to “enable, encourage and develop a flourishing commercial presence in space” that suggests an acceptance that the private sector is a critical stakeholder in the entire value chain of the space economy. It makes five key points. It defines its role in India’s “socio-economic development and security, protection of environment and lives, pursuing peaceful exploration of outer space, stimulation of public awareness and scientific quest.”  

First, this is the only reference to ‘security’ in the document, making it clear that the focus is on civilian and peaceful applications. Considering that space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, communication, positioning, and navigation capabilities are increasingly seen as mission critical by the defence services, that India conducted a successful A-SAT (anti-satellite) direct ascent test in March 2019, and, in the same year set up the Defence Space Agency and the Defence Space Research Organisation, it is reasonable to infer that a defence-oriented space security policy will be a separate document. The United States puts out a space policy under the aegis of the White House Office of the Science and Technology Policy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Departments of Commerce and Transportation while the Department of Defence and the Director of National Intelligence are responsible for the space security strategy.

Second, the policy lays out a strategy and then spells out the roles of Department of Space, ISRO, Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) set up in 2020, and New Space India Ltd (NSIL), a public sector undertaking set up in 2019 under the Department of Space as the commercial arm of ISRO to replace the now defunct Antrix.

Third, it states that ISRO will “transition out of the existing practice of being present in the manufacturing of operational space systems. Hereafter, mature systems shall be transferred to industries for commercial exploitation. ISRO shall focus on R&D in advanced technology, proving newer systems and realisation of space objects for meeting national prerogatives.” Another of ISRO’s tasks in the new Policy is to “share technologies, products, processes and best practices with NGEs (non-government entities) and/or Government companies.” This implies that ISRO will now use its biggest asset, its qualified and talented manpower to concentrate on cutting edge R&D and long-term projects like Chandrayaan and Gaganyaan.

As ISRO’s commercial arms, NSIL will become the interface for interacting with the industry, undertake commercial negotiations and provide handholding support to ensure smooth and efficient transfer of technologies.

Private sector role

Fourth, the NGEs (this includes the private sector) are “allowed to undertake end-to-end activities in the space sector through establishment and operation of space objects, ground-based assets and related services, such as communication, remote sensing, navigation, etc”. Satellites could be self-owned, procured or leased; communication services could be over India or outside; and remote sensing data could be disseminated in India or abroad. NGEs can design and operate launch vehicles for space transportation and establish their own infrastructure. NGEs can now make filings with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and engage in commercial recovery of asteroid resources. In short, the entire gamut of space activities is now open to the private sector. Security agencies can task NGEs for procuring tailor made solutions to address specific requirements.

The activities of the NGEs will be in keeping with guidelines and regulation to be issued by IN-SPACe. It is expected to act as the single window agency for authorising space activities “by government entities and NGEs,” in keeping with safety, security, international obligations and overall national interests.

Finally, IN-SPACe is expected to create and “stable and predictable regulatory framework” that will ensure a level playing field for the NGEs. It will act as a promoter by setting up industry clusters and as the regulator, issue guidelines on liability issues.  

The gaps

The policy sets out an ambitious role for IN-SPACe but provides no timeframe for the necessary steps ahead. Neither is there an indicative timeline for ISRO’s transitioning out of its current practices nor is there a schedule for IN-SPACe to create the regulatory framework. The policy framework envisaged will need clear rules and regulations pertaining to FDI and licensing, government procurement to sustain the new space start-ups, liability in case of violations and an appellate framework for dispute settlement.

A regulatory body needs legislative authority. The Reserve Bank of India was set up by the 1934 RBI Act, SEBI by the 1992 SEBI Act, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) by the 1997 TRAI Act. IN-SPACe is expected to authorise space activities for all, both government and non-government entities. Currently, its position is ambiguous as it functions under the purview of the Department of Space. The Secretary (Space) is also Chairman of ISRO, the government entity to be regulated by IN-SPACe.

The Space Policy 2023 is a forward-looking document reflecting good intentions and a vision. But it is not enough. What is urgently needed is a timeframe to provide the necessary legal framework to translate this vision into reality, to successfully launch India into the Second Space Age. 

*****

Piecing Together the History of India’s Nuclear Journey

(Review: Ploughshares and Swords by Jayita Sarkar)

Published in The Wire on April 16, 2023

India’s nuclear programme has received a fair amount of scholarship in the last two decades. Yet, the majority of it suffers from a common weakness – the attempt to fit it into a Western narrative, perhaps to make it more easily understandable to Western audiences or even to Indian scholars who are reared on a diet of western IR theories. A key reason is that there is little written by the central actors themselves, the dilemmas and challenges they faced, as well as the economic and political compulsions under which they had to address the challenges and resolve the dilemmas. 

Dr. Jayita Sarkar’s Ploughshares and Swords is a welcome addition that mines a rich seam of information, especially the linkages between the nuclear and space programmes during the late 1960s and early 1970s, not hitherto explored, though it also suffers from the same weakness when it seeks to impose a structural framework on the sequence of events.

The title – Ploughshares and Swords, is a good window into Dr Sarkar’s approach by emphasising the dual use character of both nuclear and space technologies. However, this duality dilemma was not new for the Indian scientists. Indian scientists like Homi Bhabha, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, K. S. Krishnan and Vikram Sarabhai had studied abroad and rubbed shoulders with the global scientific elite.

In fact, it was present even for the scientists involved with the Manhattan project. The destructive character of the nuclear weapons coupled with the seductive promise of understanding the nature and structure of the world was apparent to the scientists as they wrestled with their political choices, determined in no small manner by how close they remained to Los Alamos and the corridors of power.

The secrecy surrounding the Manhattan project also led to the first betrayals. In the early 1940s, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a U.S. ally and partner. Yet, ideological rivalries prevented sharing of information. Klaus Fuchs was an unlikely spy. A German refugee who fled to U.K. and then to the U.S. passed on key design elements of the Fat Man (the implosion type plutonium device dropped over Nagasaki) because he felt that the U.S. and the U.K. were treating their ally unfairly. There were others too – Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, Ted Hall, David Greenglass, Morris Cohen, and their inputs helped the Soviet programme catch up with the U.S. in both, the fission and fusion devices. As they stated during their trials, their betrayal was not for financial reasons; it was their way of resolving the nuclear dilemma in their moral universe. Ideological rivalry however was not the only driving force.

Controlling access to nuclear science and technology became a key U.S. objective and in 1946, the U.S. passed the Atomic Energy (McMohan) Act restricting access to nuclear information and handing over security at nuclear facilities to the FBI. Even the British scientists found themselves excluded. They proceeded to set up their own nuclear reactor and reprocessing unit to produce plutonium. Since the U.S. test site was unavailable and Canada seen as too risky, the islands in northwest Australia was the site chosen for their first test in 1952.

Yet, the U.S. also came up with the Atoms for Peace initiative in 1953 where the dilemma was sought to be resolved by transforming this threat to mankind by turning it into a beneficial technology, accessible to all. In 1957, this initiative led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a vehicle to promote international cooperation for peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. It took a decade when its role was transformed into becoming the verification arm of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

While political leaders enjoy agency, it is always constrained, partly by domestic politics and partly by prevailing global events and tides. It is therefore difficult to look at specific decisions and label them as examples of ‘ploughshares’ or ‘swords’ and that analyse personalities accordingly. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru refrained from openly going down the weapons route but strongly supported the creation of the infrastructure that eventually made it possible. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi undertook an underground test in 1974 but remained content with describing it as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Yet, in public perception, the two are seen very differently. This is what makes the Indian nuclear story so different and unique.

Attempts to fit decisions into categories – “the leaders of the nuclear program saw in nuclear fission the possibility to augment geopolitical goals of the territorial state as well as the technopolitical goals of the developmentalist state, leading to a larger dual-use enterprise simultaneously serving military and civilian ends,” are inherently problematic and always ex-post facto. It can enable Dr Sarkar to question which decisions are ‘ploughshares’ and which decisions are ‘swords’; the question is merely rhetorical because reality seldom comes in black and white, mostly it is in shades of grey. To describe the struggles of India’s nuclear and space programmes as ‘an embodiment of the notion of a revisionist post-colonial modernity through a “logic of self-differentiation” and improvisation’ (Dr Sarkar quoting Sudipta Kaviraj) only sounds glib.

The strength of Dr Sarkar’s book lies in exploring the diplomacy undertaken by India with the U.S., France, and the USSR during the decade of 1950s and 1960s, before the two nuclear superpowers found common cause in promoting the goal of non-proliferation. The close links between the scientists and diplomats as they engaged with their counterparts in Washington, Moscow, Paris, and Geneva is a lesson that was lost sight of in following decades and only got revived after 1998. During the 1970s and 1980s as the Cold War came to India’s doorstep, first with the 1971 crisis that led to the creation of Bangla Desh and the war with Pakistan and then the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the gap between diplomatic rhetoric and national security interests grew. This is an issue that deserves greater academic scrutiny.

The linkages between the nascent space programme and the Department of Atomic Energy have never been written about in such detail. Dr Sarkar also dispels the idea that Dr Vikram Sarabhai was not as supportive of an underground test explosion as his predecessor Dr Bhabha had been. The impact of the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, both in India and in the U.S. and its impact on nuclear diplomacy provides political insights without the distraction of frameworks.

There are interesting questions that remains unexplored – if India’s plutonium reprocessing had begun in 1964, why did India not test before 1967 given that India was an active participant in the negotiations in Geneva on the NPT where the date of 1 January 1967 was being presented as the NPT’s cut-off date between the nuclear-weapon-states and the non-nuclear-weapon-states. Given that Indian scientists and diplomats had foreseen the political ramifications of safeguards and opposed it, why did the thought of testing not get explored? Were the limitations technical or political or both?

Another interesting question that could do with more study is Mrs Gandhi’s decision to test in 1974. Dr Sarkar does well to dispel the myth that the decision was a distraction from her domestic political troubles, by pointing out that the decision was taken in 1972 when she enjoyed peak popularity. What is not adequately explored is the decision to call it a PNE. In hindsight, it is clear that it only kept India in limbo, safeguarding its nuclear option. Though this is also something that makes India’s nuclear odyssey sui-generis.

This bridge was crossed in 1998 when two announcements were made, one relating to having conducted the nuclear weapon states and the second that India was a nuclear-weapon-state.

The Indian nuclear jigsaw puzzle is still incomplete but Dr Sarkar has successfully added many small and necessary pieces to provide greater content and give it greater shape.

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