Tag Archives: INDIA

Transforming India’s Nuclear Power Landscape

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Published in the Hindu on April 6, 2026

In the 2025-26 Budget speech, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced that India’s installed nuclear power generation capacity would rise from 8180 MW  to 100,000 MW (100 GW) by 2047. She also signalled transformative legislative changes, leading to the introduction and rapid passage of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill in December 2025.

The scope of change envisaged is dramatic. All nuclear activity had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The SHANTI Act promises a transformation of India’s nuclear energy landscape by bringing in private companies to build, own and operate nuclear power plants, provides a statutory status to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and revises the liability framework to encourage private and even foreign investment. The 1962 Atomic Energy Act and the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) stand repealed and replaced by the SHANTI Act (2025).

However, to realise the promise of 100 GW will need putting the nuts and bolts of implementation in place, the notification of supportive Rules and Regulations, consonant with the transformative spirit underlying the SHANTI Act.

Driving the reforms

 Two key pronouncements drive the reform: achieving  Viksit Bharat (Developed India) by 2047 and net zero emissions by 2070. As society moves up the development ladder, the nature of energy consumption shifts to electricity from the traditional modes of energy like firewood, fossil fuels for transport and heating, and coal for industry. Consequently, the “net zero” target also imposes a parallel shift away from fossil fuel-based power generation towards renewables and other low carbon options.

In 2024, India’s per capita electricity generation was 1418 kWh (kilo-watt-hour) compared to 7097 kWh for China and 12701 kWh for the  United States. The OECD average is a little above 8000 kWh. This indicates the distance India needs to travel to achieve the goal of Viksit Bharat. The second goal of “net zero” imposes its own conditionalities. In 2024, India’s per capita energy consumption was 7893 kWh, indicating that only one-fifth of the energy consumption is from electricity.

In June 2025, India’s electricity generating capacity reached 476 GW (giga-watt) and approximately 50 percent was non-fossil fuel sources. Renewable sources made up 227 GW, consisting of solar power 111 GW, wind power 51 GW, hydro power 48 GW with an additional 5GW from micro-hydel projects and bioenergy 12 GW. In addition, nuclear power – which is seen as low carbon and not strictly renewable as it consumes fissile material as fuel – was 8.8 GW. Thermal power, primarily based on coal accounted for 240 GW. India has committed to increasing the installed capacity of renewables to 500 GW by 2030.  

However, the installed capacity does not reveal the full picture. Renewable sources generation depends on the time of day, climatic and seasonal conditions and geography. India generated a total of 1824 TWh (tera-watt-hours) during 2024-25. The renewable sources accounted for 403 TWh (solar 144 TWh, wind 83 TWh, hydro power 160 TWh and bioenergy 16 TWh). Nuclear power accounted for 57 TWh while thermal power generation was 1363 TWh. Thermal power therefore accounted for 75% of the electricity generated with 50% of the generating capacity compared to 50% renewables capacity providing 22%, while nuclear power contributed 3% with 1.8% of generating capacity. The reason is that thermal and nuclear sources provide for steady baseload power. For renewables to provide at scale, large investments in energy storage become essential. This is why renewables capacity growth is now facing headwinds with projects of 40 GW languishing without power-purchase contracts.

India’s nuclear power journey and options

Conservative estimates indicate that India will need to grow its electricity generating capacity to over 2000 GW to reach Viksit Bharat levels. Even with more efficient and cheaper battery storage, renewables like solar and wind farms are about ten times more land intensive compared to thermal power plants; since coal is inconsistent with “net zero”, nuclear power remains the preferred baseload means to achieve “net-zero.”

India’s first nuclear power reactor went operational in 1969 in Tarapur. Today, Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) is managing 24 nuclear power plants with an installed capacity of 8780 MW (one reactor in Rawatbhata has been shut down). The two oldest are Boiling Water Reactors (BWR), two at Kudankulum are Russian design VVERs (PWR) and the balance are Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR). The original design was 220 MW; this has been successfully indigenised and adapted to 540 MW and 700 MW designs.

The DAE budget has averaged between Rs. 24000 and 26000 crores during the last three years. India’s 700 MW PHWR construction cost is $2 million per MW, among the lowest globally for nuclear power. To add 90 GW over the next two decades would need an outlay of over $200 billion (Rs 18 lakh crores), only feasible with private investment; both domestic and foreign.

In 2017, government gave administrative and financial approval for building 10 reactors of 700 MW each in fleet mode but work hasn’t begun. The logic of fleet mode was to streamline production to gain economies of scale. Three other locations, Jaitapur for six reactors of 1650 MW each based on a French (EdF) design, Mithi Virdi and Kovvada to have six reactors each of 1000 MW capacity with Westinghouse-Toshiba and GE-Hitachi designs, have been mentioned for over a decade. The likely power generation costs from these unproven designs are likely to be over $5 million per MW.

Many industries have captive power plants, ranging from 10 MW to 200 MW and most of these are fossil fuel based. Current estimates for the installed capacity are 90 GW with plants of 100 MW and above accounting for two-thirds capacity. The government has allocated Rs. 20000 crores to research and develop five indigenous models of Small Modular Reactors (SMR) of 5 MW, 55 MW and 200 MW capacity by 2033. Meanwhile, the indigenised 220 MW PHWR model (15 are currently operational), can be a reliable work horse. With efficient project management, some amount of modularisation, and economies of scale, the time from first pour-of-concrete to going-on-stream can be reduced to 40 months. Steel, primary metals, cement, petrochemicals and paper industries and now, the data centres, have shown interest.

Three-front nuclear strategy

To achieve the 100 GW target requires careful planning across three fronts. The EdF and Westinghouse designs are comparatively new and will need to be indigenised to bring down costs. China has demonstrated this by building a supporting industry base, and plans to build 33 reactors of 1000 MW each at below $2 million per MW over 10 years. Second, DAE should identify institutions to accelerate R&D for the indigenous SMRs, especially of the Molten Salt Reactor design. Another research area is use of Thorium cladding with HALEU (High Assay Low Enriched Uranium) that can provide an alternative to the Breeder Reactor route in order to permit early exploitation of India’s thorium reserves. Third, the indigenised 220 MW PHWR model is ready to be modularised as an economically viable replacement for a number of captive power plants and some Indian private sector companies (L&T, TCE, Kirloskar etc.) have the requisite design, fabrication, and construction experience.  Since nuclear power generation requires high upfront capital costs but low operating costs over a long (60 years) operating life, an appropriate financing model will need to be worked out. Existing exclusion zone regulations, intended for multiple reactors at one site will need to be modified for captive single unit reactors.

Conceptually, the SHANTI Act attempts a division between the strategic and defence related nuclear activities and the civilian power generation; now the Rules and Regulations to be issued must make this clear. Issues of nuclear power tariffs, ownership of nuclear fuel, waste management, insurance and liability, dispute settlement mechanism, and an autonomous regulator will need to be dealt with in a transparent manner. Only then will the SHANTI Act deliver on its promise.

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Making Sense of the Political Tsunami in Nepal

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Published in The Hindu (online) on March 14, 2026

As a landlocked country, Nepal has gone through both geological and political earthquakes in recent years but the snap election held on March 5 has been nothing short of a political tsunami. The old political parties have barely scraped through and the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP), which is less than five years old, has won 125 seats out of the 165 first-past-the-past FPTP seats; with 57 proportional representation (PR) seats, it has a total tally of 182, just two short of the two-thirds mark, an unprecedented outcome in a Nepali election. Most of the political leaders who have dominated the Kathmandu scene for the last quarter century will be missing when the new House is convened. However, the RSP leaders now face a bigger challenge – of converting a stable majority into institution-based policy formulation and good governance team to deliver on the high expectations generated.

Crisis after crisis

Barely had the 21st century begun when Nepal went through its first major political crisis. On June 1, 2001, at a family dinner at the Narayanhiti Palace, Crown Prince Dipendra killed nine members of the royal family, including his father, King Birendra, and his mother, Queen Aishwarya. As Nepal mourned, he died three days as a result of a self-inflicted gun wound. King Gyanendra took over, marking a turning point for the two-century old Shah dynasty.

Meanwhile, Nepal was also struggling with a Maoist insurgency that finally ended by 2006 with the political mainstreaming of the Maoists. In the Terai, the Madhesi movement had gained momentum, backing demand for a federal structure. During his seven years, King Gyanendra changed prime-ministers six times and even abolished the National Assembly to impose direct rule. However, the political parties were able to lead a Jan Aandolan that forced him to retreat.

A Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected in 2008 that voted to abolish the monarchy marking Nepal’s second major political change. The CA’s mandate was to draft a constitution for a federal democratic Nepal in two years. The process turned out to be politically difficult and took considerably longer. After another CA election mandated by the Supreme Court in 2013, a new constitution was finally adopted in 2015.   These seven years saw six prime-ministers. The reason was simple. Both the 2008 and the 2013 elections failed to throw up clear majorities, and the leaders of the political parties – Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal -United Marxist Leninist (UML), Maoists and the Madhesi parties – devoted their time to jockeying for positions in the coalition governments.

The 2015 constitution marked Nepal’s third political turning point but the expectations of the much-awaited dawn of a naya Nepal were soon belied. From 2015 to 2025, Nepal saw seven prime-ministers but the faces were the same – UML leader K P Sharma Oli thrice, NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba twice, and Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda twice.

The lavish lifestyles of the political elite went viral on social media accompanied by tales of corruption and impunity of ‘nepo-babies’. The disconnect between a young Nepal with a median age of 26 years and a self-absorbed political leadership in its 70s, was combustible. The spark came when the Oli government banned 26 social media websites (including Facebook, X, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Signal, YouTube, and Instagram) on September 4 for failing to comply with domestic regulations. Resentment erupted as Gen Z protests on 8-9 September, leading to widespread looting and arson across Nepal. With 77 deaths due to police firings, Prime Minister Oli was forced to resign.  

Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was sworn in on September 12 to head an interim government. According to the Constitution, an interim leader should have been from the Assembly but given the anger against all the political parties, President Ram Chandra Poudel’s choice was guided by public sentiment. Ms. Karki made it clear that her goal was to ensure inclusive and peaceful elections within six months and she has delivered on her promise by bringing Nepal back on the constitutional path.

Message of the 2026 election

The Gen Z protests brought down the Oli government. The decimation of the old political forces in the 2026 elections mark 21st century Nepal’s fourth political transformational moment. Beginning 2008, when Nepal introduced PR seats along with FPTP to ensure a more balanced political representation, none of the last four elections (in 2008, 2013, 2017 and 2022) saw any political party manage a clear majority. Most Nepali observers had blamed the PR system for political instability and unwieldy coalitions. However, RSP’s victory puts that myth to rest.

The number of MPs, under 40, has gone up to 61 out of 165 FPTP members, and 52 are from RSP. NC has slipped from 89 seats in 2022 to 18 and UML from 78 to 9. Both parties had seen calls for leadership changes after the Gen Z protests. In the UML, K P Sharma Oli managed to stave it off leading to his ignominious defeat in his home constituency that he had represented since 1991, by 35-year-old Balendra (Balen) Shah, a former mayor of Kathmandu, fighting his first assembly election. NC managed an organisational reshuffle with 51-year-old Gagan Thapa easing out 79-year-old five-time PM Sher Bahadur Deuba but it happened too late to improve NC’s prospects. All the pro-Monarchy and Madhes parties have been wiped out. Evidently, identity politics (Madhes/Pahad, Khas Arya/Janjati, secularism/Hindu rashtra) was not a factor in 2026.

The credit for RSP’s victory goes to its founder chairman Rabi Lamichhane and Mr. Shah who joined the party in December-end on the understanding that while Mr. Lamichhane would continue as the party chairman, he (Balen) would be the party candidate for PM. He, together with the party symbol ghanti, became the face of the RSP campaign. It was a politically sound decision because Mr. Lamichhane’s short stint in government following the 2022 elections, as Deputy PM was marked by controversies. The first was on account of the fact that he hadn’t renounced his U.S. citizenship, and the second is an ongoing criminal case regarding financial embezzlement from a number of cooperative societies. But such was the pro-RSP wave that out of its tally of 125, 42 MPs are those who defected from other parties less than eight weeks before the elections.

Success raises its own challenges. The RSP spelt out ambitious targets in its manifesto – ensuring 7% annual growth, doubling the per capita income to $3000 and GDP to $100 billion, creating 1.2 million formal jobs to curb the daily youth migration running at 3300, delivering universal health insurance and integrated social security, and reforming public education.

Among the promised administrative and political reforms are – reducing ministries from 25 to 18, bringing in experts as ministers so that MPs only exercise oversight, merit-based bureaucracy and judiciary, a review of assets of all public officials since 1990, and constitutional amendments for a directly elected Executive with a fully PR parliament. Mr. Lamichhane and Mr. Balen will have to show that they can work together to prioritise elements from this list and put together a core team that can deliver.

Managing external relations

On the foreign policy front, establishing ground rules for relations with India, China and the U.S. will be another challenge. As Mayor of Kathmandu, Mr. Shah has been temperamental and kept aloof from media, relying instead on his social media outreach. In a country with a population of 30 million, he enjoys a following of 3.7 million on Facebook and a million on Instagram. Even during the election campaign, he spoke at only five events, for a total of 27 minutes. He is a Madhesi by birth, speaks Maithili but did not exploit it. His messaging doesn’t rely on speeches and TV interviews but social media.

His outbursts can be mercurial; last November his Facebook, “F…America F…India F…China F…UML F…congress F…RSP F…RPP F…Maobaadi You Guys all Combined can do Nothing (Smiley)” generated criticism before he deleted it. In 2023, in response to the unveiling of the mural of Akhand Bharat in India’s new parliament building, he put up a map of Greater Nepal in his office that showed parts of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal as part of Nepal. He declared that “India called its parliamentary map a cultural one, so we put up a historical map of Greater Nepal. No one should object”.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken to both Mr. Shah and Mr. Lamichhane to congratulate them and both sides have conveyed their intention to strengthen and deepen bilateral relations. Mr. Lamichhane has talked of Nepal pursuing the path of “development diplomacy”. Given the changes in Nepal, India will need to be careful about reiterating the old mantras of cultural, historical and religious ties and invoking tropes of Ayodhya-Janakpur, Kashi-Pashupatinath and, roti-beti ka rishta; it should now invest in developing a new idiom of responding to the naya Nepal. 

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Redeeming India’s Nuclear Power Promise

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Published in the Hindu on July 23, 2025

If India is to meet its ambitious target of 100GW of power generating capacity by 2047, it needs foreign partners as well as private entities to participate in the nuclear sector which has been till now completely under the government

The Union Budget for 2025-26 marked a significant shift in India’s nuclear energy plan by announcing an ambitious target of 100 GW of power generating capacity by 2047, up from the present 8.18 GW. This positions nuclear power as a major pillar in India’s energy mix, given the two goals of emerging as a developed country (Viksit Bharat) by 2047 and achieving “net zero emissions” by 2070.

Simultaneously, the Nuclear Energy Mission announced a special allocation of Rs. 20000 crores to develop “at least five indigenously designed and operational Small Modular Reactors (SMR) by 2033.” Such ambitious plans will need involvement of private players, both domestic and foreign, into a hitherto government sector, requiring significant changes in the legislative, financial and regulatory framework. Government has indicated that some changes in the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010 are in the offing. However, the comprehensive reforms needed also require a change in mind set.

India’s nuclear journey

India had an early start, setting up Asia’s first nuclear research reactor, Apsara, in 1956, and beginning work on Asia’s first nuclear power reactors at Tarapore in 1963. As early as 1954, Dr Homi Bhabha, the architect of India’s nuclear programme presented a target of generating 8 GW of nuclear power by 1980!

However, the journey has been long and difficult. Following the war with China in 1962; its entry into the nuclear club in 1964; India’s decision to stay out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968; and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) test in 1974; India was excluded from the emerging nuclear order. International cooperation ceased and gradually, export controls further slowed down the nuclear power programme. The first unit at Rajasthan was barely set up while the second was under construction: it only went critical in 1981. The nuclear power target was pushed to 10 GW by 2000.

Moreover, India took time to successfully indigenise the design of the 220 MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR), employed in Rajasthan. The advantage was that it uses natural uranium as fuel unlike the design of the Tarapur Light Water Reactor (LWR), a design that used Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that India obtained from the U.S., and later, from France. Subsequently, the same 220 MW PHWR units were established at Narora, Kaiga, Kakrapar etc; the design was upgraded to 540 MW (set up at Tarapur TAPS 3 and 4 in 2005-06) and to 700 MW with two units getting operational at Kakrapar in 2024. Since the nuclear establishment was excluded from civilian exchanges, an understandable and unintended consequence of the 1974 PNE was that the it became inward looking and wary about external engagement.

After the nuclear tests in 1998, followed by intense negotiations with the U.S. and other strategic partners, India finally gained acceptance as a responsible nuclear power. It also got a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India was thus ready to resume exchanges with other nuclear powers to import both nuclear fuel and more advanced reactors to expand its nuclear energy programme.

However, the CLNDA created new difficulties that have prevented the anticipated external participation, from France and the U.S. In fact, Russia is the only country that is partnering with us at Kudankulum with six VVER-1000 power reactors because this government-to-government agreement, signed in 1988, predated the CLNDA.   

Towards green development

To become a developed country by 2047, India’s annual per capita income needs to grow from the current $2800 to $22000, and correspondingly, the GDP from the current $4 trillion to over $35 trillion. There is a well-established correlation between economic growth and energy consumption. In 2022, India’s per capita electricity consumption stood at 1,208 kWh, compared to 4,600 kWh for China, and over 12,500 kWh for the U.S.

India’s electricity generation capacity, currently at 480 GW (divided almost equally between fossil fuels and renewables), will have to grow five-fold, accounting for growth in population and urbanisation. However, solar, wind, and small hydro provide intermittent power. That is why out of 2030 TWh, the total electricity generated in 2024, renewables, with half the generation capacity, accounted for 240 TWh. Coal fired thermal plants accounted for 75 percent of the generation, the balance added by nuclear and large hydro projects.

The climate change commitments announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2021 at the Glasgow COP26, of “net zero emissions by 2070, raising non-fossil energy generation capacity to 500 GW by 2030 while meeting 50 percent of the energy demand through renewables, and achieving a carbon intensity reduction of 45 percent over 2005 levels by 2030” means that that India will not be able to rely on fossil fuels for its growth. The potential from renewables (including solar, hydro, wind, and biomass) is estimated at providing 20% of the demand and up to 25% with investments in battery and pumped storage.   The obvious candidate therefore to fuel India’s growth is nuclear power.

There is a renewed interest globally in nuclear power. It was reflected in the Dubai 2023 COP28 ‘Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy’, acknowledging nuclear power as ‘a critical input in reducing reliance on fossil fuels, enhancing energy security, and move towards a low carbon future’. in June, the IAEA and the World Bank agreed to work together to support nuclear energy in developing countries, marking a significant policy shift. World Bank President Ajay Banga pointed out, “nuclear (energy) delivers base load power, which is essential to building modern economies.” It is quite likely that the World Bank lead will be followed by other development funding banks and organisations.

Creating an enabling environment

Government is looking at three routes ahead. One is to standardise the 220 MW PHWR design and apply it to the Bharat Small Modular Reactors, that significantly reduces costs and commissioning time. This would be relevant to replacing captive thermal power plants that today account for over 100 GW and will be replaced over the next two decades.

The second track is scaling up the Nuclear Power Corporation of India  Ltd (NPCIL) plans for the 700 MW PHWR into fleet mode by facilitating land acquisition, streamlining licensing, and strengthening indigenous supply chains.

The third track is to accelerate negotiations with partners in France and the U.S. partners that have been moving at a glacial pace for the last 15 years.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, nuclear power is a sector reserved by the government. The NPCIL is a government owned company that builds, owns, and operates the PHWRs, the first two Tarapur LWRs, and the Russian designed VVERs.

Nuclear power financing is qualitatively different because of the higher upfront capital costs, lower operating costs, a lifecycle of 50-60 years, and costs associated with decommissioning and radioactive waste management. The indigenised PHWR model has a capital cost of $2 million/MW while the equivalent cost for a coal fired thermal unit is just under a million. Given NPCIL’s annual budget of $1.2 billion, government realises that to achieve the target of 100 GW, private sector companies will have to be brought into the sector, necessitating a comprehensive set of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.

Questions of majority/minority ownership, whether the nuclear operator is exclusively NPCIL; responsibility and control over the nuclear island part of the plant; and concerns over assured fuel supply and waste management responsibility will need to be considered with the potential stakeholders that include major players like Tatas, Adani, Ambani, Vedanta and L & T. The power plants will be under IAEA safeguards and ensuring this is a sovereign responsibility, necessitating a different legal framework. All these will require amendments to the 1962 Act.

A set of comprehensive amendments will also be needed for the 2010 CLNDA. The Liability Law was intended to be consistent with the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for Nuclear Damage to which India is a party. The CSC provides liability to be channelled only to the ‘operator;’ however the CLNDA added a ‘right of recourse’ by the ‘operator’ to the ‘supplier’ as well as the possibility of legal proceedings under other applicable laws. The government has tried to square the circle by providing explanations that but appears to have finally accepted the need for legal clarity through amendments.

A third area is commercial disputes relating to tariffs. Nuclear electricity tariff for NPCIL is notified under the Atomic Energy Act. Generally, commercial disputes fall under the Electricity Act and are settled by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) but a recent dispute between NPCIL and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam has led to conflicting views by the CERC and the Appellate Tribunal. The case is now under consideration before the Supreme Court. With the entry of private sector in the field, should the tariff setting come into the ‘levelized cost of energy’ as applicable to thermal, solar, wind and hydro will depend on how the question of ownership and control are determined.  

While India has had an impeccable nuclear safety record, the certification and safety oversight is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) that is ‘autonomous’ but not a legal entity and is subordinate to the Department of Atomic Energy. In 2011, a draft Bill was circulated to establish AERB as an independent regulator, but the Bill lapsed. With the entry of the private sector, the need for an independent regulator becomes paramount.

In addition, a raft of financial incentives will need to be introduced. While nuclear energy is a low-carbon energy source, it is not classified as “renewable,” like solar or wind. Revising this classification would make nuclear power projects eligible for tax incentives and specially designed ‘green financing’ instruments. Long term power-purchase-agreements and provision for viability-gap-funding are other incentives. The sector also needs to be opened for FDI participation, perhaps up to 49 percent, to ensure Indian ownership and control.  

In the past, the process of reform has been tentative. In 2011, NPCIL set up a Joint Venture (JV) with the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) but it languished till it was revived last year. It will now build and operate 4 units of 700 MW each, scheduled to come up at Mahi Banswara in Rajasthan. Land acquisition has been underway and once completed, the first unit will take seven years. A JV with Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) is also envisaged. Both REC and NTPC are PSUs and these JVs will be wholly government entities.

However, if India has to deliver on the promise of 100 GW by 2047, India needs foreign partners and the private sector. This has been accepted by the government Now it has to move forward the reform process comprehensively and decisively.  

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