Category Archives: INDIA DOMESTIC

Redeeming India’s Nuclear Power Promise

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Published in the Hindu on July 23, 2025

If India is to meet its ambitious target of 100GW of power generating capacity by 2047, it needs foreign partners as well as private entities to participate in the nuclear sector which has been till now completely under the government

The Union Budget for 2025-26 marked a significant shift in India’s nuclear energy plan by announcing an ambitious target of 100 GW of power generating capacity by 2047, up from the present 8.18 GW. This positions nuclear power as a major pillar in India’s energy mix, given the two goals of emerging as a developed country (Viksit Bharat) by 2047 and achieving “net zero emissions” by 2070.

Simultaneously, the Nuclear Energy Mission announced a special allocation of Rs. 20000 crores to develop “at least five indigenously designed and operational Small Modular Reactors (SMR) by 2033.” Such ambitious plans will need involvement of private players, both domestic and foreign, into a hitherto government sector, requiring significant changes in the legislative, financial and regulatory framework. Government has indicated that some changes in the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010 are in the offing. However, the comprehensive reforms needed also require a change in mind set.

India’s nuclear journey

India had an early start, setting up Asia’s first nuclear research reactor, Apsara, in 1956, and beginning work on Asia’s first nuclear power reactors at Tarapore in 1963. As early as 1954, Dr Homi Bhabha, the architect of India’s nuclear programme presented a target of generating 8 GW of nuclear power by 1980!

However, the journey has been long and difficult. Following the war with China in 1962; its entry into the nuclear club in 1964; India’s decision to stay out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968; and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) test in 1974; India was excluded from the emerging nuclear order. International cooperation ceased and gradually, export controls further slowed down the nuclear power programme. The first unit at Rajasthan was barely set up while the second was under construction: it only went critical in 1981. The nuclear power target was pushed to 10 GW by 2000.

Moreover, India took time to successfully indigenise the design of the 220 MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR), employed in Rajasthan. The advantage was that it uses natural uranium as fuel unlike the design of the Tarapur Light Water Reactor (LWR), a design that used Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that India obtained from the U.S., and later, from France. Subsequently, the same 220 MW PHWR units were established at Narora, Kaiga, Kakrapar etc; the design was upgraded to 540 MW (set up at Tarapur TAPS 3 and 4 in 2005-06) and to 700 MW with two units getting operational at Kakrapar in 2024. Since the nuclear establishment was excluded from civilian exchanges, an understandable and unintended consequence of the 1974 PNE was that the it became inward looking and wary about external engagement.

After the nuclear tests in 1998, followed by intense negotiations with the U.S. and other strategic partners, India finally gained acceptance as a responsible nuclear power. It also got a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India was thus ready to resume exchanges with other nuclear powers to import both nuclear fuel and more advanced reactors to expand its nuclear energy programme.

However, the CLNDA created new difficulties that have prevented the anticipated external participation, from France and the U.S. In fact, Russia is the only country that is partnering with us at Kudankulum with six VVER-1000 power reactors because this government-to-government agreement, signed in 1988, predated the CLNDA.   

Towards green development

To become a developed country by 2047, India’s annual per capita income needs to grow from the current $2800 to $22000, and correspondingly, the GDP from the current $4 trillion to over $35 trillion. There is a well-established correlation between economic growth and energy consumption. In 2022, India’s per capita electricity consumption stood at 1,208 kWh, compared to 4,600 kWh for China, and over 12,500 kWh for the U.S.

India’s electricity generation capacity, currently at 480 GW (divided almost equally between fossil fuels and renewables), will have to grow five-fold, accounting for growth in population and urbanisation. However, solar, wind, and small hydro provide intermittent power. That is why out of 2030 TWh, the total electricity generated in 2024, renewables, with half the generation capacity, accounted for 240 TWh. Coal fired thermal plants accounted for 75 percent of the generation, the balance added by nuclear and large hydro projects.

The climate change commitments announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2021 at the Glasgow COP26, of “net zero emissions by 2070, raising non-fossil energy generation capacity to 500 GW by 2030 while meeting 50 percent of the energy demand through renewables, and achieving a carbon intensity reduction of 45 percent over 2005 levels by 2030” means that that India will not be able to rely on fossil fuels for its growth. The potential from renewables (including solar, hydro, wind, and biomass) is estimated at providing 20% of the demand and up to 25% with investments in battery and pumped storage.   The obvious candidate therefore to fuel India’s growth is nuclear power.

There is a renewed interest globally in nuclear power. It was reflected in the Dubai 2023 COP28 ‘Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy’, acknowledging nuclear power as ‘a critical input in reducing reliance on fossil fuels, enhancing energy security, and move towards a low carbon future’. in June, the IAEA and the World Bank agreed to work together to support nuclear energy in developing countries, marking a significant policy shift. World Bank President Ajay Banga pointed out, “nuclear (energy) delivers base load power, which is essential to building modern economies.” It is quite likely that the World Bank lead will be followed by other development funding banks and organisations.

Creating an enabling environment

Government is looking at three routes ahead. One is to standardise the 220 MW PHWR design and apply it to the Bharat Small Modular Reactors, that significantly reduces costs and commissioning time. This would be relevant to replacing captive thermal power plants that today account for over 100 GW and will be replaced over the next two decades.

The second track is scaling up the Nuclear Power Corporation of India  Ltd (NPCIL) plans for the 700 MW PHWR into fleet mode by facilitating land acquisition, streamlining licensing, and strengthening indigenous supply chains.

The third track is to accelerate negotiations with partners in France and the U.S. partners that have been moving at a glacial pace for the last 15 years.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, nuclear power is a sector reserved by the government. The NPCIL is a government owned company that builds, owns, and operates the PHWRs, the first two Tarapur LWRs, and the Russian designed VVERs.

Nuclear power financing is qualitatively different because of the higher upfront capital costs, lower operating costs, a lifecycle of 50-60 years, and costs associated with decommissioning and radioactive waste management. The indigenised PHWR model has a capital cost of $2 million/MW while the equivalent cost for a coal fired thermal unit is just under a million. Given NPCIL’s annual budget of $1.2 billion, government realises that to achieve the target of 100 GW, private sector companies will have to be brought into the sector, necessitating a comprehensive set of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.

Questions of majority/minority ownership, whether the nuclear operator is exclusively NPCIL; responsibility and control over the nuclear island part of the plant; and concerns over assured fuel supply and waste management responsibility will need to be considered with the potential stakeholders that include major players like Tatas, Adani, Ambani, Vedanta and L & T. The power plants will be under IAEA safeguards and ensuring this is a sovereign responsibility, necessitating a different legal framework. All these will require amendments to the 1962 Act.

A set of comprehensive amendments will also be needed for the 2010 CLNDA. The Liability Law was intended to be consistent with the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for Nuclear Damage to which India is a party. The CSC provides liability to be channelled only to the ‘operator;’ however the CLNDA added a ‘right of recourse’ by the ‘operator’ to the ‘supplier’ as well as the possibility of legal proceedings under other applicable laws. The government has tried to square the circle by providing explanations that but appears to have finally accepted the need for legal clarity through amendments.

A third area is commercial disputes relating to tariffs. Nuclear electricity tariff for NPCIL is notified under the Atomic Energy Act. Generally, commercial disputes fall under the Electricity Act and are settled by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) but a recent dispute between NPCIL and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam has led to conflicting views by the CERC and the Appellate Tribunal. The case is now under consideration before the Supreme Court. With the entry of private sector in the field, should the tariff setting come into the ‘levelized cost of energy’ as applicable to thermal, solar, wind and hydro will depend on how the question of ownership and control are determined.  

While India has had an impeccable nuclear safety record, the certification and safety oversight is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) that is ‘autonomous’ but not a legal entity and is subordinate to the Department of Atomic Energy. In 2011, a draft Bill was circulated to establish AERB as an independent regulator, but the Bill lapsed. With the entry of the private sector, the need for an independent regulator becomes paramount.

In addition, a raft of financial incentives will need to be introduced. While nuclear energy is a low-carbon energy source, it is not classified as “renewable,” like solar or wind. Revising this classification would make nuclear power projects eligible for tax incentives and specially designed ‘green financing’ instruments. Long term power-purchase-agreements and provision for viability-gap-funding are other incentives. The sector also needs to be opened for FDI participation, perhaps up to 49 percent, to ensure Indian ownership and control.  

In the past, the process of reform has been tentative. In 2011, NPCIL set up a Joint Venture (JV) with the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) but it languished till it was revived last year. It will now build and operate 4 units of 700 MW each, scheduled to come up at Mahi Banswara in Rajasthan. Land acquisition has been underway and once completed, the first unit will take seven years. A JV with Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) is also envisaged. Both REC and NTPC are PSUs and these JVs will be wholly government entities.

However, if India has to deliver on the promise of 100 GW by 2047, India needs foreign partners and the private sector. This has been accepted by the government Now it has to move forward the reform process comprehensively and decisively.  

*****

My Interview to India’s World on India’s ambitious goals for nuclear power

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Published in India’s World on February 23, 2025

“Realising 100 GW of Nuclear Power by 2047 Depends on…” Former Diplomat Rakesh Sood

‘Realising 100 GW of Nuclear Power by 2047 Depends on Building the Right Framework’, says, former Indian Diplomat Rakesh Sood.

Hely Desai

February 23, 2025

India has indicated a significant shift in its nuclear energy strategy with the Union Budget 2025-26. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s announcement of the Nuclear Energy Mission outlines ambitious targets, modest financial allocations, and significantly, some amendments to the Atomic Energy Act (1962) and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010), aimed at accelerating private sector participation. With the country’s rapidly growing industrial sector and rising energy demands, the Finance Minister emphasised the urgent need to diversify India’s energy mix, positioning nuclear power as a crucial pillar in the low-carbon development strategy for realising the vision of a “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) by 2047 and a “net zero” by 2070.

In this interview, Hely Desai sits down with Rakesh Sood, former Indian diplomat and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, to decode the implications of these potentially transformative nuclear developments following the budget announcement.

Hely Desai: In the Union Budget 2025, nuclear energy received significant attention once again. The Finance Minister set an ambitious target of 100 gigawatts (GW) by 2047—nearly 12 times the current capacity. Given that this goal has been revised several times over the years, do you think it is now achievable? What key challenges have hindered progress so far?

Amb. Rakesh Sood: To put it in context, in the 1970s, India set a target of 10 GW to be achieved by 2000. We are at 8.2 GW today. Each time a new target has been set, it has become more ambitious and, understandably, more difficult to achieve. So, while the targets of 22 GW by 2031 and eventually 100 GW by 2047 are ambitious targets, their realisation will depend on how we prepare the framework to achieve it. 

The budget for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for 2025-26 is INR 24,049 crores. Last year, it was INR 24,450 crores, and the year before that, INR 25,882 crores. These are in the same ballpark range and do not reflect either the urgency or the priority to the sector. In the budget speech, the Finance Minister also mentioned an additional INR 20,000 crores for nuclear power, but with no clarity about the time frame for this allocation to materialise. If this amount is spread over the next five years, it would mean an additional INR 4,000 crores per year, which doesn’t significantly address the funding gap, given that the average cost of nuclear power per megawatt in India at $2 million is approx. Rs 17 crores! Therefore, this amount is unlikely to help meet the ambitious targets if the government is the only source of funding. This is why I believe the Finance Minister also mentioned the need to amend existing legislation.

The Atomic Energy Act (1962) places all nuclear energy activities, including materials and technology, under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). As a result, all nuclear facilities are under the DAE and all nuclear power reactors are operated by nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), a wholly government-owned Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) and a subsidiary of the DAE. To involve the private sector, existing legislation will need to be amended. However, the exact form this will take remains unclear. 

One indication is the Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by NPCIL in December 2024, inviting private industries to build two 220 MWe PHWR Bharat Small Reactors. The RFP suggests that “the reactors are planned to be set up with private sector investment, operating within the existing legal framework and approved business models.” The intention is to replace captive power plants, which are currently coal-based, with the DAE-indigenised PHWR models. However, the investor/user/industrial party would construct the project under the supervision and control of the NPCIL, which would take over the plant as the operator. Capital costs, all operating expenses during the life cycle, and decommissioning expenses would be borne by the ‘user’ who can utilise the captive power and/or sell it according to tariffs approved by the government.

However, we still don’t know what the response to the RFP has been. The RFP was issued two months before the amendment announcement and emphasises that it is “within existing legal framework.” 

How is India’s energy profile expected to evolve as India pursues the twin goals of Viksit Bhat by 2047 and net-zero by 2070?

Currently, India’s annual per capita income is approximately $2500, and to reach Viksit Bharat (developed country standard according to World Bank), it has to grow to approximately $ 22,000. In 2022-23, India’s per capita annual energy consumption was 1208 kWh while China was 4600kWh, Singapore was 9220 kWh and the US is stable at 80000 kWh. National energy consumption is approx. 10000 TWH; taking into account rising energy efficiencies, it still needs to rise to 35000 TWH by 2047 to achieve Viksit Bharat. India has committed to the target of ‘net-zero’ by 2070. This imposes restrictions on sources for energy growth. In absolute numbers, with the energy composition changing with growing urbanisation, India’s power generation needs to grow from current installed capacity of approx. 450 GW (consisting of 200 GW from renewables covering solar, wind and hydroelectric, 8 GW from nuclear and the balance from fossil fuels) to 4000 GW. Solar, wind, hydel, and biomass can contribute to approximately 1300-1500 GW, leaving a large shortfall of 2500-2700 GW to be met from fossil fuels and nuclear power.   Given the net-zero goal, it is clear that nuclear power has to play a much larger role in India’s economic development. Against this backdrop, the Finance Minister’s target of 100 GW of nuclear generation by 2047 seems critical and may need to grow much more by 2070 to achieve net-zero. This would require significant investment in both nuclear power plants and renewable infrastructure, meaning the private sector must play a key role, as the government alone cannot shoulder this energy transition. 

Given the potential amendments that may also be in part aimed at advancing Small Modular Reactors (SMR) development, the announcement also sets a target of having five operational SMRs by 2033. Do you think financial and technological challenges could pose significant obstacles for India in achieving this goal?

Yes, absolutely. When discussing these amendments in the context of advancing SMRs, a key driving force is India’s commitment to meeting clean energy targets while ensuring scalability. SMRs are projected to be beneficial for supporting urbanisation, providing power in remote locations, and meeting dedicated industrial energy needs, thus driving sustainable growth across diverse regions. 

Now, small modular reactors, typically under 300 MW and modular in design, are projected to play a crucial role in this transition. However, to make this work, it is essential to reach a consensus on a specific SMR design. Only then can it be mass-produced, potentially reducing costs through economies of scale. 

Globally, around 80 different SMR designs (variants of Molten Salt Reactors, Pressurised Water Reactors, Molten Metal Reactors and High-Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors) are under development, with only two having reached operational stages. If we look at Russia, they have an operational floating nuclear power plant with an SMR based on the pressurised water reactor (PWR) design, and China has a land-based High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR). Apart from these two, no other country has reached the operationalisation stage for SMRs yet. 

For India, most of our existing nuclear power plants are limited to PHWR technology, which, while effective, is not the most efficient. Post 1974, after India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, India was excluded from international exchanges and cooperation, and PHWR was the only option available at the time. Now, the government is looking to explore more secure and advanced technologies for the future. Collaboration and external expertise will be crucial. This was also one of the primary objectives behind the nuclear deal with the U.S., which aimed to foster international cooperation. This context underpins the Finance Minister’s announcement that India aims to have five operational SMRs by 2033. 

Assuming this announcement for amendments is intended to incentivise private sector involvement in nuclear energy, what significant changes do you anticipate in the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, and how might they affect private sector participation?

First, the Atomic Energy Act would need to create a role for the private sector. What this role is intended to be is unclear. Second is the Liability Act. According to the NPCIL RFP (issued a month before the Finance Minister’s budget speech), the private sector role is only that of the investor. If NPCIL is the operator and the project is built to NPCIL’s designs and specifications and under its supervision, then physical protection and nuclear safety will also become NPCIL’s responsibility. The private sector will insist on complete indemnity through a “hold harmless” clause. However, if the private sector entity’s role is to be greater, then it will need to be legally defined as also the sharing of the liability responsibility. In Western countries, private companies are allowed to build and operate nuclear power plants (though designs and operations are regulated by governments), and they are held liable according to their respective liability laws. 

The general principle is that, in the event of a nuclear accident, the first priority is to provide immediate relief and assistance to those affected. This is operator liability under the principle of “economic channelling” In India, under our liability law, this assistance is capped at INR 1,500 crores, and if damages exceed that, the government must intervene. This means the operator is required to have an insurance pool for immediate assistance. Under the CLNDA, even if the NPCIL holds a supplier responsible, it can pursue the claim through “legal channelling” but without delaying immediate relief.

Currently, NPCIL, an entirely government-owned agency, acts as the operator, and the government essentially serves as its insurer. After the CLNDA, the ambiguities created by unclear definitions made private players (both foreign and domestic) hesitant to enter the sector.  For the private sector to play any significant part in the development of nuclear power, some of these ambiguities in the CLNDA would need to be clarified. So far, the government has relied on Explanations provided through Frequently Asked Questions posted on government department websites, but this has failed to satisfy the private entities. 

Ahead of the budget announcement, there was a report in the Economic Times suggesting that civil nuclear energy could be moved from the DAE’s oversight to the Ministry of Power, with fuel handling remaining under the DAE. How likely do you think this shift is, and what challenges might arise from such a transfer?

For a shift like this, I think one of the first things needed is an independent regulator. Currently, we have the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). There was a draft bill proposed to make the AERB a statutory body but it didn’t see the light of day. Today, even though the AERB is autonomous in name, it remains part of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), meaning it lacks the independence of regulators like the RBI, SEBI, or TRAI that were established through specific acts of Parliament, granting them the necessary autonomy to regulate both government and private sector activities. For example, the RBI supervises even government-owned banks like the SBI, while the SEBI regulates stock exchanges such as the BSE and NSE.

In this context, the nuclear sector would benefit from a similar independent regulator, one that can oversee activities regardless of whether these are carried out by the government or private sector entities. This is a crucial step as we explore private sector participation in nuclear power generation. There would, of course, be mandatory safety and security guidelines. And even if the nuclear material remains under the DAE’s ownership, certain protocols would need to be in place to ensure the DAE can retain ownership without assuming liability in the event of an accident. Establishing these clear boundaries will present legal challenges if the private sector is to play a role in nuclear power generation.

Another important issue would be land acquisition for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Often, communities resist having NPPs near their towns or villages, fearing potential accidents. The question then becomes—who will handle resistance, outreach communication, and compensation? While the government can acquire land to some extent, it typically sets up an industrial zone and allocates it to private companies. But with public resistance, it raises the issue of who will acquire land for private companies looking to build NPPs. For private companies, acquiring land and establishing facilities would be even more challenging. 

Additionally, Indian private companies lack the necessary expertise in designing and operating nuclear power plants, as they have never been involved in this sector. So, will they form joint ventures with foreign technology entities like Westinghouse, GE, or Électricité de France? If so, how would these joint ventures be structured? Will the government insist NPCIL be involved as an operator, as with previous deals like the French reactors at Jaitapur? These are questions that remain to be answered as the situation develops.

To conclude, developing a strong, independent regulatory framework and managing land acquisition, safety protocols, and private sector involvement will be key to successful private sector participation in India’s nuclear power generation. These challenges, particularly around regulatory independence and the acquisition of land amidst public resistance, will require clear legal structures and government support to ensure the safe, efficient, and sustainable development of nuclear energy in the country. 

How these issues are addressed will likely shape the future of India’s nuclear energy sector as India pursues the twin goals of Viksit Bharat by 2047 and net-zero by 2070.

*****

R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended

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I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/

Remembering Dr R Chidambaram

From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)

I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.

In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.

In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.  

Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.

At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.

Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.

Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.

The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.

At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.

It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.

It’s Time to Tweak the Nuclear Policy

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Published in Hindustan Times on May 15, 2023

India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, stunned the world. This was not the first; in 1974, India had tested but called it a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). This time, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared that India was now a nuclear-weapon-state. Addressing parliament on the subject on May 27, he also placed a paper – “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy” – that provided the rationale for the tests and spelt out the elements of India’s doctrine that defined India as a reluctant but responsible nuclear power.

When India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, its “nuclear option” was born. In subsequent decades, preserving the option became the primary political and diplomatic objective. Through more than three decades of domestic political changes, policy continuity was sustained.

Meanwhile, Pakistan pushed ahead with its programme and by early 1980s, it was enriching uranium at Kahuta and by late 1980s, had weaponised its deterrent with Chinese help. As the frontline state in the United States’ covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to make the U.S. turn a blind eye to its nuclear developments.

There was a growing realisation that given technological advances since the 1974 PNE, the “nuclear option” could no longer remain viable and needed to be exercised. Post Cold War global developments with tightening dual-use export controls were also squeezing the Indian option. In 1995, the NPT was extended into perpetuity, freezing a nuclear order that India had long considered arbitrary and discriminatory. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in 1994 with the Clinton administration pushing to complete it in 1996.

In 1995, France and China were still undertaking tests to validate designs and acquire data that would help sustain their capabilities with ‘zero-yield’ tests in their laboratories. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao gave the green light for tests and preparatory work began at Pokhran. In early December, days before the tests were scheduled, U.S. satellites picked up imagery of activity at Pokhran. The tests were postponed till after the general elections and meanwhile, Indian stand on the CTBT negotiations hardened.

Prime Minister Vajpayee toyed with the idea of the tests in 1996 but decided against it as his tenure was a mere 13 days. The next opportunity arose when he became PM again in 1998, and the die was cast.

The 1998 declaration of India as a nuclear-weapon-state marked a decisive break. It generated its own challenges, both domestic and external. A new kind of policy continuity was crafted. Domestically, it related to the nuclear doctrine and the configuration of the nuclear arsenal into the defence and decision-making structures. Externally, it was to gain acceptance as a responsible nuclear power and second, to stabilise deterrence relations with India’s adversaries.

After 25 years, the domestic challenge is still a work in progress. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad was considered necessary. The land-based missile force has now inducted Agni IV with an estimated range of 3500 kms. Agni V and Agni VI are expected to extend the ranges to beyond 6000 kms. The nuclear submarine programme has made slow progress with Arihant having undertaken its firs patrol last year. However, it currently carries K-15 (Sagarika) missile that has a limited range of 700 kms. Longer range missiles are under development.

Though India has no intention of embarking on a nuclear arms race with any other country, it must factor in technological developments that can have an impact on the credibility of its deterrent. Increasing use of dual use systems like hypersonics and cruise missiles, conventional precision global strike weapons blur the dividing line between nuclear and conventional systems. Digitisation renders both early warning systems and command and control systems vulnerable to counter-space and offensive cyber action.

These developments have led to questions as to how to define the ‘minimum’ and whether the no-first-use policy needs review. Some critics point to Kargil in 1999 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as evidence of failure of nuclear deterrence and would advocate a more robust posture. However, such criticism is ill founded. Indian doctrine is intended to deter threat and use of nuclear weapons. Dealing with Kargil-type attacks or terrorist strikes requires building conventional and intelligence capabilities that can offer a range of response options.

The external diplomatic challenge of gaining acceptance as a responsible nuclear power has been achieved in great measure. The Vajpayee government was proactive in reaching out to key countries, particularly the U.S. since it had taken the lead in condemning the tests and calling for sanctions.

The dialogue between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh between 1998 and 2000 remains the most intense phase of bilateral engagement with 18 rounds of talks in 24 months. It remained inconclusive in not meeting either side’s stated objectives; yet, it was immensely productive in clearing the path towards the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and eventually the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement following the exceptional waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008 – another milestone that completes 15 years in 2023. The NSG waiver legitimised India’s civilian nuclear trade and has enabled over a dozen cooperation agreements to be concluded.

This has been possible because the post-1998 policy too has been marked by a similar continuity that characterised it in its early years. Today, changing geopolitics has revived rivalries among major nuclear powers even as the geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Navigating these challenges may need policy adjustments that will be strengthened by consensus and continuity.

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A Ground View of the Indian Space Policy 2023

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Published in the Hindu on May 11, 2023

On April 20 this year, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) released the Indian Space Policy 2023 that had been in the works for some years. The document has been received positively by industry; however, it needs to be followed up with suitable legislation, accompanied by clear rules and regulations. Just preceding this, this writer wrote the article, “Awaiting lift-off into the Second Space Age” (April 10, 2023), which said that India’s modest entry into the First Space Age followed by its many gains should be used to help the country tap the vast potential in the Second Space Age.

Until the early 1990s, India’s space industry and space economy was defined by ISRO. Private sector involvement was limited to building to ISRO designs and specifications. The Second Space Age began with the licensing of private TV channels, the explosive growth of the internet, mobile telephony, and the emergence of the smartphone. Today, while ISRO’s budget is approx. $1.6 billion, India’s space economy is over $9.6 billion. Broadband, OTT and 5G promise a double-digit annual growth in satellite-based services. It is estimated that with an enabling environment, the Indian space industry could grow by 2030 to $60 billion, directly creating more than 2 lakh jobs.

Yet, it is the enabling policy environment that has proved elusive. The first SATCOM policy was introduced in 1997. It contained guidelines for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the satellite industry that were subsequently further liberalised but never generated much enthusiasm. Today, more than half the transponders beaming TV signals into Indian homes are hosted on foreign satellites resulting in an annual outflow of over half a billion dollars.

A remote sensing data policy was introduced in 2001, which was amended in 2011; in 2016, it was replaced by a National Geospatial Policy that has been further liberalised in 2022. Yet, Indian users including the security and defence agencies spend nearly a billion dollars annually to procure earth observation data and imagery from foreign sources.

To streamline matters, a draft Space Activities Bill was brought out in 2017 and went through a long consultative process. It lapsed in 2019 with the outgoing Lok Sabha. The government was expected to introduce a new bill by 2021 but appears to have contented itself with the new policy statement.

What is different

To be fair, the Indian Space Policy 2023 is qualitatively different from previous efforts. It is a short 11-page document, which includes three pages devoted to definitions and abbreviations. The Vision is to “enable, encourage and develop a flourishing commercial presence in space” that suggests an acceptance that the private sector is a critical stakeholder in the entire value chain of the space economy. It makes five key points. It defines its role in India’s “socio-economic development and security, protection of environment and lives, pursuing peaceful exploration of outer space, stimulation of public awareness and scientific quest.”  

First, this is the only reference to ‘security’ in the document, making it clear that the focus is on civilian and peaceful applications. Considering that space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, communication, positioning, and navigation capabilities are increasingly seen as mission critical by the defence services, that India conducted a successful A-SAT (anti-satellite) direct ascent test in March 2019, and, in the same year set up the Defence Space Agency and the Defence Space Research Organisation, it is reasonable to infer that a defence-oriented space security policy will be a separate document. The United States puts out a space policy under the aegis of the White House Office of the Science and Technology Policy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Departments of Commerce and Transportation while the Department of Defence and the Director of National Intelligence are responsible for the space security strategy.

Second, the policy lays out a strategy and then spells out the roles of Department of Space, ISRO, Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) set up in 2020, and New Space India Ltd (NSIL), a public sector undertaking set up in 2019 under the Department of Space as the commercial arm of ISRO to replace the now defunct Antrix.

Third, it states that ISRO will “transition out of the existing practice of being present in the manufacturing of operational space systems. Hereafter, mature systems shall be transferred to industries for commercial exploitation. ISRO shall focus on R&D in advanced technology, proving newer systems and realisation of space objects for meeting national prerogatives.” Another of ISRO’s tasks in the new Policy is to “share technologies, products, processes and best practices with NGEs (non-government entities) and/or Government companies.” This implies that ISRO will now use its biggest asset, its qualified and talented manpower to concentrate on cutting edge R&D and long-term projects like Chandrayaan and Gaganyaan.

As ISRO’s commercial arms, NSIL will become the interface for interacting with the industry, undertake commercial negotiations and provide handholding support to ensure smooth and efficient transfer of technologies.

Private sector role

Fourth, the NGEs (this includes the private sector) are “allowed to undertake end-to-end activities in the space sector through establishment and operation of space objects, ground-based assets and related services, such as communication, remote sensing, navigation, etc”. Satellites could be self-owned, procured or leased; communication services could be over India or outside; and remote sensing data could be disseminated in India or abroad. NGEs can design and operate launch vehicles for space transportation and establish their own infrastructure. NGEs can now make filings with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and engage in commercial recovery of asteroid resources. In short, the entire gamut of space activities is now open to the private sector. Security agencies can task NGEs for procuring tailor made solutions to address specific requirements.

The activities of the NGEs will be in keeping with guidelines and regulation to be issued by IN-SPACe. It is expected to act as the single window agency for authorising space activities “by government entities and NGEs,” in keeping with safety, security, international obligations and overall national interests.

Finally, IN-SPACe is expected to create and “stable and predictable regulatory framework” that will ensure a level playing field for the NGEs. It will act as a promoter by setting up industry clusters and as the regulator, issue guidelines on liability issues.  

The gaps

The policy sets out an ambitious role for IN-SPACe but provides no timeframe for the necessary steps ahead. Neither is there an indicative timeline for ISRO’s transitioning out of its current practices nor is there a schedule for IN-SPACe to create the regulatory framework. The policy framework envisaged will need clear rules and regulations pertaining to FDI and licensing, government procurement to sustain the new space start-ups, liability in case of violations and an appellate framework for dispute settlement.

A regulatory body needs legislative authority. The Reserve Bank of India was set up by the 1934 RBI Act, SEBI by the 1992 SEBI Act, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) by the 1997 TRAI Act. IN-SPACe is expected to authorise space activities for all, both government and non-government entities. Currently, its position is ambiguous as it functions under the purview of the Department of Space. The Secretary (Space) is also Chairman of ISRO, the government entity to be regulated by IN-SPACe.

The Space Policy 2023 is a forward-looking document reflecting good intentions and a vision. But it is not enough. What is urgently needed is a timeframe to provide the necessary legal framework to translate this vision into reality, to successfully launch India into the Second Space Age. 

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