Category Archives: INDIA RELATIONS

Op Sindoor: Conventional Operations Under the Nuclear Shadow

Posted on by
Reply

For CSDR dt May 28, 20225

Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states after undertaking a series of tests, the India-Pakistan crises have followed a predictable pattern. The first escalatory step is invariably a terrorist attack by one of the numerous terrorist groups based in Pakistan; India’s outrage and political, diplomatic, economic and, (since 2016) measured kinetic retaliation against specific terrorist targets, signalling a possible closure to hostilities; Pakistan’s military retaliation that sets into motion a cycle of escalation, often accompanied by nuclear sabre rattling designed to energise the international community, leading finally to a de-escalation with both countries getting a face saving exit.

The terrorist attacks permit Pakistan a degree of deniability unless a perpetrator has been captured (as happened in the Mumbai 2008 attack) though the deniability claims carry little conviction, given Pakistan’s well documented long-standing policy of nurturing such jihadi outfits. India has been a slow learner in developing and acquiring the intelligence and kinetic means to be able to track and engage in precision targeting of terrorist groups inside Pakistan. Though subjected to major terrorist attacks, especially since the 1990s, the recourse to kinetic retaliation only began in 2016. After Pahalgam, Prime Minister has described it as an expansive “new normal.”

Developing kinetic retaliation capability

In 2001, following the attack on Indian parliament by five JeM terrorists, India mobilised its ground forces with the strike formations. The process lasted weeks, giving Pakistan adequate time to prepare its counter-mobilisation. Since the U.S. needed Pakistan’s military cooperation for its Op Enduring Freedom launched against the Taliban in October 2001, and the Pakistani military claimed that it was stretched on the India front, Pakistan was prevailed upon to provide assurances of “not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.” The exercise in coercive diplomacy helped provide a reprieve for seven years.

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks are often called India’s 9/11 moment. A group of 10 LeT militants targeted 12 locations in Mumbai. The carnage lasted four days and claimed 175 lives, including nine militants. Among the dead were 29 foreign nationals from 16 countries, including six from the U.S. The captured militant provided the details of Pakistan’s involvement. While this enabled international condemnation and diplomatic measures to penalise Pakistan, the absence of any kinetic retaliation drew unfavourable comparisons in certain domestic sections with the U.S and Israel. In Pakistan, it led to a growing conviction that its tactical nuclear weapons served as an effective deterrent against any conventional military action by India.

Kinetic retaliation, from Uri to Pahalgam

Realising that its military forces were a blunt instrument ill-equipped to undertake short, sharp punitive operations, India began to build up its capabilities slowly. The 2016 attack on a military camp in Uri by four JeM militants killed 19 soldiers and provided an opportunity to employ kinetic retaliation for the first time. A coordinated set of simultaneous cross-border operations were launched by special teams to neutralise more than half a dozen terrorist launch pads. The operation was successfully projected as a shift to a more punitive approach and these “surgical strikes” was the subject of a successful Bollywood film. Pakistan found a face-saver by denying that there had been any intrusions.

In 2019, a suicide attack on a paramilitary convoy, claimed by JeM, claimed forty lives. With general elections less than two months away, the Modi government had little choice. Days later, Indian authorities announced that the IAF had carried out an air strike on a JeM training camp at Balakot, 65 kms from the LoC, in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Once again, it was described as a limited operation against a terrorist location, based on real time intelligence, and therefore pre-emptive and defensive.

Pakistan denied that there was any camp, protested at its air space violation, and the following morning, five Pakistani aircraft entered Indian airspace. Indian fighters scrambled, and in the ensuing dogfight, an Indian pilot ejected, ending up in Pakistani custody. This created a fresh crisis, leading to U.S. involvement to ensure that the pilot was released quickly. The following morning, Pakistan PM Imran Khan announced that Pakistan had demonstrated its capability and resolve by retaliating against India’s intrusion and would return the Indian pilot as a humanitarian gesture, providing a face-saver to both sides.

According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials from both countries had been in touch with the U.S. officials, blaming the other for nuclear escalation and threatening retaliation, thereby leading to U.S. involvement. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also claimed to have intervened and counselled restraint.

The Pahalgam attack on April 22 claimed 26 civilian lives. Though a series of political and economic measures were announced including putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, it was evident that the scope of the kinetic retaliation had to be larger. Eventually, nine terrorist locations, including iconic locations such as the LeT and JeM headquarters in Punjab, were targeted using loitering munitions, stand-off air-to-surface missiles and smart bombs. It was emphasised that India had targeted terrorist locations and the operation was over unless Pakistan escalated matters. The next three nights saw an escalation with strikes and counter-strikes, with both sides using drones and standoff missiles though the aircraft remained in their respective airspaces. Once again, senior U.S. officials began to engage as the crisis sharpened and news about the ceasefire was made public by President Trump shortly before the official announcements on May 10.

Evidently, the Modi government’s policy for dealing with Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks has been evolving, in keeping with improving capabilities. The first Rafale aircraft landed in India in mid-2020, with some of the weapon systems following. The Harop drone fleet was expanded post-2019 and the indigenous Sky Striker drones were ordered in 2021, including with kamikaze versions. Therefore, compared to 2019 Balakot, Indian was better placed to ensure precision targeting and avoid collateral damage, especially in populated areas like Bahawalpur and Muridke.

The lessons from Pahalgam

In his address to the nation on May 12, PM Modi announced that Op Sindoor had redefined the fight against terror and established a “new normal.” This consisted of India’s right to respond militarily since any act of terror was an act of war; India would not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail;” and India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. Two new elements can be discerned in this – while claiming a right to military response is not new as it was exercised in 2016 and 2019 too, calling every terror attack an “act of war” expands the scope of the military action that has so far been limited to terrorist locations. Second, putting together the terrorists and the ISI, puts the military on notice but what form this would take is left uncertain. In 2016, 2019 and 2025, India has consistently emphasised that its kinetic action was “non-escalatory” as it was directed at known terrorist locations and not at a military site.

Even though Op Sindoor’s objectives had not been spelt out, it is clear that on May 7, Indian forces demonstrated their capability in identifying and destroying multiple terrorist camps and related infrastructure, across a distance of 800 kms, in a speedily executed, coordinated operation using precision strike weapons. In subsequent days, the operations grew gradually and by May 10, IAF had shown its ability to penetrate Pakistan’s air defence to inflict damage on nearly all Pakistan’s forward air bases and air defence installations. Yet, this did not emerge as the prevailing narrative.

On May 7, Pakistan claimed that five Indian aircraft had been downed, a claim denied by India. The narrative therefore became one of evaluation of Chinese technologies (J-10 and JF-17 aircraft and PL-15E missiles) versus French (Rafale aircraft) and Russian (SU-30 and Mig-29) aircraft. The Indian statement on May 11, “We are in a combat scenario and losses are part of combat…we achieved all our objectives and all our pilots are back home,” if made earlier, would have prevented the misleading commentary and maintained the primacy of the Indian narrative. The fact that the IAF operated under non-escalatory rules of engagement and did not neutralise Pakistani air defences in advance was a signal to assure Pakistan that our strike was only against terrorist targets. It would also have reinforced the impact of the punitive strikes on May 10, in face of repeated Pakistani escalatory provocations.

It is reasonable to assume that the terrorist infrastructure that has been degraded will be rebuilt, presumably also at more inaccessible or concealed locations. It is highly unlikely that the ISI will dismantle the LeT, JeM or the dozen other outfits that it has nurtured over decades. A recent Gallup Pakistan poll revealed that 96 percent of the Pakistanis believe that Pakistan has emerged victorious from the four-day limited conflict. The elevation of the COAS Gen Asim Munir to Field Marshal has been welcomed by the political parties, including the PTI.

The current ceasefire is fragile and could therefore breakdown along the predictable pattern that led to Pahalgam and earlier attacks. A full-scale war like 1971 is not feasible as it is an unaffordable exercise that yields no practical military objectives. Therefore, a key take away is to define narrower objectives that yield desirable outcomes and build capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, accordingly. A realistic objective will combine three elements – degrade terrorist capabilities as decisively as possible; inflict punitive measures, political, economic, and military; and demonstrate national unity and resolve.

Exploring the ‘new normal’

The conception of a ‘new normal’ poses three key questions –                                                             

  1. Does the expansive ‘new normal’ establish deterrence?                                 
  2. Second, if deterrence fails, and there is a terrorist attack, does the ‘new normal’ lead to more rapid escalation, and does it ensure superior escalation management?                                                    
  3. And finally, does it enable de-escalation without external involvement?

Deterrence normally implies ‘deterrence by denial’ coupled with ‘deterrence by punishment.’ ‘Denial’ implies strengthening intelligence capabilities to track infiltration, movement, and communications of terrorists, to plan and prevent such attacks. It also means better preparation to reduce response times unlike in the Pahalgam instance. If the number of casualties were less than five, if the perpetrators had been killed or captured, the attack, though heinous, would have registered on a lower scale. It would deny the adversary the sense of ‘satisfaction’ at having inflicted significant harm and loss.

In case of failure of deterrence-by-denial, punitive deterrence kicks in. The terrorist needs to be convinced that punishment will be certain and severe enough to make the terrorists refrain from the act, in the first place. India has so far declared that its kinetic retaliation was based on hard intelligence and pre-emptive; pre-emption against a terrorist attack has now gained acceptance as a legitimate act of self-defence. However, a terrorist is not always guided by a rational cost benefit analysis as the scourge of suicide attacks demonstrates. Nevertheless, since the terror attacks are often green lighted by the ISI, the certainty of severe punishment does strengthen deterrence.

In the past, the limited kinetic retaliation in 2016 and 2019 failed to establish deterrence. Therefore, deterrence capabilities for both ‘denial’ and ‘punishment’ will need to be strengthened by continuous investments in new technologies, particularly cyber and space, to monitor and penetrate terrorist groups and prevent attacks as also permit engagement without contact and inflict punishment at a distance, if the ‘new normal’ has to prevent future terrorist attacks.

India needs to plan afresh for managing escalation because if every terror attack is to be considered an act of war, and no distinction is to be made between terrorists and their masterminds and sponsors, the response to any future terrorist attack will be larger in scope, raising the prospects of more rapid escalation.

In the Balakot (2019) crisis, an Indian pilot being taken captive in Pakistani territory after his aircraft was shot down, was an unforeseen escalatory development. India demanded his immediate return to maintain the narrative of its successful strike; Pakistan wanted to capitalise on its air superiority. Neither India nor Pakistan could control the escalation, leading to external involvement.

In 2025, the U.S. initially adopted a relatively detached approach – initially condemning the terrorist attack and urging Pakistan to cooperate with India, and after May 7, urging both sides to work together to de-escalate tensions. By May 9, however, the U.S. position shifted and it adopted a more active role.

During the 88-hour crisis, India managed to retain control of escalation. In the initial round, the IAF refrained from targeting Pakistan air defences, a restraint that may have led to higher operational risks. Pakistan’s retaliation was against military targets and not against civilian targets. Even as artillery shelling intensified across the LoC, there was no large-scale mobilisation of ground forces or strike formations. These were signals that both sides were exploring thresholds but not crossing them.

By May 10, the temptation for India to exploit its advantage, having neutralised Pakistan’s forward based air defences was high and could have led to a notch up the escalation ladder. It would have increased Indian reluctance to let Pakistan get a face-saving exit. Finding an off-ramps or de-escalation between nuclear adversaries requires that both sides find a face saver, though backed by competing narratives. To establish superior escalation management, India has to internalise that at every step on the escalation ladder, it has to signal Pakistan towards a face-saver, as was done successfully in the early stages of the Pahalgam crisis. This requires better narrative management so that policy shapes sentiment rather than the other way around.

Finding an off ramps without external involvement creates a different challenge. There is a tacit acknowledgement that Pakistani establishment has been complicit in sponsoring and aiding terrorist attacks in India for decades and India is justified in kinetic retaliation. At the same time, given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapon-states, nuclear sabre rattling during rising tensions grabs international attention with de-escalation emerging as the priority. Since 1998, Pakistan has successfully exploited this opening as this also serves Pakistan by obfuscating the distinction between the perpetrator and the victim of the terrorist attack.

Successive U.S. presidents have played a role in defusing crises since 1998 – President Clinton during the 1999 Kargil crisis, President Bush following the 2001 parliament attack, Presidents Bush, and Obama in 2008-09 following the Mumbai attack, and President Trump in 2019 Balakot and the 2025 Pahalgam crisis. With the sole exception of President Trump, they were prudent in not offering to mediate between India and Pakistan; the current aberration is more a reflection of the disarray in the US administration and President Trump’s propensity for impulsive pronouncements.

During Pahalgam, no nuclear threats were exchanged between India and Pakistan. The only nuclear signalling, presumably directed to the international community was the announcement by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on May 9 that a meeting of the National Command Authority was to be held the following day though he backtracked later after the phone call with Secretary of State Rubio. This did not prevent President Trump from claiming on May 12, “We stopped a nuclear conflict. I think it could have been a bad nuclear war. Millions of people could have killed” and repeating the claim after couple of days.

The contrast between Indian and Pakistani reactions to President Trump’s claims is revealing. Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif has repeated thanked President Trump for his mediation and urged him continue mediation on other issues while the Indian Foreign Office spokesperson denied on May 13 that there was any US mediation or any nuclear escalation or signalling and the ceasefire was arrived at bilaterally; further, there was no scope for any mediation and no broader talks at a any neutral venue were planned. Therefore, unlike in 2019, there was neither any nuclear brinkmanship nor any strategic mobilisation.

The ’new normal’ is a shifting line and introduces a degree of ambiguity. The attempt is to see if it strengthens deterrence. So far, both sides have shown an interest in de-escalation. However, this requires a face saver for both sides. This means that each side creates its own narrative of “victory” and can sustain it. As the stronger power, India must calibrate how far it should discredit the Pakistan military to disincentivise it from sponsoring terrorist attacks while keeping it invested in de-escalation. This is necessary to ensure that conventional operations remain below the nuclear threshold despite brinkmanship.

Today, there is an absence of established crisis management mechanisms between India and Pakistan. During Pahalgam, the only channel of communication in operation was the DGMOs hotline. Past practice and experience indicate that in the military hierarchies on both side, there remains a degree of faith in an inbuilt culture of restraint. However, it is possible that a terrorist group may deliberately act to heighten confrontation to sabotage de-escalation, severely testing the culture of restraint. At such moments, until India and Pakistan invest in building crisis management mechanisms and additional communication channels, de-escalation will continue to be out-sourced to external parties.

*****

The New Normal after Pahalgam, India’s Response

Posted on by
Reply

Published in The Hindu on May 17, 2025

Operation Sindoor is on ‘pause’ and though the ceasefire began somewhat shakily on Saturday evening (May 10), it seems to be holding. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) – India and Pakistan – had a follow-up conversation and discussed further de-escalatory measures to reduce troop presence in the forward areas that had seen a buildup in recent weeks.

Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror…setting a new standard and a new normal in counter-terrorism measures.” Kinetic retaliation is not new. The Modi government conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the Uri attack, and an air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019 following the Pulwama suicide attack. Yet, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.  

88 hours to ceasefire

After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear that the Indian government would respond with force. The only question of when and in what manner. The measures announced in the days that followed such as reducing diplomatic presence, switching off trade, closing down the Wagah-Attari border crossing, cancelling existing visas, and putting the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, were a strong response but not a substitute for kinetic retaliation.

The intervening fortnight till May 7 was used in finalising targets for kinetic retaliation and ramping up diplomatic engagement at all levels. Post 2019, Indian authorities were certain that sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would compel a calibrated military response. This demanded planning and periodic updating, based on evolving technical capabilities. Eventually, nine targets were chosen out of nearly two dozen options.  The intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, in Delhi and other key capitals, prepared the ground to ensure an acceptance (though sometimes with caveats) of India’s right to target the terrorists and their infrastructure.  India’s challenge was to restore red lines while managing the escalation narrative and leaving a de-escalation option open.

Shortly after the May 7 early morning strike was concluded, the Pakistan DGMO Maj Gen Kashif Abdullah was informed of the nine locations targeted as these were closely associated with designated terrorist groups, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), JeM, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. India emphasised that Op Sindoor was against the terrorists and not the Pakistani military or the Pakistani people. It added that if the Pakistani forces responded, India would reserve the right to retaliate.

Pakistan acknowledged the strike (at six locations) and claimed that it had downed between five to six Indian aircraft, including some Rafale fighter jets, though this was denied by India. It offered an off-ramps de-escalation option – Pakistan claiming success in terms of taking down Indian aircraft, playing down the impact of Indian strikes, and taking the issue of violation of its territory to the United Nations Security Council where it is currently a non-permanent member.

However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to bolster its faltering image and vowed military retaliation. The following two nights, Pakistan mounted escalating drone intrusions, together with some loitering munitions and missile firings, over 36 locations along the 3,300 kilometre-long border, more with the intent to probe for gaps in India’s air defences. India retaliated, with its declared quid pro quo plus policy, targeting Pakistani air bases and air defence units. However, Pakistan denied its intrusions even as it blamed India for repeated violations and attacks. Its air space remained open for civilian air traffic, prompting an Indian warning on May 9 that this was jeopardising civilian air traffic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting on May 9 to approve the next tranche of the IMF Extended Fund Facility (loan to Pakistan) necessitated prudence.  

The night of 9-10 May witnessed a dramatic escalation. Pakistan claimed to have struck 26 Indian targets “to reestablish deterrence after repeated Indian attacks.” India acknowledged “limited damage to equipment and personnel at air force stations Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur, and Bhuj.” Indian response on the morning of May 10 was ferocious and targeted nine military airfields from Skardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahim Yar Khan and Jacobabad in the south as well as three forward air defence units. The stand-off weapons used included the Scalp and BrahMos missiles as well as Crystal Maze, Hammer and Spice 2000 precision guided munitions.

The previous 24 hours had seen intense diplomatic activity with a flurry of telephone calls between Washington, Islamabad, and Delhi. Following a conversation between the two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into effect at 1700 hours on May 10.

The U.S.’s role

Initially, the U.S. adopted a hands-off approach with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting on May 8 that the U.S. was not going to get involved “in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” However, within 24 hours, the U.S. assessment changed as it picked up signs of more cross-border strikes and reports that Pakistan was scheduling a meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA). While Mr. Vance spoke to PM Modi on the evening of May 9 (Indian time), sharing the U.S.’s concerns about a “dramatic escalation” and again the following day (Indian time), U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, following it up with calls to his counterparts India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif announced on May 10 that no meeting of the NCA had taken place.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s message on May 10 pre-empted the official announcement about the ceasefire raising questions about the U.S.’s role. The fact is that after 1998, the U.S. has played a role in de-escalating multiple crises: Kargil in 1999, the Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram in 2001, Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, the exception being the 2016 surgical strikes that Pakistan denied had happened. Yet, none of these instances have led to U.S. mediation and there is little reason to think otherwise this time. There are only two ways of avoiding external intervention – first, increase the economic and military differential with Pakistan, and second, have independent communication channels between the two countries.   

Conflict under the nuclear shadow

Since 1998 when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states, Pakistan’s approach has been to reduce the space for conventional war, by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use. The objective is to constrain India’s space for a kinetic response to a terrorist attack. However, this is no longer working.  If the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ made kinetic retaliation the new normal, Balakot enlarged it in 2019 by introducing air power, and Operation Sindoor has expanded it to cover all of Pakistan. So far, India has emphasised that it has been retaliating against terrorist targets – launch pads across the LoC in 2016, Balakot training camp in 2019, and the nine locations now (Operation Sindoor). However, Mr. Modi has added a new dimension.

In the expansive ‘new normal’ that he outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to respond militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, but added that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts Pakistani military on notice that the next time, India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist targets. The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go together; terror and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”

By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, Mr. Modi is seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang but this requires a significant expansion in conventional capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defences and adopt a network-centric-approach that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for surveillance, communication and targeting, will need to be introduced. Simultaneously, India needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led to Pahalgam, in order to better plan, predict and prevent future Pahalgams. Only then will the expansive ‘new normal’ be a credible deterrent against future terrorist attacks.

*****

R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended

Posted on by
Reply

I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/

Remembering Dr R Chidambaram

From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)

I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.

In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.

In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.  

Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.

At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.

Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.

Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.

The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.

At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.

It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.

How and Why D&ISA Division was Created in MEA

Posted on by
Reply

I write for India’s World Vol 1 Issue 1

How and Why D&ISA Division Was Created in MEA 

In early 1992, after five and a half years posted abroad, I returned to India with a growing realization of the shifting geopolitical equations, its impact on South Asia, and the challenges it would pose for Indian foreign policy that had been crafted during the Cold War years. These realisations were also shared by the Foreign Secretary and the political leadership, eventually leading to the birth of the Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.

A faraway view

My five and a half years were split between two postings: Geneva, where I served as First Secretary (Disarmament) at the Permanent Mission of India, and then Islamabad, where I was Counsellor (Political) at the High Commission of India.

Both postings provided a ringside view of changing geopolitics and its impact on South Asia.

In Geneva, the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention began to register progress as the Soviet delegation softened its position on on-site and challenge inspections. Mandatory and consultative verification was accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilaterally concluded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989 and in November, the Berlin Wall came down. In Vienna, talks began on for setting limits on conventional forces leading to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty the following year.

In 1990, tensions between India and Pakistan began to rise with growing incidents of violence and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The camps in Pakistan that had trained the mujahideen for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan were ready for new recruits. Following a crisis in summer of 1990, talks between the Foreign Secretaries were initiated to develop Confidence Building Measures, the first such talks since the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities, concluded in 1988. This led to the operationalising of the Hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) and another was set up between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Two significant conventional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) concluded in 1991 were the Agreement on Advance Notices on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres, and Troop Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts.

Coming home

By early 1992, I was back in Delhi and took charge as Director in the United Nations Division, responsible for dealing with Disarmament issues (UND). The work related to the UN in New York (General Assembly, Disarmament Commission), Geneva (negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other review conferences), and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). However, the world was changing rapidly, with new challenges and opportunities.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen states with Russia as the successor state. The bipolar world of the Cold War, came to an end. For the first time since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met at summit level (Prime Minister Narsimha Rao participated as India was a non-permanent member) to take stock of the global security environment and concluded, inter-alia, that proliferation posed a major threat to regional and global security.

On the margins of the UNSC meeting in New York, Prime Minister Rao and President George H W Bush held a bilateral meeting, concluded that the end of the Cold War provided India and the U.S. an opportunity to overcome their differences, agreeing to open a dialogue on strategic and nuclear issues that had been a source of friction since the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India.

 The dialogue commenced a few months later and continued through various ups and downs, culminating in the 123 Agreement permitting civilian nuclear cooperation in 2008.

Meanwhile restrictions on dual use items began to get tightened. In 1991, the Nuclear Suppliers Group convened after more than a decade and the following year, added Part 2 to their Guidelines covering nuclear-related-dual-use items and technologies that, in addition to having non-nuclear applications, could also contribute to the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) met to add to its Category 2 lists by adding more dual-use items and technologies, as also Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) above a certain threshold. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had concluded an agreement with a Russian entity Glavkosmos, for transfer of technology relating to cryogenic rocket engines. Despite the fact that cryogenic technology is for satellite launches and not for missiles, the U.S. sanctioned both ISRO and Glavkosmos, reflecting the focus on non-proliferation.

In 1992, India announced full diplomatic recognition to Israel with the opening of embassies in Delhi and Tel Aviv. Under the multi-track Arab-Israeli peace process underway, India became an extra-regional participant in the Arms Control and Regional Security track that worked on CBMs.

Within weeks of returning from Islamabad as Director (UND), I found that nearly three-fourths of my time was devoted not to UN related disarmament agendas but national and regional security and strategic dialogues as well as handling non-proliferation related sanctions and licensing issues for dual use items, especially relating to civilian nuclear and space programmes.

To take stock of the changes under way, an Eminent Persons Group was set with Prime Minister Rao’s approval in mid-1992, with serving and former heads of nuclear, space and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) departments.

Around this time, I put up a note to Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, explaining that the designation UND no longer described the changing nature of the work and proposed the establishment of a new division that would, in addition to the disarmament negotiations and the UN and IAEA related work, also deal with national security, non-proliferation and access to dual-use technology related issues. The proposal found acceptance and following some discussions, the new division was named Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA Division).

The nuclear dialogue with the U.S. was the first of many that followed. Discussing threat perceptions was a novel challenge for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and required much closer coordination with the Ministry of Defence. Soon, D&ISA Division had to get a Military Advisor and a Science Adviser deputed from the Services and DRDO respectively.

The evolution of an idea

Over the years, D&ISA Division also became the nodal division for handling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, a security dialogue platform, that India was invited to join as part of our “Look East” policy. As the global norm of non-proliferation gained greater traction, D&ISA division began to highlight the need for sensitising our private sector entities as some of them had been found exporting dual-use chemicals that led to adverse commentary in international media and US sanctions, even though these companies had not violated any Indian laws. An empowered group was established to develop lists of dual-use materials, equipments and technologies whose exports should be licensed only after due diligence and end-use assurances, laying the foundation for non-proliferation related export controls administered by the Ministry of Commerce.

India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and D&ISA Division became responsible for coordinating industry outreach with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers and with DRDO about winding down our chemical weapons programme.

The opening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva added the responsibility of developing the national negotiating position in close coordination with the Department of Atomic Energy. By 1995, it became clear that in order to keep India’s nuclear option viable, India could not rely on the 1974 PNE and needed to carry out a new series of nuclear tests. Withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations in 1996 followed by the nuclear tests in 1998 and working the negotiating strategy for India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power added to D&ISA Division’s work load. Together with the concerned territorial divisions, it handled the strategic dialogues with a number of countries including France, UK, Israel etc. that eventually led to the establishment of long-standing strategic partnerships.

An institution in itself

In late 2000, after nearly a nine-year stint, I left Delhi on a new assignment. India had established a new position of an Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and it was my privilege to set up the new office.

Over a quarter century later, it is gratifying to see that D&ISA Division has thrived as has the position of Ambassador for Disarmament. Many of my young colleagues who I had the privilege to work with, went on to serve in Geneva and Vienna, and head the D&ISA Division, (D B Venkatesh Verma, Suchitra Durai, G Dharmendra, Amandeep Singh Gill) with great distinction.

*****