Category Archives: INDIA RELATIONS

India in the South Asian Neighbourhood: Friendship or Friction?

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Published in Frontline dated January 26. 2024

The economic shock of COVID-19 in 2020-21 and subsequent escalating debt burdens, the ongoing Ukraine war now in its third year, and, in 2023, the eruption of the Gaza conflict, repeatedly jolted the economies of all countries in South Asia. The smaller and more vulnerable economies of all of India’s neighbours have been hit hard, leading to countrywide protests and, in some instances, even street violence in 2023. Maldives just had its election in September and in 2024, all South Asian countries (except Afghanistan and Nepal) are scheduled to go to the polls, adding a degree of political uncertainty to the mix.  

Of all the forthcoming elections, perhaps the Indian election is the most predictable. Most political pundits concur that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is headed for a historic third term though opinions differ on how many seats the BJP will win in the Lok Sabha and whether it will need coalition partners. In January, Bhutan is heading for a change of government; Sheikh Hasina is likely to stay put in Bangladesh though polarisation has risen significantly; Pakistan’s outcome in February is more uncertain given the role that the courts and the military may play; and in Sri Lanka, elections will only take place in September or later.

This churn in the region is occurring when there are fundamental structural shifts underway. Three relationships will be observed carefully by the neighbours: first, the US-China rivalry at the global level; second, the India-US emerging partnership; and finally, India-China relations that have not recovered since the nosedive it took in 2020 following Galwan. How these evolve and how India’s neighbours respond will influence India’s neighbourhood policies.

Legacy of British India

Historically, India has had difficult relations with its neighbours, in large part because of the legacy of the multiple partitions that it went through. Following three Anglo-Burmese wars over a span of nearly sixty years, from 1886 to 1937 Burma became a province of British India and thereafter a separate colony till its independence in 1948. The British East India Company’s conquest of Sri Lanka began during the last decade of the 18th century with the coastal areas and in 1802, it became a Crown colony, administered from Madras. Over the next two decades, the British gained control over the entire island introducing plantation crops like tea, coffee, and rubber for which large numbers of indentured Indian labour were brought in. Eventually, Sri Lanka became an independent country in 1948. The most traumatic partition was in 1947 that led to the creation of Pakistan in the name of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Even after East Pakistan seceded in 1971 to become Bangladesh, Pakistan remains the second largest country in the region and remains locked in a hostile relationship with India. Lasting hostility has in turn cast a shadow on any developments at a regional level.  

Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal were always independent and had a long tradition of trade relations and people-to-people exchanges with the neighbouring Indian states over the centuries. However, all three kingdoms had run-ins leading to wars with British India during the 18th and early 19th centuries. These conflicts ended with the establishment of boundaries between the three kingdoms and British India and in the process, the three relinquished sovereignty over their ‘defence and foreign affairs’ by accepting British ‘guidance’ through the appointment of plenipotentiary Political Agents, who in turn reported to the Viceroy in India.

This is the legacy that India inherited in 1947 as all the newly independent states struggled to consolidate their new found sovereignty.

Independent India’s challenges

As a buffer state between India and Afghanistan, Pakistan inherited the borderlands with Afghanistan and the problems of the Durand Line that divided the Pashtun homelands. The treatment of Hindu, Madhesi, and Tamil minorities with Pakistan (and post-1971 Bangladesh), Nepal, and Sri Lanka respectively, often became a domestic preoccupation for India. In the northeast, the restive tribes often sought to set up camps across the border in Myanmar as the Indian state sought to integrate these into the national mainstream, an unfinished exercise as recent developments in Manipur have shown. What this means is that India’s neighbourhood policies were, and remain, more intimately connected with our domestic policy than is often appreciated. On the flip side, societal and identity conflicts in India’s border states aroused interests in these countries that caused resentment in Delhi. Merely drawing lines on maps does not create sovereignties. British India was the paramount military power in the region and could enforce its will; a fragmented independent India, preoccupied with consolidating its own sovereignty over the 500 plus princely states and a war with Pakistan in 1947, has never enjoyed that unquestioned authority.  

The partitions also divided the economic space for a newly independent India. The creation of East Pakistan made India’s north-eastern states more distant and remote while the jute-based economy of the region was shattered. In the west, the sources of all the rivers flowing through Pakistan lie in India (and for the Kabul River, in Afghanistan) creating dependencies. India’s northern rivers basins of the Ganges and Yamuna are almost entirely fed by the rivers originating in the Nepal Himalayan ranges flowing southwards and then eastwards into the Bay of Bengal.

This legacy meant that Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood lacked both the economic and the military resources to deliver on its policy objectives that it inherited as the successor state to British India. As these countries struggled with their own sovereignty issues, their internal political squabbles often attracted Indian involvement. These involvements also left long term scars on the relationships. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 would not have happened without Indian political and material support and yet, less than five years after, there was a growing anti-India sentiment that was exploited by the military regimes that succeeded Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.

The struggle by the Tamils for their rights in Sri Lanka led to a violent insurgency, and the ill-advised deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka (from 1987-90 following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord) still rankles deeply. In Nepal, every political movement towards democracy has somehow involved India because it was the natural refuge for the asylum seekers, from King Tribhuvan in 1950 to the Nepali Congress leaders seeking democratic reform. None of the Maoists who waged a decade-long insurgency from the mid-1990s onwards ever sought refuge in China but took advantage of the open border with India. And yet, there remains an anti-India sentiment that surfaces repeatedly, stoked, and exploited by local politicians to demonstrate their nationalist credentials. Events like the 2015 economic squeeze by India (Nepalis call it a blockade) after Nepal adopted its new constitution leading to protests by the Madhesis in the Terai will remain a lasting pain point. Indian diplomats are often accused of arrogance and lacking empathy, earning them the unflattering sobriquet of a Viceroy or Pro-Consul.

The near-permanent hostility with Pakistan has meant that proposals for regional cooperation that are floated by India’s neighbours (SAARC was proposed by Bangladesh Gen Ziaur Rehman) often arouse Indian apprehensions. Even when India has overcome its reservations (especially under the Gujral Doctrine of “non-reciprocity”) and offered constructive proposals, these have often floundered, leaving India to come up with sub-regional initiatives. It is a good reminder of Tulsidas’s line from Ramcharitmanas when Lord Ram realises and declares: Bhay bin hoye nahin preet (there cannot be love/respect without a modicum of fear).

Modi’s India and ‘neighbourhood first’

On taking over as Prime Minister a decade ago, Modi declared a “neighbourhood first” foreign policy. He followed it up with his first two foreign visits to Bhutan and Nepal. These visits were successful but follow-up and economic delivery was lacking. Modi’s personalised diplomacy with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan and President Xi Jinping soon ran aground and since then, India’s neighbourhood policy has been episodic. The sole definitive action with respect to the neighbourhood from the Modi government has been the repeated postponements of the SAARC summit since 2016 after the Uri attack. However, the sub-regional initiatives like BIMSTEC (The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and BBIN The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative) promoted by India have been neither particularly noteworthy nor majorly successful.

One key reason is that India has not put forward a coherent policy for South Asia in any consistent fashion, preferring instead to deal with each neighbour bilaterally as this put India at an advantage. For the neighbours too, there were not many options. India was wary of any superpower presence in the region though Pakistan had joined SEATO and CENTO, two U.S. led military alliances. Development projects funded by India proceeded at the same leisurely pace as in India. The situation began to change with the growth of regionalisation, followed by globalisation. More significantly, China began to emerge as a global economic power and its footprint expanded, including in South Asia.

China had enjoyed close strategic ties with Pakistan since the 1960s but it also began to emerge as an economic investor. Now the other neighbours had a choice. A decade ago, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to fund strategic infrastructure like roads, railways, ports and power stations and transmission networks. Its deeper pockets and more efficient implementation made it an attractive partner. The economic presence was soon followed by political influence. During the Cold War, India had practised its own variant of the Monroe doctrine in the region but it becomes more difficult when its own neighbour that shared land borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar emerges as an economic superpower. Further, China did not have the complicated legacy of British India in the region and the intertwined minority ties with South Asia. This enables it to have a less emotive and a more transactional approach towards the region. In the last three years, there is a noticeable backlash against BRI in South Asia and elsewhere but Chinese presence in the region is now a reality.

During the last decade, Modi has been changing India’s image and how it is perceived. From kinetic retaliation for terrorist attacks originating from Pakistani territory to the alleged targeted assassinations of Khalistani terrorists on foreign soil, from doing away with Article 370 to an open espousal of majoritarianism and Hindutva, Modi wants to be the architect of transforming a soft, indecisive India into a more self-confident, assertive, and muscular Bharat. A third Modi term will sharpen and strengthen these trends. India’s neighbours are sensitive to the changes, as these are filtered through our neighbourhood policies.

Election season in 2024

The Maldives election last September brought in for President Mohamed Muizzu who had fought on an “India out” platform to distinguish him from his predecessor Ibrahim Solih, who had governed with an “India first” policy. Muizzu’s first announcement was to seek removal of the 70-odd Indian military personnel deployed there to maintain and operate two helicopters and a Dornier aircraft gifted by India. In December, he decided to pull out of the 2019 bilateral agreement for cooperation in hydrology, following it up by skipping the Colombo Security Conclave that includes India, Sri Lanka and Mauritius. Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in Maldives nearly two decades ago, every elected President’s first foreign visit has been to Delhi; Muizzu has already visited Turkey and Dubai and is now scheduled to visit China. Parliamentary elections due in 2024 might offer India some comfort, but it is too soon to predict.

Sheikh Hasina is poised to win a historic fourth term in Bangladesh in the elections scheduled on January 7. The main opposition party BNP is boycotting the polls and has mounted street protests. A harsh government crackdown has provoked criticism in the West. India has three key demands – protection of minorities’, no support to anti-India elements, and connectivity. Sheikh Hasina has been responsive, in varying degrees, on all three. At the same time, she has maintained close ties with China. As India-China rivalry sharpens, her challenge will be to avoid too close an embrace with either while not crossing India’s red lines.

The final round of Bhutan’s parliamentary elections is due on January 9 and the options will be between former PM Tshering Tobgay (2013-18) or former civil servant-turned-politician Dasho Pema Chewang. The question here is the progress in boundary talks with China that resumed last year after being frozen since the Doklam crisis. October also saw the first ever visit by the Bhutanese Foreign Minister to China. Meanwhile, Bhutan is also strengthening economic ties with India by planning a 1,000 sq km international city on the Assam border, connected by road and rail links. Gelephu is expected to be a green township with zero-emission industries. Bhutan’s opening to the world has so far been calibrated but there appears to a slight quickening of the pace to create economic opportunities for its youth who have been migrating out in recent years.

Pakistan has been grappling with multiple challenges that have forced it to turn inwards. Imran Khan remains behind bars and his party has seen many departures. Conventional wisdom indicates that Nawaz Sharif, who returned from exile with the blessings of the Army should get his fourth term. His earlier terms were cut short each time because of deteriorating relations with the Army. Has he mellowed and will the Army trust him are questions that will be clearer after the elections on February 8. Mr. Sharif will be keen to improve relations with India but the Modi government’s interest is limited to managing relations rather than moving towards resolution of historical issues.

Sri Lanka’s elections, in the last quarter of 2024, will take place in a polarised atmosphere. President Ranil Wickremesinghe, sworn in last year after President Gotabaya Rajapakse was forced to quit after a historic aragalaya (struggle) that galvanised the country, is his party’s sole MP and continues only with the support of the Rajapakse’s SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna). SLPP is adept at whipping up nationalist sentiment among the majority Sinhala middle class but the current preoccupation for the people is the economic challenges. Mr. Wickremesinghe is pushing for reforms and favours talks with minorities to bring about devolution that makes SLPP uncomfortable. The other two mainstream parties SJB (Samagi Jana Balawegaya) and SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) are mired in internal disarray.

Relations with the Taliban regime in Kabul are limited after India reopened its embassy in 2022, calling it a technical mission to coordinate Indian humanitarian assistance. The Afghan embassy in Delhi is shuttered and so far, India has not agreed to let Taliban post people to man it. Visas remain suspended. In Nepal, elections are due in 2027. The Maoist-UML coalition that took power in end-2022 proved short-lived. Within three months, Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) or the UML, had quit and Maoist Prime Minister Prachanda found a new coalition partner in the NC. Under the constitution, there cannot be a vote of confidence for the first two years and any political jockeying is likely to begin only towards end-2024.

Myanmar is caught up in its internal struggles after the military takeover in February 2021. The pushback this time has been much stronger in the past, possibly because even the limited political, economic, and social freedoms that had existed for a decade prior enabled the emergence of a middle class. The resistance this time cuts across ethnicities and in the north, has support from China. India has continued to work with the junta to promote its connectivity projects.

Regional elections are not the only source of uncertainty for South Block. On January 13, Taiwan elects a new president and another DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) victory will sharpen tensions with Beijing, impacting US-China relations. In Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will be struggling to win a third term in June and towards the year end, the UK will have a new Prime Minister. The US election on November 5 remains the most anticipated, especially if Donald Trump wins the Republican nomination. Election forecasters have their hands full in 2024, as do Indian diplomats.

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The Future Trajectory of India’s Oldest Partnership

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Published in Hindustan Times on July 21, 2023

Last week, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi witnessed the Bastille Day parade in Paris, where a contingent of Indian troops marched alongside their French counterparts to the strains of Sare jahan se achcha and the Indian Air Force (IAF) Rafales joined in the flypast, he had reason to look back with satisfaction at the 25-year-old India-France strategic partnership and feel confident about its future. The French connection has both deepened and broadened and reflects a reassuring stability in a world marked by increasing uncertainties and new rivalries.

Today, India has ‘strategic partnerships’ with over thirty countries but France was the first. As a country that prided itself on its ‘exceptionalism,’ France has been sympathetic to similar Indian claims based on its ancient civilisation. This is why both countries were quick to voice support for multi-polarity once the Cold War ended. French discomfort with United States (US)’s unipolar moment in the 1990s was evident when it described Washington DC as a ‘hyperpower’.

Defence cooperation had begun in the 1950s when India acquired the Ouragan aircraft and continued with the Mysteres, Jaguar (Anglo-French), Mirage 2000 as well as Alize and Alouette helicopters. Cooperation in the space sector has continued since the 1960s when the Centre National d’etudes Spatiales (CNES) helped ISRO set up the Sriharikota launch site, followed by liquid engine development and joint hosting of payloads. Today, it is a relationship of near equals and the two undertake joint missions. 

The Cold War imposed limitations on the partnership. However, when the Cold War ended, France decided that its preferred partner in the Indian Ocean region would be India. In January 1998, President Jacques Chirac declared that India’s exclusion from the global nuclear order was an anomaly that needed to be rectified. After the nuclear tests in May 1998 when India declared itself a nuclear weapon state, France was the first major power to open a dialogue with India and displayed a far greater understanding of India’s security compulsions compared to other countries. It was the first P-5 country to support India’s claim for a permanent seat in an expanded and reformed UN Security Council.

The original three pillars of the strategic partnership were nuclear, space and defence; gradually, others were added – counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, tackling radicalisation in plural societies, maritime cooperation, addressing climate change, renewables and green energy resources, urban planning and developing public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure.

If this expansive agenda reflects the broadening of the partnership, four key documents issued – Joint Communique, List of Outcomes, India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap, and the comprehensive Vision 2047, reflect the growing trust and deepening of the ties.

While the earlier defence purchases were straight acquisitions, the new focus has been on developing domestic capabilities. The agreement for six Scorpene submarines to be built at Mazagaon Docks Ltd was signed in 2005 with Naval Group (then DCNS). It was a 13-year project and suffered delays due to technology absorption hiccups and building domestic sourcing capacity. The first was commissioned in 2017 and the sixth will be commissioned early-2024. India has cleared the purchase of three more. The Vision Statement states that both sides “are ready to explore more ambitious projects to develop the Indian submarine fleet.” India has a target of deploying 6 nuclear-powered SSNs by 2030 and this is a potentially significant area for cooperation.

Similarly, the agreement for acquiring 36 Rafale aircraft concluded in 2016 carried a requirement of 50% offsets amounting to ₹ 28000 crores. A new agreement for 26 Rafale Marine for the aircraft carrier is under discussion with additional offsets. On the civilian side, Indigo and Air India have signed up for 750 Airbus aircraft and Airbus is expanding its network of Indian OEMs as well as considering establishing maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facilities. Both countries are developing a Roadmap for Defence Industrial Cooperation to strengthen the defence pillar.

In 2018, the two countries had agreed on a Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region that has now been extended to the Pacific with the new Indo-Pacific Roadmap in view of its growing salience. Unlike other European countries, France with its overseas territories of Reunion island, New Caledonia and French Polynesia, is a resident power in the region. The new Roadmap is broader and covers preservation of marine biodiversity, sustainable development of maritime resources, deploying renewables like solar in the region, helping small island states develop resilient infrastructure and establishing an Indo-French Health Campus. 

Bilateral economic ties people-to-people are two aspects of the relationship that have been lagging. With annual trade of $ 15 billion, France is our fifth largest trading partner in the EU. Though nearly 1000 French companies have a presence in India, French foreign direct investment (FDI) is estimated to be $10 billion. There is an opening though. In the past, Indian companies saw United Kingdom (UK) as the entry point to Europe; now with Brexit, France can position itself as India’s entry point for Europe and Francophonie. Opening an Indian consulate in Marseille and a French office in Hyderabad will help, together with more direct flights.

The most significant development at the people-to-people level is the growth in number of Indian students and their new-found ability to get two-year work visas after their education. The target of 10000 students a year by 2025 has been met and now for postgraduate students, the visa has also been extended to five years.

One of India’s oldest relationships must now train its eyes on the next 25 years.  

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More HIT than Miss in India-Nepal Ties

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Published in the Hindu on June 22, 2023

On his return to Kathmandu after concluding his four-day official visit to India, Nepal Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ described it as “successful.” He has reason to be satisfied. This is Prachanda’s third stint as Prime Minister and compared to his earlier official visits in 2008 and 2016, the visit in 2023 delivered many more concrete outcomes. More important, many of controversial issues were successfully skirted.

Prachanda’s politics

Under Prachanda’s leadership, the Maoist Centre had fought the elections last year in coalition with the Nepali Congress (NC). There was a falling out over claims to the post of the Prime Minister, and Prachanda switched sides to team up with K P Sharma Oli-led UML. Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister on December 26. However, the NC decided to support Prachanda in a vote of confidence, suggesting that since he had emerged as a consensus PM supported by 268 members in a 275-member House, he should also go for a national consensus apolitical President. Though Prachanda had earlier agreed to support UML candidates for the post of President (due for election in March) and Speaker (in return for making him Prime Minister), he began to backtrack.

Relations between Mr. Oli and Prachanda turned sour with Mr. Oli accusing Prachanda of ‘betrayal’ and Prachanda claiming that he wanted to ensure political stability by taking all parties along. The opportunistic Oli-Prachanda alliance collapsed and by end-February, UML withdrew support. In order to stay in power, Prachanda went back to NC, ready to support its candidate for President. On March 20, NC returned the favour by helping Prachanda win a freshvote of confidence, with UML sulking in the opposition. 

A complex power sharing arrangement has been worked out with Prachanda continuing as PM for two years, followed by Madhav Nepal (CPN-Unified Socialist) for a year and then NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba for the remaining two years. Nepal’s transition to a federal republic (it began in 2008 with the abolition of the monarchy and the election of a new Constituent Assembly) has been politically tumultuous, but largely peaceful. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, two rounds of elections have been held, in 2017 and last November. Hopefully, the current coalition has enough incentive to hold together, providing an opportunity to the government to focus on the economy.

During his pathbreaking visit to Nepal in August 2014, Prime Minister Modi had invoked ‘neighborhood first’ to denote a new beginning in relations. To highlight the focus on connectivity, he coined the acronym HIT, covering Highways, Infoways, and Transways. However, relations took a downturn in 2015 with the economic blockade. Repairing the relationship has been a slow process but results are now visible, leading PM Modi to recall and revive the old acronym. 

Hydropower cooperation

For years, there have been statements about cooperation in the hydropower sector but gradually, things are looking up. Nepal is endowed with an economically viable potential of 50000 MW of hydropower, but till a decade ago, had an installed capacity of barely 1200 MW, making it dependent on electricity imports from India. Today, Nepal has an installed capacity of 2200 MW and in season, can export power to India. A 400 KV transmission is now operational. In 2021, Nepal made a modest beginning by exporting 39 MW; the following year it went up to 452 MW earning Nepali Rupees 11 billion in export earnings. In the lean season, Nepal does import power from India but its dependence has dropped from 20% to 10% during the last five years.

Both sides have finalized a long-term power trade agreement targeting export of 10000 MW within a 10-year time frame. The 900 MW Arun III project started in 2018 by SJVN (formerly the Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam) will be operational later this year. In addition, it signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the 695 MW Arun IV project last year. The National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) signed two projects last year totaling 1200 MW. During the visit, announcements were made about SJVN signing the 669 MW Lower Arun and NHPC, the 480 MW Phukot-Karnali projects.

To keep pace, work has begun on a second high voltage transmission line between Butwal and Gorakhpur and two more are planned under a Line of Credit of $679 million. By agreeing to the Nepali demand for the facility to export electricity to Bangladesh using the Indian grid, India has highlighted the prospects for sub-regional cooperation.

To facilitate movement of goods and people, the Rupaidiha-Nepalgunj Integrated Check Post was inaugurated, work begun on the Sunauli-Bhairahwa ICP and an MOU signed for another at Dodhara Chandni. The Jayanagar-Kurtha railway line, inaugurated last year is planned to be extended while more links are to taken up. After the Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline was operationalized in 2019, work has begun to extend it to Chitwan and an MOU for a new pipeline between Jhapa and Siliguri signed including terminals and other infrastructure.

Negotiations on these projects have been time consuming; the challenge is to ensure timely implementation.

Avoiding irritants

The fact that both sides successfully avoided controversial issues and public disagreements went a long way in keeping the focus on economic ties and ensuring a successful visit. Of the three difficult issues, two are of recent origin and the third is a legacy issue.

The latest issue is the Agnipath scheme that impacts the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian Army’s Gurkha regiments, a practice that began in 1816 by the British Indian army. This was continued under a 1947 treaty based on ‘equal treatment’. The Agnipath revision of the terms needs to be discussed between the two armies and the concerned defence and finance officials. But a resolution is possible given the traditional ties between the two Services.

The second is the Kalapani boundary issue that was deliberately stoked as a nationalist cause by Mr. Oli in 2020 when his position as Prime Minister was under threat. He pushed through a constitutional amendment and unilaterally changed Nepal’s map. Resolving this will need time because a lasting solution will need political wisdom and understanding.

The legacy issue is the !950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In Nepal, a conviction has taken root that the Treaty is unfair to Nepal as it was imposed somehow. This ignores the reality that in 1949, the Nepali regime was perturbed by the Maoist revolution in China and the subsequent takeover of Tibet. It sought an understanding with India and the 1950 Treaty, in large measure, reflects the provisions of the 1923 Treaty between Nepal and British India. In fact, the Treaty enables Nepali nationals ‘equal treatment’ in terms of employment and permits them to apply for any government job, except for the Indian Foreign Service, Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service. Nepali nationals work in the Indian private and public sector, have joined the revenue services and in the Army, have risen to become two-star generals.

The demand to review the Treaty was officially raised first in 1995; in 1996, it was on the agenda of Foreign Secretary’s meeting. Subsequent summits have included a reference to ‘review and update’ it but no substantive talks have taken place. However, some of the cobwebs of history need to cleared so that discussions can take place in an objective manner that addresses the concerns of both countries.

For the present, as Mr. Modi and Prachanda have demonstrated, the focus on HIT will go a long way in rebuilding trust.

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Global Implications of Erdogan’s Historic Win

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Published in Hindustan Times on June 12, 2023

Last month, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won his second term in the most contested election in the last two decades, and cemented his place in Turkish history by becoming its longest-serving ruler. So far, that distinction belonged to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish republic and its first president from 1923 till his death in 1938.

The 2023 election took place against two negative developments. First, a weak economy, with inflation running at over 40% and a weakening lira that has depreciated by 80% since 2018. The second was the devastating earthquake in February this year that claimed 50000 lives and exposed that building codes had been violated with impunity by the contractors and builders because of widespread corruption.

For the first time, six Opposition parties came together determined to end to Erdogan’s autocratic rule. The emerging opposition front led by the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) evidently rattled Erdogan, and the government revived an old case against Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul.

After considerable political manoeuvrings, 74-year-old Kemal Kilicdaroglu, became the Opposition candidate. A soft-spoken former civil servant who entered politics in 1999, he made it clear that his goal was to transition Turkey to a parliamentary system and restore independence and integrity of institutions like the central bank and the judiciary.

In the run-up to the elections, opinion polls gave a slight edge to Kilicdaroglu. But in the first round on May 14, Erdogan led with 49.4% of the vote with Kilicdaroglu trailing at 45%. Since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) coalition retained its majority in parliament, Erdogan made it clear a Kilicdaroglu victory would only lead to political paralysis. In the run-off on May 28, Erdogan maintained his lead, obtaining 52.2% of the vote.

Even though Erdogan controls 90% of the print and audio-visual media, leaving the opposition to rely on social media, Kilicdaroglu was able to push Erdogan to a second round for the first time in the last twenty years. His votes came from the major urban areas, the developed coastal areas in the south and the west and the Kurdish areas in the east. His open acknowledgement that he is an Alevi and fighting on a liberal platform failed to make a dent in the rural majority Sunni heartland that remained Erdogan’s stronghold. The result is a polarised country with deep divides, on issues of Western influence and traditional culture, religion and secularism, values and identity, manifest in growing nationalism.

Erdogan’s nimble foreign policy during in recent years helped him establish an image as a nationalist. Even as he expanded Turkey’s influence in the areas that were once part of the Ottoman empire, he balanced concerns with his North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, with traditional rivals like Russia and Iran, while seeking a pole position in the Islamic world. It required brinkmanship but that appeals to the nationalist sentiment that cuts across the political spectrum.

Erdogan is closer to China and applied to join SCO but also criticised its treatment of Uighurs; is a member of NATO but bought the Russian S-400 missile defence system; seeks to improve ties with Russia but opposes it in the conflicts in Libya and Armenia-Azerbaijan; created an Organisation of Turkic States reflecting shades of neo-Ottomanism; maintains close ties with Qatar and after a downturn in ties with Saudi Arabia on the Adnan Khashoggi murder, successfully restored ties with the Arab world.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have bailed him out by providing $5 billion each to the central bank and Russia postponed a gas payment of $600 million to 2024 while agreeing to fund a $10 billion Akkuyu nuclear power plant.

Now that Syrian President Assad has beaten back resistance and is there to stay, Erdogan’s major diplomatic challenge is to reconcile with him. However, his real challenge is to stabilise the economy that has been rocked by his upside-down policies. To tackle inflation, he has been lowering interest rates and pumping in dollars to lower the Lira’s decline but reserves are trending into negative territory. He appears confident of Western support since he managed to broker the Black Sea grain export deal between Ukraine and Russia and curbed the flow of refugees into Europe.

Historically, relations with India have been low-key, with Turkey sympathetic to Pakistan on Kashmir, and countering UN Security Council expansion in the permanent category by proposing an expansion only of the non-permanent category. Despite the personal empathy between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Erdogan, borne out shared experiences of their struggle to get to the top, their recourse to nationalism and invoking a grand past, a deep religiosity and exceptional communication skills, given each leader’s current challenges, the bilateral relationship is likely to remain low-key.

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Nepal’s Coalition Politics, A Game Of Musical Chairs

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Published in the Hindu on March 4, 2023

Coalition politics in Nepal increasingly resembles the game of musical chairs; in Kathmandu too, it is the same cast of characters who have been taking turns for nearly two decades. The tragedy is that scant attention is paid to critical issues like rising unemployment, growing national indebtedness and development challenges.

A coalition collapses again

The last coalition government, formed in December, after the elections last November, has lasted just two months. It was stitched together by UML leader K. P. Sharma Oli with the idea of breaking away the Maoists by promising the prime-ministership to their leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’.

Mr. Prachanda had formed an alliance with Mr. Oli in 2018 that broke down in 2020 after a series of decisions by Mr. Oli (he was then PM) seeking to marginalise Prachanda and other senior leaders. Later, Prachanda and the Madhav Nepal led breakaway faction of UML, rechristened as the CPN (Unified-Socialist), joined with the Nepali Congress (NC) and formed an electoral alliance in 2022.

The Nepali Congress emerged as the largest party with 89 seats (the House strength is 275) and Maoists were a distant third with 32.  Power-sharing talks collapsed because Prachanda insisted on becoming Prime Minister first. Knowing Prachanda’s weakness, Mr. Oli made him an offer, he could not refuse. On December 26, Mr. Prachanda was sworn in as PM and in return, he assured support to UML for the posts of House Speaker and the President. Six other parties had joined the coalition. These included disparate groups like the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (14 seats) that espouses a pro-monarchy and pro-Hindutva agenda and the newly created Rashtriya Swatantra Party (20 seats) consisting of professionals who professed disenchantment with the rampant opportunism reflected in the traditional Nepali politics. However, both were tempted with offers of Deputy Prime Minister-ships and Prachanda’s cabinet had four deputy PMs, one each from Maoists, UML, RSP and RPP!

Within weeks, Prachanda started chafing as Mr. Oli reverted to his old autocratic ways of calling the shots from behind the scenes. Realising that with Oli nominees as President and Speaker, he could easily be manoeuvred out, Prachanda reached out to the NC. Anticipating this, NC had voted in support of Prachanda in the confidence vote on January 10, announcing that it had done so in the interests of national consensus governance that could provide stability.

Prachanda saw his opportunity to return the favour by espousing the idea of a national consensus presidency and promised support to the NC candidate Ram Chandra Poudel. UML called it a “betrayal” and pulled out of the coalition. However, other than the RPP, the other members of the Oli-led coalition declined to follow, announcing their support for Poudel’s candidature.

Presidential elections

The Election Commission has announced that presidential elections will be held on March 9, followed by elections for the Vice-President on March 17. Since the Code of Conduct will be in effect till March 19, no overt political activity is possible. Given that Mr. Prachanda is now heading a minority government with 16 vacant cabinet positions, power sharing talks will gain momentum though the final outcome will remain a matter of speculation.

Mr. Prachanda has till month end to seek a fresh vote of confidence. Once Mr. Poudel is elected, the NC is likely to throw its weight behind Prachanda. RSP, Janata Samajbadi Party (12 seats), Janmat Party (six seats) and the Nagrik Unmukti Party (three seats), earlier with the Oli coalition have switched their support to Poudel. In addition, NC coalition members Loktantrik Samajbadi Party (four seats), CPN (U-S) (10 seats) and Rashtriya Janamorcha (one seat) will also support Mr. Poudel.

UML has put up former speaker Subhas Nembang as its presidential candidate. The electoral college for these elections is made up of 275 members of the House of Representatives and the 59 members of the National Assembly together with the 550 members of the seven provincial assemblies, with votes being weighted. Given the current assurances of support, Mr. Poudel will win with nearly three-fourths of the electoral college. In the election for the Vice-President,  it appears that the JSP candidate will obtain the coalition backing. 

Prachanda’s real challenge will emerge the following week. Managing negotiations between the competing demands of NC and these seven parties will not be easy. This is his third stint as Prime Minister; his first time in 2008 was the only time he came to power on the basis of his electoral victory but his coalition collapsed in less than a year because he failed to make the transition from being Comrade Prachanda to an elected leader. Both the second and third times have been purely opportunistic gambles of teaming up with Oli and then getting burnt. After the second time, he even naively merged his party with the UML in 2018. Fortunately for him, the Supreme Court annulled the merger in 2021 giving him a political lifeline. However, he candidly admits to being easily tempted.

On the other hand, NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba, nearly 78 and a five-time PM, is convinced that he should be PM again. Hopefully, the events of the last two months should have a sobering influence on both because while Deuba’s intransigence led to the breakdown of talks in December, Prachanda should realise that his bromance with Oli will always be short lived.

The foreign hand

Since 2008, when Nepal declared a republic, the game of political musical chairs has been a regular phenomenon. In fifteen years, Nepal has had three NC Prime Ministers (G. P. Koirala, Sushil Koirala and Sher Bahadur Deuba twice), two Maoist Prime Ministers (Prachanda, now thrice, and Baburam Bhattarai), three UML Prime Ministers (Madhav Nepal, Jhala Nath Khanal and K. P. Oli twice), and a Chief Justice as caretaker PM in 2013. It is the resulting disenchantment of the electorate that spawned the emergence of new political forces in the 2022 elections.

Normally, it is during these rounds of musical chairs that Nepali politicians start wearing their ‘nationalist’ colours by looking for the convenient scapegoat of the ‘foreign hand.’ While India has often been blamed, China has played a visible hand in seeking to keep a united communist front but failed to find a compromise between Oli’s egoistical tendencies and Prachanda’s opportunistic impulses. 

In recent years, India has retrieved some of the lost ground by focusing on project implementation such as the Jayanagar-Bardibas railway and the Motihari-Amlekhgunj oil pipeline. Power export from Nepal has picked up: the agreement for 364 MW signed in June has yielded export earnings of $60 million in 2022 whilelooking at increasing power transmission on the 400 kV Muzaffarpur-Dhalkebar line to 800 MW. The 900 MW Arun 3 is expected to be operational later in 2023.  

Meanwhile, some of the high-profile infrastructure projects undertaken by China have generated concerns about their economic viability and resulting long term debt implications, a concern shared by other countries in South Asia and beyond.

A good ‘neighbourhood first’ policy for India is to focus on connectivity and development while letting the Nepali politicians continue with their game of ‘musical chairs.’

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