Category Archives: INDIA RELATIONS

A Flurry Of Diplomatic Activity On Afghanistan

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Article for Observer Research Foundation on 21st March, 2021

A flurry of diplomatic activity on Afghanistan has begun, catalysed by the approaching May deadline for the U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan under the agreement signed on 29 February last year by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha.

The problem is that a year later, the Doha agreement is in shambles. The intra-Afghan dialogue that was supposed to begin in March finally began in September and has not made progress. Taliban had committed to cut their ties with Al Qaeda but recent statements by Afghan and U.S. officials indicate that this has not happened. Meanwhile, violence levels in Afghanistan have risen sharply in recent months. A recent UN report indicated 3035 civilian deaths and 5785 injured during 2020 with Taliban held responsible for 45 percent of the casualties.

Biden’s options

President Biden’s options are limited. He can stick to the original withdrawal date but it is a foregone conclusion that the Kabul government will not be able to last very long and the country will descent into a civil war. The option of extending the stay unilaterally means that the Taliban may resume targeting U.S. troops, something they have refrained from since the Doha deal. A third option is to negotiate a short extension with the Taliban by offering them a share in governance in return for a reduction in violence.

Khalilzad has been asked to stay on to explore the third option and kickstart the intra-Afghan peace negotiations by suggesting that a Transition Government, including the Taliban, replace the current regime in Kabul, and the UN convene an international conference with key global and regional players, and the Afghan groups, a kind of Bonn 2, somewhat reminiscent of the Bonn conference convened in November 2001 where the post-Taliban political arrangements were concluded.

Diplomacy picks up

The rationale for the U.S. approach was spelt out in identical letters by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah. It expressed concern about the growing levels of violence and shared the bleak U.S. assessment that after a U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban were likely to make rapid territorial gains unless there was a serious attempt to restart and accelerate the peace process. The new peace plan was shared by Khalilzad with Afghan leaders and Taliban in early March in Kabul and Doha respectively. It contains a roadmap to an inclusive transition government, the terms for a significant reduction in violence leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and drafting a new constitutional framework. In the larger interest, President Ghani is expected to make the sacrifice and step down. UN has been requested to convene a Foreign Minister level conference inviting the Afghan groups, China, India, Iran, Russia and the U.S. to discuss a unified approach to a durable peace.

Turkey has conveyed willingness to host the UN convened conference, possibly in April, and also a March conference between Afghan government and leaders from Kabul and the Taliban to arrive at an agreement on the transition arrangements. UN Secretary general has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative. Arnault was in Kabul from 2002-06, first as Deputy and then as Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Those were the hopeful days, though by 2006, Taliban had announced their return with a spate of suicide attacks and IEDs.

Moscow added to the diplomatic activity by convening a conference of the ‘expanded troika’ – China, Pakistan, U.S. and Russia together with Afghan leaders and the Taliban on 18 March, with intra-Afghan talks continuing on 1the following two days. The highlight was a joint statement by the four Special Representatives – Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wang Yu, Sadiq Mohammed and host Zamir Kabulov on the first day declaring that they “do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate” system that the Taliban had introduced. The joint statement recognised that the Afghan people desired peace, called for reduction in violence from all sides, asked the Taliban not to launch the Spring offensive and reiterated their call for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan government has reacted positively emphasising the Islamic Republic is the only inclusive and acceptable structure that can ensure equality and pluralism and accommodates the diversity of Afghanistan and provides stability. Taliban have responded, saying that peace talks should be expedited and U.S. should stick to its withdrawal date.

A limited consensus

However, there is a growing momentum behind the call for Ghani’s departure. Within Afghanistan, many leaders like Karzai, Qanooni, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Sayyaf etc would be happy to see Ghani go. Among the international community, U.S. sees Ghani now as an obstacle to peace and Russia, Iran and Pakistan have always seen him as too pro-U.S. Ghani has responded by suggesting that he is ready to hold early elections (these are due in 2024) and hand over power to any elected government. However, the 2019 election saw an abysmal turnout of 20 percent and the current situation is no better. Moreover, Taliban are not inclined to go the electoral route.

However, the limited consensus breaks down thereafter and Bonn 2 is not like Bonn 1. There are fundamental differences and internal changes. At Bonn 1, the four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation with these four groups in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are fighting a bloody war. Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence.

The most important internal factor is Afghan demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30 years. This large cohort has come of age post-2002 and is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears and they are united in not accepting an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

India’s role

Since 2002, India has undertaken an extensive economic cooperation programme at a cost of $ 3 billion. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours. At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.

The Biden administration realises that it needs diplomacy to ensure a managed exit from Afghanistan. It needs Russia, Pakistan and Iran (as well as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) to lean on the Taliban to agree to a short U.S. extension; it needs Russia to lean on Ghani to make the sacrifice, and it needs the UN to come back and take over the peace process, thereby enlarging the number of stakeholders. Once the Taliban join a transitional government, they should wind up the Doha office and move to Kabul so that future Afghan talks will be Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled. 

However, whether this flurry of diplomatic activity can bring lasting peace to a country that has experimented with monarchy, a socialist republic, a communist rule, an Islamic Emirate and an Islamic Republic over the last 70 years, remains  difficult to predict.

*****

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/flurry-diplomatic-activity-afghanistan/

Pakistan: Where Fact and Fiction Come Together

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Published in the Hindustan Times on 21st November, 2020

Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani, who headed Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the early 1990s is no stranger to controversy. Two years ago, together with A S Dulat, chief of the Research and Analysis Wing in late 1990s, he co-authored The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and The Illusion of Peace. The slim volume based on their conversations on the Track II circuit (that he describes as a circus), covered India-Pakistan relations, Kashmir and cross-border terrorism, and got him into trouble in Pakistan. ISI hauled him over the coals, a court of enquiry suspended his pension and other retirement benefits and he was barred from leaving the country. He has since been pursuing lawsuits in local courts to get his entitlements restored.

He has authored a novel, Honour Among Spies (Harper Collins) that describes the travails of a Pakistani Lt Gen Osama Barakzai (Zirak branch of the Durrani tribe) who gets into trouble with his parent organisation (Guards) ostensibly for co-authoring a book with Indian spy ex-chief Randhir Singh. However, as he plays cat and mouse with his interrogators and engages in verbal duelling with colleagues from the Central Intelligence Agency and MI6, Osama finds other plausible reasons for his troubles, pointing the spotlight at the ‘establishment’ (a popular euphemism for the Army and ISI). Despite the disclaimer that “though inspired by some real events, this is a work of fiction”, such a book would be explosive at any time in Pakistan but appearing as the domestic political scene heats up for PM Imran Khan, Lt Gen Durrani may find that he has more than a bestseller on his hands.

Fiction
Osama Barakzai was appointed to head the Intelligence outfit in the Guards by the Chief Akram Moghul in 1990. Both came under a cloud in a case filed by Admiral Khan for using Yousaf Haseeb, a banker for channelling slush funds to Naveen Shaikh to dislodge the incumbent woman PM. Part of the money is unaccounted for and Barakzai points the finger at Moghul who feels vengeful. The case lingers on through Pakistan’s courts and the current tribal Chief Jabbar Jatt, shares a sub-tribal loyalty with Moghul. He had been appointed by Naveen Shaikh (in power from 2013-17) but since switched loyalties to Khurshid Kadri.

Another thread in Barakzai’s ruminations leads to the terrorist female mastermind, Uzma bint Laden who was living incognito in Jacobabad and killed in 2011 in a daring raid by the United States (US) Navy Seals. Barakzai who had long retired, and, after a couple of diplomatic assignments, is now active on the conference circuit and a sought-after commentator on TV channels, suggests on BBC about the possibility of complicity between the Guards and the US agency. The story passes as it absolves the Guards (under then Chief Raja Rasalu) of incompetence that they were unable to detect the incoming raid. The problem resurfaces as US investigative journalist Simon Hirsh follows through and uncovers a Pakistani mole Baqar Bhatti who had walked into the US embassy to inform them about the fugitive indicating collusion.

Adding to this mix is the tricky relationship with India with the Modi government’s assertive policy of ‘surgical strikes’ after Uri, the air strike at Balakot after the Pulwama attack and the conversations between Barakzai and Randhir Singh to keep alive the hopes of the ‘composite dialogue’ initiated by former Indian PM K L Gujjar and pursued by opening up of Sardarpur shrine.

Fact
Lt Gen Durrani was DG(MI) and Gen Mirza Aslam Beg appointed him DG(ISI) in 1990. Both were interrogated in the case filed in 1996 by late Air Marshal Asghar Khan, accusing the army of funding Nawaz Sharif in the 1990 elections against Benazir Bhutto through Younis Habib, CEO of Mehran Bank. General Beg and current chief General Qamar Bajwa both belong to 16 Baloch Regt.

Lt Gen Durrani has been critical of Gen Musharraf’s role in the Kargil war (described as the Pir Panjal pass fiasco where Gen Gulrez Shahrukh keeps PM Naveen Shaikh in the dark). In 2011, Lt Gen Durrani told BBC that Pakistani authorities probably knew about Osama bin Laden hiding in Abbottabad but would have preferred to be blamed for ‘incompetence’ rather than ‘complicity’. Seymour Hersh’s disclosures in 2015 confirmed this, pointing at Gen Ashfaq Kayani and identifying the Pakistani informant as Brig Usman Khalid, subsequently resettled in USA.

Enough parallels to whet any conspiracy theorist’s appetite.

A strange reality
Nawaz Sharif may have begun his political career with the blessings of the ‘establishment’ but differences grew after Kargil and Musharraf’s coup in 1999. After returning to power in 2013, Sharif pressed treason charges against Musharraf. The Army was unhappy; Panamagate took its toll and Sharif was ousted in 2017, jailed, and has been in exile for a year. He has mounted a no-holds barred attack on the ‘selected’ PM Imran Khan and the ‘selectors’, General Bajwa and the ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, holding them responsible for his ouster.

An Opposition front combining Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Bilawal Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) under Maryam Sharif, led by veteran Maulana Fazlur Rehman who was close to the Army but currently unhappy, has begun a series of protest rallies last month culminating in Islamabad next month. It is a re-run of the process that ousted Sharif in 2017 with Imran Khan and the Maulana in the lead, with the tacit backing of the ‘establishment’.

Last year, Gen Bajwa managed a three-year extension from an obliging Imran Khan, causing rumblings within the Army. Into this mix comes a thinly disguised novel calling out those manipulating democratic politics and hinting at internal differences within the ‘establishment’.

Only time will tell Barakzai will reappear in a sequel – Honour Restored.

The India-US Defence Partnership is Deepening

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Published in The Hindu on 30th October, 2020

The India-US defence partnership received a major boost earlier this week with the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and U.S. Defence Secretary Mark Esper for the third round of the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. The Joint Statement spells out the highlights but the optics are what define the visit. At a time when most ministerial engagements and even summits are taking place virtually, the significance of two senior US officials travelling to Delhi a week before US goes to the polls conveys an unambiguous political message – the defence partnership has come of age.

A long road
It has been a long process, with many ups and downs since the first modest steps were taken with the end of the Cold War three decades ago. The 199 Kicklighter proposals (Lt Gen Claude Kicklighter was the army commander at the US Pacific Command) suggested establishing contacts between the three Services to promote exchanges and explore areas of cooperation. An Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation was concluded in 1995 instituting a dialogue at the Defence Secretary level together with the setting up of a Technology Group.

The end of the Cold War had helped create this opening but the overhang of the nuclear issue continued to cast a shadow on the talks. There was little appreciation of each other’s threat perceptions and the differences came to a head when India undertook a series of nuclear tests in 1998. US responded angrily by imposing a whole slew of economic sanctions and leading the international condemnation campaign.

An intensive engagement followed with 18 rounds of talks between the then External Affairs Minister, the late Jaswant Singh, and then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott spanning two years that helped bring about a shift in perceptions. Sanctions were gradually lifted and in 2005, a 10-year Framework for Defence Relationship established, followed by a Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation in 2013. The Framework agreement was renewed in 2015 for another decade.

The Framework laid out an institutional mechanism for areas of cooperation including joint exercises, intelligence exchanges, joint training for multinational operations including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, technology transfer and sharing non-proliferation best practices. Initial movement was slow; it gathered momentum once the nuclear hurdle was overcome in 2008
with the India-US civil nuclear deal.

There were other factors at play too. Equally important was the progressive opening up of the Indian economy that was registering an impressive annual growth rate of over 7 percent. Bilateral trade in goods and services was $20 billion in 2000 and exceeded $140 billion in 2018. The four million-strong Indian diaspora has come of political age and its impact can be seen in the bipartisan composition of the India Caucus (in the House) and the Senate Friends of India group. From less than $400 million of defence acquisitions till 2005, US has since signed defence contracts of $18 billion.

A bipartisan consensus
A bipartisan consensus supporting the steady growth in India-US ties in both Delhi and Washington has been a critical supporting factor. The first baby steps in the form of the Kicklighter proposals came in 1991 from the Bush administration (Republican) when P V Narsimha Rao led a Congress coalition. Following the nuclear tests, a PM Atal Behari Vajpayee (BJP) welcomed President Bill Clinton (Democrat) to Delhi. The visit, taking place after 22 years – the previous one being U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s visit in 1978, marked a shift from “estranged democracies” to “natural allies”. A Congress coalition led by PM Manmohan Singh carried the process forward with a Republican Bush administration. Heavy political lifting was needed to concluding the historic nuclear deal in 2008, removing the biggest legacy obstacle.

The biggest push has come from PM Modi overcoming the “hesitations of history” and taking forward the relationship first with a Democratic Obama administration by announcing a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015, followed by elevating the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (launched in 2009 and the first round held in 2010) into the 2+2 dialogue in 2018 with the (Republican) Trump administration reflecting the ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’. Mr Modi is not constrained (at least on the strategic side) unlike Dr Singh during his second term who faced opposition within his party, had a Defence Minister who preferred to shy away from any decision, and often had to prod a reluctant bureaucracy.

The signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) providing for the sharing of geospatial data is the last of the foundational agreements. The first General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), relating to security of each other’s military information was signed in 2002. The Congress led UPA government signed the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) in 2009 but then dragged its feet on the others on the grounds that it would jeopardise India’s strategic autonomy. However, it was apparent that as military exercises with US expanded, both in scale and complexity and US military platforms were inducted, not signing these agreements was perceived as an obstacle to strengthening cooperation. Nearly 60 countries have signed BECA. In 2016, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) relating to exchange of logistics support had been concluded, followed by Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 permitting encryption standards of communication systems. More than a hundred countries have signed these agreements with US. Equivalent agreements on logistics and mutual security of military communication have also been signed with France but without the political fuss.

Breaking away from ‘labels’
Developing the habit of working together has been a long process of building mutual respect and trust while accepting differences. The US is used to dealing with allies (invariably junior partners in a US dominated alliance structure) and adversaries. India falls into neither category. Therefore, engaging as equal partners has been a learning experience for both India and the US.

Recognising this, US categorised India as “a major defence partner” in 2016, a position unique to India that was formalised in the National Defence Authorisation Act (2017) authorising the Secretaries of State and Defence to take necessary measures. It has helped that India also joined the export control regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement) and has practices consistent with the Nuclear Suppliers Group where its membership was blocked by China spuriously linking it to Pakistan. In 2018, India was placed in Category I of the Strategic Trade Authorisation, easing exports of sensitive technologies.

In every relationship, there is a push factor and a pull factor; an alignment of the two is called the convergence of interests. An idea matures when the timing is right. After all, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and US) was first mooted in 2007 but after one meeting, it petered out till its re-emergence now. Alongside the ministerial meeting in Tokyo earlier this month, India was invited for the first time to also attend the Five Eyes (a signals intelligence grouping set up in 1941 consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US) meeting.

The policy debate in India is often caught up in ‘labels’. When PM Nehru described non-alignment as the guiding principle of Indian foreign policy, it was designed to expand India’s diplomatic space. Yet in 1971 when the Cold War directly impinged on India’s national security, a non-aligned India balanced the threat by signing the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with USSR. However, during the 1970s and 80s, it was often hijacked by the Non-aligned Movement tying up policy in ideological knots. Such became the hold of the label that even after the Cold War, India defined strategic autonomy as Non-alignment 2.0! Indian strategic community needs to appreciate that policies cannot become prisoners of labels. Ultimately, the policy objective has to enhance India’s strategic space and capability. That is the real symbolism of the in-person meeting in Delhi.

A soldier, diplomat, politician, mentor

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Published in The Hindu on 29th of September, 2020

I first met Jaswant Singh in the days following India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. As the MEA official dealing with nuclear issues, I was to draft PM Vajpayee’s address to parliament due to open on 27 May while handling the flood of communications with our Embassies and outreach with Delhi-based Embassies and media.

Every few days, Vajpayee would convene a meeting to take stock of the international fallout and Jaswant Singh, then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, was a permanent invitee. As the draft speech and the nuclear policy paper went back and forth, Vajpayee’s trust and regard for him soon became evident. Jaswant Singh had spent under a decade in the army but clearly had studied and thought deeply about India’s security dilemmas and challenges. He also had a vision of 21 st -century India that Vajpayee shared. Hardly surprising, then, that the following month, he was entrusted with the responsibility of opening dialogue with the USA, a daunting task because the Clinton administration had come down heavily on India, taking the lead in the UN Security Council in drafting a highly critical resolution and imposing sanctions.

Bill Clinton had originally planned a visit to India in early 1998, postponed to late 1998 because of the elections that brought the Vajpayee government to power. The nuclear tests left the US administration stunned and embarrassed. Jaswant Singh was visiting New York for a UN meeting in early June; a message was conveyed to the White House that he would be available to come to
Washington for talks. While he was not Foreign Minister, he held cabinet rank as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was travelling, so it was appropriate that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (who would be acting Secretary) could engage the visitor.

And thus began the dialogue between India and the USA, an engagement that is best described as the most intense, the most inconclusive and yet, the most productive. After 16 meetings between June ’98 and September 2000 in seven cities, the tide turned with the highly successful Clinton visit in March 2000 and Vajpayee’s return visit in September when Clinton hosted his largest state dinner at the White House. From “estranged democracies”, India and the US became “natural partners for the 21st century”. I was privileged to be a part of the team and consider it a masterclass in diplomatic negotiations.

The US position was guided by progress on five benchmarks for India that were also part of the UN Security Council resolution – sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that had been concluded in 1996; join the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations being pushed in Geneva; accept a freeze on developing nuclear arsenal; tighten export controls on sensitive materials and technologies; and engage in dialogue to reduce tensions with Pakistan.

Jaswant Singh took Vajpayee’s speech and the nuclear policy paper tabled in parliament as his reference frame. He elaborated on India’s security concerns, elements of credible minimum deterrence as evidence of India’s restraint, adoption of a no-first-use use policy to ensure stability, voluntary declaration of a moratorium on further nuclear testing and India’s continuing commitment to responsible non-proliferation despite not being party to the NPT.

While both agreed that neither was looking for short cuts, Strobe emphasised compliance with the benchmarks while Jaswant focussed on securing better appreciation of India’s security compulsions that would compel any democratic government to do what India had.

Ramrod straight, beetle-browed, wearing his trademark army-style khaki bush shirt, Jaswant Singh’s most distinctive feature was his resonant baritone that he used equally skilfully, to make a short, decisive point and close a discussion or to spin long, complex sentences to stymie an inquisitive journalist or leave his interlocutor pondering.

Another hallmark was his recourse to homespun aphorisms. In the early days of his dialogue with Strobe, Jaswant cited an old saying, “There is merit in asking for directions only if we know the village we are going to”. As Strobe later acknowledged, “Jaswant’s strategy was more directional than destinational” and laid the grounds for the lifting of sanctions, introducing the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership leading to the 2008 civilian nuclear deal.

On another occasion in Manila in July 1998, we had our first meeting since the tests with the Chinese on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The meeting began frostily, with Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan blaming India for itsprovocative actions. He added, “There is an old Chinese saying – he who ties a knot must untie the knot”. Jaswant arched his eyebrows and said, “In my
village in Rajasthan, we too have a saying – it takes two hands to untie a knot”.

The meeting with Tang, scheduled to last for 20 minutes lasted an hour. Before the end of the year, I was in Beijing to lay the ground for a new security dialogue between the two countries.

Rest in peace, valiant soldier, for you did your country proud.

Another Afghan peace push and a role for India

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Published in The Hindu on 19th September, 2020

Last week, on 12 September the much awaited intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Afghan High Council for National Reconciliation opened in Doha, nineteen years after the 9/11 attacks on US homeland that stunned the world and marked the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, its local sponsors. The initiation of intra-Afghan talks was a key element in the US-Taliban peace deal signed in Doha on 29 February between US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader. Originally planned to begin on 10 March, the process had to overcome many hurdles along the way providing a small glimpse of the difficult road that lies ahead.

US-Taliban deal
The Trump administration soon realised that its 2017 policy of breaking the military stalemate by a small increase in US troops was not working and soon reverted to seeking a managed exit. As the former Defence Secretary General Mattis put it, “the US doesn’t lose wars, it loses interest”. Political optics demanded a re-labelling of the withdrawal.

Direct negotiations with the Taliban began two years ago with Ambassador Khalilzad’s appointment as Special Envoy. Actually, it became a three-way negotiation. The Doha track was with the Taliban, a second track was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi to cajole the Pakistan Army to lean on the Taliban to get them to the negotiating table and the third was with Kabul to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the Doha outcome.

Originally Ambassador Khalilzad had spelt out four objectives – an end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan dialogue for a lasting peace, Taliban cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, and US troop withdrawal. Within months, the Taliban had whittled these down to just the last one with some palliatives regarding the third. Instead of an Afghan led,
Afghan owned and Afghan controlled reconciliation, it had become a US led and Taliban controlled process with nobody claiming ownership or responsibility.

Time lines were fixed for the US drawdown by mid-June (followed by complete withdrawal by April 2021) and for removal of Taliban from the UN Security Council sanctions list by end-May. The Taliban have released 1000 members of Afghan security forces and the Afghan authorities have freed over 5000 Taliban from their custody. This process took longer than originally foreseen but has now been completed. The two elements that remained open ended in the US- Taliban deal are the ceasefire declaration and the intra-Afghan talks.

The uncertainties ahead
By end-June, US had reduced its troop presence to 8600 as promised and in early September, CENTCOM commander Gen Kenneth McKenzie indicated that by November the numbers would be down to 4500. Despite two brief 3 day truces in May and August for Eid al Fitr and Eid al Adha, the levels of violence showed no respite. Speaking the Doha at the opening session, Dr Abdullah
Abdullah, Chairman of the High Council regretted that more than 12000 Afghans had been killed and another 15000 injured since end-February. The number of attacks on government security forces and installations averaged over eighty a week.

A report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued in July covering the second quarter of 2020 assessed that “the Taliban has calibrated the use of violence to continue undermining the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces while keeping it at a level that encourages the US troops to leave”. The report expressed scepticism about whether the Taliban had cut ties with Al Qaeda and stated that “the Islamic State-Khorasan retains the ability to conduct mass casualty attacks”. A UN Sanctions Monitoring Team Report concerning IS and Al Qaeda also issued in July concluded that “Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent continues to operate
under the Taliban umbrella in Nimroz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces with 400-600 fighters in the country”.

Perhaps nothing reflects the challenges facing the intra-Afghan negotiations more starkly than the title of the US-Taliban Doha deal – “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA”. This awkward phrase is repeated more than a dozen times in the Agreement. The leader of the Haqqani Network Sirajuddin Haqqani who is also the second in command of the Taliban happens to be on the US wanted list with a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death. All this is difficult to reconcile with the notion that US considers the Taliban a partner in counter-terrorism operations against the IS and other terrorist groups.

In an op-ed in the Washington Post on 14 August, President Ashraf Ghani wrote that “the Afghan people want peace” and that is why the government “made the decision to take another risk for peace”. Calling on the Taliban to sit across from Afghan representatives to arrive at a political resolution, he added that “we acknowledge the Taliban as part of our reality” and urged that “the Taliban must, in turn, acknowledge the changed reality of today’s Afghanistan”.

The current reality is that 74 percent of Afghan population is below 30 and has lived, for most part, in a conservative but open society. However, the Taliban continue to maintain the Kabul administration as an imported Western structure for continued American occupation. Senior members of the Afghan government continue to be targeted including Vice President Amrullah Saleh who narrowly escaped an IED attack on his motorcade (9 September) even as 11 innocent Afghans lost their lives.

Evolving Indian position
Addressing the opening session of the Doha meeting, EAM Dr Jaishankar reiterated that the peace process must be “Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” but Indian policy has evolved from its earlier hands-off approach to the Taliban. Speaking to Indian media a few months ago on separate occasions, both Ambassador Khalilzad and Russian Special Envoy Ambassador Zamir Kabulov bluntly pointed out that if India had concerns regarding anti-India activities of terrorist groups, it must engage directly with the Taliban. In other words, if India wanted to be invited to the party, it must be prepared to get up and dance.

The reality is major powers have limited interests. For the US, the peace talks provide President Trump an exit opportunity weeks before his re-election bid. EU has made it clear that its financial contribution will depend on the security environment and the human rights record. China can always lean on Pakistan to preserve its security and connectivity interests. For Russia, blocking the drug supply and keeping its southern periphery secure from extremist influences is key. That is why no major power is taking ownership for the reconciliation talks but merely content with being facilitators.

A report issued last month by the Heart of Asia Society, a Kabul based think tank observes that “the prospect for peace in Afghanistan depends on regional consensus to support the peace process as much as it depends on actual progress in the intra-Afghan talks”. India’s vision of a sovereign, united, stable, plural and democratic Afghanistan is one that is shared by a large constituency in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic and provincial lines. A more active engagement will enable India to work with like minded forces in the region to ensure that the vacuum created by the US withdrawal does not lead to an unravelling of the gains registered during the last two decades.