Category Archives: ARTICLES

Stress Test For American Democracy

Posted on by
Reply

Published in The Hindu on 20th January, 2021

The oldest democracy has been subjected to its most severe stress test; it came to the brink, stared at the abyss and just managed to clear it. The U.S. may have survived the test but considerable damage has been done; defining pictures of 20000 National Guard troops deployed in and around the Capital and an outgoing President who has been impeached a second time in his term, a week before he relinquishes office, have hurt US self-image as also its global standing. It is a grim reminder that democracy, however deeply rooted, can’t be taken for granted and needs constant nurturing and protection to prevent its descent into populism and mobocracy.

A Polarising Election

The stress test began two months earlier when incumbent President Donald Trump refused to accept the election outcome, alleging that his victory had been stolen through fraudulent means. The 2020 election was the most polarising the U.S. has seen and what happened on 6 January was its reflection. The certification of the results by Congress will get Mr. Trump out of the White House but Trumpism will be a much tougher challenge to deal with. In an election that saw the highest turnout (nearly 67 percent) since 1900, if Joe Biden won over 81 million votes, Mr. Trump managed an impressive tally of 74 million. The county wise election map of the US reveals that Mr. Biden won in 509 counties that account for over 70 percent of US GDP, while Mr. Trump won in 2547 counties that provide the rest.

Even though media channels including Fox News had called the results by 5 November, Mr. Trump refused to make the traditional concession speech, insisting that the election had been rigged. Legal challenges were mounted by his supporters in many states. By end-November, the recounts had been completed and legal challenges disposed of. The election result remained unchanged. Attorney General William Barr, a known Trump supporter, announced on 1 December that the Justice Department had not uncovered any significant fraud that could have affected the results of the presidential election. On 14 December, the Electoral College met in each of the State capitals to formalise the Biden victory by casting 306 votes for Biden/Harris versus 232 for Trump/Pence.

The results were conveyed to the Congress for certification, but Mr. Trump had still not given up. He continued to urge Vice-President Pence, who was to chair the Congress session on 6 January, to use his authority to question the returns submitted from the swing states. Mr. Pence demurred, pointing out that he had no “unilateral authority” to overturn the electoral votes submitted.

Mr. Trump had been urging his supporters to stage a protest in Washington against the certification, sending out tweets, “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild”. On that day, addressing his protesters, he sent them to Capitol, urging, “If you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore”. Hours later, the mob had stormed Capitol, disrupting the proceedings. The dedicated Capitol police force proved inadequate and the National Guard was called in. Five people died. After a day that will be remembered as one of the darkest days in U.S. history, Congress certified Mr. Biden’s victory clearing the way for him to be sworn in the 46th President of USA on 20 January.

Yet, the shock at the events and Mr. Trump’s role in inciting his supporters led to growing demands for him to step down. Mr. Pence was reluctant to invoke the 25th Amendment (it was designed to deal with a president suffering incapacitation) leading to the House passing an impeachment motion on 13 January. The charges framed included “threatening the integrity of the democratic system, interfering with peaceful transition of power and imperilling a coequal branch of government”. While many Republicans did hold Trump responsible, they were reluctant on impeaching and finally, only 10 of them supported the motion that was carried by 232 votes against 197.

The fate of the impeachment motion is uncertain in the Senate. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell though privately supportive of impeachment, has not indicated how he would vote. Given the requirement of two-thirds majority for conviction and the Senate at fifty-fifty, it is difficult to gauge if there will be 17 Republican Senators needed. In 2019, Mr. Trump was impeached by the House over his dealings with Ukraine but cleared by the Senate. For the Democrats, the impeachment is as much about Mr. Trump as it is about indicting Trumpism. For the Republican Party however, it is a polarising moment. The question its leaders need to introspect over is why they allowed Mr. Trump to take over the GOP. A recent poll suggests that 64% of the Republican voters remain convinced that the election was stolen. GOP’s challenge is how to reject Trumpism while retaining the Trump supporters.

The brutal reality is that in 2016, Republicans held the House, the Senate and won the White House but in the last four years, they first lost the House and now have lost both the White House and their Senate majority. This is despite the record turnout and in the process, the country has been badly divided. Purging GOP of Trumpism will not be easy especially if Trump does plan to run again in 2024. That is why there is talk of invoking the 14th Amendment provisions by which a simple majority in the Congress can bar Mr. Trump from running for any federal office.

Populism and Social Media

Somewhat belatedly, Twitter and Facebook removed Trump’s accounts and along with a number of other right-leaning platforms linked to QAnon. Apple and Google stopped carrying the right-wing chat group Parler App while Amazon declined to host its data on its servers, effectively killing it. This has led to legitimate questions about free speech, the monopoly of social media platforms, the viability of their economic model and who should determine policy in the digital public domain. The European Union is accelerating consideration of new rules to guide content moderation policies of social media networks.

In How to Lose A Country (2019), Turkish writer Ece Temelkuren writes about how a democracy descends into populism, majoritarianism and finally authoritarianism. Opposition is delegitimised, the leader claims to represent the real people, who claim title to victimhood thereby aggressively claiming their dignity; and the elites become either irrelevant or, worse, instruments of oppression. Terms of political discourse shift, secular liberals become “sickular libtards”, facts are questioned and an alt-reality takes shape firing up the believers. This risk is not new but social media is a tool that aids such manipulation.

The U.S. is not the first democratic society to face this threat and even as Mr. Biden tackles the challenges of COVID-19 and economic recovery, his real challenge will be rebuilding the traditions of democratic discourse aimed at enlarging the centrist consensus. With Ms. Harris casting the tie-breaker in the Senate, Democrats control the Congress, though taking recourse to this thin majority will only exacerbate divisions and mutual recriminations. That is the legacy of Trumpism that must be undone if U.S. democracy has to successfully graduate from its stress test.

*****

Why The World Needs Nuclear Deterrence 3.0

Posted on by
Reply

Published in The Straits Times (Singapore) on 15th January, 2021

            When Trump leaves office and Biden takes over, humanity should breathe a huge sigh of relief. Trump is the only recent President to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. In August 2017, Trump warned North Korea, “They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen…” Even as President-elect, Trump had already put the nuclear option on the table. Responding to a question on whether he would rule out using nuclear weapons, in April 2016, he said, “Would there be a time when it could be used? Possibly. Possibly.” This is one reason why the Doomsday Clock, established in 1947 by a group of scientists who developed the first nuclear weapons but now wanted to convey the risk it posed to humanity, was calibrated in 2020 to 100 seconds to midnight, the closest to a global catastrophe that it has ever been. 

            Despite this stark warning from the Doomsday Clock, many nuclear strategic experts tell us that we should feel more secure. After all, the nuclear taboo has held since 1945 despite the Cold War. US-USSR/Russia arms control agreements have helped reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles from nearly 65,000 in late-1970s to less than 15,000. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that entered into force in 1970 for 25 years with about 50 states was extended indefinitely in 1995 and is the most widely accepted treaty, with 190 adherents.

            The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) may well be the most universal treaty but it has reached the limits of its success. The five nuclear-weapon-states party to it (USA, Russia, UK, France and China) blithely ignore their responsibility for nuclear disarmament, convinced that NPT legitimises their possession of nuclear weapons and the four non-NPT countries (Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea) have built weapons for their own security reasons. Indeed, in a direct violation of the spirit of the NPT, Trump said blithely to Bob Woodward, “I have built a nuclear – a weapons system that nobody’s ever had in this country before. We have stuff that you haven’t seen or heard about.” William Lambers, a nuclear weapons specialist, has observed that “while for over 60 years presidents in both parties worked to reduce nuclear weapons and the likelihood of their use, Trump has begun unravelling these efforts.”

Pacts in the past

Deterrence 1.0, which governed the US-Soviet Union nuclear rivalry during the Cold War, was characterised by arms control agreements and efforts to curb global proliferation. Deterrence 2.0 characterised the post-Cold War era of unipolarity, when the US largely determined the global nuclear agenda. The US strengthened its Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) system, which was intended to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. However, this had an unintended consequence as China and Russia embarking on their own – India and Pakistan, that never signed the NPT and North Korea, after announcing its withdrawal from it.

In the current changed political reality, old instruments of US-Soviet arms control and non-proliferation no longer work. Secondly, new developments in cyber and space technologies as well as hypersonic missiles and missile defence systems are challenging old deterrence equations. In Covid terminology, the challenge has mutated and old prescriptions do not help. Today’s politics is marked by growing major power rivalry, sharpening nuclear multipolarity. More usable weapons and blurring of the nuclear-conventional line creates a permissive scenario, raising the likelihood of the non-use taboo being breached. Old arms control agreements are under strain and some (such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Treaty on Open Skies) have collapsed.

Restoring nuclear sanity

The stage is set for Deterrence 3.0 except that this time, it is not a ‘known-unknown’ but an ‘unknown-unknown’.

Indications are that US President-elect Joe Biden is inclined towards the Russian proposal to extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). This treaty lapses on 5 February 2021. This will provide some breathing room. But, will this be enough to restore nuclear sanity? Traditional arms control and non-proliferation believers believe ‘Yes’ but the Doomsday Clock indicates otherwise. Bridging this gap is necessary and while it does not mean discarding old instruments or treaties, it does mean realising their limitations in today’s nuclear world.

This is why the world needs Deterrence 3.0.

Deterrence 3.0 has to create a new consensus for a multipolar nuclear world, a world not of nuclear parity but asymmetry in terms of both sizes and nature of arsenals. This asymmetry in turn exacerbates mistrust, where some countries believe that ambiguity and unpredictability strengthens their deterrence. Such need to preserve ambiguity makes cooperative verification difficult, especially when cyber and AI developments are heightening risks of an accidental nuclear collision.

The Biden administration therefore provides an opportunity to step back from the Trump Administration’s hyperbole of ‘fire and fury’. We should use this opportunity to create a platform where the nine nuclear-weapon-states can at least meet, have intensive discussion and agree that preventing the use of nuclear weapons is a shared responsibility. They should also exchange views on how to step back from escalatory postures; and share experiences on fail-safe, critical and secure communication channels to be employed in times of crisis. Deterrence 3.0 recognises that nuclear weapons cannot be wished away. What is critical is to reduce their salience in security doctrines and ensure that they are never used.

Two approaches

There are two complementary approaches, one doctrinal and the other technical. The first is the policy of no-first-use. In other words, nuclear weapons would be used only for retaliatory purposes. This diminishes the role of nuclear weapons.

The second is de-alerting or increasing the lead-time between the decision to use a nuclear weapon and the time that it takes to implement the nuclear strike. The issues of hair-trigger-alert (which enables nuclear weapons to be launched in minutes) and highly centralised control has been the subject of debate and discussion in the US in recent years.

             In Asia, where several nuclear weapons states are locked in decades-long conflicts, Deterrence 3.0 is crucial in ensuring that conflicts do not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. This includes China and India, as well as nuclear flashpoint regions such as South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In the India-China context, the nuclear dimension has never surfaced because both countries maintain a no-first-use policy. However, in South Asia, both India and Pakistan have experienced many close shaves: Kargil in 1999, the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament (2001) and in Mumbai (2008), and the latest incident in Pulwama, Kashmir, in 2019, leading to the crash of an Indian jet in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Given these close shaves, the world must once again focus on the dangers of an accidental nuclear exchange.

The goal of Deterrence 3.0 is to ensure that once again, the Doomsday Clock is recalibrated far away from midnight. We will all sleep better when that happens.   

******

Pakistan: Where Fact and Fiction Come Together

Posted on by
Reply

Published in the Hindustan Times on 21st November, 2020

Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani, who headed Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the early 1990s is no stranger to controversy. Two years ago, together with A S Dulat, chief of the Research and Analysis Wing in late 1990s, he co-authored The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and The Illusion of Peace. The slim volume based on their conversations on the Track II circuit (that he describes as a circus), covered India-Pakistan relations, Kashmir and cross-border terrorism, and got him into trouble in Pakistan. ISI hauled him over the coals, a court of enquiry suspended his pension and other retirement benefits and he was barred from leaving the country. He has since been pursuing lawsuits in local courts to get his entitlements restored.

He has authored a novel, Honour Among Spies (Harper Collins) that describes the travails of a Pakistani Lt Gen Osama Barakzai (Zirak branch of the Durrani tribe) who gets into trouble with his parent organisation (Guards) ostensibly for co-authoring a book with Indian spy ex-chief Randhir Singh. However, as he plays cat and mouse with his interrogators and engages in verbal duelling with colleagues from the Central Intelligence Agency and MI6, Osama finds other plausible reasons for his troubles, pointing the spotlight at the ‘establishment’ (a popular euphemism for the Army and ISI). Despite the disclaimer that “though inspired by some real events, this is a work of fiction”, such a book would be explosive at any time in Pakistan but appearing as the domestic political scene heats up for PM Imran Khan, Lt Gen Durrani may find that he has more than a bestseller on his hands.

Fiction
Osama Barakzai was appointed to head the Intelligence outfit in the Guards by the Chief Akram Moghul in 1990. Both came under a cloud in a case filed by Admiral Khan for using Yousaf Haseeb, a banker for channelling slush funds to Naveen Shaikh to dislodge the incumbent woman PM. Part of the money is unaccounted for and Barakzai points the finger at Moghul who feels vengeful. The case lingers on through Pakistan’s courts and the current tribal Chief Jabbar Jatt, shares a sub-tribal loyalty with Moghul. He had been appointed by Naveen Shaikh (in power from 2013-17) but since switched loyalties to Khurshid Kadri.

Another thread in Barakzai’s ruminations leads to the terrorist female mastermind, Uzma bint Laden who was living incognito in Jacobabad and killed in 2011 in a daring raid by the United States (US) Navy Seals. Barakzai who had long retired, and, after a couple of diplomatic assignments, is now active on the conference circuit and a sought-after commentator on TV channels, suggests on BBC about the possibility of complicity between the Guards and the US agency. The story passes as it absolves the Guards (under then Chief Raja Rasalu) of incompetence that they were unable to detect the incoming raid. The problem resurfaces as US investigative journalist Simon Hirsh follows through and uncovers a Pakistani mole Baqar Bhatti who had walked into the US embassy to inform them about the fugitive indicating collusion.

Adding to this mix is the tricky relationship with India with the Modi government’s assertive policy of ‘surgical strikes’ after Uri, the air strike at Balakot after the Pulwama attack and the conversations between Barakzai and Randhir Singh to keep alive the hopes of the ‘composite dialogue’ initiated by former Indian PM K L Gujjar and pursued by opening up of Sardarpur shrine.

Fact
Lt Gen Durrani was DG(MI) and Gen Mirza Aslam Beg appointed him DG(ISI) in 1990. Both were interrogated in the case filed in 1996 by late Air Marshal Asghar Khan, accusing the army of funding Nawaz Sharif in the 1990 elections against Benazir Bhutto through Younis Habib, CEO of Mehran Bank. General Beg and current chief General Qamar Bajwa both belong to 16 Baloch Regt.

Lt Gen Durrani has been critical of Gen Musharraf’s role in the Kargil war (described as the Pir Panjal pass fiasco where Gen Gulrez Shahrukh keeps PM Naveen Shaikh in the dark). In 2011, Lt Gen Durrani told BBC that Pakistani authorities probably knew about Osama bin Laden hiding in Abbottabad but would have preferred to be blamed for ‘incompetence’ rather than ‘complicity’. Seymour Hersh’s disclosures in 2015 confirmed this, pointing at Gen Ashfaq Kayani and identifying the Pakistani informant as Brig Usman Khalid, subsequently resettled in USA.

Enough parallels to whet any conspiracy theorist’s appetite.

A strange reality
Nawaz Sharif may have begun his political career with the blessings of the ‘establishment’ but differences grew after Kargil and Musharraf’s coup in 1999. After returning to power in 2013, Sharif pressed treason charges against Musharraf. The Army was unhappy; Panamagate took its toll and Sharif was ousted in 2017, jailed, and has been in exile for a year. He has mounted a no-holds barred attack on the ‘selected’ PM Imran Khan and the ‘selectors’, General Bajwa and the ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, holding them responsible for his ouster.

An Opposition front combining Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Bilawal Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) under Maryam Sharif, led by veteran Maulana Fazlur Rehman who was close to the Army but currently unhappy, has begun a series of protest rallies last month culminating in Islamabad next month. It is a re-run of the process that ousted Sharif in 2017 with Imran Khan and the Maulana in the lead, with the tacit backing of the ‘establishment’.

Last year, Gen Bajwa managed a three-year extension from an obliging Imran Khan, causing rumblings within the Army. Into this mix comes a thinly disguised novel calling out those manipulating democratic politics and hinting at internal differences within the ‘establishment’.

Only time will tell Barakzai will reappear in a sequel – Honour Restored.

The Challenge Ahead For Terror-Hit France

Posted on by
Reply

Published in the Hindustan Times on 1st November, 2020

France has faced its own share of terrorist attacks, including from among its own radicalised Muslims. The latest cycle, which has left the country in shock, began with the beheading of Samuel Paty, a school teacher on 16 October killed by an 18 year old Chechen refugee who was enraged because Paty had shown caricatures of Prophet Mohammed during his lecture on “free speech” to the students, after advising them that those offended could leave. This was followed by a fatal stabbing of three, in a church in Nice by a 21 year old recently arrived Tunisian migrant on 29 October.

Global reactions
President Emmanuel Macron’s statement at Paty’s memorial service describing him as a symbol of “freedom and reason” and vowing that French freedom of expression means that “we will not give up our cartoons” has provoked angry reactions from Muslims in other countries, fuelled by incendiary responses from Turkish President Erdogan, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and Malaysian leader Mahathir bin Mohamed.

Erdogan said that “Macron needs a mental health check” followed by calling for a boycott of French goods leading France to recall its ambassador in protest. Behind his animus are growing differences on Turkish military interventions in Libya, in eastern Mediterranean against Greece and in supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia.

If France sees itself as the torchbearer for democratic, liberal and secular values, Turkey under Erdogan (who has been in power since 2003 and ensured his continuation till 2028 through constitutional manipulations) has reversed the Ataturk reforms of the 1930s to reclaim its Islamic identity and role in a neo-Ottoman avatar.

Imran Khan, facing domestic political unrest, issued a series to tweets blaming Macron for “encouraging Islamophobia” and “hurting the sentiments and provoking millions of Muslims”. Parliament passed resolutions seeking recall of its ambassador from Paris before realising that there was none as the new appointee hadn’t joined.

Mahathir Mohamed’s tweet that Muslims have the right “to kill millions of French people for the massacres of the past” was taken down by Twitter for being offensive. Ironically, none of them has uttered a word about incarceration of a million Uighur Muslims by China.

Other European countries demonstrated solidarity. Germany, UK, Italy and the Netherlands issued strong statements of support and condemned terrorist acts. In Delhi, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement “deploring the personal attacks” on Macron while condemning the “brutal terrorist attack” on Paty. In a subsequent tweet, PM Modi condemned the terrorist act conveying solidarity with France, even as Foreign Secretary Shringla was in Paris yesterday for talks where the radicalisation of Muslim communities would have been discussed.

Macron’s challenge
Secularism or laicite, separating ‘religion’ and ‘state’ was legalised in France in 1905. A 2004 law prohibits the ostentatious display of “conspicuous religious symbols” in public institutions. While it alienated sections of Muslims by prohibiting the ‘hijab’, it applied equally to Catholics wearing a large cross or Jews wearing the yarmulke (skull-cap). Faith was restricted to the privacy of the home in order to promote civic nationalism, in keeping with the sense of French exceptionalism.

France is home to 6 million Muslims, the largest concentration in Europe. It has been aware of growing radicalisation in certain sections of the community. Earlier this month, in a long-awaited speech on 2 October, Macron cautioned about the risks of ‘Islamic separatism’ leading to a ‘counter-society’ and said that new legislation would be introduced to prevent it. This would include measures to improve prospects for socio-economic mobility as well as tighter controls on financing and instruction in mosques and madrassahs as well as monitoring cultural and sports organisations. The suggestion that Islam was ‘in crisis’ and needed its own ‘enlightenment’ elicited a mixed response within France but little comment outside.

The challenge for France is not easy. The idea that education, hard work and following French laws and customs led to upward mobility has been challenged in recent years and Covid-19 has only highlighted it. A recent opinion poll among Muslims in France revealed that while an encouraging 60 percent believed that ‘freedom of expression’ should include satire, the same poll also indicated that over 75 percent were unwilling to include caricatures of Prophet Muhammed as acceptable satire. This is the gap that Marine Le Pen, Macron’s most likely opponent in the 2022 election, will exploit with her populist, nationalist and anti-EU platform. This is also the gap that Macron needs to bridge with his proposed legislative initiative.

The India-US Defence Partnership is Deepening

Posted on by
Reply

Published in The Hindu on 30th October, 2020

The India-US defence partnership received a major boost earlier this week with the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and U.S. Defence Secretary Mark Esper for the third round of the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. The Joint Statement spells out the highlights but the optics are what define the visit. At a time when most ministerial engagements and even summits are taking place virtually, the significance of two senior US officials travelling to Delhi a week before US goes to the polls conveys an unambiguous political message – the defence partnership has come of age.

A long road
It has been a long process, with many ups and downs since the first modest steps were taken with the end of the Cold War three decades ago. The 199 Kicklighter proposals (Lt Gen Claude Kicklighter was the army commander at the US Pacific Command) suggested establishing contacts between the three Services to promote exchanges and explore areas of cooperation. An Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation was concluded in 1995 instituting a dialogue at the Defence Secretary level together with the setting up of a Technology Group.

The end of the Cold War had helped create this opening but the overhang of the nuclear issue continued to cast a shadow on the talks. There was little appreciation of each other’s threat perceptions and the differences came to a head when India undertook a series of nuclear tests in 1998. US responded angrily by imposing a whole slew of economic sanctions and leading the international condemnation campaign.

An intensive engagement followed with 18 rounds of talks between the then External Affairs Minister, the late Jaswant Singh, and then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott spanning two years that helped bring about a shift in perceptions. Sanctions were gradually lifted and in 2005, a 10-year Framework for Defence Relationship established, followed by a Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation in 2013. The Framework agreement was renewed in 2015 for another decade.

The Framework laid out an institutional mechanism for areas of cooperation including joint exercises, intelligence exchanges, joint training for multinational operations including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, technology transfer and sharing non-proliferation best practices. Initial movement was slow; it gathered momentum once the nuclear hurdle was overcome in 2008
with the India-US civil nuclear deal.

There were other factors at play too. Equally important was the progressive opening up of the Indian economy that was registering an impressive annual growth rate of over 7 percent. Bilateral trade in goods and services was $20 billion in 2000 and exceeded $140 billion in 2018. The four million-strong Indian diaspora has come of political age and its impact can be seen in the bipartisan composition of the India Caucus (in the House) and the Senate Friends of India group. From less than $400 million of defence acquisitions till 2005, US has since signed defence contracts of $18 billion.

A bipartisan consensus
A bipartisan consensus supporting the steady growth in India-US ties in both Delhi and Washington has been a critical supporting factor. The first baby steps in the form of the Kicklighter proposals came in 1991 from the Bush administration (Republican) when P V Narsimha Rao led a Congress coalition. Following the nuclear tests, a PM Atal Behari Vajpayee (BJP) welcomed President Bill Clinton (Democrat) to Delhi. The visit, taking place after 22 years – the previous one being U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s visit in 1978, marked a shift from “estranged democracies” to “natural allies”. A Congress coalition led by PM Manmohan Singh carried the process forward with a Republican Bush administration. Heavy political lifting was needed to concluding the historic nuclear deal in 2008, removing the biggest legacy obstacle.

The biggest push has come from PM Modi overcoming the “hesitations of history” and taking forward the relationship first with a Democratic Obama administration by announcing a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015, followed by elevating the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (launched in 2009 and the first round held in 2010) into the 2+2 dialogue in 2018 with the (Republican) Trump administration reflecting the ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’. Mr Modi is not constrained (at least on the strategic side) unlike Dr Singh during his second term who faced opposition within his party, had a Defence Minister who preferred to shy away from any decision, and often had to prod a reluctant bureaucracy.

The signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) providing for the sharing of geospatial data is the last of the foundational agreements. The first General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), relating to security of each other’s military information was signed in 2002. The Congress led UPA government signed the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) in 2009 but then dragged its feet on the others on the grounds that it would jeopardise India’s strategic autonomy. However, it was apparent that as military exercises with US expanded, both in scale and complexity and US military platforms were inducted, not signing these agreements was perceived as an obstacle to strengthening cooperation. Nearly 60 countries have signed BECA. In 2016, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) relating to exchange of logistics support had been concluded, followed by Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 permitting encryption standards of communication systems. More than a hundred countries have signed these agreements with US. Equivalent agreements on logistics and mutual security of military communication have also been signed with France but without the political fuss.

Breaking away from ‘labels’
Developing the habit of working together has been a long process of building mutual respect and trust while accepting differences. The US is used to dealing with allies (invariably junior partners in a US dominated alliance structure) and adversaries. India falls into neither category. Therefore, engaging as equal partners has been a learning experience for both India and the US.

Recognising this, US categorised India as “a major defence partner” in 2016, a position unique to India that was formalised in the National Defence Authorisation Act (2017) authorising the Secretaries of State and Defence to take necessary measures. It has helped that India also joined the export control regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement) and has practices consistent with the Nuclear Suppliers Group where its membership was blocked by China spuriously linking it to Pakistan. In 2018, India was placed in Category I of the Strategic Trade Authorisation, easing exports of sensitive technologies.

In every relationship, there is a push factor and a pull factor; an alignment of the two is called the convergence of interests. An idea matures when the timing is right. After all, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and US) was first mooted in 2007 but after one meeting, it petered out till its re-emergence now. Alongside the ministerial meeting in Tokyo earlier this month, India was invited for the first time to also attend the Five Eyes (a signals intelligence grouping set up in 1941 consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US) meeting.

The policy debate in India is often caught up in ‘labels’. When PM Nehru described non-alignment as the guiding principle of Indian foreign policy, it was designed to expand India’s diplomatic space. Yet in 1971 when the Cold War directly impinged on India’s national security, a non-aligned India balanced the threat by signing the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with USSR. However, during the 1970s and 80s, it was often hijacked by the Non-aligned Movement tying up policy in ideological knots. Such became the hold of the label that even after the Cold War, India defined strategic autonomy as Non-alignment 2.0! Indian strategic community needs to appreciate that policies cannot become prisoners of labels. Ultimately, the policy objective has to enhance India’s strategic space and capability. That is the real symbolism of the in-person meeting in Delhi.