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The India-US Defence Partnership is Deepening

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Published in The Hindu on 30th October, 2020

The India-US defence partnership received a major boost earlier this week with the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and U.S. Defence Secretary Mark Esper for the third round of the 2+2 Dialogue with their Indian counterparts, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. The Joint Statement spells out the highlights but the optics are what define the visit. At a time when most ministerial engagements and even summits are taking place virtually, the significance of two senior US officials travelling to Delhi a week before US goes to the polls conveys an unambiguous political message – the defence partnership has come of age.

A long road
It has been a long process, with many ups and downs since the first modest steps were taken with the end of the Cold War three decades ago. The 199 Kicklighter proposals (Lt Gen Claude Kicklighter was the army commander at the US Pacific Command) suggested establishing contacts between the three Services to promote exchanges and explore areas of cooperation. An Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation was concluded in 1995 instituting a dialogue at the Defence Secretary level together with the setting up of a Technology Group.

The end of the Cold War had helped create this opening but the overhang of the nuclear issue continued to cast a shadow on the talks. There was little appreciation of each other’s threat perceptions and the differences came to a head when India undertook a series of nuclear tests in 1998. US responded angrily by imposing a whole slew of economic sanctions and leading the international condemnation campaign.

An intensive engagement followed with 18 rounds of talks between the then External Affairs Minister, the late Jaswant Singh, and then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott spanning two years that helped bring about a shift in perceptions. Sanctions were gradually lifted and in 2005, a 10-year Framework for Defence Relationship established, followed by a Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation in 2013. The Framework agreement was renewed in 2015 for another decade.

The Framework laid out an institutional mechanism for areas of cooperation including joint exercises, intelligence exchanges, joint training for multinational operations including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, technology transfer and sharing non-proliferation best practices. Initial movement was slow; it gathered momentum once the nuclear hurdle was overcome in 2008
with the India-US civil nuclear deal.

There were other factors at play too. Equally important was the progressive opening up of the Indian economy that was registering an impressive annual growth rate of over 7 percent. Bilateral trade in goods and services was $20 billion in 2000 and exceeded $140 billion in 2018. The four million-strong Indian diaspora has come of political age and its impact can be seen in the bipartisan composition of the India Caucus (in the House) and the Senate Friends of India group. From less than $400 million of defence acquisitions till 2005, US has since signed defence contracts of $18 billion.

A bipartisan consensus
A bipartisan consensus supporting the steady growth in India-US ties in both Delhi and Washington has been a critical supporting factor. The first baby steps in the form of the Kicklighter proposals came in 1991 from the Bush administration (Republican) when P V Narsimha Rao led a Congress coalition. Following the nuclear tests, a PM Atal Behari Vajpayee (BJP) welcomed President Bill Clinton (Democrat) to Delhi. The visit, taking place after 22 years – the previous one being U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s visit in 1978, marked a shift from “estranged democracies” to “natural allies”. A Congress coalition led by PM Manmohan Singh carried the process forward with a Republican Bush administration. Heavy political lifting was needed to concluding the historic nuclear deal in 2008, removing the biggest legacy obstacle.

The biggest push has come from PM Modi overcoming the “hesitations of history” and taking forward the relationship first with a Democratic Obama administration by announcing a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015, followed by elevating the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (launched in 2009 and the first round held in 2010) into the 2+2 dialogue in 2018 with the (Republican) Trump administration reflecting the ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’. Mr Modi is not constrained (at least on the strategic side) unlike Dr Singh during his second term who faced opposition within his party, had a Defence Minister who preferred to shy away from any decision, and often had to prod a reluctant bureaucracy.

The signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) providing for the sharing of geospatial data is the last of the foundational agreements. The first General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), relating to security of each other’s military information was signed in 2002. The Congress led UPA government signed the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) in 2009 but then dragged its feet on the others on the grounds that it would jeopardise India’s strategic autonomy. However, it was apparent that as military exercises with US expanded, both in scale and complexity and US military platforms were inducted, not signing these agreements was perceived as an obstacle to strengthening cooperation. Nearly 60 countries have signed BECA. In 2016, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) relating to exchange of logistics support had been concluded, followed by Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 permitting encryption standards of communication systems. More than a hundred countries have signed these agreements with US. Equivalent agreements on logistics and mutual security of military communication have also been signed with France but without the political fuss.

Breaking away from ‘labels’
Developing the habit of working together has been a long process of building mutual respect and trust while accepting differences. The US is used to dealing with allies (invariably junior partners in a US dominated alliance structure) and adversaries. India falls into neither category. Therefore, engaging as equal partners has been a learning experience for both India and the US.

Recognising this, US categorised India as “a major defence partner” in 2016, a position unique to India that was formalised in the National Defence Authorisation Act (2017) authorising the Secretaries of State and Defence to take necessary measures. It has helped that India also joined the export control regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement) and has practices consistent with the Nuclear Suppliers Group where its membership was blocked by China spuriously linking it to Pakistan. In 2018, India was placed in Category I of the Strategic Trade Authorisation, easing exports of sensitive technologies.

In every relationship, there is a push factor and a pull factor; an alignment of the two is called the convergence of interests. An idea matures when the timing is right. After all, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and US) was first mooted in 2007 but after one meeting, it petered out till its re-emergence now. Alongside the ministerial meeting in Tokyo earlier this month, India was invited for the first time to also attend the Five Eyes (a signals intelligence grouping set up in 1941 consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US) meeting.

The policy debate in India is often caught up in ‘labels’. When PM Nehru described non-alignment as the guiding principle of Indian foreign policy, it was designed to expand India’s diplomatic space. Yet in 1971 when the Cold War directly impinged on India’s national security, a non-aligned India balanced the threat by signing the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with USSR. However, during the 1970s and 80s, it was often hijacked by the Non-aligned Movement tying up policy in ideological knots. Such became the hold of the label that even after the Cold War, India defined strategic autonomy as Non-alignment 2.0! Indian strategic community needs to appreciate that policies cannot become prisoners of labels. Ultimately, the policy objective has to enhance India’s strategic space and capability. That is the real symbolism of the in-person meeting in Delhi.

The U.S. election just became more uncertain

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Published in The Hindu on 10th October, 2020

All elections are unpredictable and American presidential elections are no exception. Yet, such is power of incumbency that there have been only four occasions since 1900 where a sitting and elected President has been defeated by his challenger for a second term. The 2020 election was shaping up to be cliff-hanger when President Donald Trump announced Friday last week that he and First Lady Melania Trump had tested positive for COVID-19, further darkening the clouds of uncertainty. He returned to the White House after three days of hospitalisation but question marks persist.

One term presidencies
In 1912, Democratic challenger Woodrow Wilson scored a decisive victory over President William Taft, seeking his second term. However, the reason was a divided Republican vote. President Theodore Roosevelt, the US president from 1901 to 1909 had supported Taft for his first term. Subsequently, he got disenchanted and eventually split the Republican party, running as the candidate of newly established Progressive party, and coming second in the race. Taft, already weakened with the infighting in the Republican party, emerged a distant third.

The second one-term president was Herbert Hoover, defeated in a landslide victory by his Democratic challenger Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. This election was fought against the backdrop of the Great Depression. Roosevelt won on the promise of the New Deal and then went on to win in 1936, 1940 and 1944. By the time he began his fourth term in January 1945, he was already suffering from high blood pressure and congestive heart disease and died three months later. Till then, there was no restriction on the number of terms for president; the two-term limit was introduced with the 22nd constitutional amendment in 1951.

In 1976, Democratic challenger Jimmy carter defeated President Gerald Ford who had taken over the presidency after president Nixon resigned when faced with the threat of impeachment. He had earlier been appointed (not elected) Vice-President in 1973 when Vice-President Spiro Agnew resigned. In US history, Ford is the only one to have held both positions of Vice-President and President without having won an election to either.

1970s was a decade marked by an energy crisis sparked by oil price hikes, high inflation, economic downturn and rising unemployment. The US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran in 1979 following the Islamic revolution in Iran became emblematic of eroding confidence among the people that made it easier for Republican challenger Ronald Reagan to trounce Democratic incumbent President Jimmy Carter in 1980. Democratic party was already polarised as Senator Ted Kennedy had challenged President Carter in the party primaries.

Both 1932 and 1980 also marked deeper power shifts; in 1932, Democrats took back Congress continuing till 1950s, introducing social security; the 1980s saw the return of the Republicans with promises of tax cuts and supply side economics.

The last one term president in the 20th century was George H W Bush who had won easily in 1988 after being Reagan’s Vice President for eight years. He lost his re-election bid to rank newcomer, Democratic challenger Bill Clinton in 1992 despite having notched up a series of foreign policy successes during the first term – Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan followed by the unification of Germany and the break-up of the Soviet Union. “It’s the economy, stupid”, became the catchphrase of the successful Clinton campaign.

Unresolved questions
The handling of the COVID-19 pandemic was going to be an issue but President Trump testing positive raised a bunch of fresh questions – about implications for continuity for government, and, for the election campaign leading to polling on 3 November and its follow-through till the winner takes office on 20 January 2021.

Presidential succession to ensure continuity of government was addressed in the 25th constitutional amendment (1967), triggered by the 1963 assassination of President Kennedy. In case a president dies, resigns or is otherwise incapacitated, the succession moves to the Vice President, and then on to the Speaker of the House, the president pro tempore of the Senate and the members of the Cabinet beginning with the Secretary of the State.

Campaign continuity is more uncertain. Elections are held every four years in November on the Tuesday after the first Monday of the month. Changing the date would need bipartisan consensus, hardly likely when the country is in the throes of a campaign. This year, the popular election on 3 November will be followed by the 538-member Electoral College voting on 14 December.

Congress will certify the Electoral College vote on 6 January 2021 officially declaring the president (and vice-president) who will assume office at the inauguration on 20 January. During this, when exactly does the winning candidate become “president-elect” is a question on which legal experts still differ.

There is no legal guidance in case a candidate dies or is unable to campaign shortly before the November polling or anytime thereafter. For 2020, in any event, the ballot papers are already printed and millions of postal ballots were cast when the question surfaced.

Were a vacancy to arise after 3 November, the Electoral College will be guided by the two political parties since the primaries process of anointing candidates is their jealously guarded preserve. Under the circumstances they may just find it expedient to bump up the VP to fill the presidential slot but how the VP slot will then be filled remains uncertain.

Tight race or landslide
How will this uncertainty play out in 2020? President Trump returned to the White House on 5 October and two days later was back in the Oval Office announcing that he had recovered fully. Doctors described the cocktail of drugs administered to the president as an experimental therapeutic.

Trump has refused to participate in any virtual TV debates with Biden, a decision announced by the bipartisan Commission on Presidential Debates after he tested positive. The first TV debate had been variously described as “chaotic”, “a shit show” and a “wrestling bout in a mud-pit”, none an edifying label.

More than once, Trump expressed scepticism about the integrity of postal balloting warning that the issue would have to be decided by the Supreme Court. When asked about a peaceful transition of power, he generated controversy with, “we are going to have to see what happens”. This is one reason that Trump is keen to push through the appointment of Judge Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court to replace late Judge Ginsburg, widely seen as a moderate and a liberal voice.

Earlier, ratification of federal judicial appointments was approved not by a simple majority but a larger (filibuster proof) majority of 60. This invariably meant getting support from across party aisles. However, growing polarisation and politicisation of judicial appointments in recent decades often led to prolonged impasses and nominations had to be withdrawn. In 2013, then Democratic Senate majority leader Harry Reid worked out a deal to permit judicial appointments for Circuit and Appeal Courts to be cleared by simple majority of 51. It boomeranged when the Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell employed the same ‘nuclear option’ to approve the appointment of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court in 2017 and is threatening to use it again.

Surveys and reality
In all four instances of single term presidencies, the challenger won a decisive victory and in three instances, a landslide victory. Most opinion polls indicate a lead (not landslide) for Democratic candidate Joe Biden but polls can be notoriously misleading; even in 2016, Hillary Clinton led in the polls even winning more popular votes but losing the electoral college.

It is also impossible to predict whether the pandemic will catalyse a cyclical shift seen in 1932 and 1980. Just as there are old time Republicans who wish they had another candidate instead of Trump, many staunch Democrats wonder whether Biden will be sufficiently committed to their progressive agenda. Which party is more fractured internally remains speculative.

Amid the growing uncertainty, only a decisive victory on 3 November will show that US democracy has developed immunity from COVID-19.

A soldier, diplomat, politician, mentor

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Published in The Hindu on 29th of September, 2020

I first met Jaswant Singh in the days following India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. As the MEA official dealing with nuclear issues, I was to draft PM Vajpayee’s address to parliament due to open on 27 May while handling the flood of communications with our Embassies and outreach with Delhi-based Embassies and media.

Every few days, Vajpayee would convene a meeting to take stock of the international fallout and Jaswant Singh, then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, was a permanent invitee. As the draft speech and the nuclear policy paper went back and forth, Vajpayee’s trust and regard for him soon became evident. Jaswant Singh had spent under a decade in the army but clearly had studied and thought deeply about India’s security dilemmas and challenges. He also had a vision of 21 st -century India that Vajpayee shared. Hardly surprising, then, that the following month, he was entrusted with the responsibility of opening dialogue with the USA, a daunting task because the Clinton administration had come down heavily on India, taking the lead in the UN Security Council in drafting a highly critical resolution and imposing sanctions.

Bill Clinton had originally planned a visit to India in early 1998, postponed to late 1998 because of the elections that brought the Vajpayee government to power. The nuclear tests left the US administration stunned and embarrassed. Jaswant Singh was visiting New York for a UN meeting in early June; a message was conveyed to the White House that he would be available to come to
Washington for talks. While he was not Foreign Minister, he held cabinet rank as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was travelling, so it was appropriate that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (who would be acting Secretary) could engage the visitor.

And thus began the dialogue between India and the USA, an engagement that is best described as the most intense, the most inconclusive and yet, the most productive. After 16 meetings between June ’98 and September 2000 in seven cities, the tide turned with the highly successful Clinton visit in March 2000 and Vajpayee’s return visit in September when Clinton hosted his largest state dinner at the White House. From “estranged democracies”, India and the US became “natural partners for the 21st century”. I was privileged to be a part of the team and consider it a masterclass in diplomatic negotiations.

The US position was guided by progress on five benchmarks for India that were also part of the UN Security Council resolution – sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that had been concluded in 1996; join the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations being pushed in Geneva; accept a freeze on developing nuclear arsenal; tighten export controls on sensitive materials and technologies; and engage in dialogue to reduce tensions with Pakistan.

Jaswant Singh took Vajpayee’s speech and the nuclear policy paper tabled in parliament as his reference frame. He elaborated on India’s security concerns, elements of credible minimum deterrence as evidence of India’s restraint, adoption of a no-first-use use policy to ensure stability, voluntary declaration of a moratorium on further nuclear testing and India’s continuing commitment to responsible non-proliferation despite not being party to the NPT.

While both agreed that neither was looking for short cuts, Strobe emphasised compliance with the benchmarks while Jaswant focussed on securing better appreciation of India’s security compulsions that would compel any democratic government to do what India had.

Ramrod straight, beetle-browed, wearing his trademark army-style khaki bush shirt, Jaswant Singh’s most distinctive feature was his resonant baritone that he used equally skilfully, to make a short, decisive point and close a discussion or to spin long, complex sentences to stymie an inquisitive journalist or leave his interlocutor pondering.

Another hallmark was his recourse to homespun aphorisms. In the early days of his dialogue with Strobe, Jaswant cited an old saying, “There is merit in asking for directions only if we know the village we are going to”. As Strobe later acknowledged, “Jaswant’s strategy was more directional than destinational” and laid the grounds for the lifting of sanctions, introducing the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership leading to the 2008 civilian nuclear deal.

On another occasion in Manila in July 1998, we had our first meeting since the tests with the Chinese on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The meeting began frostily, with Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan blaming India for itsprovocative actions. He added, “There is an old Chinese saying – he who ties a knot must untie the knot”. Jaswant arched his eyebrows and said, “In my
village in Rajasthan, we too have a saying – it takes two hands to untie a knot”.

The meeting with Tang, scheduled to last for 20 minutes lasted an hour. Before the end of the year, I was in Beijing to lay the ground for a new security dialogue between the two countries.

Rest in peace, valiant soldier, for you did your country proud.

Another Afghan peace push and a role for India

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Published in The Hindu on 19th September, 2020

Last week, on 12 September the much awaited intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Afghan High Council for National Reconciliation opened in Doha, nineteen years after the 9/11 attacks on US homeland that stunned the world and marked the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, its local sponsors. The initiation of intra-Afghan talks was a key element in the US-Taliban peace deal signed in Doha on 29 February between US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader. Originally planned to begin on 10 March, the process had to overcome many hurdles along the way providing a small glimpse of the difficult road that lies ahead.

US-Taliban deal
The Trump administration soon realised that its 2017 policy of breaking the military stalemate by a small increase in US troops was not working and soon reverted to seeking a managed exit. As the former Defence Secretary General Mattis put it, “the US doesn’t lose wars, it loses interest”. Political optics demanded a re-labelling of the withdrawal.

Direct negotiations with the Taliban began two years ago with Ambassador Khalilzad’s appointment as Special Envoy. Actually, it became a three-way negotiation. The Doha track was with the Taliban, a second track was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi to cajole the Pakistan Army to lean on the Taliban to get them to the negotiating table and the third was with Kabul to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the Doha outcome.

Originally Ambassador Khalilzad had spelt out four objectives – an end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan dialogue for a lasting peace, Taliban cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, and US troop withdrawal. Within months, the Taliban had whittled these down to just the last one with some palliatives regarding the third. Instead of an Afghan led,
Afghan owned and Afghan controlled reconciliation, it had become a US led and Taliban controlled process with nobody claiming ownership or responsibility.

Time lines were fixed for the US drawdown by mid-June (followed by complete withdrawal by April 2021) and for removal of Taliban from the UN Security Council sanctions list by end-May. The Taliban have released 1000 members of Afghan security forces and the Afghan authorities have freed over 5000 Taliban from their custody. This process took longer than originally foreseen but has now been completed. The two elements that remained open ended in the US- Taliban deal are the ceasefire declaration and the intra-Afghan talks.

The uncertainties ahead
By end-June, US had reduced its troop presence to 8600 as promised and in early September, CENTCOM commander Gen Kenneth McKenzie indicated that by November the numbers would be down to 4500. Despite two brief 3 day truces in May and August for Eid al Fitr and Eid al Adha, the levels of violence showed no respite. Speaking the Doha at the opening session, Dr Abdullah
Abdullah, Chairman of the High Council regretted that more than 12000 Afghans had been killed and another 15000 injured since end-February. The number of attacks on government security forces and installations averaged over eighty a week.

A report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued in July covering the second quarter of 2020 assessed that “the Taliban has calibrated the use of violence to continue undermining the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces while keeping it at a level that encourages the US troops to leave”. The report expressed scepticism about whether the Taliban had cut ties with Al Qaeda and stated that “the Islamic State-Khorasan retains the ability to conduct mass casualty attacks”. A UN Sanctions Monitoring Team Report concerning IS and Al Qaeda also issued in July concluded that “Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent continues to operate
under the Taliban umbrella in Nimroz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces with 400-600 fighters in the country”.

Perhaps nothing reflects the challenges facing the intra-Afghan negotiations more starkly than the title of the US-Taliban Doha deal – “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA”. This awkward phrase is repeated more than a dozen times in the Agreement. The leader of the Haqqani Network Sirajuddin Haqqani who is also the second in command of the Taliban happens to be on the US wanted list with a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death. All this is difficult to reconcile with the notion that US considers the Taliban a partner in counter-terrorism operations against the IS and other terrorist groups.

In an op-ed in the Washington Post on 14 August, President Ashraf Ghani wrote that “the Afghan people want peace” and that is why the government “made the decision to take another risk for peace”. Calling on the Taliban to sit across from Afghan representatives to arrive at a political resolution, he added that “we acknowledge the Taliban as part of our reality” and urged that “the Taliban must, in turn, acknowledge the changed reality of today’s Afghanistan”.

The current reality is that 74 percent of Afghan population is below 30 and has lived, for most part, in a conservative but open society. However, the Taliban continue to maintain the Kabul administration as an imported Western structure for continued American occupation. Senior members of the Afghan government continue to be targeted including Vice President Amrullah Saleh who narrowly escaped an IED attack on his motorcade (9 September) even as 11 innocent Afghans lost their lives.

Evolving Indian position
Addressing the opening session of the Doha meeting, EAM Dr Jaishankar reiterated that the peace process must be “Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” but Indian policy has evolved from its earlier hands-off approach to the Taliban. Speaking to Indian media a few months ago on separate occasions, both Ambassador Khalilzad and Russian Special Envoy Ambassador Zamir Kabulov bluntly pointed out that if India had concerns regarding anti-India activities of terrorist groups, it must engage directly with the Taliban. In other words, if India wanted to be invited to the party, it must be prepared to get up and dance.

The reality is major powers have limited interests. For the US, the peace talks provide President Trump an exit opportunity weeks before his re-election bid. EU has made it clear that its financial contribution will depend on the security environment and the human rights record. China can always lean on Pakistan to preserve its security and connectivity interests. For Russia, blocking the drug supply and keeping its southern periphery secure from extremist influences is key. That is why no major power is taking ownership for the reconciliation talks but merely content with being facilitators.

A report issued last month by the Heart of Asia Society, a Kabul based think tank observes that “the prospect for peace in Afghanistan depends on regional consensus to support the peace process as much as it depends on actual progress in the intra-Afghan talks”. India’s vision of a sovereign, united, stable, plural and democratic Afghanistan is one that is shared by a large constituency in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic and provincial lines. A more active engagement will enable India to work with like minded forces in the region to ensure that the vacuum created by the US withdrawal does not lead to an unravelling of the gains registered during the last two decades.

Iran Ties Need Quiet Diplomacy

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Published in The Hindu on 18th July, 2020

Recent reports that Iran’s Transportation Minister Mohammed Eslami had launched the track laying programme for the 600 km long rail link between Chabahar and Zahidan last week sparked concerns that India was being excluded from the project. Iran has since clarified that it is not the case and India could join the project at a later stage. This keeps the door open for IRCON
which has been associated with the project even as India continues with the development of Chabahar port.

Connectivity for Afghanistan
Providing connectivity for Afghanistan through Iran in order to lessen its dependence on Karachi port has enjoyed support in Delhi, Kabul and Tehran since 2003. Chabahar port on Iran’s Makran coast, just 1000 kms from Kandla, is well situated but road and rail links from Chabahar to Zahidan and then 200 kms further on to Zaranj in Afghanistan, need to be built. With Iran under sanctions during the Ahmedinejad years (2005-13), there was little progress. IRCON had prepared engineering studies estimating that the 800 km long railway project would need an outlay of $1.5 billion. Meanwhile, India concentrated on the 220 km road to connect Zaranj to Delaram on the Herat highway. This was completed in 2008 at a cost of $150 million.

Things moved forward after 2015 when sanctions on Iran eased with the signing of the JCPOA. An MOU was signed with Iran during Prime Minister Modis’s visit to Tehran in 2016 to equip and operate two terminals at the Shahid Beheshti port as part of Phase I of the project. Another milestone was the signing of the Trilateral Transit and Transport Corridor treaty between Afghanistan, Iran and India. In addition to $85 million of capital investment, India also committed to provide a line of credit of $150 million for port container tracks. Phase I was declared operational in 2018 and India’s wheat shipments to Afghanistan have been using this route. An SEZ at Chabahar was planned but re-imposition of US sanctions has slowed investments into the SEZ.

India was given a waiver from US sanctions to continue cooperation on Chabahar as it contributed to Afghanistan’s development. Despite the waiver, the project has suffered delays because of the time taken by US treasury to actually clear the import of heavy equipment like rail mounted gantry cranes, mobile harbour cranes etc. With regard to the rail-track project, a financing MOU was signed under which India undertook to provide $500 million worth of rolling stock and signalling equipment including $150 million of steel rail tracks. In fact, the railway tracks currently being laid are those supplied by IRCON. Iranian responsibility was for local works of land levelling and procurement. The MOU between IRCON and Construction and Development of Transport Infrastructure Co expired last year. Further, the Iranian company undertaking some of the works, Khatab al Anbiya was listed by the US as Special Designated Entity leading IRCON to suggest to the Iranians to appoint another contractor.

Meanwhile, Iran has ambitious plans to extend the railway line from Zahidan to Mashad (about 1000 kms) and then another 150 kms onwards to Sarakhs on the border with Turkmenistan. Another plan is to link it with the INSTC towards Bandar Anzali on the Caspian Sea. In 2011, a consortium of seven Indian companies led by SAIL had also successfully bid for mining rights at Hajigak mines in Afghanistan that contain large reserves of iron ore. However, developments at Hajigak remain stalled because of the precarious security situation in Afghanistan continues.

Why Iran Needs China
In 2016 January, just as sanctions were eased, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tehran and proposed a long term comprehensive, strategic partnership programme that would involve Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure and assured supplies of Iranian oil and gas at concessional rates. Reluctant to be tied in too close a Chinese embrace, Iran kept the negotiations going for years. China patiently permitted a limited barter trade; SINOPEC prolonged its negotiations on developing the Yadavaran oilfield while CNPC pulled out of the South Pars gas project last year, after initially promising to take over the French company Total’s stake.

Meanwhile tensions in the region have been growing since last year with missile strikes in Saudi Arabia claimed by the Houthis and a US drone strike in January killing IRGC chief Gen Qassim Soleimani. During the last four weeks, there have been more than half a dozen mysterious explosions including at the ballistic missile liquid fuel production facility at Khojir, advanced centrifuge assembly shed in Natanz and the shipyard at Bushehr. Reports attribute these to US and Israeli agencies in an attempt to provoke Iran before the US elections.

In May, US announced that it wanted UN Security Council to continue the ban on Iranian acquisition of conventional weapons. UNSC Resolution 2231 was adopted in July 2015 by consensus to endorse the JCPOA and contains a 5-year restriction on Iran’s importing conventional weapons that ends on 18 October. Even though US unilaterally quit the JCPOA, it is threatening to invoke the automatic snapback of sanctions provisions of JCPOA. UK and France have criticised US duplicity but are unlikely to exercise a veto. At the same time, Iran hopes that November may bring about a change in the White House that opens options for dialogue.

Iran’s Balancing Act
Just as it has been a tricky exercise for India to navigate between US and Iran to keep the Chabahar project going, the Rouhani administration has found it difficult balancing act to manage the hardliners at home while coping with Trump administration’s policy of ‘maximum pressure’.

Russia and China are the only countries to veto US moves in the UN Security Council. Even so, the Iran- China comprehensive, strategic partnership roadmap has run into opposition in the Majlis. After the recent elections, the Reformists are down from 120 seats to 20 while the Principlists (Conservatives) are up from 86 to 221 seats in a house of 290 members. A former IRGC Air Force commander Mohammed Ghalibaf, former Mayor of Tehran who ran unsuccessfully for President against Rouhani in 2013 and 2017 has been elected the new Speaker. Hard liners have accused Foreign Minister Zarif of undue secrecy surrounding the agreement amid rumours that China may be taking over Kish island and that Chinese troops would be stationed in Iran to secure Chinese companies and investments.

Iran may well be considering a long-term partnership with China but Iranian negotiators are wary of growing Chinese mercantilist tendencies. It is true that China has greater capacity to resist US sanctions compared to India but Iran realises the advantage of working with its only partner that enjoys a sanctions waiver from US for Chabahar since it provides connectivity for land-locked Afghanistan. Iran and India also share an antipathy to a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. This is why Iran would like to keep the door open. Nevertheless, India needs to improve its implementation record of infrastructure projects that it has taken up in its neighbourhood. There are numerous tales of Indian cooperation projects in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar etc suffering delays and cost over-runs that only make it easier for China to expand its footprint in our neighbourhood. The key is to continue to remain politically engaged with Iran so that there is a better appreciation of each other’s sensitivities and compulsions.