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The Trends Shaping The Post-Covid World

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Published in The Hindu on 11th May, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic began as a global health crisis. As it spread rapidly across countries, country after country responded with a lockdown, triggering a global economic crisis. Certain geopolitical trendlines were already discernible but the Covid shock therapy has brought these into sharper focus, defining the contours of the emerging global (dis)order.

The first trend which became clear in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis is the rise of Asia. Economic historians pointed to its inevitability recalling that till the 18th century, Asia accounted for half the global GDP. The Industrial Revolution accompanied by European naval expansion and colonialism contributed to the rise of the West and now the balance is being restored. The 2008 financial crisis showed the resilience of the Asian economies and even today, economic forecasts indicate out of G-20 countries, only China and India are likely to register economic growth during 2020.

Asian countries have also demonstrated greater agility in tackling the pandemic compared to US and Europe. This is not limited to China but a number of other Asian states have shown greater responsiveness and more effective state capacity. Consequently, Asian economies will recover faster than those in the West.

The second trend is the US retreat after a century of being in the forefront of shaping the global order. From the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations after World War I or the creation of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions after World War II, leadership of the Western world during the Cold War, moulding global responses to threats posed by terrorism or proliferation or climate change, US played a decisive role.

US hubris and arrogance also generated resentment, more evident in recent years. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have become quagmires that have sapped domestic political will and resources. This is the fatigue that President Obama sensed when he talked of “leading from behind”. President Trump changed it to “America first” and during the current crisis, US efforts to corner supplies of scarce medical equipment and medicines and acquiring biotech companies engaged in R&D in allied states, show that this may mean America alone. Moreover, even as countries were losing trust in US leadership, its bungled response at home to the pandemic indicates that countries are also losing trust in US competence. US still remains the largest economy and the largest military power but has lost the will and ability to lead. This mood is unlikely to change, whatever the outcome of the election later this year.

A third trend is EU’s continuing preoccupation with internal challenges generated by its expansion of membership to include East European states, impact of the financial crisis among the Eurozone members, and ongoing Brexit negotiations. Threat perceptions vary between old Europe and new Europe making it increasingly difficult to reach agreement on political matters e:g relations with Russia and China. The trans-Atlantic divide is aggravating an intra-European rift. Rising populism has given greater voice to Euro-sceptics and permitted some EU members to espouse the virtues of “illiberal democracy”.

Adding to this is the North-South divide within the Eurozone. Strains showed up a decade ago when austerity measures were imposed on Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal a decade ago by the ECB, persuaded by the fiscally conservative Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. ECB chief Christine Lagarde’s press statement in end March that “ECB is not here to close spreads” undermined any solidarity that the Italians felt as they battled with the pandemic and growing borrowing costs.

Further damage was done when Italy was denied medical equipment by its EU neighbours who introduced export controls leading to China airlifting medical teams and critical supplies. Schengen visa or free-border movement has already become a victim to the pandemic. EU will need considerable soul searching to rediscover the limits of free movement of goods, services, capital and people, the underlying theme of the European experiment of shared sovereignty.

A fourth trend, related to the first, is the emergence of a stronger and more assertive China. While China’s growing economic role has been visible since it joined the WTO at the turn of the century, its more assertive posture has taken shape under President Xi Jinping’s leadership with the call that a rejuvenated China is now ready to assume global responsibilities. Chinese assertiveness has raised concerns, first in its neighbourhood and now, in the US that feels betrayed because it assisted China’s rise in the hope that an economically integrated China would become politically more open. In recent years, the US- China relationship moved from cooperation to competition and now with trade and technology wars, is moving steadily to confrontation. The pandemic has seen increasing rhetoric on both sides and with the election season in the US, confrontation will only increase. A partial economic de-coupling had begun and will gather greater momentum.

Xi has engaged in an unprecedented centralisation of power and with the removal of the two-term limit, has made it clear that he will continue beyond 2022. His signature Belt and Road Initiative seeks to connect China to the Eurasia and Africa through both maritime and land routes by investing trillions of dollars in infrastructure building as a kind of pre-emptive move against any US attempts at containment. Even if Xi’s leadership comes under questioning, it may soften some aggressive policy edges but the confrontational rivalry with US will remain.

Global problems demand global responses. With Covid-19, international and multilateral bodies are nowhere on the scene. WHO was the natural candidate to lead global efforts against the health crisis but it has become a victim of politics. Its early endorsement of the Chinese efforts has put it on the defensive as US blames the outbreak on a Chinese biotech lab and accuses Beijing of suppressing vital information that contributed to the spread. UN Security Council, G-7 and G-20 (latter was structured to co-ordinate a global response to the 2008 financial crisis) are paralysed at when the world faces the worst recession since 1929.

The reality is that these institutions were always subjected to big power politics. During the Cold War, US-Soviet rivalry blocked the UNSC on many sensitive issues and now with major power rivalry returning, finds itself paralysed again. Agencies like the WHO have lost autonomy over decades as their regular budgets shrank, forcing them to increasingly rely on voluntary contributions sourced largely from Western countries and foundations. US leadership strengthened Bretton Woods institutions in recent decades (World Bank spends 250% of WHO’s budget on global health) because US’ voting power gives it a blocking veto. The absence of a multilateral response today highlights the long felt need for reform of these bodies but this can’t happen without collective global leadership.

The final trend relates to energy politics. Growing interest in renewables and green technologies on account of climate change concerns, and US emerging as a major energy producer was fundamentally altering the energy markets. Now, a looming economic recession and depressed oil prices will exacerbate internal tensions in Gulf countries which are solely dependent on oil revenues. Long standing rivalries in the region have often led to local conflicts but can now create political instability in countries where regime structures are fragile.

A vaccine for the Coronavirus possibly by end-2020 will help deal with the global health crisis but these unfolding trends have now been aggravated by the more pernicious panic virus. Rising nationalism and protectionist responses will prolong the economic recession into a depression sharpening inequalities and polarisations. Greater unpredictability and more turbulent times lie ahead.

At The Edge Of A New Nuclear Arms Race

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Published in The Hindu on 27th April, 2020

Last week, a report issued by the US State Department on “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments” raised concerns that China might be conducting nuclear tests with low yields at its Lop Nor test site, in violation of its Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) undertakings.

The US report also claims that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that produced a nuclear yield and were inconsistent with ‘zero yield’ understanding underlying the CTBT though it was uncertain about how many such experiments had been conducted.

Russia and China have rejected US claims but with growing rivalry among major powers, the report is a likely harbinger of new nuclear arms race which would also mark the demise of the CTBT that came into being in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter century.

What does the CTBT ban
For decades, a ban on nuclear testing was seen as the necessary first step towards curbing the nuclear arms race but Cold War politics made it impossible. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 banning underwater and atmospheric tests but this only drove testing underground. By the time the CTBT negotiations began in Geneva in 1994, global politics had changed. The Cold War was over and the nuclear arms race was over. USSR had broken up and its principal testing site, Semipalatinsk, was in Kazakhstan (Russia still had access to Novaya Zemlya near the Arctic circle). In 1991, Russia declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, followed by the US in 1992. By this time, US had conducted 1054 tests and Russia, 715.

Negotiations were often contentious. France and China continued testing claiming that they had conducted far fewer tests and needed to validate new designs since the CTBT did not imply an end to nuclear deterrence. France and US even toyed with the idea of a CTBT that would permit testing at a low threshold, below 500 tonnes of TNT equivalent. This was one-thirtieth of the 15000 tonne Little Boy, the bomb US dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Civil society and the non-nuclear weapon states reacted negatively to such an idea and it was dropped. Some countries proposed that the best way to verify a comprehensive test ban would be to permanently shut down all test sites, an idea that was unwelcome to the nuclear weapon states.

Eventually, US came up with the idea of defining the “comprehensive test ban” as a “zero yield” test ban that would prohibit supercritical hydro-nuclear tests but not sub-critical hydrodynamic nuclear tests. Once UK and France came on board, US was able to prevail upon Russia and China to accept this understanding. After all, this was the moment of US’ unipolar supremacy. At home, the Clinton administration satisfied the hawks by announcing a Science Based Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Programme, a generously funded project to keep the nuclear labs in business and the Pentagon happy. Accordingly, the CTBT prohibits all parties from carrying out “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”; these terms are neither defined nor elaborated.

Why the CTBT lacks authority
Another controversy arose regarding the entry-into-force provisions (Article 14) of the treaty. After India’s proposals for anchoring the CTBT in a disarmament framework did not find acceptance, in June 1996, India announced its decision to withdraw from the negotiations. Unhappy at this turn, UK, China and Pakistan took the lead in revising the entry-into-force provisions. The new provisions listed 44 countries by name whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to enter into force and included India. India protested that this attempt at arm twisting violated a country’s sovereign right to decide if it wanted to join a treaty but was ignored. The CTBT was adopted by a majority vote and opened for signature.

Of the 44 listed countries, to date only 36 have ratified the treaty. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and USA have signed but not ratified. China maintains that it will only ratify it after US does so but the Republican dominated Senate had rejected it in 1999. In addition, North Korea, India and Pakistan are the three who have not signed. All three have also undertaken tests after 1996; India and Pakistan in May 1998 and North Korea six times between 2006 and 2017. The CTBT has therefore not entered into force and lacks legal authority.

Nevertheless, an international organisation to verify the CTBT was established in Vienna with a staff of about 230 persons and an annual budget of $ 130 million. Ironically, US is the largest contributor with a share of $17 million. The CTBTO runs an elaborate verification system built around a network of over 325 seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic (underwater) monitoring stations. The CTBTO has refrained from backing the US allegations.

A new nuclear arms race
The key change from the 1990s is that US’ unipolar moment is over and strategic competition among major powers is back. US now identifies Russia and China as ‘rivals’. Its Nuclear Posture Review asserts that US faces new nuclear threats because both Russia and China are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. US therefore has to expand the role of its nuclear weapons and have a more usable and diversified nuclear arsenal. The Trump administration has embarked on a 30-year modernisation plan with a price tag of $1.2 trillion, which could go up over the years. Readiness levels at Nevada test site that has been silent since 1992 are being enhanced to permit resumption of testing at six months notice.

Russia and China have been concerned about US’ growing technological lead particularly in missile defence and conventional global precision strike capabilities. Russia has responded by exploring hypersonic delivery systems and theatre systems while China has embarked on a modernisation programme to enhance the survivability of its arsenal which is considerably smaller. In addition, both countries are also investing heavily in offensive cyber capabilities.

The new US report stops short of accusing China for a violation but refers to “a high level of activity at the Lop Nor test site throughout 2019” and concludes that together with its lack of transparency, China provokes concerns about its intent to observe the zero-yield moratorium on testing.

US claims that Russian experiments have generated nuclear yield but is unable to indicate how many such experiments were conducted in 2019. It suggests that Russia could be testing in a manner that releases nuclear energy from an explosive canister, generating suspicions about its compliance.

The New START agreement limits US and Russian arsenals but will expire in 2021 and President Trump has already indicated that he does not plan to extend it. Instead, the Trump administration would like to bring China into some kind of nuclear arms control talks, something China has avoided by pointing to the fact that US and Russia still account for over 90 percent of global nuclear arsenals.

Both China and Russia have dismissed US allegations pointing to Trump administration’s backtracking from other negotiated agreements like the Iran nuclear deal or the US-Russia INF Treaty. Tensions with China are already high with trade and technology disputes, militarisation in the South China Sea and most recently, with the Coronavirus pandemic. US could also be preparing the ground for resuming testing at Nevada.

The Cold War rivalry was already visible when the nuclear arms race began in the 1950s. New rivalries have already emerged. Resumption of nuclear testing may signal the demise of the ill-fated CTBT, marking the beginnings of a new nuclear arms race.

NPT @ 50: Celebration or Midlife Crisis

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Published in Hindustan Times on 12th March, 2020

Last week, on 5 th March, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) turned 50. Often described by its supporters as the ‘cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’, the NPT is among the most widely adhered to global treaties. All countries except four (India, Israel and Pakistan that never joined, and North Korea that withdrew in 2003) are parties to the NPT.

Yet NPT’s golden anniversary passed without much notice. A statement issued in New York by the Spokesman for the UN Secretary General was notable for its brevity and anodyne character. There are suggestions that the NPT Review Conference due to open in New York on 27th April be postponed, ostensibly on account of the coronavirus outbreak, but actually to avoid a potentially bruising showdown.

In 1963, President Kennedy voiced an apprehension that by 1975, there could be as many as 20 countries with nuclear weapons. USSR shared similar concerns. This convergence of interests between the two Cold War adversaries enabled the negotiations for an NPT.

To make it attractive, it was initially conceived as a three-legged stool – non-proliferation, obliging those without nuclear weapons to undertake never to acquire them and accept full-scope safeguards; disarmament, obliging the five countries with nuclear weapons (US, USSR, UK, France and China) to negotiate to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons; and, third, to ensure that non-nuclear weapon states would enjoy full access to peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

By the time the negotiations concluded in 1968, India had concluded that the disarmament leg was too weak and the definition of a nuclear weapon state (one that had exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967) was one that created a permanent division between nuclear haves and have-nots; it chose to stay away.

Among the oft-cited successes of the NPT is the dramatic reduction in the number of nuclear weapons from a peak of 70300 warheads in 1986 to around 14000 at present, with US and Russia accounting for over 12500. What is overlooked is that nearly all the reductions happened between 1990 and 2010 and the process has now dwindled to a halt. More significantly, these reductions were a result of bilateral talks between US and Russia reflecting their state of relations and no negotiations have ever been held in the NPT framework. In fact, during the first fifteen years of the NPT, the US-Soviet arsenals went up from below 40000 to over 70000, making it abundantly clear that the NPT nuclear-weapon-states have blithely ignored the disarmament leg of the NPT.

The NPT has successfully prevented proliferation. Since 1970, only four countries have acquired nuclear weapons bringing the total number of nuclear-weapon-states to nine, much less than Kennedy’s apprehensions in 1963. However, it brings out the uncomfortable reality that the NPT has no means of dealing with these four states.

The five nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT (N-5) are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) giving rise to the inevitable conclusion that nuclear weapons remain the currency of political and military power. This conclusion can only encourage potential proliferators by making nuclear weapons more attractive as the ultimate security guarantor.

NPT supporters also claim credit for strengthening the taboo against nuclear weapons by pointing out that nuclear weapons have never been used since 1945. However, a closer examination of recently declassified papers indicates that since 1970, there were over a dozen instances where US and USSR came close to initiating a nuclear exchange, often based on misperceptions about the intentions of the other or plain system errors. Even today, US and Russia maintain over 1000 nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert, increasing the risks of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange.

Today, the nuclear taboo is being challenged as major nuclear powers undertake R&D for more usable low-yield nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defence, hypersonic systems that carry both conventional and nuclear payloads and growing offensive cyber capabilities further blur the line between conventional and nuclear.

Frustrated by the lack of responsiveness on the part of the N-5, 120 countries party to the NPT joined hands with civil society to push negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (TPNW), concluded in 2017. These countries had concluded that despite near universal adherence, the NPT could never be the vehicle for nuclear disarmament. It had delegitimised proliferation but done little to delegitimise nuclear weapons. And in the process, the NPT had reached the limits of its success. The N-5 and their allies boycotted the negotiations but the existence of the TPNW exposes the inherent imbalance in the NPT’s three-legged stool.

The uncomfortable truth is that the old nuclear arms control model reflected the political reality of the Cold War. Today’s reality reflects multipolarity, marked by asymmetry. It is hardly surprising that US-USSR treaties of the bipolar era, like the ABM Treaty or the INF Treaty are already dead and others like New START and Open Skies Treaty are being challenged.

The NPT faces a similar challenge, of continued political relevance. Unless the NPT members, especially the N-5 realise this, its golden anniversary may well mark the onset of NPT’s mid-life crisis.

The Sum & Substance of the Afghan Deal

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Published in The Hindu on 5th March, 2020

The long-awaited deal between the US and Taliban was finally signed in Doha last Saturday by US Special Envoy Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and former Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader. On the same day, US Defence Secretary Mark Esper visited Kabul to conclude the Joint Declaration for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the two governments. Gaps and inconsistencies between the two only add to the confusion. But two facts are clear – the US is on its way out and second, this does not ensure peace for the Afghan people. As former US Defence Secretary Gen Mattis put it, “The US doesn’t lose wars, it loses interest”. But since a major power cannot be seen to be losing a war, certainly not in an election year, a re-labelling of the withdrawal becomes necessary.

Shades of Vietnam
Nearly a half century ago, President Richard Nixon had faced a similar dilemma. With more than half a million US soldiers deployed in Vietnam, it was clear that a military solution was out of question. Seeking an exit, his NSA Dr Henry Kissinger, during his secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, assured Premier Zhou Enlai that US was prepared to withdraw completely from Vietnam in return for release of US POWs and a ceasefire lasting “a decent interval”. Kissinger and Nixon knew that the deal would leave their ally, the South Vietnamese government led by President Thieu, vulnerable. In the declassified 1972 White House tapes, Nixon and Kissinger acknowledge that “South Vietnam is not going to survive and the idea is to find a formula that can hold things together for a year or two”. The ploy worked.

President Nixon was re-elected with a record margin in November 1972 on the platform that peace was at hand. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed and by end March, US had completed its withdrawal ending direct military involvement. US POWs were released but by end-1973, the ceasefire was in tatters. Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975. Approximately 20000 US soldiers died during 1972-73 (Nixon cemented the understanding during his visit to China in February 1972) and 80000 South Vietnamese soldiers died after the collapse of the ceasefire, following the decent interval. To win his re-election, Nixon had promised an honourable peace and delivered a delayed defeat but by then, the world had moved on. Dr Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. The secret assurances of 1971-72 only surfaced after four decades.

Khalilzad is no stranger to Washington politics having served in Republican administrations since the Reagan era. He understood his job perfectly when Secretary Pompeo appointed him the Special Envoy for Afghan Reconciliation in September 2018. An Afghan by birth (he came to US in his teens) and having served as US ambassador in Afghanistan, he knew full well that he was not negotiating an Afghan peace deal, he was negotiating a ‘managed’ US exit. The time line too was clear. President Trump had repeatedly declared that “great nations do not fight endless wars” and his re-election was due in the fall of 2020.

The road to Doha
President Trump’s 2017 policy aimed at breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional 5000 soldiers, giving US forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Within a year, it was clear that the policy was not working because no insurgency can be defeated as long as it enjoys safe havens and secure sanctuaries. Pakistan’s help was necessary to get the Taliban to the negotiating table.

A three-way negotiation ensued. First was the Doha track with the Taliban, a second was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi and the third was with Kabul to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the outcome. The dice was loaded because Taliban and Pakistan negotiated as a team. Within six months, they had whittled down Ambassador Khalilzad’s four objectives – a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan peace dialogue, cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, and finally, US troop withdrawal – to just the last one, with some palliatives regarding the third.

The deal was ready to be signed last September when Trump abruptly called it off stalling the process. NSA John Bolton’s dismissal (he was opposed) and the release of three high level Taliban militants including Anas Haqqani (Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother) in November helped smoothen issues.

The key features of the Doha deal are:

a. US troops to be reduced from current 14000 to 8600 by 15 June (in 135 days).

b. Withdrawal of all remaining US and foreign forces by 29 April 2021 (in 14 months).

c. Removal of Taliban from UN Security Council sanctions list by 29 May.

d. Upto 5000 Taliban prisoners and 1000 Afghan security forces prisoners to be released from Afghan and Taliban custody respectively by 10 March.

e. US sanctions against Taliban leaders to be lifted by 27 August.

f. Intra-Afghan talks to begin on 10 March.

Whither Afghanistan
Nothing reflects the fragility of the deal signed between US and Taliban in Doha better than the title – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA! This is repeated more than a dozen times in the Agreement. Ironically, US has committed to getting UN Security Council endorsement for the deal with an entity that it doesn’t recognise!

The leader of the Haqqani network and No. 2 of Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani who recently wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, remains on the US wanted list with a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death. This hardly squares with the notion that Taliban is now a US counter- terrorism partner against the IS.

The Kabul Declaration states that Afghan government will “participate in US facilitated discussion with Taliban on CBMs, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant number of prisoners on both sides”. There is no reference to numbers to be released or a deadline of 10 March linking it to commencing intra-Afghan talks, as in the Doha deal. No wonder President
Ghani angrily declared a day later that release of prisoners will be part of the agenda for the intra-Afghan talks, provoking the Taliban to declare that the truce would no longer cover Afghan security forces, creating the first of many obstacles ahead.

There is no mention of what will happen to the Taliban fighters whose numbers have suddenly inflated from earlier range of 30000 to 50000 to 60000 to 150000! Are they to be disarmed and demobilised; prepared for civilian life or integrated with the Afghan security forces? Who is expected to provide stipends to those opting for peace? Trump maintains that it is ‘time that the
war on terror is fought by someone else’ so it won’t be the US. US has described itself as a “facilitator”, a responsibility that it will be glad to share with others.

The idea of a ceasefire, which is normally the starting point for any peace process, has been made an outcome of the intra-Afghan dialogue, together with a political roadmap for the future, but without any timeframe. There is no reference to preserving the gains of the last eighteen years and with the Taliban intent on reviving the Islamic Emirate, the shape of things is clear.

Remember the duck test – if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck.

A US-Taliban Deal or an Afghan Peace Deal

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Published in Hindustan Times on 1st March, 2020

On Saturday, 29 th February, an agreement will be signed between the US and the Taliban in Doha. Widely welcomed as a ‘peace deal’, it will be claimed by US President Donald Trump as further proof of his uncanny deal-making prowess. But while the deal may well mark the end of the US war in Afghanistan whether it actually ends conflict in Afghanistan remains an open question.

Road to the deal
Negotiations began in September 2018 with the appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to initiate direct talks with Taliban. It marked a reversal of Trump’s 2017 policy based on breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional 5000 soldiers, giving US forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Since it was soon clear that the policy was not working and the Taliban insurgency could not be defeated as long as it enjoyed safe havens and secure sanctuaries, US changed track and sought Pakistan’s help to get Taliban to the negotiating table.

While US maintained that Doha talks covered four issues – cessation of hostilities, cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, an intra- Afghan peace dialogue, and finally, US troop withdrawal, Taliban made it clear that their priority was the last issue. They rejected the idea of a ceasefire, and any talks with the Afghan government describing it as a puppet regime, lacking
legitimacy. Taliban provided some assurances on the second issue but focused on a firm date for US troop withdrawal.

A deal was ready to be signed on 8th September, with a Taliban delegation scheduled to travel to Camp David, when there was a hiccup. A US soldier was killed in a car bomb attack; coupled with the negative optics of welcoming a Taliban delegation in Camp David during the week marking the 9/11 attacks anniversary led Trump to call off the deal.

Within a month, talks were revived. US demanded a ceasefire for a month as a sign of Taliban commitment but Taliban demurred. Taliban felt that too long a ceasefire would make it difficult for them to regroup their fighters once they returned to their villages. Eventually, US settled for ‘significant reduction in violence’ for a week. The week long period began in the early hours of 22nd February, setting the stage for the Doha signing.

Echoes of Vietnam
The deal provides a timetable for reducing US troops from 14000 to 8600, possibly by the end of 2020 and the kick-starting of intra-Afghan peace talks. It is unclear if there is a date for complete withdrawal of US troops or for concluding the intra-Afghan dialogue or for how long the truce will hold. What is clear is that the US war in Afghanistan will come to an end permitting Trump to deliver on his promise of bringing the soldiers home in his re-election year.

Around fifty years ago, US pursued a similar strategy in Vietnam. President Nixon had taken over in 1969 when US troop presence in Vietnam was over half a million. It was clear that a military solution was not possible. During his secret visit to Beijing in 1971 July, Nixon’s NSA Dr Kissinger told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that US would agree to a complete withdrawal of troops in return for Hanoi’s releasing US POWs and a ceasefire for “a decent interval, say 18 months or more, before a Communist takeover in Vietnam”. He assured Zhou that if the Saigon government was overthrown following “a decent interval”, US would not intervene. Neither the US public nor the South Vietnamese were privy to this exchange.

And this is exactly how it unfolded. Nixon visited China in February 1972, describing it a visit to bring about “a lasting peace in the world” and won his re-election handsomely in November 1972 promising that “peace was at hand”. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accord was signed ending direct US military involvement and withdrawal, release of POWs, ceasefire and a reunification through peaceful means. Full scale fighting erupted before end-1973. South Vietnam lost another 80000 soldiers till 30th April 1975 when Saigon finally fell. US did not intervene as its war had been over two years earlier. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Nixon resigned in 1974, facing impeachment in the Watergate scandal.

Crafting a peace deal
Many things have changed but US still cannot be seen to be losing the war in a re-election year and so the US withdrawal needs repackaging as a peace process for Afghanistan. The problem is that nobody really knows what the Taliban want and reconciling an Emirate and Shariat based system with the existing Constitution is not easy. How would Taliban fighters be demobilised? How would an amnesty and reintegration package be worked out and who pays? Would an early US withdrawal encourage the Taliban to improve their bargaining position on the battlefield? Are the major powers only ‘facilitators’ or are they collectively prepared to act as ‘guarantors’?

Addressing these is necessary for a good deal but if the search is only for “a decent interval”, the Taliban who have waited two decades can also wait out “a decent interval”.