Category Archives: ARTICLES

The New Normal after Pahalgam, India’s Response

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Published in The Hindu on May 17, 2025

Operation Sindoor is on ‘pause’ and though the ceasefire began somewhat shakily on Saturday evening (May 10), it seems to be holding. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) – India and Pakistan – had a follow-up conversation and discussed further de-escalatory measures to reduce troop presence in the forward areas that had seen a buildup in recent weeks.

Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror…setting a new standard and a new normal in counter-terrorism measures.” Kinetic retaliation is not new. The Modi government conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the Uri attack, and an air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019 following the Pulwama suicide attack. Yet, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.  

88 hours to ceasefire

After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear that the Indian government would respond with force. The only question of when and in what manner. The measures announced in the days that followed such as reducing diplomatic presence, switching off trade, closing down the Wagah-Attari border crossing, cancelling existing visas, and putting the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, were a strong response but not a substitute for kinetic retaliation.

The intervening fortnight till May 7 was used in finalising targets for kinetic retaliation and ramping up diplomatic engagement at all levels. Post 2019, Indian authorities were certain that sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would compel a calibrated military response. This demanded planning and periodic updating, based on evolving technical capabilities. Eventually, nine targets were chosen out of nearly two dozen options.  The intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, in Delhi and other key capitals, prepared the ground to ensure an acceptance (though sometimes with caveats) of India’s right to target the terrorists and their infrastructure.  India’s challenge was to restore red lines while managing the escalation narrative and leaving a de-escalation option open.

Shortly after the May 7 early morning strike was concluded, the Pakistan DGMO Maj Gen Kashif Abdullah was informed of the nine locations targeted as these were closely associated with designated terrorist groups, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), JeM, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. India emphasised that Op Sindoor was against the terrorists and not the Pakistani military or the Pakistani people. It added that if the Pakistani forces responded, India would reserve the right to retaliate.

Pakistan acknowledged the strike (at six locations) and claimed that it had downed between five to six Indian aircraft, including some Rafale fighter jets, though this was denied by India. It offered an off-ramps de-escalation option – Pakistan claiming success in terms of taking down Indian aircraft, playing down the impact of Indian strikes, and taking the issue of violation of its territory to the United Nations Security Council where it is currently a non-permanent member.

However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to bolster its faltering image and vowed military retaliation. The following two nights, Pakistan mounted escalating drone intrusions, together with some loitering munitions and missile firings, over 36 locations along the 3,300 kilometre-long border, more with the intent to probe for gaps in India’s air defences. India retaliated, with its declared quid pro quo plus policy, targeting Pakistani air bases and air defence units. However, Pakistan denied its intrusions even as it blamed India for repeated violations and attacks. Its air space remained open for civilian air traffic, prompting an Indian warning on May 9 that this was jeopardising civilian air traffic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting on May 9 to approve the next tranche of the IMF Extended Fund Facility (loan to Pakistan) necessitated prudence.  

The night of 9-10 May witnessed a dramatic escalation. Pakistan claimed to have struck 26 Indian targets “to reestablish deterrence after repeated Indian attacks.” India acknowledged “limited damage to equipment and personnel at air force stations Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur, and Bhuj.” Indian response on the morning of May 10 was ferocious and targeted nine military airfields from Skardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahim Yar Khan and Jacobabad in the south as well as three forward air defence units. The stand-off weapons used included the Scalp and BrahMos missiles as well as Crystal Maze, Hammer and Spice 2000 precision guided munitions.

The previous 24 hours had seen intense diplomatic activity with a flurry of telephone calls between Washington, Islamabad, and Delhi. Following a conversation between the two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into effect at 1700 hours on May 10.

The U.S.’s role

Initially, the U.S. adopted a hands-off approach with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting on May 8 that the U.S. was not going to get involved “in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” However, within 24 hours, the U.S. assessment changed as it picked up signs of more cross-border strikes and reports that Pakistan was scheduling a meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA). While Mr. Vance spoke to PM Modi on the evening of May 9 (Indian time), sharing the U.S.’s concerns about a “dramatic escalation” and again the following day (Indian time), U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, following it up with calls to his counterparts India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif announced on May 10 that no meeting of the NCA had taken place.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s message on May 10 pre-empted the official announcement about the ceasefire raising questions about the U.S.’s role. The fact is that after 1998, the U.S. has played a role in de-escalating multiple crises: Kargil in 1999, the Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram in 2001, Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, the exception being the 2016 surgical strikes that Pakistan denied had happened. Yet, none of these instances have led to U.S. mediation and there is little reason to think otherwise this time. There are only two ways of avoiding external intervention – first, increase the economic and military differential with Pakistan, and second, have independent communication channels between the two countries.   

Conflict under the nuclear shadow

Since 1998 when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states, Pakistan’s approach has been to reduce the space for conventional war, by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use. The objective is to constrain India’s space for a kinetic response to a terrorist attack. However, this is no longer working.  If the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ made kinetic retaliation the new normal, Balakot enlarged it in 2019 by introducing air power, and Operation Sindoor has expanded it to cover all of Pakistan. So far, India has emphasised that it has been retaliating against terrorist targets – launch pads across the LoC in 2016, Balakot training camp in 2019, and the nine locations now (Operation Sindoor). However, Mr. Modi has added a new dimension.

In the expansive ‘new normal’ that he outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to respond militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, but added that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts Pakistani military on notice that the next time, India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist targets. The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go together; terror and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”

By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, Mr. Modi is seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang but this requires a significant expansion in conventional capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defences and adopt a network-centric-approach that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for surveillance, communication and targeting, will need to be introduced. Simultaneously, India needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led to Pahalgam, in order to better plan, predict and prevent future Pahalgams. Only then will the expansive ‘new normal’ be a credible deterrent against future terrorist attacks.

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Diplomatic Discussions Are Best Held In Camera

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For Trump, It’s All For Good TV

Published in The Print on March 7, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/diplomatic-discussions-are-best-held-in-camera-for-trump-its-all-for-good-tv/2537827/

Last Friday, the Oval Office provided an unusual stage for diplomatic theatre that stunned audiences around the world. The live telecast of the unscripted exchange between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian and US President Donald Trump, a former reality TV star, with J D Vance playing a supporting role, has become the stuff of diplomatic legend, with reactions ranging from applause and awe to shock and horror.

Perhaps, there was a hint of what was to come when Trump remarked “Oh, you are all dressed up,” as he welcomed Zelensky to the White House. Or in an early question by a reporter about why he wasn’t wearing a suit in “United States’ highest office?” But if so, it didn’t register with Zelensky. When Vance praised Trump’s efforts at diplomacy and Zelensky questioned it, Vance belligerently accused him of being “disrespectful” instead of being “thanking the president.” Zelensky remonstrated but Trump intervened, telling him that he didn’t “have the  cards” and blamed him for “gambling with World War III.” Minutes later, Trump ordered the media to leave but added that “This (their spat) is going to be great television.”

Since then, the signalling has continued through media and X. On 1 March, Trump said that “Zelensky is not ready for peace.” The following day, Zelensky said after his London meeting that a peace deal is “still very very far away” angering Trump, who responded that “America will not put up with this for longer.” On 3 March, US announced that it was pausing all aid to Ukraine, even as European leaders were finding ways of repairing the damage. Meanwhile, on Saturday, Elon Musk tweeted “I agree” to a post from someone who wrote, “It’s time to leave NATO and the UN.”

Political leaders make use of media, including social media, for signalling to different audiences, both at home and abroad. But there is a good reason why diplomatic discussions and negotiations are conducted in camera. It permits the parties concerned to protect the image of the leaders, allow diplomatic summitry to maintain the aura of gravitas of diplomatic summitry, and control  the narrative. The Trump-Zelensky encounter is an example of how both sides lost control of the plot.

Some policy analysts feel that US outreach to Putin is to dilute the Russia-China bond, reminiscent of the 1971 Kissinger visit to China to divide the Communist bloc. But the parallel is misplaced. In 1971, cracks were visible in the China-Soviet relationship, and second, the US was not creating a divide within the Western bloc.

The substance of US diplomacy

Zelensky knew that he held the weaker hand. Had he kept it in mind in the Oval Office, he could have sidestepped the provocation. Trump and Vance revel in the in-your-face approach, both domestically and with other leaders. However, exposing a growing US-Europe divide on Ukraine and other issues only weakens the US hand by giving comfort to Putin and Xi Jinping.

Realism has always been an integral part of diplomacy. Political leaders, whether democrats or autocrats, instinctively know that idealism is not the strategy for survival. Writing in the fourth century B.C., Greek historian Thucydides described the powerful Athenian delegation bluntly informing the weaker Melians, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Closer home, Kautilya elaborated how diplomacy and persuasion can amplify the effectiveness of power in the Arthashastra.

US presidents have never been idealists. Even President Roosevelt, the key architect of the United Nations, was clear that the real power would be exercised by the Security Council and within that, by the Permanent Members who enjoy veto powers. At the same time, he also realised that the principle of equality of sovereign states had to be respected to get a buy-in by all countries and so the General Assembly became the premier annual gathering. And this when the US accounted for 50 percent of global GDP!

Nixon extricated the US from Vietnam but needed the fig leaf of the Paris Peace Accords negotiated in 1973. Just as Biden used the agreement Trump had concluded with the Taliban to engineer the US exit from Afghanistan. Both were guided by realism but needed the diplomatic cover. During the Cold War, successive US presidents supported military dictatorships in pursuit of realism but couched it as a defence of democracy and the free world. Yet, when faced with the Soviet crackdowns in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the value-based diplomacy quickly yielded to realist prudence. 

Therefore, Trumpian diplomacy is not a departure from US diplomatic practice in substance; its change is more in Trump’s style of diplomacy. He may desire to Make America Great Again but he presides over an America that no longer enjoys the primacy it enjoyed in 1945 or 1991. Though President Theodore Roosevelt’s advice “speak softly and carry a big stick” was given at the beginning of the 20th century before the age of TV and social media, it remains valid because as President Abraham Lincoln famously said, “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.” Trump would do well to heed the advice of his predecessors and not be seduced by his own voice on Truth Social.

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My Interview to India’s World on India’s ambitious goals for nuclear power

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Published in India’s World on February 23, 2025

“Realising 100 GW of Nuclear Power by 2047 Depends on…” Former Diplomat Rakesh Sood

‘Realising 100 GW of Nuclear Power by 2047 Depends on Building the Right Framework’, says, former Indian Diplomat Rakesh Sood.

Hely Desai

February 23, 2025

India has indicated a significant shift in its nuclear energy strategy with the Union Budget 2025-26. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s announcement of the Nuclear Energy Mission outlines ambitious targets, modest financial allocations, and significantly, some amendments to the Atomic Energy Act (1962) and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010), aimed at accelerating private sector participation. With the country’s rapidly growing industrial sector and rising energy demands, the Finance Minister emphasised the urgent need to diversify India’s energy mix, positioning nuclear power as a crucial pillar in the low-carbon development strategy for realising the vision of a “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) by 2047 and a “net zero” by 2070.

In this interview, Hely Desai sits down with Rakesh Sood, former Indian diplomat and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, to decode the implications of these potentially transformative nuclear developments following the budget announcement.

Hely Desai: In the Union Budget 2025, nuclear energy received significant attention once again. The Finance Minister set an ambitious target of 100 gigawatts (GW) by 2047—nearly 12 times the current capacity. Given that this goal has been revised several times over the years, do you think it is now achievable? What key challenges have hindered progress so far?

Amb. Rakesh Sood: To put it in context, in the 1970s, India set a target of 10 GW to be achieved by 2000. We are at 8.2 GW today. Each time a new target has been set, it has become more ambitious and, understandably, more difficult to achieve. So, while the targets of 22 GW by 2031 and eventually 100 GW by 2047 are ambitious targets, their realisation will depend on how we prepare the framework to achieve it. 

The budget for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for 2025-26 is INR 24,049 crores. Last year, it was INR 24,450 crores, and the year before that, INR 25,882 crores. These are in the same ballpark range and do not reflect either the urgency or the priority to the sector. In the budget speech, the Finance Minister also mentioned an additional INR 20,000 crores for nuclear power, but with no clarity about the time frame for this allocation to materialise. If this amount is spread over the next five years, it would mean an additional INR 4,000 crores per year, which doesn’t significantly address the funding gap, given that the average cost of nuclear power per megawatt in India at $2 million is approx. Rs 17 crores! Therefore, this amount is unlikely to help meet the ambitious targets if the government is the only source of funding. This is why I believe the Finance Minister also mentioned the need to amend existing legislation.

The Atomic Energy Act (1962) places all nuclear energy activities, including materials and technology, under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). As a result, all nuclear facilities are under the DAE and all nuclear power reactors are operated by nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), a wholly government-owned Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) and a subsidiary of the DAE. To involve the private sector, existing legislation will need to be amended. However, the exact form this will take remains unclear. 

One indication is the Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by NPCIL in December 2024, inviting private industries to build two 220 MWe PHWR Bharat Small Reactors. The RFP suggests that “the reactors are planned to be set up with private sector investment, operating within the existing legal framework and approved business models.” The intention is to replace captive power plants, which are currently coal-based, with the DAE-indigenised PHWR models. However, the investor/user/industrial party would construct the project under the supervision and control of the NPCIL, which would take over the plant as the operator. Capital costs, all operating expenses during the life cycle, and decommissioning expenses would be borne by the ‘user’ who can utilise the captive power and/or sell it according to tariffs approved by the government.

However, we still don’t know what the response to the RFP has been. The RFP was issued two months before the amendment announcement and emphasises that it is “within existing legal framework.” 

How is India’s energy profile expected to evolve as India pursues the twin goals of Viksit Bhat by 2047 and net-zero by 2070?

Currently, India’s annual per capita income is approximately $2500, and to reach Viksit Bharat (developed country standard according to World Bank), it has to grow to approximately $ 22,000. In 2022-23, India’s per capita annual energy consumption was 1208 kWh while China was 4600kWh, Singapore was 9220 kWh and the US is stable at 80000 kWh. National energy consumption is approx. 10000 TWH; taking into account rising energy efficiencies, it still needs to rise to 35000 TWH by 2047 to achieve Viksit Bharat. India has committed to the target of ‘net-zero’ by 2070. This imposes restrictions on sources for energy growth. In absolute numbers, with the energy composition changing with growing urbanisation, India’s power generation needs to grow from current installed capacity of approx. 450 GW (consisting of 200 GW from renewables covering solar, wind and hydroelectric, 8 GW from nuclear and the balance from fossil fuels) to 4000 GW. Solar, wind, hydel, and biomass can contribute to approximately 1300-1500 GW, leaving a large shortfall of 2500-2700 GW to be met from fossil fuels and nuclear power.   Given the net-zero goal, it is clear that nuclear power has to play a much larger role in India’s economic development. Against this backdrop, the Finance Minister’s target of 100 GW of nuclear generation by 2047 seems critical and may need to grow much more by 2070 to achieve net-zero. This would require significant investment in both nuclear power plants and renewable infrastructure, meaning the private sector must play a key role, as the government alone cannot shoulder this energy transition. 

Given the potential amendments that may also be in part aimed at advancing Small Modular Reactors (SMR) development, the announcement also sets a target of having five operational SMRs by 2033. Do you think financial and technological challenges could pose significant obstacles for India in achieving this goal?

Yes, absolutely. When discussing these amendments in the context of advancing SMRs, a key driving force is India’s commitment to meeting clean energy targets while ensuring scalability. SMRs are projected to be beneficial for supporting urbanisation, providing power in remote locations, and meeting dedicated industrial energy needs, thus driving sustainable growth across diverse regions. 

Now, small modular reactors, typically under 300 MW and modular in design, are projected to play a crucial role in this transition. However, to make this work, it is essential to reach a consensus on a specific SMR design. Only then can it be mass-produced, potentially reducing costs through economies of scale. 

Globally, around 80 different SMR designs (variants of Molten Salt Reactors, Pressurised Water Reactors, Molten Metal Reactors and High-Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors) are under development, with only two having reached operational stages. If we look at Russia, they have an operational floating nuclear power plant with an SMR based on the pressurised water reactor (PWR) design, and China has a land-based High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR). Apart from these two, no other country has reached the operationalisation stage for SMRs yet. 

For India, most of our existing nuclear power plants are limited to PHWR technology, which, while effective, is not the most efficient. Post 1974, after India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, India was excluded from international exchanges and cooperation, and PHWR was the only option available at the time. Now, the government is looking to explore more secure and advanced technologies for the future. Collaboration and external expertise will be crucial. This was also one of the primary objectives behind the nuclear deal with the U.S., which aimed to foster international cooperation. This context underpins the Finance Minister’s announcement that India aims to have five operational SMRs by 2033. 

Assuming this announcement for amendments is intended to incentivise private sector involvement in nuclear energy, what significant changes do you anticipate in the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, and how might they affect private sector participation?

First, the Atomic Energy Act would need to create a role for the private sector. What this role is intended to be is unclear. Second is the Liability Act. According to the NPCIL RFP (issued a month before the Finance Minister’s budget speech), the private sector role is only that of the investor. If NPCIL is the operator and the project is built to NPCIL’s designs and specifications and under its supervision, then physical protection and nuclear safety will also become NPCIL’s responsibility. The private sector will insist on complete indemnity through a “hold harmless” clause. However, if the private sector entity’s role is to be greater, then it will need to be legally defined as also the sharing of the liability responsibility. In Western countries, private companies are allowed to build and operate nuclear power plants (though designs and operations are regulated by governments), and they are held liable according to their respective liability laws. 

The general principle is that, in the event of a nuclear accident, the first priority is to provide immediate relief and assistance to those affected. This is operator liability under the principle of “economic channelling” In India, under our liability law, this assistance is capped at INR 1,500 crores, and if damages exceed that, the government must intervene. This means the operator is required to have an insurance pool for immediate assistance. Under the CLNDA, even if the NPCIL holds a supplier responsible, it can pursue the claim through “legal channelling” but without delaying immediate relief.

Currently, NPCIL, an entirely government-owned agency, acts as the operator, and the government essentially serves as its insurer. After the CLNDA, the ambiguities created by unclear definitions made private players (both foreign and domestic) hesitant to enter the sector.  For the private sector to play any significant part in the development of nuclear power, some of these ambiguities in the CLNDA would need to be clarified. So far, the government has relied on Explanations provided through Frequently Asked Questions posted on government department websites, but this has failed to satisfy the private entities. 

Ahead of the budget announcement, there was a report in the Economic Times suggesting that civil nuclear energy could be moved from the DAE’s oversight to the Ministry of Power, with fuel handling remaining under the DAE. How likely do you think this shift is, and what challenges might arise from such a transfer?

For a shift like this, I think one of the first things needed is an independent regulator. Currently, we have the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). There was a draft bill proposed to make the AERB a statutory body but it didn’t see the light of day. Today, even though the AERB is autonomous in name, it remains part of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), meaning it lacks the independence of regulators like the RBI, SEBI, or TRAI that were established through specific acts of Parliament, granting them the necessary autonomy to regulate both government and private sector activities. For example, the RBI supervises even government-owned banks like the SBI, while the SEBI regulates stock exchanges such as the BSE and NSE.

In this context, the nuclear sector would benefit from a similar independent regulator, one that can oversee activities regardless of whether these are carried out by the government or private sector entities. This is a crucial step as we explore private sector participation in nuclear power generation. There would, of course, be mandatory safety and security guidelines. And even if the nuclear material remains under the DAE’s ownership, certain protocols would need to be in place to ensure the DAE can retain ownership without assuming liability in the event of an accident. Establishing these clear boundaries will present legal challenges if the private sector is to play a role in nuclear power generation.

Another important issue would be land acquisition for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Often, communities resist having NPPs near their towns or villages, fearing potential accidents. The question then becomes—who will handle resistance, outreach communication, and compensation? While the government can acquire land to some extent, it typically sets up an industrial zone and allocates it to private companies. But with public resistance, it raises the issue of who will acquire land for private companies looking to build NPPs. For private companies, acquiring land and establishing facilities would be even more challenging. 

Additionally, Indian private companies lack the necessary expertise in designing and operating nuclear power plants, as they have never been involved in this sector. So, will they form joint ventures with foreign technology entities like Westinghouse, GE, or Électricité de France? If so, how would these joint ventures be structured? Will the government insist NPCIL be involved as an operator, as with previous deals like the French reactors at Jaitapur? These are questions that remain to be answered as the situation develops.

To conclude, developing a strong, independent regulatory framework and managing land acquisition, safety protocols, and private sector involvement will be key to successful private sector participation in India’s nuclear power generation. These challenges, particularly around regulatory independence and the acquisition of land amidst public resistance, will require clear legal structures and government support to ensure the safe, efficient, and sustainable development of nuclear energy in the country. 

How these issues are addressed will likely shape the future of India’s nuclear energy sector as India pursues the twin goals of Viksit Bharat by 2047 and net-zero by 2070.

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R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended

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I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/

Remembering Dr R Chidambaram

From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)

I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.

In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.

In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.  

Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.

At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.

Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.

Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.

The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.

At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.

It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.