Category Archives: ARTICLES

How and Why D&ISA Division was Created in MEA

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I write for India’s World Vol 1 Issue 1

How and Why D&ISA Division Was Created in MEA 

In early 1992, after five and a half years posted abroad, I returned to India with a growing realization of the shifting geopolitical equations, its impact on South Asia, and the challenges it would pose for Indian foreign policy that had been crafted during the Cold War years. These realisations were also shared by the Foreign Secretary and the political leadership, eventually leading to the birth of the Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.

A faraway view

My five and a half years were split between two postings: Geneva, where I served as First Secretary (Disarmament) at the Permanent Mission of India, and then Islamabad, where I was Counsellor (Political) at the High Commission of India.

Both postings provided a ringside view of changing geopolitics and its impact on South Asia.

In Geneva, the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention began to register progress as the Soviet delegation softened its position on on-site and challenge inspections. Mandatory and consultative verification was accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilaterally concluded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989 and in November, the Berlin Wall came down. In Vienna, talks began on for setting limits on conventional forces leading to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty the following year.

In 1990, tensions between India and Pakistan began to rise with growing incidents of violence and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The camps in Pakistan that had trained the mujahideen for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan were ready for new recruits. Following a crisis in summer of 1990, talks between the Foreign Secretaries were initiated to develop Confidence Building Measures, the first such talks since the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities, concluded in 1988. This led to the operationalising of the Hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) and another was set up between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Two significant conventional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) concluded in 1991 were the Agreement on Advance Notices on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres, and Troop Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts.

Coming home

By early 1992, I was back in Delhi and took charge as Director in the United Nations Division, responsible for dealing with Disarmament issues (UND). The work related to the UN in New York (General Assembly, Disarmament Commission), Geneva (negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other review conferences), and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). However, the world was changing rapidly, with new challenges and opportunities.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen states with Russia as the successor state. The bipolar world of the Cold War, came to an end. For the first time since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met at summit level (Prime Minister Narsimha Rao participated as India was a non-permanent member) to take stock of the global security environment and concluded, inter-alia, that proliferation posed a major threat to regional and global security.

On the margins of the UNSC meeting in New York, Prime Minister Rao and President George H W Bush held a bilateral meeting, concluded that the end of the Cold War provided India and the U.S. an opportunity to overcome their differences, agreeing to open a dialogue on strategic and nuclear issues that had been a source of friction since the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India.

 The dialogue commenced a few months later and continued through various ups and downs, culminating in the 123 Agreement permitting civilian nuclear cooperation in 2008.

Meanwhile restrictions on dual use items began to get tightened. In 1991, the Nuclear Suppliers Group convened after more than a decade and the following year, added Part 2 to their Guidelines covering nuclear-related-dual-use items and technologies that, in addition to having non-nuclear applications, could also contribute to the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) met to add to its Category 2 lists by adding more dual-use items and technologies, as also Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) above a certain threshold. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had concluded an agreement with a Russian entity Glavkosmos, for transfer of technology relating to cryogenic rocket engines. Despite the fact that cryogenic technology is for satellite launches and not for missiles, the U.S. sanctioned both ISRO and Glavkosmos, reflecting the focus on non-proliferation.

In 1992, India announced full diplomatic recognition to Israel with the opening of embassies in Delhi and Tel Aviv. Under the multi-track Arab-Israeli peace process underway, India became an extra-regional participant in the Arms Control and Regional Security track that worked on CBMs.

Within weeks of returning from Islamabad as Director (UND), I found that nearly three-fourths of my time was devoted not to UN related disarmament agendas but national and regional security and strategic dialogues as well as handling non-proliferation related sanctions and licensing issues for dual use items, especially relating to civilian nuclear and space programmes.

To take stock of the changes under way, an Eminent Persons Group was set with Prime Minister Rao’s approval in mid-1992, with serving and former heads of nuclear, space and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) departments.

Around this time, I put up a note to Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, explaining that the designation UND no longer described the changing nature of the work and proposed the establishment of a new division that would, in addition to the disarmament negotiations and the UN and IAEA related work, also deal with national security, non-proliferation and access to dual-use technology related issues. The proposal found acceptance and following some discussions, the new division was named Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA Division).

The nuclear dialogue with the U.S. was the first of many that followed. Discussing threat perceptions was a novel challenge for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and required much closer coordination with the Ministry of Defence. Soon, D&ISA Division had to get a Military Advisor and a Science Adviser deputed from the Services and DRDO respectively.

The evolution of an idea

Over the years, D&ISA Division also became the nodal division for handling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, a security dialogue platform, that India was invited to join as part of our “Look East” policy. As the global norm of non-proliferation gained greater traction, D&ISA division began to highlight the need for sensitising our private sector entities as some of them had been found exporting dual-use chemicals that led to adverse commentary in international media and US sanctions, even though these companies had not violated any Indian laws. An empowered group was established to develop lists of dual-use materials, equipments and technologies whose exports should be licensed only after due diligence and end-use assurances, laying the foundation for non-proliferation related export controls administered by the Ministry of Commerce.

India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and D&ISA Division became responsible for coordinating industry outreach with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers and with DRDO about winding down our chemical weapons programme.

The opening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva added the responsibility of developing the national negotiating position in close coordination with the Department of Atomic Energy. By 1995, it became clear that in order to keep India’s nuclear option viable, India could not rely on the 1974 PNE and needed to carry out a new series of nuclear tests. Withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations in 1996 followed by the nuclear tests in 1998 and working the negotiating strategy for India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power added to D&ISA Division’s work load. Together with the concerned territorial divisions, it handled the strategic dialogues with a number of countries including France, UK, Israel etc. that eventually led to the establishment of long-standing strategic partnerships.

An institution in itself

In late 2000, after nearly a nine-year stint, I left Delhi on a new assignment. India had established a new position of an Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and it was my privilege to set up the new office.

Over a quarter century later, it is gratifying to see that D&ISA Division has thrived as has the position of Ambassador for Disarmament. Many of my young colleagues who I had the privilege to work with, went on to serve in Geneva and Vienna, and head the D&ISA Division, (D B Venkatesh Verma, Suchitra Durai, G Dharmendra, Amandeep Singh Gill) with great distinction.

*****

What makes the India-France ‘Strategic Partnership’ Tick

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Published in the Hindu on February 1, 2024

The French President, Emmanuel Macron, was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day, making it his third visit to India, after his 2018 State Visit and last year for the G-20 summit hosted by India. Coming within six months of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit last year as the Chief Guest at France’s Bastille Day, it is clear that the two countries do share a ‘Strategic Partnership’ that is special. It is no secret that United States President Joseph Biden had been invited initially and his visit was to be followed by a Quad summit that had been accepted by the Australian and Japanese leaders when Mr. Biden declared his inability to travel. The fact that Mr. Macron stepped in readily speaks for the personal ties that he and Mr. Modi have established and the importance they attribute to the relationship.

Origins of strategic convergence

President Jacques Chirac was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day in 1998 when India established its first Strategic Partnership. In a significant statement, Mr. Chirac declared that India’s exclusion from the global nuclear order was an anomaly that needed to be rectified. The ‘Strategic Partnership’ was tested when India undertook its series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. France was the first country to open a dialogue with India and displayed a greater understanding of India’s security compulsions compared to other countries. It was the first P-5 country to support India’s claim for a permanent seat in an expanded and reformed UN Security Council.

India and France have valued strategic autonomy, in their own fashion. India adopted non-alignment. After the Second World War, France was one of the founding members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 and hosted the NATO headquarters; it withdrew from its Integrated Military Command in 1966 due to reservations over U.S. insistence on subordinating French nuclear deterrent to NATO and accepting any collective control that Gen Charles de Gaulle felt would dilute French sovereignty, forcing NATO to shift its headquarters to Brussels.

After the Cold War ended, both countries were quick to espouse the virtues of multipolarity. French discomfort with a unipolar system was clear when French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine described USA as a hyperpuissance and openly spoke out in favour of multipolarity, forming a natural convergence with India’s ambitions of seeking strategic autonomy. As a resident power in the Indian Ocean, France was quick to realise the geopolitical focus shifting from the Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific and decided on India as its preferred partner in the region. 

Both France and India share a common trait of ‘civilisation exceptionalism’ and pride themselves on their ‘argumentative intellectualism’ but have wisely refrained from preaching to each other. Though part of the western world, France, as a non-Anglo-Saxon nation, found it easier and more natural to engage with India on equal terms.

Building the Partnership

The nuclear dialogue established in May 1998 grew into a broader strategic dialogue elevated to the level to the National Security Advisers. From the original three pillars of nuclear, space and defence, the agenda gradually expanded to include counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and cyber-security issues. Convergence has also evolved on global challenges like climate change, reform of multilateral development institutions, a globally beneficial Artificial Intelligence, and as the Joint Statement indicates, ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza.

On the defence side, six Scorpene submarines have been built by Mazagaon Docks Shipbuilders Limited with transfer of technology from the Naval Group. Technology sharing memoranda of understanding and acquisitions of short-range missiles and radar equipment were concluded. Joint exercises between the navies, air forces and the armies were instituted in 2001, 2004 and 2011 respectively. The government-to-government agreement for 36 Rafale aircraft, salvaged out of the prolonged negotiations for the original 126 which were at an impasse, has been concluded. Its offset target of 50 percent (nearly Rs 25000 crores), has helped in building up India’s budding aerospace industry.

During Mr. Modi’s visit last year, an announcement regarding a further acquisition of three more Scorpenes with enhanced features of air-independent-propulsion and 26 Rafale M aircraft for India’s new aircraft carrier was made, with negotiations to be concluded by the end of 2024.

Mr. Macron’s visit saw the conclusion of an India-France for Defence Industrial Roadmap that fits in with the goal of atmanirbharta. Tata Advanced Systems Ltd and Airbus concluded an agreement to set up a final assembly line by 2026 for H125 civilian helicopters. A final assembly line for C-295 military transport aircraft has already been set up in Vadodara by the two partners. Collaboration between Safran, DRDO and its Gas Turbine Research Establishment is being stepped up for designing, developing, and producing an aircraft engine for India’s fifth generation aircraft (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) with 100 % transfer of technology. This is a major step forward from the agreement concluded with the U.S. to permit technology transfer to HAL to produce General Electric F-414 engine to power Tejas Mk2 fighter aircraft. However, the GE engine is a 1990s design while the Safran project will entail defining parameters, co-designing, engineering, certification, in addition to production. Akasa Air has signed a $5 billion agreement for 300 LEAP-1B engines to power its fleet acquisition of 170 Boeing MAX aircraft. This engine is a Safran-GE JV product and together with Safran’s Snecma engines powering Rafale and Rafale M, sets the stage for it to set up a maintenance, repair, and operations in India.

Cooperation in the space domain began in the 1960s with French assistance to set up the Indian launch facility at Sriharikota but languished in later years because of export controls. The strategic dialogue helped restart this cooperation and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and French Space Agency (CNES) now work on joint missions. The visit saw a new MoU being signed between New Space India Ltd, a Government of India company under the Department of Space and the commercial arm of ISRO, and French satellite launch company Arianespace for collaboration on space launches. In addition, with France converting its air-force into the French  Air and Space Force and India setting up Defence Space Agency, the two ministries of defence are looking to work together in optimising space domain awareness.

Broadening and deepening the partnership

The challenge for both countries has been to take the partnership out of the government domains into the commercial and civilian spaces. As a result, Joint Working Groups on a range of subjects covering agriculture, environment, civil aviation, IT and telecom, urban development, transportation, culture, and tourism have been set up over the years.

One of the success stories has been the growing number of Indian students now going to France for higher education. A decade ago, it was less than 3000 and today it is upwards of 10000. The target is now 30000 by 2030. The visa issue is being addressed with a five-year Schengen visa for Indians who pursue a post-graduate course in France. The operationalisation of the Young Professional Scheme under the Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement will help. Last year the University Grants Commission revised rules regarding foreign universities setting up campuses in India. Sorbonne University, established in the 13th century, is globally renowned, and has had a campus in the United Arab Emirates since 2006. A campus in India should be identified as a priority objective.

There are nearly 1000 French companies present in India including 39 of the CAC 40 (the most influential benchmark of performance in the French economy) while nearly 150 Indian businesses have established a presence in France. In the past, Indian companies saw the United Kingdom as the entry point for Europe; post-Brexit, France is an entry point for Europe and Francophonie!

‘Strategic Partnership’ does not require convergence on all issues but sensitivity so that differences, where these exist, are expressed in private and not publicly. This is where India-France ties, nurtured over the last quarter century, reflect maturity and resilience. 

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India in the South Asian Neighbourhood: Friendship or Friction?

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Published in Frontline dated January 26. 2024

The economic shock of COVID-19 in 2020-21 and subsequent escalating debt burdens, the ongoing Ukraine war now in its third year, and, in 2023, the eruption of the Gaza conflict, repeatedly jolted the economies of all countries in South Asia. The smaller and more vulnerable economies of all of India’s neighbours have been hit hard, leading to countrywide protests and, in some instances, even street violence in 2023. Maldives just had its election in September and in 2024, all South Asian countries (except Afghanistan and Nepal) are scheduled to go to the polls, adding a degree of political uncertainty to the mix.  

Of all the forthcoming elections, perhaps the Indian election is the most predictable. Most political pundits concur that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is headed for a historic third term though opinions differ on how many seats the BJP will win in the Lok Sabha and whether it will need coalition partners. In January, Bhutan is heading for a change of government; Sheikh Hasina is likely to stay put in Bangladesh though polarisation has risen significantly; Pakistan’s outcome in February is more uncertain given the role that the courts and the military may play; and in Sri Lanka, elections will only take place in September or later.

This churn in the region is occurring when there are fundamental structural shifts underway. Three relationships will be observed carefully by the neighbours: first, the US-China rivalry at the global level; second, the India-US emerging partnership; and finally, India-China relations that have not recovered since the nosedive it took in 2020 following Galwan. How these evolve and how India’s neighbours respond will influence India’s neighbourhood policies.

Legacy of British India

Historically, India has had difficult relations with its neighbours, in large part because of the legacy of the multiple partitions that it went through. Following three Anglo-Burmese wars over a span of nearly sixty years, from 1886 to 1937 Burma became a province of British India and thereafter a separate colony till its independence in 1948. The British East India Company’s conquest of Sri Lanka began during the last decade of the 18th century with the coastal areas and in 1802, it became a Crown colony, administered from Madras. Over the next two decades, the British gained control over the entire island introducing plantation crops like tea, coffee, and rubber for which large numbers of indentured Indian labour were brought in. Eventually, Sri Lanka became an independent country in 1948. The most traumatic partition was in 1947 that led to the creation of Pakistan in the name of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Even after East Pakistan seceded in 1971 to become Bangladesh, Pakistan remains the second largest country in the region and remains locked in a hostile relationship with India. Lasting hostility has in turn cast a shadow on any developments at a regional level.  

Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal were always independent and had a long tradition of trade relations and people-to-people exchanges with the neighbouring Indian states over the centuries. However, all three kingdoms had run-ins leading to wars with British India during the 18th and early 19th centuries. These conflicts ended with the establishment of boundaries between the three kingdoms and British India and in the process, the three relinquished sovereignty over their ‘defence and foreign affairs’ by accepting British ‘guidance’ through the appointment of plenipotentiary Political Agents, who in turn reported to the Viceroy in India.

This is the legacy that India inherited in 1947 as all the newly independent states struggled to consolidate their new found sovereignty.

Independent India’s challenges

As a buffer state between India and Afghanistan, Pakistan inherited the borderlands with Afghanistan and the problems of the Durand Line that divided the Pashtun homelands. The treatment of Hindu, Madhesi, and Tamil minorities with Pakistan (and post-1971 Bangladesh), Nepal, and Sri Lanka respectively, often became a domestic preoccupation for India. In the northeast, the restive tribes often sought to set up camps across the border in Myanmar as the Indian state sought to integrate these into the national mainstream, an unfinished exercise as recent developments in Manipur have shown. What this means is that India’s neighbourhood policies were, and remain, more intimately connected with our domestic policy than is often appreciated. On the flip side, societal and identity conflicts in India’s border states aroused interests in these countries that caused resentment in Delhi. Merely drawing lines on maps does not create sovereignties. British India was the paramount military power in the region and could enforce its will; a fragmented independent India, preoccupied with consolidating its own sovereignty over the 500 plus princely states and a war with Pakistan in 1947, has never enjoyed that unquestioned authority.  

The partitions also divided the economic space for a newly independent India. The creation of East Pakistan made India’s north-eastern states more distant and remote while the jute-based economy of the region was shattered. In the west, the sources of all the rivers flowing through Pakistan lie in India (and for the Kabul River, in Afghanistan) creating dependencies. India’s northern rivers basins of the Ganges and Yamuna are almost entirely fed by the rivers originating in the Nepal Himalayan ranges flowing southwards and then eastwards into the Bay of Bengal.

This legacy meant that Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood lacked both the economic and the military resources to deliver on its policy objectives that it inherited as the successor state to British India. As these countries struggled with their own sovereignty issues, their internal political squabbles often attracted Indian involvement. These involvements also left long term scars on the relationships. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 would not have happened without Indian political and material support and yet, less than five years after, there was a growing anti-India sentiment that was exploited by the military regimes that succeeded Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.

The struggle by the Tamils for their rights in Sri Lanka led to a violent insurgency, and the ill-advised deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka (from 1987-90 following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord) still rankles deeply. In Nepal, every political movement towards democracy has somehow involved India because it was the natural refuge for the asylum seekers, from King Tribhuvan in 1950 to the Nepali Congress leaders seeking democratic reform. None of the Maoists who waged a decade-long insurgency from the mid-1990s onwards ever sought refuge in China but took advantage of the open border with India. And yet, there remains an anti-India sentiment that surfaces repeatedly, stoked, and exploited by local politicians to demonstrate their nationalist credentials. Events like the 2015 economic squeeze by India (Nepalis call it a blockade) after Nepal adopted its new constitution leading to protests by the Madhesis in the Terai will remain a lasting pain point. Indian diplomats are often accused of arrogance and lacking empathy, earning them the unflattering sobriquet of a Viceroy or Pro-Consul.

The near-permanent hostility with Pakistan has meant that proposals for regional cooperation that are floated by India’s neighbours (SAARC was proposed by Bangladesh Gen Ziaur Rehman) often arouse Indian apprehensions. Even when India has overcome its reservations (especially under the Gujral Doctrine of “non-reciprocity”) and offered constructive proposals, these have often floundered, leaving India to come up with sub-regional initiatives. It is a good reminder of Tulsidas’s line from Ramcharitmanas when Lord Ram realises and declares: Bhay bin hoye nahin preet (there cannot be love/respect without a modicum of fear).

Modi’s India and ‘neighbourhood first’

On taking over as Prime Minister a decade ago, Modi declared a “neighbourhood first” foreign policy. He followed it up with his first two foreign visits to Bhutan and Nepal. These visits were successful but follow-up and economic delivery was lacking. Modi’s personalised diplomacy with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan and President Xi Jinping soon ran aground and since then, India’s neighbourhood policy has been episodic. The sole definitive action with respect to the neighbourhood from the Modi government has been the repeated postponements of the SAARC summit since 2016 after the Uri attack. However, the sub-regional initiatives like BIMSTEC (The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and BBIN The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative) promoted by India have been neither particularly noteworthy nor majorly successful.

One key reason is that India has not put forward a coherent policy for South Asia in any consistent fashion, preferring instead to deal with each neighbour bilaterally as this put India at an advantage. For the neighbours too, there were not many options. India was wary of any superpower presence in the region though Pakistan had joined SEATO and CENTO, two U.S. led military alliances. Development projects funded by India proceeded at the same leisurely pace as in India. The situation began to change with the growth of regionalisation, followed by globalisation. More significantly, China began to emerge as a global economic power and its footprint expanded, including in South Asia.

China had enjoyed close strategic ties with Pakistan since the 1960s but it also began to emerge as an economic investor. Now the other neighbours had a choice. A decade ago, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to fund strategic infrastructure like roads, railways, ports and power stations and transmission networks. Its deeper pockets and more efficient implementation made it an attractive partner. The economic presence was soon followed by political influence. During the Cold War, India had practised its own variant of the Monroe doctrine in the region but it becomes more difficult when its own neighbour that shared land borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar emerges as an economic superpower. Further, China did not have the complicated legacy of British India in the region and the intertwined minority ties with South Asia. This enables it to have a less emotive and a more transactional approach towards the region. In the last three years, there is a noticeable backlash against BRI in South Asia and elsewhere but Chinese presence in the region is now a reality.

During the last decade, Modi has been changing India’s image and how it is perceived. From kinetic retaliation for terrorist attacks originating from Pakistani territory to the alleged targeted assassinations of Khalistani terrorists on foreign soil, from doing away with Article 370 to an open espousal of majoritarianism and Hindutva, Modi wants to be the architect of transforming a soft, indecisive India into a more self-confident, assertive, and muscular Bharat. A third Modi term will sharpen and strengthen these trends. India’s neighbours are sensitive to the changes, as these are filtered through our neighbourhood policies.

Election season in 2024

The Maldives election last September brought in for President Mohamed Muizzu who had fought on an “India out” platform to distinguish him from his predecessor Ibrahim Solih, who had governed with an “India first” policy. Muizzu’s first announcement was to seek removal of the 70-odd Indian military personnel deployed there to maintain and operate two helicopters and a Dornier aircraft gifted by India. In December, he decided to pull out of the 2019 bilateral agreement for cooperation in hydrology, following it up by skipping the Colombo Security Conclave that includes India, Sri Lanka and Mauritius. Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in Maldives nearly two decades ago, every elected President’s first foreign visit has been to Delhi; Muizzu has already visited Turkey and Dubai and is now scheduled to visit China. Parliamentary elections due in 2024 might offer India some comfort, but it is too soon to predict.

Sheikh Hasina is poised to win a historic fourth term in Bangladesh in the elections scheduled on January 7. The main opposition party BNP is boycotting the polls and has mounted street protests. A harsh government crackdown has provoked criticism in the West. India has three key demands – protection of minorities’, no support to anti-India elements, and connectivity. Sheikh Hasina has been responsive, in varying degrees, on all three. At the same time, she has maintained close ties with China. As India-China rivalry sharpens, her challenge will be to avoid too close an embrace with either while not crossing India’s red lines.

The final round of Bhutan’s parliamentary elections is due on January 9 and the options will be between former PM Tshering Tobgay (2013-18) or former civil servant-turned-politician Dasho Pema Chewang. The question here is the progress in boundary talks with China that resumed last year after being frozen since the Doklam crisis. October also saw the first ever visit by the Bhutanese Foreign Minister to China. Meanwhile, Bhutan is also strengthening economic ties with India by planning a 1,000 sq km international city on the Assam border, connected by road and rail links. Gelephu is expected to be a green township with zero-emission industries. Bhutan’s opening to the world has so far been calibrated but there appears to a slight quickening of the pace to create economic opportunities for its youth who have been migrating out in recent years.

Pakistan has been grappling with multiple challenges that have forced it to turn inwards. Imran Khan remains behind bars and his party has seen many departures. Conventional wisdom indicates that Nawaz Sharif, who returned from exile with the blessings of the Army should get his fourth term. His earlier terms were cut short each time because of deteriorating relations with the Army. Has he mellowed and will the Army trust him are questions that will be clearer after the elections on February 8. Mr. Sharif will be keen to improve relations with India but the Modi government’s interest is limited to managing relations rather than moving towards resolution of historical issues.

Sri Lanka’s elections, in the last quarter of 2024, will take place in a polarised atmosphere. President Ranil Wickremesinghe, sworn in last year after President Gotabaya Rajapakse was forced to quit after a historic aragalaya (struggle) that galvanised the country, is his party’s sole MP and continues only with the support of the Rajapakse’s SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna). SLPP is adept at whipping up nationalist sentiment among the majority Sinhala middle class but the current preoccupation for the people is the economic challenges. Mr. Wickremesinghe is pushing for reforms and favours talks with minorities to bring about devolution that makes SLPP uncomfortable. The other two mainstream parties SJB (Samagi Jana Balawegaya) and SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) are mired in internal disarray.

Relations with the Taliban regime in Kabul are limited after India reopened its embassy in 2022, calling it a technical mission to coordinate Indian humanitarian assistance. The Afghan embassy in Delhi is shuttered and so far, India has not agreed to let Taliban post people to man it. Visas remain suspended. In Nepal, elections are due in 2027. The Maoist-UML coalition that took power in end-2022 proved short-lived. Within three months, Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) or the UML, had quit and Maoist Prime Minister Prachanda found a new coalition partner in the NC. Under the constitution, there cannot be a vote of confidence for the first two years and any political jockeying is likely to begin only towards end-2024.

Myanmar is caught up in its internal struggles after the military takeover in February 2021. The pushback this time has been much stronger in the past, possibly because even the limited political, economic, and social freedoms that had existed for a decade prior enabled the emergence of a middle class. The resistance this time cuts across ethnicities and in the north, has support from China. India has continued to work with the junta to promote its connectivity projects.

Regional elections are not the only source of uncertainty for South Block. On January 13, Taiwan elects a new president and another DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) victory will sharpen tensions with Beijing, impacting US-China relations. In Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will be struggling to win a third term in June and towards the year end, the UK will have a new Prime Minister. The US election on November 5 remains the most anticipated, especially if Donald Trump wins the Republican nomination. Election forecasters have their hands full in 2024, as do Indian diplomats.

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The Global Nuclear Order is Under Strain

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Published in the Hindu on January 3, 2024

To gain legitimacy, any global order needs to fulfil two conditions. First, a convergence among the major powers of the day; and, second, successfully presenting the outcome as a global public good to the rest of the world. The global nuclear order (GNO) was no exception but, today, it is under strain.

Lessons of the Cold War

The GNO was created in the shadow of the Cold War, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., leading the Western and the Socialist blocs, respectively. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the two came perilously close to launching a nuclear war, both President John F. Kennedy and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev understood two political realities. First, as the two nuclear super-powers, they needed bilateral mechanisms to prevent tensions from escalating to the nuclear level. And, second, nuclear weapons were dangerous and, therefore, their spread should be curbed. This convergence created the GNO.

During the Cuban crisis, a secret back-channel between President Kennedy’s brother Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, helped resolve the crisis. The first bilateral measure was the Hot Line, established in 1963, to enable the leaders to communicate directly. The Hot Line (later upgraded into Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres) was followed by arms control negotiations as the two nuclear superpowers sought to manage their nuclear arms race and maintain strategic stability.

To control proliferation, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. initiated multilateral negotiations in Geneva in 1965 on a treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Three years later, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), opened for signature. It began modestly with less than sixty parties but today, it is widely described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear order with 191 adherents.

The third element of the global nuclear order came into existence in 1975. India had chosen not to sign the NPT, and in 1974, stunned the world by conducting an underground nuclear explosion, or PNE. Seven countries (the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., Canada, France, Japan, and West Germany) held a series of meetings in London and concluded that ad-hoc export controls were urgently needed to ensure that nuclear technology, transferred for peaceful purposes, not be used for PNEs. London Club (as it was originally known) sounded inappropriate and later transformed into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, consisting of 48 countries today, which observe common guidelines for exporting nuclear and related dual-use materials, equipment, and technologies. Though Soviet Union and India enjoyed close relations, having signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971, U.S.S.R. was committed to upholding the GNO, and a founding member of the London Club.  

Sustaining the nuclear order

The GNO has held reasonably well, particularly on two fronts. First, the taboo against nuclear weapons has held since 1945. It is a matter of debate how far the U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control process helped preserve the taboo or whether it was just plain luck but the fact is that humanity has survived 75 years of the nuclear age without blowing itself up.

Second, non-proliferation has been a success. Despite dire predictions of more than twenty countries possessing nuclear weapons by the 1970s, (there were five in 1968 – the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France, and China) only four countries have since gone nuclear, i.e., India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Even after the Cold War ended, non-proliferation remained a shared objective and Moscow and Washington cooperated to ensure that Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan that hosted Soviet nuclear weapons and possessed some capabilities, were denuclearised. In 1995, the NPT, originally concluded for 25 years, was extended into perpetuity.

On other counts, the record is mixed. Arms control did not end the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear race; in fact, their arsenals grew from 28,000 bombs in 1962 to over 65,000 bombs in the early 1980s but the dialogue and some agreements provided a semblance of managing the arms race. Agreements like SALT I and II, ABM treaty, INF Treaty, START I and the New START were concluded. Since the late 1980s, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals have declined sharply, to below 12,000 bombs today, though much of this can be attributed to the end of the Cold War rivalry and the breakup of the U.S.S.R.

The two nuclear hegemons shared a notion of ‘strategic stability’ based on assured second strike capability, guaranteed by the enormous arsenals that both had built up. This eliminated any incentive to strike first ensuring deterrence stability. Arms control negotiations led to parity in strategic capacities creating a sense of arms race stability, and fail-safe communication links provided crisis management stability. These understandings of nuclear deterrence in a bipolar world outlasted the Cold War but are under question.

Changing geopolitics

Today’s nuclear world is no longer a bipolar world. The U.S. faces a more assertive China, determined to regain influence, regionally and globally. This rivalry is different from the Cold War because both economies are closely intertwined and further, China is an economic and technological peer rival. China has resented the U.S.’s naval presence in the South China and East China Seas and since the last Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, has steadily built up its naval and missile capabilities. These were on display in August last year to demonstrate changing power equations following Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. 

Changing geopolitics has taken its toll on the treaties between the U.S. and Russia. In 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and in 2019, from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on grounds that Russia was violating it. The only remaining agreement, New START, will lapse in 2026; its verification meetings were suspended during the COVID-19 outbreak and never resumed. Strategic stability talks began in 2021 following the Geneva meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, but collapsed with the Ukraine war. Last month, Russia de-ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to bring it on a par with the U.S., raising concerns about the resumption of nuclear testing. As U.S. relations with Russia went into a nosedive, the U.S. is facing a new situation of two nuclear peer rivals who are exploring new roles for more usable weapons. Moreover, Russian nuclear sabre rattling to warn North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the U.S. against escalation in Ukraine has revived nuclear concerns. The old definitions of strategic stability no longer hold.

The Cold War convergence on non-proliferation has run its course; also, nuclear weapons technology is a 75-year-old technology. The U.S. has always had a pragmatic streak shaping its policy approaches. It turned a blind eye when Israel went nuclear in the 1960s-70s and again, when China helped Pakistan with its nuclear programme in the 1980s. More recently, the nuclear submarine AUKUS deal (Australia, U.K., U.S.) with Australia, a non-nuclear weapon state, is raising concerns in the NPT community.

During the 1970s, South Korea began to actively consider a nuclear weapons programme, spurred by the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. However, France withdrew its offer to supply a reprocessing plant to South Korea under U.S. pressure in 1975-76 and South Korea was persuaded to join the NPT. Recent opinion polls indicate a 70% support for developing a national nuclear deterrent and 40% for reintroducing U.S. nuclear weapons (withdrawn in 1991) on its territory.

From 1977 to 1988, the U.S. actively subverted Taiwan’s nuclear weapons programme as it stepped up a normalisation of ties with China. As a nuclear victim, the Japanese public retains a strong anti-nuclear sentiment but there is a shift, visible in Japan’s decision to double its defence spending over next five years.

During the Cold War, the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella tied its European allies closer. Today, domestic compulsions are turning the U.S. inwards, raising questions in the minds of its allies about its ‘extended deterrence’ guarantees, especially in East Asia. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have the technical capabilities to develop their independent nuclear deterrents within a short time, given political will. It is only a matter of time before U.S. pragmatism reaches the inevitable conclusion that more independent nuclear deterrent capabilities may be the best way to handle the rivalry with China.  

The GNO is looking increasingly shaky.

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