Category Archives: PAPERS

Providing Direction To India-EU Relations

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Publication for Institute for Study of International Politics

Summits are occasions to provide a sense of direction and the 15 th India-EU summit to be held in virtual mode on 15 th July is no exception. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are fully aware that their meeting is taking place in unusual times when both India and EU are facing new challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated many trends, both political and economic, that were barely discernible when the last summit took place in Delhi in October 2017.

From 2017 to 2020
Recall, France had elected its youngest president in Emmanuel Macron and in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel won an unprecedented fourth term, pushing back decisively against the populist trend that had been gaining ground as UK under PM Theresa May had commenced Brexit negotiations. President Trump had taken over and his statements about ‘America First’ had only strengthened European determination for ‘more Europe’ as the way forward and a democratic India would be a key partner.

The 53 paragraph long Joint Statement that issued in 2017 provided a rich menu for cooperation – human rights, counter-terrorism, outer space, cyber space, climate change, renewable energy, sustainable development, skill development, education, migration, water management, science and technology – these were all areas where India and EU had or were committed to having bilateral dialogues. In addition, there were paragraphs referring to common positions on a host of other issues – G-20, WTO, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Middle East Peace Process, Myanmar, Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Africa – reflecting the wide range of foreign and security policy consultations.

The India-EU annual summit process began in 2000 and the twelfth summit was held in 2012. The thirteenth took place after five years and this time too, it is taking place after a gap of three years. Why these long gaps? The answer lies in the fact that though the menu has been vast, it lacks depth. Differences have persisted on fundamental issues that have prevented substantial forward movement. So, the 53 para Joint Statement may reflect good optics about the breadth of the relationship, the fact that the next summit is taking place after three years means that the depth is lacking and fundamental gaps still need to be bridged.

Getting Rid of Bottlenecks
Politics is like riding a bicycle; one has to keep moving forward because standing still is not an option. India and EU launched negotiations on an ambitious Broadbased Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) in 2007 but these negotiations stalled in 2013. In the run-up to the 2017 summit, efforts to overcome the differences failed and the Joint Statement merely “noted the ongoing efforts of both sides to re-engage actively towards timely relaunching negotiations” for a BTIA.

In seven years, India-EU trade has grown but remains much below its potential. Unlike with some other partners, India and EU enjoy a balanced trade relationship with bilateral trade (in goods) at over Euros 100 billion and trade in services adding another Euros 40 billion. EU companies have invested Euros 90 billion and Indian companies that came in much later have invested Euros 70 billion in EU states. During these seven years, new trade and investment issues have been added. Keeping negotiations at an impasse creates an illusion but the reality is different. Both sides need to display political leadership and commitment to get the relationship out of this morass. If a BTIA is not considered possible then the infructuous exercise should be terminated and more modest agreements salvaged in areas where it is possible.

Basis For A Reset
This requires both sides to undertake a serious internal review. India needs to assess the merits of an agreement with EU now that RCEP does not appear to be on the cards. Brussels needs to push more with individual member states to soften their stands on their pet product lines so that India does not get frustrated about carrying out 27 separate negotiations. COVID-19 is bringing about fundamental changes in international trade patterns and altering supply chains driven in the direction of greater resilience.

EU’s core strength lies in a 440 million strong affluent consumer market that provides it with considerable regulatory clout in areas where Brussels enjoys authority. In such sectors as food safety, environment and labour standards, industrial safety and now with GDPR in data privacy, Brussels has competence and has developed technical capability.

However political solidarity has been severely tested during the COVID -19 crisis as it was seen as a national issue. Instead of the old response of ‘more Europe’, member states reacted by putting up walls going against the fundamental tenets of free movement of goods, services, capital and people. This has forced EU leaders to undertake serious introspection about its internal divisions, between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’, between liberal democracies and ‘illiberal’ democracies, and between the ‘frugal states’ and the weaker economies.

In addition, EU also needs to contemplate a future with a weaker trans-Atlantic alliance. This affects not just NATO members but also the non-NATO EU member states. And more crucially, it forces the EU to figure out whether it can adopt a common approach towards China.

In 2012, China launched a new cooperation programme with central and east European countries and with the recent addition of Greece, it now stands at 17+1. Of the 17, 12 are EU member states. In march, EU adopted new foreign investment screening regulations to bring about greater intra-EU harmonisation. The underlying concern was that in a COVID battered economies, European companies should not become easy pickings for Chinese cash rich entities. However, states are bound to take ‘utmost account’ of the EC’s advice but retain the final authority as a sovereign right.

India is in the middle of fundamental changes in its relations with China too. Recent incidents have shown that the old modus vivendi has broken down. There are many new areas that can bring EU and India together in a more meaningful and productive partnership because of a shared faith in democracy and an open, rule-based order. To achieve such a result at the 15 th India-EU summit, PM Modi and Presidents Michel and von der Leyen must get the legacy bottlenecks out of the way and set clear directions for the future course.

Writings On The Chinese Wall

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Publication for Observer Research Foundation

There is an old saying – coming events cast their shadows before them. This is certainly true in India-China relations. For three years prior to the 1962 war with China, there were clear signs that disagreements on the border were becoming sharper but Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was unwilling to believe that China would resort to war.

And yet again, in recent years India has ignored the writing on the Chinese wall, assuming that the slew of agreements signed, beginning in 1990s would ensure a peaceful border. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was perhaps so convinced of the virtues of his personal diplomacy with President Xi Jinping over 18 summits since 2014 that the darkening shadows cast by the cumulative evidence of increasing incursions and what these implied were disregarded. Even as the official statements talked of disengagement to ease the 45-day stand-off, the gloves came off and more than 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the fighting at Galwan Valley in Ladakh on the night of 15-16 June. Unconfirmed reports put the number of Chinese casualties at over 40.

These are the first casualties since October 1975 when four Indian soldiers from Assam Rifles were ambushed at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh. In keeping with the three-decade old understanding, no shots were fired; the present casualties resulted from iron rods, batons studded with barbed wire, stones and hand to hand combat which only makes it more grisly. Why have things come to such a pass when India and China have concluded multiple agreements regarding maintenance of peace and tranquillity and confidence building measures during the last three decades? How did India fail to register the changing ground reality?

The current priority will be to restore normalcy to the border through negotiations leading to disengagement and restoration of status quo ante. However, the important challenge is for India to undertake a deeper examination that has been long overdue about the premises on which its China policy has been conducted in recent decades. Growing evidence in the last decade would indicate that these premises are in need of review and many of the understandings based on them have outlived their utility.

The 1988 Opening With China

The process of re-normalising ties with China after the 1962 war began in 1988 with the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when both countries agreed to put the boundary dispute on the backburner and focus instead on building economic, commercial and cultural aspects of the relationship so that a more conducive environment could be created over time that would enable both sides to address the boundary issue. A Joint Working Group on Boundary Question was also set up to keep matter under review.

The underlying thinking on both sides was that while neither side was in a position in 1988 to be able to achieve an acceptable solution to the boundary dispute, hopefully, after a passage of time, it would be better placed to reach an outcome that would be better and more acceptable. Such an assumption on both sides would only be natural and reflective of a sense of pragmatism that led to the shift in the relationship in 1988.

The first major development thereafter was the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, concluded in 1993. The clunky title reflected a compromise. The concept of a Line of Actual Control (LAC) had been suggested by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to Prime Minister Nehru in his letter dated 7 November 1959 “as the line up to which each side exercises actual control”. This was significant for settling the boundary dispute in the western sector while in the eastern sector, the Chinese leader suggested that the LAC coincided broadly with the 1914 McMahon line. Nehru rejected the notion because India considered the India-China boundary in the western sector to be defined by the 1865 Johnson Line, a point disputed by China.

Following the 1962 war, China asserted that it had withdrawn 20 kms behind its claimed LAC, a notion that India had never accepted. India took the stand that China had illegally occupied Aksai Chin area which was part of Indian territory. The language of the 1993 Agreement marked a shift by acknowledging the LAC. The shift was justified on the ground that the reference to the LAC was without qualifying it either as the 1959 or the 1962 LAC; this enabled India to claim that it interpreted the reference as its own version of the LAC.

Para 1 of the 1993 Agreement commits both states to resolve the boundary question “through peaceful and friendly consultations” and that pending an ultimate solution, “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides”. However, given that India and China did not share a common understanding of the LAC, the 1993 Agreement added “In case the personnel of one side cross the line of actual control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the line of actual control . When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment”. This fudge or creative ambiguity lay at the heart of the 1993 Agreement.

This was followed three years later by the 1996 Agreement on Confidence- Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. Since India and China perceived the LAC differently, any use of this term had to be accompanied with the phrase “in the India-China Border Areas”. Both sides agreed to reduce military presence in these areas and also added constraints on the size and nature of military exercises in these areas. Both sides also committed not to “open fire” within two kilometres of the line of actual control. Evidently this restraint was observed at Galwan even though more barbaric means were employed.

A significant addition was in Article X – “Recognising that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present Agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree to speed up the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control”. It reflected the realisation that differing perceptions of the LAC carried the potential for misunderstanding and conflict. The common understanding was to be reached through exchange of maps, an exercise completed for the middle sector (pertaining to the border falling in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) in 2001 as this was the least contentious; thereafter the process stalled.

Realising that the Joint Working Group on Boundary Question was unable to get around politically sensitive boundary issues, a new dialogue channel was added following PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003. Both sides agreed to appoint a Special Representative (SR) “to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement”. On the Indian side, the National Security Adviser has been the SR while on the Chinese side it has been the State Councillor; currently Foreign Minister Wang Yi also holds this position and is the SR. Twenty-two rounds of talks have been held between the SRs but clearly, the “clarification and confirmation” of the LAC as well as the contours of a “boundary settlement” have remained elusive.

There was a sense of optimism when the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question was concluded in 2005 but it turned out to be short lived. Among the principles identified were “the principle of mutual and equal security”, aligning the boundary “along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features” and safeguarding “due interests of their settled populations in border areas”. These were widely interpreted to mean that Arunachal Pradesh which had a settled population would remain part of India and in the western sector, India would have to make adjustments in keeping with geographical features so that Chinese connectivity through Tibet to Xinjiang was not impaired. However, the SR level talks failed to sustain the 2005 momentum and translate these expectations into forward movement.

By 2005, the number of incidents where patrols of both countries often came face to face had started growing. Accordingly, a Protocol to the 1996 Agreement on CBMs was concluded on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. Article IV of the Protocol defines the procedure for exercising restraint in such situations – On coming face to face, both sides were to refrain from advancing further, return to their bases, inform their respective Headquarters to enable consultations, not use or threaten to use force, treat each other with courtesy and refrain from provocative actions. However, these provisions have been ignored in recent years as there have been increasing reports of pushing and shoving and stone throwing causing injuries though neither side suffered fatal casualties till the present showdown in Galwan area.

It is clear that 2005 was the high point in terms of registering some forward movement, though incremental, in terms of managing the situation in the border areas. After 2005, summit level meetings have continued to take place regularly and some new agreements were also concluded but these did not further the boundary dispute resolution. The SRs have met regularly but were also unable to register progress on the boundary question. Part of the reason is that in recent years, the agenda of the SR’s talks has expanded and now encompasses the entire gamut of the bilateral relationship as well as exchanging views on regional and global developments, thereby diluting the focus on the core issue.

In 2012, an Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs was concluded. It provided for the Joint Secretary level officers in the respective Foreign Ministry(s) to “study ways and means to conduct and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between military personnel and establishments of the two sides in the border areas”. Art V of this Agreement states that they “will not discuss resolution of the Boundary Question or affect the Special Representatives Mechanism”.

The following year saw another Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation being concluded after a prolonged stand-off in Depsang in Ladakh. Art VI enjoined both sides not “to follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas”. It reiterated the need for exercising maximum restraint as agreed in the 2005 Protocol. Significantly, the 2012 and 2013 agreements did not reflect material progress on the LAC or boundary issue; these merely reiterated suggestions that were no longer working on the ground.

How The Ground Reality Changed
The future is always marked by uncertainty and a policy is an attempt to provide a map for the foggy road ahead. Looking continuously into the rear-view mirror for assurance that one is on the right road creates a bias that will lead to a crisis, exactly as has happened with China. Underlying political realities had changed dramatically from 1988 but Indian policy makers and leaders found reassurance in policy continuity.

In 1988, when both countries embarked on the new chapter in their relationship, Indian GDP was $296 billion (in 2010 dollar value) and Chinese GDP was $312 billion. In per capita terms, India was marginally better off. The defence budget of both countries was at par, at $20 billion each. A decade later, in 1998, Indian GDP rose to $421 billion while China moved faster to reach a trillion dollars. Indian defence spending rose to $24 billion while Chinese spending went up to $33 billion. This gap grew larger and in 2008, as Indian GDP reached $1.2 trillion, Chinese economy was nearly four times larger at $4.6 trillion. Indian defence budget was $44 billion while Chinese budget had reached $133 billion. During the last decade, the gap has further widened; Chinese GDP is estimated at five times that of India while its defence budget has climbed to four times that of India.

A similar gap was growing in other areas too. From near zero in 1988, bilateral trade registered a modest beginning, crossing $2 billion by 1998. By 2008, China had emerged as India’s biggest trading partner with a $41 billion turnover and the imbalance was evident in India’s $21 billion trade deficit. This has only grown further to over $50 billion at present, indicating that continued engagement in the current manner was placing India at a disadvantage on account of a non-level playing field.

In other words, the growing gap in capabilities across the board was an unmistakable trend that undermined the political basis of the 1988 policy. The basic assumption in 1988 that India would be better placed after a passage of time to achieve a more acceptable resolution to the boundary dispute was no longer valid. While it is true that India had registered considerable progress between 1988 and 2008 and had improved its standing vis-à-vis many countries but relative to China, India’s position had worsened.

As the account of the discussions on boundary CBMs indicates, it is around the same time that progress in these dialogue mechanisms began to stall. References to the 21 st century as the Asian century that included the rise of both China and India had been an accepted phraseology in bilateral statements but no longer found mention after 2008.

The LAC clarification process had stalled even as both countries stepped up patrolling. The number of “transgressions” reported by India began to grow to over 400 a year. India embarked on improving its connectivity infrastructure in the border areas. Since no progress had been made on clarification of the LAC and each side was engaged in more robust patrolling up to its perception of where the LAC lay, face-offs became more frequent. Transgressions became prolonged stand-offs, requiring diplomatic and political intervention. New agreements merely reiterated restraint but remained unable to address either the underlying reasons or impose restraints on patrolling. In short, it was just a matter of time that a face-off would turn violent and get out of hand and this is what happened on the night of 15 June.

A New Policy Reset
Currently, analysts are speculating more about the proximate causes that have led to the crisis. These span a range of factors – domestic compulsions on the Chinese leadership facing troubles at home, distraction from the criticism on China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, unhappiness with India’s statements following the declaration of Ladakh as a union territory last year, concerns about India’s expanding infrastructure in border areas, signalling aimed at growing Indian ties with the US as US-China ties remain locked into a downward spiral, or just part of China’s growing assertiveness also on display with Taiwan, Hong Kong and in South China Sea in recent months. However, the Indian analysis needs to dig deeper and examine the changed political drivers behind China’s behaviour.

Right now, both sides have taken firm stands but it is not in either side’s interest to escalate matters. Nevertheless, a prolonged stand-off appears likely. This will force India to review its plans on building infrastructure in border areas by ensuring adequate security and surveillance. In this case too, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi road had been in the making for years and occupying heights at vulnerable points to secure the road would have avoided the unpleasant surprise that faced us in 2020.

Since the 2020 incursions are seen as different from the recent incidents as being larger in scale and across multiple locations, it can only be concluded that the Chinese side wanted to unilaterally force India back from its perceived LAC. India has therefore sought a restoration of status quo ante, as in April. It is difficult to predict how and when this is going to be achieved through negotiations. The Chinese attempt in Ladakh seems to be similar to its salami slicing tactics in the South China Sea where the steady land reclamation has enabled it to convert atolls into islands with runways and missile defences, creating a new military reality. But suffice to say, China’s unilateral approach has forced India to rethink on the fundamental basis of the relationship by making it clear that the 1988 assumption is no longer tenable.

Therefore, what is needed is a thorough review of the three-decade old policy. It has become evident that an ambiguous LAC is unlikely to remain peaceful and tranquil. Creative ambiguity worked for a while but its time was running out, a fact that Indian policy makers should have foreseen but were somehow reluctant to accept. China did not face a similar compulsion because it had improved its relative standing and continuing ambiguity was to its advantage. Formalising an understanding of the respective perceptions is only the first step; then will come the harder challenge of resolving the differences. And in the meantime, a new set of CBMs will need to be worked out to guide activities in the grey zone of overlapping LACs, in order to prevent future incidents.

These negotiations are going to be long and contentious. Compared to the 1990s when the early agreements were concluded, today the bilateral relationship has become multi-dimensional providing both sides with additional leverages and also a stake in not allowing the situation to spin out of control. At the same time, areas of concern have also grown. In the past, it was China’s defence, nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan that remained a constant irritant for India but was never discussed; it still exists today and CPEC adds to it. However there is a host of other issues – trade imbalances, market access, foreign investment entry regulations, non-tariff restrictions on commercial activities, China’s growing footprint in India’s neighbourhood including in the Indian Ocean, developments in South China Sea, BRI, interpretation of free and open Indo Pacific and role of Quad, and many more, including some that both sides have not taken up in recent years but could be revived like Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang.

In sum, since the basis of the old modus vivendi is no longer tenable, both sides need to start by asking how they visualise their relationship in the coming decades.

US To Withdraw From Open Skies Treaty

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Publication for Observer Research Foundation

On 21 May, US President Donald Trump announced that US was serving notice of its intent to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). Concluded in 1992, the OST entered into force in 2002 and currently has 35 members (1) (Kyrgyzstan is a signatory but hasn’t yet ratified). Canada and Hungary are the depositary states. The reason provided is continuing Russian non-compliance with the OST which has led US to conclude that it is no longer in US interest to remain a party. Trump added that the US decision will take effect after six months (as provided in the treaty text) but US can reconsider if Russia returns to full compliance.

Unravelling Arms Control
The US decision had been anticipated and is in keeping with recent US decisions to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA, signed between US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and EU and Iran) on 8 May 2018, followed by the withdrawal from the US-Russia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) on 2 August 2019.

Two more nuclear related treaties are at risk. The New START treaty between Russia and the US imposes a ceiling on operational strategic nuclear weapons of 700 launchers and 1550 warheads each, was concluded in 2010 and is due to lapse in February 2021 unless extended for a period of five years. President Trump has indicated that he is not in favour of the extension.

The second is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which was concluded in 1996 but has not entered into force. It prohibits countries from carrying out nuclear test explosions but earlier this year US voiced suspicions that both Russia and China were carrying out low yield nuclear tests in violation of the understanding on zero-yield threshold. US has signed but not ratified the CTBT and there are indications that it may be planning to test.

Negotiating the OST
The concept underlying the OST is aerial reconnaissance flights by unarmed aircraft over each other’s territories as a means of promoting confidence, trust and stability between potential adversaries. It was first proposed by US President Dwight Eisenhower in mid-1955 in Geneva to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin but found no traction. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea was revived in December 1989 by US President George Bush and accepted by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations commenced between NATO and Warsaw Pact members supported by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, which continues to host the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna) and were concluded on 24 March 1992. It entered into force on 1 January 2002. Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in mid-1991, months before the break-up of the Soviet Union and 27 out of 29 NATO members are party to the OST.

The OST establishes a regime for conduct of short notice flights by unarmed aircraft over territories of States Parties in accordance with established “quotas” spelt out in the treaty taking into account the size of the country. For example, US has a quota of 42 flights, the same as Russia (it is a joint quota with Belarus) while Portugal has a quota of 2 flights. The quota defines both the number of flights that a country can mount as also the number of flights it can host. The latter is called a “passive quota” and the former, “active quota”. States Parties can form groups to redistribute their active quotas as long as the absolute ceilings are observed. Since 2002, nearly 1500 flights have been undertaken by member states. In recent years, US has mounted an average of 14-16 flights a year while Russia has mounted between 4 and 9 flights annually.

Time frames are stipulated for providing notice to the observed state with flight plans and possible refuelling stops which are needed, particularly across the large territories of US, Canada and Russia. The observed state can propose changes and there are rules regarding deviations. The kind of aircraft to be used by each state are already agreed upon as also the sensors to be mounted on the aircraft. Four kinds of sensors are authorised – optical panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras with real time display, infra-red line-scanning devices and sideways looking synthetic aperture radar. A copy of the data collected is provided to the observed state and other countries can also obtain access to the data. Periodic review conferences have been held where technical issues regarding developments in sensor technology are discussed to redefine approved lists.

Why US is leaving

While Russia and other countries have upgraded both the aircraft and the sensors, US surveillance aircraft modernisation has been held up for lack of funds. Part of the reason is that US is able to obtain equally good or better data from its satellites. No other country can match US’ satellite monitoring capabilities. Sharing of satellite imagery is restricted and accordingly managed bilaterally by US. For the US, the OST is not particularly useful as an intelligence gathering tool but the reality is that it was always intended as a confidence building and transparency measure. As tensions between US and Russia have grown, US has become more interested in restricting transparency over its territory.

Since 2015, US has voiced concerns about instances of Russian non- compliance in terms of either delaying clearances or imposing onerous restrictions. The recent report on compliance issued by the US State department cited instances of Russian non-compliance in 2019 by imposing a limit of 500 kms over Kaliningrad and creating highly restrictive flight corridors in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US has also cited undue restrictions on flights over eastern Ukraine Crimea. The stage was therefore set for the US withdrawal.

The US has been increasingly concerned that Russia is using its overflights over US critical infrastructure to develop actionable intelligence and possibly mapping it for possible future offensive cyber operations. In 2017, an overflight request over the Trump golf estate in Bedford (New Jersey) raised concerns in the White House. This led the US to conclude that Russia was converting the transparency measure into an intimidation measure by weaponizing it. Reacting with a tit for tat approach was not in US interest.

US allies have expressed regret over the US decision. Russia has bluntly rejected US allegations of non-compliance, calling it a pretext for US moves to turn its back on multilaterally negotiated arms control treaties, citing the JCPOA and INF Treaty as examples. However, it has refrained from any indications regarding its response. Clearly, the OST is of limited utility for Russia if US territory is excluded and limited only to Europe and Canada. The OST may limp along for a while even after the US withdrawal takes effect after six months but the countdown for it has begun.

NOTES

(1) Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

A Long Road Ahead

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Publication for Observer Research Foundation

As the 21-day lockdown announced on 24 March neared the end on 14 April, Prime Minister Modi delivered his much awaited address. Expectedly, he extended the lockdown by another 19 days till 3 May. Limited relief in districts where the disease is in check may be allowed after a week. Guidelines regarding these are yet to be issued.

The extension of the lockdown was inevitable. Even after 21 days, the spread of COVID-19 has continued, both horizontally and vertically. From 128 districts out of 729 that had confirmed cases on 24 March, the horizontal spread now covers 375 districts. The pace has continued to reflect a doubling rate of four days since 14 March when India crossed the 100 cases threshold. The last doubling from 3200 cases on 5 April to 6400 cases took five days and at these rates, the number of cases would exceed a lakh by the end of the lockdown. The major lacuna has been testing which has picked up only during the last ten days to about 18000 tests a day. However, the number of tests so far (2.3 lakh against the over 10000 positive cases) are about a fifth of what was needed to provide a better picture of both the vertical growth and its likely direction.

A Change in Modi’s Approach
This time there were two key differences compared to Modi’s address three weeks ago announcing the lockdown. First, it was preceded by widespread consultation with the chief ministers. This reflected an acceptance of India’s federal character and the fact that the district is the fundamental unit of administration. Any scheme or plan, in order to be implemented effectively on the ground across the country, needs a two-way up-down information flow through certain well established channels.

The second difference was the shift from the “jaan hai jahaan hai” sentiment to the “jaan bhi aur jahan bhi” objective, announced after the meeting with the state chief ministers on 11 April. Once again, it reflected an acceptance that while a national lockdown had been a top down decision announced without wide consultations and with a mere four-hour notice, it was not the solution and a staggered relaxation of the lockdown needed to be managed by each state government looking at the situation in each district. In coming days, the new guidelines will begin to delegate the responsibility of staggered relaxation to the state governments. Modi realised that even extending the lockdown was also better done following consultations.

The “jaan hai, jahaan hai” sentiment gave rise to a binary approach. Those supporting a lockdown became labelled as supporters of health security while those who asserted that a lockdown would only kill the poor person saved from coronavirus though starvation caused by economic hardship were believers in economic security.

The binary choice is a false one as it blunts critical thinking. It was convenient for the central government because instead of adopting an analytical data driven approach, it was simpler to motivate the people by evoking the image that India was fighting a “war” and victory demanded an unquestioning rallying around by the population. It fitted well with Modi’s governance style. The downside of it was that it also activated the panic virus which spread far from rapidly than the Coronavirus resulting in the unforeseen challenges (keeping essential services running, reverse migration, economic hardship of the vulnerable sections etc) and fumbling policy responses.

The reality is that India had been slow in developing its responses. India’s lead time was the month of February during which India had only three cases limited to Kerala, all of whom recovered. But that opportunity was squandered because of lack of coordination within government both at the centre and states, mixed messaging particularly by the ICMR, absence of a national policy and task force which mean that priorities and action points remained ill- defined and fuzzy. The 21-day lockdown was intended to extend the lead time for ramping up medical preparedness because Modi knew full well that the abysmal state of the health infrastructure in India would be overwhelmed very quickly unless there was a war like approach to enforce suppression.

On 14 April, it became clear that suppression had yet to show a conclusive downturn. More time was needed to build the health infrastructure as well as the database so the planners could get ahead of the curve. And so, the lockdown needed to be extended.

Changing the Governance Model
Before the national curve can be flattened, each state has to flatten its curve and the credit for it will accrue to state governments that demonstrate effective governance, use technology tools, employ grass roots outreach and have better information flows with a motivated administrative machinery. The centre’s role will be providing the fiscal space and at best, access to scarce equipment like PPEs and masks. Modi now understands (perhaps reluctantly) that if there is credit for successfully curbing COVID-19, it will have to be shared with state chief ministers whether from BJP or other parties. Note that now the models for tracking and controlling spread being talked of are the Bhilwara (Rajasthan) model, the Pathanamthitta (Kerala) model and the Agra (UP) model; it is no longer the one size fits all model designed in Delhi.

This is equally true for managing the lockdown exit. The economic machine of the state was brought to a shuddering halt on the midnight of 24-25 March. The resulting demand shock and the supply squeeze sparked a series of fall-outs including highlighting the risks of a crisis in some sections of the financial sector where money circulation has slowed down exposing unsustainable debts burdens. The support needed for the informal sector of the economy in terms of welfare, food and direct benefit transfers is very different from the stimulus and tax breaks needed for the organised sector. It is clear that the economic engine cannot be kickstarted as simply as its was switched off. And therefore, managing the exit out of the economic lockdown has to be gradual and fine-tuned but will require a high level of coordination between the centre and the states, with the latter taking up a major share of the management.

The fight against COVID-19 has just begun. It will continue over time. It is possible that in some areas, gradual relaxation might lead to a spike in infections leading to a reimposition of restrictions. This process could take months or even a year till effective vaccines and therapeutics are available. Even then, the story doesn’t end.

Viruses have a tendency to mutate and sometimes become endemic in some societies. We have seen this with the H1N1 which continues to afflict India after the initial outbreak nearly a decade ago. Casualty figures have averaged over a thousand a year and some years have been difficult, the worst year being 2015 when India had more than 42000 infectious cases and nearly 3000 people died. Just last January, six Supreme Court judges tested positive for H1N1.

Even as India weathers the current crisis, the long term challenge for the government will be to build a pandemic resistant infrastructure so that artificial binaries between health security and economic security are avoided and we are better prepared in future.

What India Needs On 14 April

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Publication for Observer Research Foundation

India is halfway through the 21-day lockdown announced by Prime Minister Modi on 24 March to tackle the growing challenge of COVID-19. At the outset, it was clear that the lockdown was not a cure. It was a drastic measure to break the transmission chain and also gain an additional valuable 21 days to prepare a plan and put in place systems to implement it effectively after the lockdown was lifted.

India had an invaluable lead time in February when only three cases were registered in Kerala between 30 Jan and 3 Feb, all students returning from Wuhan. The next round of cases began in March which included patients with history of travel from other parts of the world. During this period, the numbers in China went up from 10000 to 78000 and the disease spread to 60 countries with new clusters emerging in South Korea, Italy and Iran. Yet, other than putting into place screening measures for people coming from certain countries, little was done to prepare for the impending outbreak. Universal screening was introduced on 4 March; all visas for India were suspended after a week, followed by a ban on all international flights on 18 March.

During February, no plans for procuring or producing test kits were prepared because internal debates about testing criteria continued. Even as the global numbers crossed 100000 on 6 March (it crossed a million 26 days later), India struggled with plans for adequate safety equipment like masks, gloves and protective suits for the health service workers as well as estimates for essential equipment like respirators, ventilators and adequate beds in isolation wards.

Meanwhile, the virus continued to spread. After reaching a hundred cases on 16 March, it began to double every four days. After a trial run with a “Janata Curfew” on 22 March, the 21-day lockdown began on 25 March. PM Modi has since spoken twice, once during his Mann ki Baat radio address on 29 March when he “apologised” to the people for the hardships caused by the lockdown and again on 3 April when he exhorted people to light a candle or diya for nine minutes on 5 April at 9 PM after switching off lights, in an act of solidarity. In all likelihood, he will speak again on 14 April to inform the nation of the next decision, whether to continue, partially relax or lift the lockdown. On what will this decision be based?

We know that the initial decision was intended to break the chain of transmission. So has that happened? The current assessment is that COVID-19 has a Basic Reproductive Number (Ro) of 2.9; this is the number of people that each patient is likely to infect further. Breaking the transmission chain means bringing this number to below 1, implying cutting it by two-thirds or more. A conclusive determination can only be made on the basis of data. As on 3 April, according to ICMR, only 70000 tests had been conducted across the country. The officially declared increase in the number of cases continues its four-day doubling cycle. On the basis of this limited data, the transmission chain is yet to be broken. In coming days, the data set needs to be expanded significantly; testing needs to grow to a hundred times the number of cases to enable arriving at a definitive conclusion.

However, ICMR continues its flip-flop on tests. In addition to the more accurate real-time Reverse Transcription Polymerase Reaction test (rRT-PCR), a faster and simpler (though less reliable) serum test to detect antibodies is now gaining widespread acceptance. A positive result with this needs to be further verified by using the PCR test. However, ICMR is undecided and a protocol regarding the antibody test, about where this should be employed is still awaited.

On 24 March, PM Modi had announced a Rs 15000 crore package for rapid strengthening of the healthcare sector. The resources were intended to step up procurement of protective equipment, ventilators, build quarantine centres and train medical workers. Large orders have been placed for these but deliveries have yet to pick up. Ramping up domestic production is difficult during a lockdown because of supply chains of inputs – fabric, special coated synthetics, zips, pressure valves etc, down the chain and employment of labour at each stage; global supplies have become scarce.

It is correct to claim that the pandemic has to be fought on a war footing; however, without data and without protective equipment, it is like fighting a war blindfolded and without weapons.

Every war has its share of the unexpected. However, the impact of the lockdown on the economic chain, even if expected certainly did not anticipate the extent of the reverse migration of the migrant labour. It has thrown up new challenges of ensuring food security and adequate welfare measures. Partial reversals could ease the economic pain but would adversely affect the objective of breaking the transmission chain. Yet it is important to remember that economic pain can be reversed but death cannot be, whether due to disease or other aggravations.

It is likely that government may therefore consider a partial relaxation. Such a suggestion was implicit in the video conference that PM Modi undertook with the CMs of the states on 2 April. Yet a common exit strategy cannot be uniformly applied across all states because the spread of the disease is not uniform. From 18% districts (132 out of 729) affected when the lockdown was announced, the disease has now spread to 33% districts (238). Certain regions are more highly impacted even as there are areas that are clear. These would be likely candidates for relaxation of lockdown after 14 April so that economic activity can recommence even as careful monitoring and testing ensures that these districts remain green zones. It will also help in staggered harvesting.

Technology needs to be used extensively. Mobile phones enable location tracking, extensively employed in other countries for contact tracing provided it is accompanied by widespread testing. Road movement cross-verified with petrol/diesel offtake and mapped with disease helps anticipate and correlate spread with movement. Districts remain the fundamental administrative unit and it is here that the battle has to be fought and won.

Planning has to be done on the basis of tracking the disease using data to develop epidemiological models that can predict the movement of disease. Strategy implementation has to be done at the district level for which resource allocation and sharing becomes the state and central responsibility.

The lead time gained with the 21-day lockdown will come to an end in another ten days. It will not see the end of COVID-19 and more sacrifices by the people will still be called for. But hopefully, on 14 April, PM Modi will be able to provide the nation with a strategy based on scientific analysis developed as a result of consultations with states, based on a clear understanding of available resources at the national level. Therein lies the key to solidarity that remains the need of the hour.