India Faces Second Wave of COVID-19

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Posted on April 8, 2021

Publication for Observer Research Foundation

India is squarely into its second wave of COVID-19. Will it be able to manage it better compared to the first wave? That will depend largely on the lessons it draws from those experiences.

The second wave

The number of new daily cases registered has increased more than ten-fold from below 9,000 on 1 February 2021 to over 103,000 in the first week of April. During the first wave, the peak was in mid-September when India crossed 97000. This time, despite far more extensive diagnostic and monitoring capabilities, the rate of increase has been much faster.

The number of related deaths has steadily risen from below 90 in early February to over 440 but there is invariably a lag between rising cases and related mortality numbers. These numbers are likely to rise further in coming weeks. Medical facilities, especially intensive care unit (ICU) beds are increasingly coming under strain in Maharashtra where the second wave has hit hardest.

Mutated variants of the virus with a higher infection rate, pandemic fatigue and increasing Covid-inappropriate behaviour are cited as reasons for the second wave. The beginning of the vaccination programme on 16 January 2021 gave a sense of complacency. The government’s message of not letting the guard down is diluted by the huge election rallies in recent weeks with nobody wearing masks and the Mahakumbh in Haridwar that is drawing 30 million visitors daily, convinced that their faith will protect them from the virus.

Lockdown is not an option

The first wave was during a period of complete uncertainty about the virus.  The central government quickly took control. Though health is a state subject, decisions were centralised and often announced without adequate consultation with states. On 24 March 2020 a nation-wide lockdown was announced when India had 525 cases and had suffered 11 deaths. The lockdown was lifted on May 31, after 68 days, with the number of cases standing at 190,606 and the death toll at 5,408. The pandemic spread slowed but then quickly gathered pace, reaching a peak in the second half of September, before the numbers began declining from November.

However, even with a more rapid second wave, nobody is talking about a repeat of the national lockdown. That Brahmastra was used and the belated realisation of its economic downside means that there is no appetite for such measures. Delhi would rather let individual states take that call and face the fallout. In fact, the central government is desperate to get the economy back on track. 

The only solution is a rapid increase in vaccinations. In January, before the vaccination programme was launched, the target was to complete vaccinating Indians in the priority category numbering 300 million (consisting of 10 million healthcare workers, 20 million frontline workers, 140 million above 45 years and suffering from co-morbidities and 130 million above 60 years) by July (later extended to August) 2021. Since the vaccines need two-doses, this meant 600 million vaccinations in five months, over and above the normal vaccination drives covering children, pregnant women and for other infectious diseases.

India has a large immunisation programme that has led to its emergence as the largest vaccine producer in the world. Annual immunisation against nearly a dozen infectious diseases and the natal and neo-natal immunisations number 400 million doses annually covering about 60 million people. This means nearly 34 million monthly doses and the Covid-19 drive would add another 100 million to it. However, this target needs to be revised in the face of the second wave.

Ramping up vaccination

It is clear that the COVID-19 vaccination rate is far too slow. In the first phase, beginning 16 January for healthcare and frontline workers, the offtake was lukewarm. Confusion was generated by statements about Covaxin (developed and produced by Bharat Biotech) use in “clinical trial mode” even as Phase III trial data was awaited while Covishield (developed by Astra-Zeneca and Oxford and produced by Serum Institute) was given “emergency use authorisation”. In Europe, there were reports about Covishield not being given to age group above 60 years because of suspected blood clot developments. On 1 March, the government opened vaccinations for those above 60 and also for those above 45 years suffering from co-morbidities and on1  April, to all above 45 years.

Demographic data indicates that the above 45 year cohort accounts for only 22 percent of the population. While it is true that this age group accounts for 60 percent of the cases of infection and 88 percent of COVID deaths, the second wave is also hitting the younger age groups hard because they are back at work, in fields, shops, factories and offices.

To date, 80 million vaccinations have been given; the current rate is approx. 3 million daily. At this rate, the target of 600 million doses for the priority population by July cannot be met. If it is assumed that for the 800 million Indians above 18 years that need 1.6 billion doses, at the current rate, vaccinations would continue till November 2022!

Currently, there are about 50,000 vaccination points with a target of 100 vaccinations each. However, because of reluctance and lack of effective communication strategies, the offtake is much less at many centres. In addition, there is a wastage of vaccines, estimated at 7 percent nationally and reflecting wide variations among states. Some wastage is inherent in such a large scale exercise but in a war-footing, every vaccine ought to get used. This has added to anxieties, especially among states worst impacted. It is therefore hardly surprising that Maharashtra, Delhi etc have started demanding that the government open up vaccination to all ages or allow the states to set their own rules to protect their populations and control outbreaks in most affected districts.

It is clear that the second wave is moving faster and according to preliminary calculations, 1.7 times faster than the first wave. At this pace, it could go beyond 150000 daily cases before it peaks. Second, the idea that the case fatality rate (CFR) is lower this time is turning out to be a fallacy because the delayed-CFR (using an 18 day lag) indicates that it is as deadly as the first wave. This means that we may soon see rates exceeding the peak of 1200 deaths daily during the first wave.

Policy changes

The first requirement is to open up vaccination and accelerate vaccinations to 10 million doses a day; in a manner that retains priority to those above 45 years, but below 45 years would also be accepted for vaccination, according to local situation and suitable guidelines. This requires delegating authority to states for establishing vaccination points and opening up vaccinations to age groups below 45 years.  Guidelines for monitoring the vaccinations would continue to be prescribed by the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR).

At three million-plus vaccinations daily, the government’s monthly demand of 100 million doses already exceeds the current production capacity of Serum Institute (SII) and Bharat Biotech (BB) that currently stands at 65 million and four million doses a month respectively. According to a report tabled by Department of Biotechnology in Rajya Sabha on 8 March, 2021, SII capacity is to go up to 100 million and BB to 10 million by mid-2021. Beyond that, the two companies have asked the central government for financial assistance to undertake scaling up production.

The central government has no choice in this matter. It had established a national task force to expand vaccine production under the Department of Biotechnology last year that has helped in development of diagnostics and promoted R&D for vaccine development. But the requirement now is different. The first priority is to fund an immediate expansion of production of the two approved vaccines, Covishield and Covaxin.

The second priority is to move forward on the approvals of the Russian vaccine Sputnik V for which the Russian company, Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) has tied up with five Indian vaccine manufacturers to produce a total of 850 million doses in 2021. There are at least five other vaccines in the Indian pipeline, being developed by Biological E, Zydus Cadilla, Gennova Biopharmaceuticals, SII and BB’s nasal vaccine.

Meanwhile the single shot Johnson and Johnson should also be considered for early use, especially if Biological E is going to produce it in India. If the government finds it too expensive, its use can be allowed for the private sector. Large corporates will be glad to take on the responsibility for their workers and their families if they can be certain that their schedules will be spared the Covid outbreak disruptions.

The national wastage levels are estimated at 7 percent, with considerable variation among states. Opening up vaccination will put an end to this avoidable waste.

Current testing levels need to increase rapidly. The current level of 1.1 million tests daily is less than the 1.5 million tests conducted daily last September-October. With prices being much lower now, there is no reason why the testing numbers should not go to 2 million or even higher.

Finally, India has only undertaken sequencing of 11000, a fraction of 900000 genomes sequenced, of which nearly half are by US and UK. Large scale sequencing helps in early tracking of variants so that the mutations can be analysed. The ICMR labs are best suited to address this shortcoming. This will also help the Indian vaccine developers.

Finally, the most important lesson of the first wave is the need to change the mindset-from centralising control to delegating responsibility. In order to have a whole of government approach, the central government needs to focus on what only it can do and rely on the state governments to manage the ground situation. Local authorities are also better able to tailor communication strategies specific to demographic groups to ensure higher vaccination rates.

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Nuclear Risks In Asia

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In conversation with Lt Gen Amit Sharma (Former C-in-C, Strategic Force Command), Hannah Haegeland (Sandia National Laboratories), Dr Manpreet Sethi (Distinguished Fellow, Centre For Air Power Studies) and Dr Toby Dalton (Co-Director and Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment) for CSDR

@CSDR_India, @HappymonJacob, @HHaegeland, @manpreetsethi01, @toby_dalton

We talk about assessing nuclear risks, India-Pakistan, India-China, advanced technologies, cyber threats, missile defences, no-first-use policies and prospects for arms control and stability talks.

In Kabul, be ready for political uncertainty

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Published in Hindustan Times on 26th March, 2021

Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Haneef Atmar, was in Delhi this week to brief Indian authorities on the recent spurt in diplomatic activity as the Joe Biden administration approaches the May deadline for United States (US) troops to exit Afghanistan. The problem is that the intra-Afghan peace talks have barely moved forward since the Doha agreement signed a year ago between U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Barader and violence levels have been steadily rising, especially since last October.

US policy shifts

Biden is the third president to deal with the challenge of bringing US troops back home. In 2009, Barack Obama described Afghanistan as “the necessary war that U.S. must win”. He approved a surge in troop presence, from 55,000 to over 100,000 soldiers, and also quadrupled the number of drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan but U.S. failed to blunt the Taliban insurgency. By May 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Obama realised that the real failure lay not in transforming Afghanistan but in changing Pakistan’s policy of continuing to provide sanctuaries to Taliban even while claiming credit as major U.S. partner in stabilising Afghanistan. Frustrated, he reduced the troop presence to 8500 by the time he left office in 2017.

Announcing his policy in August 2017, Donald Trump said that though his “original instinct was to pull out”, he had been persuaded by Pentagon to push for “an honourable and enduring outcome” and added 5000 troops while easing restrictions on use of airpower. However, after a year, he too changed track and Khalilzad was appointed to open negotiations with the Taliban that eventually led to the February 2020 deal. By the time Trump left, US troops were reduced to 2500.

The title of the deal – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA – showed that Taliban’s ideology had not changed and the deal was doomed to failure. Yet, such was the willingness to suspend disbelief that Khalilzad successfully persuaded everyone that it was “a peace deal” and not a “US withdrawal deal”, and the mouse he pulled out of the hat was a rabbit. A year later, that uncomfortable reality can’t be denied. While no American soldiers have died in combat in Afghanistan in last twelve months, the monthly death toll is 800 Afghan security forces and 250 Afghan civilians.

A new peace plan

The Biden administration is therefore seeking a “responsible withdrawal”. In an interview last week, Biden said that in view of the prevailing situation, it is difficult for the US to leave by May and a short extension may be needed. A new peace plan has been developed and Khalilzad retained to pull another rabbit out of a hat.

The new plan envisages replacing the present government by a transitional government that includes the Taliban, and establishing a 21-member commission (including 10 Taliban nominees) to draft a new constitution. Taliban and government should reach an agreement for a 90-day “significant reduction in violence” to create a conducive environment for diplomatic efforts. To energise the stalled Doha talks, Turkey has been invited to host a meeting between Taliban and the Afghan government and other representatives to work this out. A United Nations (UN) conference (on the lines of the Bonn Conference in 2001 that worked out the political road map for a post-Taliban Afghanistan) involving US, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India, along with Taliban and other Afghan groups is proposed to discuss a unified approach.

Renewed diplomacy

UN Secretary General has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to lead the UN efforts and prepare for the international conference. Arnault knows Afghanistan well, having been there from 2002-06, as Deputy and then head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

Last week, Moscow hosted a meeting of the expanded troika (U.S., China, Pakistan and Russia) together with Taliban and Afghan government and other leaders led by Abdullah Abdullah, head of the High Council for National Reconciliation. While the intra-Afghan talks were contentious, the four ‘extended troika’ states issued a joint statement recognising the Afghan peoples desire for peace, calling for a reduction in violence on all sides, expediting negotiations for a political settlement, urging Taliban not to launch a Spring offensive and underlining that they do not support a return to the Islamic Emirate system.

President Ashraf Ghani is unwilling to step down to make way for a transitional government, suggesting early elections instead but the Taliban are not interested in the electoral route. Last two elections in Afghanistan were marred by controversy which were resolved only because US leaned heavily on Ghani and Abdullah to share power instead. A number of prominent Afghan leaders, unhappy with Ghani, have supported a transition as have Russia, Iran and Pakistan, leaving Ghani with no options.

The political reality is the Taliban had more loyal and consistent backers in Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence, while the Kabul government steadily lost legitimacy because of its own incompetence and disunity, and because its backers in the West eventually lost patience and interest. By end-2021, the US may have ended its longest war, but for Afghanistan, the uncertainties are only increasing.

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A Flurry Of Diplomatic Activity On Afghanistan

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Article for Observer Research Foundation on 21st March, 2021

A flurry of diplomatic activity on Afghanistan has begun, catalysed by the approaching May deadline for the U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan under the agreement signed on 29 February last year by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha.

The problem is that a year later, the Doha agreement is in shambles. The intra-Afghan dialogue that was supposed to begin in March finally began in September and has not made progress. Taliban had committed to cut their ties with Al Qaeda but recent statements by Afghan and U.S. officials indicate that this has not happened. Meanwhile, violence levels in Afghanistan have risen sharply in recent months. A recent UN report indicated 3035 civilian deaths and 5785 injured during 2020 with Taliban held responsible for 45 percent of the casualties.

Biden’s options

President Biden’s options are limited. He can stick to the original withdrawal date but it is a foregone conclusion that the Kabul government will not be able to last very long and the country will descent into a civil war. The option of extending the stay unilaterally means that the Taliban may resume targeting U.S. troops, something they have refrained from since the Doha deal. A third option is to negotiate a short extension with the Taliban by offering them a share in governance in return for a reduction in violence.

Khalilzad has been asked to stay on to explore the third option and kickstart the intra-Afghan peace negotiations by suggesting that a Transition Government, including the Taliban, replace the current regime in Kabul, and the UN convene an international conference with key global and regional players, and the Afghan groups, a kind of Bonn 2, somewhat reminiscent of the Bonn conference convened in November 2001 where the post-Taliban political arrangements were concluded.

Diplomacy picks up

The rationale for the U.S. approach was spelt out in identical letters by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah. It expressed concern about the growing levels of violence and shared the bleak U.S. assessment that after a U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban were likely to make rapid territorial gains unless there was a serious attempt to restart and accelerate the peace process. The new peace plan was shared by Khalilzad with Afghan leaders and Taliban in early March in Kabul and Doha respectively. It contains a roadmap to an inclusive transition government, the terms for a significant reduction in violence leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and drafting a new constitutional framework. In the larger interest, President Ghani is expected to make the sacrifice and step down. UN has been requested to convene a Foreign Minister level conference inviting the Afghan groups, China, India, Iran, Russia and the U.S. to discuss a unified approach to a durable peace.

Turkey has conveyed willingness to host the UN convened conference, possibly in April, and also a March conference between Afghan government and leaders from Kabul and the Taliban to arrive at an agreement on the transition arrangements. UN Secretary general has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative. Arnault was in Kabul from 2002-06, first as Deputy and then as Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Those were the hopeful days, though by 2006, Taliban had announced their return with a spate of suicide attacks and IEDs.

Moscow added to the diplomatic activity by convening a conference of the ‘expanded troika’ – China, Pakistan, U.S. and Russia together with Afghan leaders and the Taliban on 18 March, with intra-Afghan talks continuing on 1the following two days. The highlight was a joint statement by the four Special Representatives – Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wang Yu, Sadiq Mohammed and host Zamir Kabulov on the first day declaring that they “do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate” system that the Taliban had introduced. The joint statement recognised that the Afghan people desired peace, called for reduction in violence from all sides, asked the Taliban not to launch the Spring offensive and reiterated their call for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan government has reacted positively emphasising the Islamic Republic is the only inclusive and acceptable structure that can ensure equality and pluralism and accommodates the diversity of Afghanistan and provides stability. Taliban have responded, saying that peace talks should be expedited and U.S. should stick to its withdrawal date.

A limited consensus

However, there is a growing momentum behind the call for Ghani’s departure. Within Afghanistan, many leaders like Karzai, Qanooni, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Sayyaf etc would be happy to see Ghani go. Among the international community, U.S. sees Ghani now as an obstacle to peace and Russia, Iran and Pakistan have always seen him as too pro-U.S. Ghani has responded by suggesting that he is ready to hold early elections (these are due in 2024) and hand over power to any elected government. However, the 2019 election saw an abysmal turnout of 20 percent and the current situation is no better. Moreover, Taliban are not inclined to go the electoral route.

However, the limited consensus breaks down thereafter and Bonn 2 is not like Bonn 1. There are fundamental differences and internal changes. At Bonn 1, the four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation with these four groups in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are fighting a bloody war. Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence.

The most important internal factor is Afghan demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30 years. This large cohort has come of age post-2002 and is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears and they are united in not accepting an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

India’s role

Since 2002, India has undertaken an extensive economic cooperation programme at a cost of $ 3 billion. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours. At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.

The Biden administration realises that it needs diplomacy to ensure a managed exit from Afghanistan. It needs Russia, Pakistan and Iran (as well as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) to lean on the Taliban to agree to a short U.S. extension; it needs Russia to lean on Ghani to make the sacrifice, and it needs the UN to come back and take over the peace process, thereby enlarging the number of stakeholders. Once the Taliban join a transitional government, they should wind up the Doha office and move to Kabul so that future Afghan talks will be Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled. 

However, whether this flurry of diplomatic activity can bring lasting peace to a country that has experimented with monarchy, a socialist republic, a communist rule, an Islamic Emirate and an Islamic Republic over the last 70 years, remains  difficult to predict.

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https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/flurry-diplomatic-activity-afghanistan/

The Vital But Delicate Task of Reviving the Iran Deal

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Pubished in The Hindu on 2nd March, 2021

Of all the foreign policy challenges facing the Joe Biden administration, none is more critical than salvaging the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or the Iran nuclear deal) that has been unravelling over the last three years when Donald Trump unilaterally discarded it. It also seems the most straightforward because Mr. Biden has consistently advocated a return to the JCPOA provided Iran returns to full compliance; Iran has always reiterated its commitment to the JCPOA maintaining that the steps it took are reversible as long as the United States lifts the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration since 2018. And yet, it is complicated and time is running out as both Iran and the US struggle to overcome the impasse.

US policy reversal

JCPOA was the result of prolonged negotiations from 2013 and 2015 between Iran and P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union). It happened, thanks to the backchannel talks between the U.S. and Iran, quietly brokered by Oman, in an attempt to repair the accumulated mistrust since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Former U.S. President Barack Obama described the JCPOA as his greatest diplomatic success. Iran was then estimated to be months away from accumulating enough highly enriched uranium to produce one nuclear device. JCPOA obliged Iran to accept constraints on its enrichment programme verified by an intrusive inspection regime in return for a partial lifting of economic sanctions. Faced with a hostile Republican Senate, Mr Obama was unable to get the nuclear deal ratified but implemented it on the basis of periodic Executive Orders to keep sanction waivers going.

Mr. Trump had never hidden his dislike for the JCPOA calling it a “horrible, one sided deal that should have never, ever been made”. After ranting about it for a year, he finally pulled the plug on it in May 2018 and embarked on a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ to coerce Iran back to the negotiating table. The U.S. decision was criticised by all other parties to the JCPOA (including the European allies) because Iran was in compliance with its obligations, as certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

For the first year after the US withdrawal, Iran’s response was muted as the E-3 (France, Germany, the U.K.) and the EU promised to find ways to mitigate the U.S. decision. But by May 2019, Tehran’s ‘strategic patience’ was wearing out as the anticipated economic relief from E-3/EU failed to materialise. As the sanctions began to hurt, Tehran shifted to a strategy of ‘maximum resistance’.

The unravelling of the JCPOA

On the nuclear front, beginning in May 2019, Iran began to move away from JCPOA’s constraints incrementally: exceeding the ceilings of 300kg on low-enriched uranium and 130 MT on heavy-water; raising enrichment levels from 3.67% to 4.5%; stepping up research and development on advanced centrifuges; resuming enrichment at Fordow; and violating limits on the number of centrifuges in use. Finally, in January 2020, following the drone strike on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Gen Qasem Soleimani, Tehran announced that it would no longer observe JCPOA’s restraints though its cooperation with the IAEA would continue.

Tensions rose as the U.S. pushed ahead with its unilateral sanctions, widening their scope to cover nearly all Iranian banks connected to the global financial system, industries related to metallurgy, energy and shipping, individuals related to the defence, intelligence and nuclear establishments and even senior political leaders including the Supreme Leader and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. By end-2020, the U.S. had imposed nearly 80 rounds of sanctions targeting close to 1,500 individuals and entities.

Events in Iran

This came on top of COVID-19 that affected Iran badly, with 1.6 million infections and more than 60000 deaths. Iranian economy contracted by 7% in 2019 and another 6% in 2020. In mid-2020, Iran was shaken by a series of unexplained fires and blasts at a number of sensitive sites including one at the Natanz nuclear facility and another at Khojir, a missile fuel fabrication unit. The damage at Natanz, described as ‘sabotage, was significant, leading Tehran to announce that it would be replaced by a new underground facility.

Last November, Mohsen Fakrizadeh, a senior nuclear scientist and head of the Research and Innovation Organisation in the Iranian Defence Ministry was killed outside Tehran in a terrorist attack amid rumours of external intelligence agencies’ involvement. Days later, Iranian Parliament, dominated by the conservatives, passed a bill seeking enrichment to be raised to 20%, acceleration of deploying new cascades and suspending implementation of some of the special inspection provisions with the IAEA within two months if sanctions relief was not forthcoming.

No Appetite for Talks

Clearly, Mr Trump’s policy may have provided comfort to Israel’s leader Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohamad bin Salman, but it failed to bring Iran back to the negotiating table and only strengthened the hardliners. Iran has suffered and there is no appetite for more negotiations. The E-3’s promised relief Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), created in 2019 to facilitate limited trade with Iran has been a disappointment; its first transaction only took place in March 2020. EU-Iran trade fell from Euros 18 billion in 2018 to less than a third in in 2019 and dropped further last year.

A recent IAEA report confirmed that 20% enrichment had begun as had production of uranium metal at Isfahan. However, a recent visit by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi enabled a ‘technical understanding’ to postpone Iran’s withdrawal from the Additional Protocol (that it had voluntarily accepted in 2015) by three months. Moreover, Iranian elections are due in June and it is likely that President Hassan Rouhani’s successor may not be from the ‘moderate’ camp. Though the nuclear dossier is controlled by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he too had to wait for the moderate Rouhani/Zarif combine to be elected in 2013 for JCPOA negotiations to commence.

If the U.S. waits for Iran to return to full compliance before lifting sanctions or Iran waits for the U.S. to restore sanctions relief before returning to full compliance, it can only lead to one outcome – the collapse of JCPOA with Iran going nuclear like North Korea; an outcome that would create major reverberations in the region and beyond. Only good intentions won’t be enough to overcome this impasse.

Overcoming the Impasse

The Biden administration has made a good start by appointing Robert Malley as the U.S. Special Envoy for Iran but he will need help. Positive steps along multiple tracks are necessary for creating a conducive atmosphere. Release of European and American nationals currently in custody in Iran would help. Clearing Iran’s applications to the International Monetary Fund for COVID-19 relief and for supply of vaccines under the international COVAX facility can be done relatively easily. Oman’s quiet facilitation helped create the positive environment for the JCPOA. After the Al Ula summit, Qatar and Kuwait too are well placed to play a diplomatic role and together, they can urgently explore the possibilities for forward movement in Yemen, with help from the EU and the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths.

The E-3/EU need to fast track deals worth several hundred million euros stuck in the INSTEX pipeline, with a visible nod from the U.S. Not all U.S. sanctions can be lifted instantly but reversing Trump’s Executive Order of May 8, 2018 is possible as also removing sanctions on Iranian political leaders; both would send a positive signal. If not with Iran, the U.S. should share with E-3/EU a 45-60 day time frame for progressive restoration of sanctions relief. Meanwhile, Iran needs to refrain from any further nuclear brinkmanship. IAEA and E-3/EU should work on a parallel reversal of steps taken by Iran to ensure full compliance with the JCPOA. Brussels has long wanted to be taken seriously as an independent foreign policy actor; it now has the opportunity to take a lead role.

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