US To Withdraw From Open Skies Treaty

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Publication for Observer Research Foundation

On 21 May, US President Donald Trump announced that US was serving notice of its intent to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). Concluded in 1992, the OST entered into force in 2002 and currently has 35 members (1) (Kyrgyzstan is a signatory but hasn’t yet ratified). Canada and Hungary are the depositary states. The reason provided is continuing Russian non-compliance with the OST which has led US to conclude that it is no longer in US interest to remain a party. Trump added that the US decision will take effect after six months (as provided in the treaty text) but US can reconsider if Russia returns to full compliance.

Unravelling Arms Control
The US decision had been anticipated and is in keeping with recent US decisions to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA, signed between US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and EU and Iran) on 8 May 2018, followed by the withdrawal from the US-Russia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) on 2 August 2019.

Two more nuclear related treaties are at risk. The New START treaty between Russia and the US imposes a ceiling on operational strategic nuclear weapons of 700 launchers and 1550 warheads each, was concluded in 2010 and is due to lapse in February 2021 unless extended for a period of five years. President Trump has indicated that he is not in favour of the extension.

The second is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which was concluded in 1996 but has not entered into force. It prohibits countries from carrying out nuclear test explosions but earlier this year US voiced suspicions that both Russia and China were carrying out low yield nuclear tests in violation of the understanding on zero-yield threshold. US has signed but not ratified the CTBT and there are indications that it may be planning to test.

Negotiating the OST
The concept underlying the OST is aerial reconnaissance flights by unarmed aircraft over each other’s territories as a means of promoting confidence, trust and stability between potential adversaries. It was first proposed by US President Dwight Eisenhower in mid-1955 in Geneva to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin but found no traction. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea was revived in December 1989 by US President George Bush and accepted by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations commenced between NATO and Warsaw Pact members supported by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, which continues to host the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna) and were concluded on 24 March 1992. It entered into force on 1 January 2002. Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in mid-1991, months before the break-up of the Soviet Union and 27 out of 29 NATO members are party to the OST.

The OST establishes a regime for conduct of short notice flights by unarmed aircraft over territories of States Parties in accordance with established “quotas” spelt out in the treaty taking into account the size of the country. For example, US has a quota of 42 flights, the same as Russia (it is a joint quota with Belarus) while Portugal has a quota of 2 flights. The quota defines both the number of flights that a country can mount as also the number of flights it can host. The latter is called a “passive quota” and the former, “active quota”. States Parties can form groups to redistribute their active quotas as long as the absolute ceilings are observed. Since 2002, nearly 1500 flights have been undertaken by member states. In recent years, US has mounted an average of 14-16 flights a year while Russia has mounted between 4 and 9 flights annually.

Time frames are stipulated for providing notice to the observed state with flight plans and possible refuelling stops which are needed, particularly across the large territories of US, Canada and Russia. The observed state can propose changes and there are rules regarding deviations. The kind of aircraft to be used by each state are already agreed upon as also the sensors to be mounted on the aircraft. Four kinds of sensors are authorised – optical panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras with real time display, infra-red line-scanning devices and sideways looking synthetic aperture radar. A copy of the data collected is provided to the observed state and other countries can also obtain access to the data. Periodic review conferences have been held where technical issues regarding developments in sensor technology are discussed to redefine approved lists.

Why US is leaving

While Russia and other countries have upgraded both the aircraft and the sensors, US surveillance aircraft modernisation has been held up for lack of funds. Part of the reason is that US is able to obtain equally good or better data from its satellites. No other country can match US’ satellite monitoring capabilities. Sharing of satellite imagery is restricted and accordingly managed bilaterally by US. For the US, the OST is not particularly useful as an intelligence gathering tool but the reality is that it was always intended as a confidence building and transparency measure. As tensions between US and Russia have grown, US has become more interested in restricting transparency over its territory.

Since 2015, US has voiced concerns about instances of Russian non- compliance in terms of either delaying clearances or imposing onerous restrictions. The recent report on compliance issued by the US State department cited instances of Russian non-compliance in 2019 by imposing a limit of 500 kms over Kaliningrad and creating highly restrictive flight corridors in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US has also cited undue restrictions on flights over eastern Ukraine Crimea. The stage was therefore set for the US withdrawal.

The US has been increasingly concerned that Russia is using its overflights over US critical infrastructure to develop actionable intelligence and possibly mapping it for possible future offensive cyber operations. In 2017, an overflight request over the Trump golf estate in Bedford (New Jersey) raised concerns in the White House. This led the US to conclude that Russia was converting the transparency measure into an intimidation measure by weaponizing it. Reacting with a tit for tat approach was not in US interest.

US allies have expressed regret over the US decision. Russia has bluntly rejected US allegations of non-compliance, calling it a pretext for US moves to turn its back on multilaterally negotiated arms control treaties, citing the JCPOA and INF Treaty as examples. However, it has refrained from any indications regarding its response. Clearly, the OST is of limited utility for Russia if US territory is excluded and limited only to Europe and Canada. The OST may limp along for a while even after the US withdrawal takes effect after six months but the countdown for it has begun.

NOTES

(1) Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

For A Reset In India-Nepal Relations

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Published in The Hindu on 29th May, 2020

Once again, relations between India and Nepal have taken a turn for the worse. The immediate provocation is the long standing territorial issue surrounding Kalapani, a 40 square kilometres patch of land near the India- Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh pass on the India-China border which is one of the approved points for border trade and the route for the pilgrimage to Mt Kailash-Mansarovar lake in Tibet. However, as in all India-Nepal issues, the underlying reasons are far more complex. Yet, the manner in which this is being exploited by PM K P Oli by raising the banner of Nepali nationalism by painting India as a hegemon is a frequent pattern that indicates that relations
between the two countries need a fundamental reset.

Kalapani and the maps
India inherited the boundary with Nepal concluded between Nepal and East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816. Kali river constituted the boundary and territory to its east was Nepal. The dispute relates to the origin of Kali. Near Garbyang (Dharchula Tehsil in Pithoragarh district), there is a confluence of different streams coming from northeast from Kalapani and northwest from Limpiyadhura. The early British survey maps identified the northwest stream Kuti Yangti from Limpiyadhura as the origin but after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the northeast streams defining the origin as just below Kalapani. Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.

The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet created deep misgivings in Nepal and India was ‘invited’ to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border. The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about six kilometres further east of Lipulekh. In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981 and border trade, in 1991.

In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass. By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory. The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 kms west of Lipulekh. Both countries reflected Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory in their respective maps. After 1979, ITBP has manned the Lipulekh pass. In actual practice, life for the locals (Byansis) remained unchanged given the open border and free movement of people and goods.

After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali (Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream) that envisaged the Pancheshwar multi-purpose hydel project, the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997. The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border. The Committee clarified 98 percent of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta (in the Terai) when it was dissolved in 2008. It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level. Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80 km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.

The Survey of India issued a new political map (8th edition) on 2 November to reflect the changes in the status of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories. Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal. However, on 8 November, the 9th edition was issued. The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted. Predictably, this led to stronger protests with Nepal invoking the Foreign Secretary level talks to resolve issues. With the Indian Ambassador Manjeev Puri in Kathmandu retiring in end-December and Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale retiring a month later, the matter remained pending despite reminders from Kathmandu.

Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism
By April, PM Oli’s domestic political situation was weakening. Under the Nepali constitution, a new prime minister enjoys a guaranteed two-year period during which a no-confidence motion is not permitted. This ended in February unleashing simmering resentment against Oli’s governance style and performance. Inept handling of the Covid-19 pandemic added to growing disenchantment. Within the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) there was a move to impose a “one man one post” rule that would force Oli to choose between being NCP co-chair or PM.

The re-eruption of the Kalapani controversy when Defence Minister Raj Nath Singh did a virtual inauguration of the 80 km road on 8 May, provided PM Oli with a political lifeline. A subsequent comment by COAS Gen Naravane on 15 May that “Nepal may have raised the issue at the behest of someone else” was insensitive, given that the Indian COAS is also an honorary general of the Nepal Army and vice versa, highlighting the traditional ties between the two armies.

Oli had won the election in 2017 by flaunting his Nepali nationalism card whose flipside is of anti-Indianism. This is not a new phenomenon but has become more pronounced in recent years. Oli donned the nationalist mantle vowing to restore Nepali territory and marked a new low in anti-Indian rhetoric by talking about “the Indian virus being more lethal than the Chinese or the Italian virus”.

A new map of Nepal based on the older British survey reflecting Kali river originating from Limpiyadhura in the northwest of Garbyang was adopted by parliament and notified on 20 May. On 22 May, a constitutional amendment proposal was tabled to include it in a relevant Schedule. The new alignment adds 335 sq kms to Nepali territory, territory that has never been reflected in a Nepali map for nearly 170 years.

This brief account illustrates the complexity underlying India-Nepal issues that cannot be solved by rhetoric or unilateral map making exercises. Such brinkmanship only breeds mistrust and puts the government-to-government relations and erodes the goodwill at the people -to-people level. Political maturity is needed to find creative solutions that can be mutually acceptable.

Rewriting the fundamentals
Prime Minister Modi has often spoken of the “neighbourhood first” policy. He started with a highly successful visit in August 2014 but then saw the relationship take a nosedive in 2015, first getting blamed for interfering in the constitution drafting and then for an “unofficial blockade” that generated widespread resentment against India. It reinforced the notion that Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism were two sides of the same coin that Oli exploited successfully.

In Nepali thinking, the China card has provided them the leverage to practice their version of non-alignment. In the past, China maintained a link with the Palace and its concerns were primarily related to keeping tabs on the Tibetan refugee community. With the abolition of the monarchy, China has shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed
Police Force. Also, today’s China is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

The reality is that India has ignored the changing political narrative in Nepal for far too long. India remained content that its interests were safeguarded by quiet diplomacy even when Nepali leaders publicly adopted anti-Indian postures – an approach adopted decades earlier during the monarchy and then followed by the political parties as a means of demonstrating nationalist credentials. Long ignored by India, it has spawned distortions in Nepali history textbooks and led to long term negative consequences. For too long has India invoked a “special relationship”, based on ties of shared culture, language and religion to anchor its relationship. Today, it carries a negative connotation, of a paternalistic India that is often insensitive and worse still, a bully.

It is hardly surprising that the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was sought by the Nepali authorities in 1949 to continue the special links it had with British India and provides for an open border and right to work for Nepali nationals is viewed as a sign of an unequal relationship, and an Indian imposition. Yet, Nepali authorities have studiously avoided taking it up bilaterally even though Nepali leaders thunder against it in their domestic rhetoric.

The urgent need today to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue where both sides need to display sensitivity as they explore the terms of a reset of the ‘special relationship”. A normal relationship where India can be a generous partner will be a better foundation for “neighbourhood first” in the 21st century.

The Trends Shaping The Post-Covid World

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Published in The Hindu on 11th May, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic began as a global health crisis. As it spread rapidly across countries, country after country responded with a lockdown, triggering a global economic crisis. Certain geopolitical trendlines were already discernible but the Covid shock therapy has brought these into sharper focus, defining the contours of the emerging global (dis)order.

The first trend which became clear in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis is the rise of Asia. Economic historians pointed to its inevitability recalling that till the 18th century, Asia accounted for half the global GDP. The Industrial Revolution accompanied by European naval expansion and colonialism contributed to the rise of the West and now the balance is being restored. The 2008 financial crisis showed the resilience of the Asian economies and even today, economic forecasts indicate out of G-20 countries, only China and India are likely to register economic growth during 2020.

Asian countries have also demonstrated greater agility in tackling the pandemic compared to US and Europe. This is not limited to China but a number of other Asian states have shown greater responsiveness and more effective state capacity. Consequently, Asian economies will recover faster than those in the West.

The second trend is the US retreat after a century of being in the forefront of shaping the global order. From the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations after World War I or the creation of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions after World War II, leadership of the Western world during the Cold War, moulding global responses to threats posed by terrorism or proliferation or climate change, US played a decisive role.

US hubris and arrogance also generated resentment, more evident in recent years. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have become quagmires that have sapped domestic political will and resources. This is the fatigue that President Obama sensed when he talked of “leading from behind”. President Trump changed it to “America first” and during the current crisis, US efforts to corner supplies of scarce medical equipment and medicines and acquiring biotech companies engaged in R&D in allied states, show that this may mean America alone. Moreover, even as countries were losing trust in US leadership, its bungled response at home to the pandemic indicates that countries are also losing trust in US competence. US still remains the largest economy and the largest military power but has lost the will and ability to lead. This mood is unlikely to change, whatever the outcome of the election later this year.

A third trend is EU’s continuing preoccupation with internal challenges generated by its expansion of membership to include East European states, impact of the financial crisis among the Eurozone members, and ongoing Brexit negotiations. Threat perceptions vary between old Europe and new Europe making it increasingly difficult to reach agreement on political matters e:g relations with Russia and China. The trans-Atlantic divide is aggravating an intra-European rift. Rising populism has given greater voice to Euro-sceptics and permitted some EU members to espouse the virtues of “illiberal democracy”.

Adding to this is the North-South divide within the Eurozone. Strains showed up a decade ago when austerity measures were imposed on Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal a decade ago by the ECB, persuaded by the fiscally conservative Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. ECB chief Christine Lagarde’s press statement in end March that “ECB is not here to close spreads” undermined any solidarity that the Italians felt as they battled with the pandemic and growing borrowing costs.

Further damage was done when Italy was denied medical equipment by its EU neighbours who introduced export controls leading to China airlifting medical teams and critical supplies. Schengen visa or free-border movement has already become a victim to the pandemic. EU will need considerable soul searching to rediscover the limits of free movement of goods, services, capital and people, the underlying theme of the European experiment of shared sovereignty.

A fourth trend, related to the first, is the emergence of a stronger and more assertive China. While China’s growing economic role has been visible since it joined the WTO at the turn of the century, its more assertive posture has taken shape under President Xi Jinping’s leadership with the call that a rejuvenated China is now ready to assume global responsibilities. Chinese assertiveness has raised concerns, first in its neighbourhood and now, in the US that feels betrayed because it assisted China’s rise in the hope that an economically integrated China would become politically more open. In recent years, the US- China relationship moved from cooperation to competition and now with trade and technology wars, is moving steadily to confrontation. The pandemic has seen increasing rhetoric on both sides and with the election season in the US, confrontation will only increase. A partial economic de-coupling had begun and will gather greater momentum.

Xi has engaged in an unprecedented centralisation of power and with the removal of the two-term limit, has made it clear that he will continue beyond 2022. His signature Belt and Road Initiative seeks to connect China to the Eurasia and Africa through both maritime and land routes by investing trillions of dollars in infrastructure building as a kind of pre-emptive move against any US attempts at containment. Even if Xi’s leadership comes under questioning, it may soften some aggressive policy edges but the confrontational rivalry with US will remain.

Global problems demand global responses. With Covid-19, international and multilateral bodies are nowhere on the scene. WHO was the natural candidate to lead global efforts against the health crisis but it has become a victim of politics. Its early endorsement of the Chinese efforts has put it on the defensive as US blames the outbreak on a Chinese biotech lab and accuses Beijing of suppressing vital information that contributed to the spread. UN Security Council, G-7 and G-20 (latter was structured to co-ordinate a global response to the 2008 financial crisis) are paralysed at when the world faces the worst recession since 1929.

The reality is that these institutions were always subjected to big power politics. During the Cold War, US-Soviet rivalry blocked the UNSC on many sensitive issues and now with major power rivalry returning, finds itself paralysed again. Agencies like the WHO have lost autonomy over decades as their regular budgets shrank, forcing them to increasingly rely on voluntary contributions sourced largely from Western countries and foundations. US leadership strengthened Bretton Woods institutions in recent decades (World Bank spends 250% of WHO’s budget on global health) because US’ voting power gives it a blocking veto. The absence of a multilateral response today highlights the long felt need for reform of these bodies but this can’t happen without collective global leadership.

The final trend relates to energy politics. Growing interest in renewables and green technologies on account of climate change concerns, and US emerging as a major energy producer was fundamentally altering the energy markets. Now, a looming economic recession and depressed oil prices will exacerbate internal tensions in Gulf countries which are solely dependent on oil revenues. Long standing rivalries in the region have often led to local conflicts but can now create political instability in countries where regime structures are fragile.

A vaccine for the Coronavirus possibly by end-2020 will help deal with the global health crisis but these unfolding trends have now been aggravated by the more pernicious panic virus. Rising nationalism and protectionist responses will prolong the economic recession into a depression sharpening inequalities and polarisations. Greater unpredictability and more turbulent times lie ahead.

At The Edge Of A New Nuclear Arms Race

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Published in The Hindu on 27th April, 2020

Last week, a report issued by the US State Department on “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments” raised concerns that China might be conducting nuclear tests with low yields at its Lop Nor test site, in violation of its Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) undertakings.

The US report also claims that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that produced a nuclear yield and were inconsistent with ‘zero yield’ understanding underlying the CTBT though it was uncertain about how many such experiments had been conducted.

Russia and China have rejected US claims but with growing rivalry among major powers, the report is a likely harbinger of new nuclear arms race which would also mark the demise of the CTBT that came into being in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter century.

What does the CTBT ban
For decades, a ban on nuclear testing was seen as the necessary first step towards curbing the nuclear arms race but Cold War politics made it impossible. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 banning underwater and atmospheric tests but this only drove testing underground. By the time the CTBT negotiations began in Geneva in 1994, global politics had changed. The Cold War was over and the nuclear arms race was over. USSR had broken up and its principal testing site, Semipalatinsk, was in Kazakhstan (Russia still had access to Novaya Zemlya near the Arctic circle). In 1991, Russia declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, followed by the US in 1992. By this time, US had conducted 1054 tests and Russia, 715.

Negotiations were often contentious. France and China continued testing claiming that they had conducted far fewer tests and needed to validate new designs since the CTBT did not imply an end to nuclear deterrence. France and US even toyed with the idea of a CTBT that would permit testing at a low threshold, below 500 tonnes of TNT equivalent. This was one-thirtieth of the 15000 tonne Little Boy, the bomb US dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Civil society and the non-nuclear weapon states reacted negatively to such an idea and it was dropped. Some countries proposed that the best way to verify a comprehensive test ban would be to permanently shut down all test sites, an idea that was unwelcome to the nuclear weapon states.

Eventually, US came up with the idea of defining the “comprehensive test ban” as a “zero yield” test ban that would prohibit supercritical hydro-nuclear tests but not sub-critical hydrodynamic nuclear tests. Once UK and France came on board, US was able to prevail upon Russia and China to accept this understanding. After all, this was the moment of US’ unipolar supremacy. At home, the Clinton administration satisfied the hawks by announcing a Science Based Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Programme, a generously funded project to keep the nuclear labs in business and the Pentagon happy. Accordingly, the CTBT prohibits all parties from carrying out “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”; these terms are neither defined nor elaborated.

Why the CTBT lacks authority
Another controversy arose regarding the entry-into-force provisions (Article 14) of the treaty. After India’s proposals for anchoring the CTBT in a disarmament framework did not find acceptance, in June 1996, India announced its decision to withdraw from the negotiations. Unhappy at this turn, UK, China and Pakistan took the lead in revising the entry-into-force provisions. The new provisions listed 44 countries by name whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to enter into force and included India. India protested that this attempt at arm twisting violated a country’s sovereign right to decide if it wanted to join a treaty but was ignored. The CTBT was adopted by a majority vote and opened for signature.

Of the 44 listed countries, to date only 36 have ratified the treaty. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and USA have signed but not ratified. China maintains that it will only ratify it after US does so but the Republican dominated Senate had rejected it in 1999. In addition, North Korea, India and Pakistan are the three who have not signed. All three have also undertaken tests after 1996; India and Pakistan in May 1998 and North Korea six times between 2006 and 2017. The CTBT has therefore not entered into force and lacks legal authority.

Nevertheless, an international organisation to verify the CTBT was established in Vienna with a staff of about 230 persons and an annual budget of $ 130 million. Ironically, US is the largest contributor with a share of $17 million. The CTBTO runs an elaborate verification system built around a network of over 325 seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic (underwater) monitoring stations. The CTBTO has refrained from backing the US allegations.

A new nuclear arms race
The key change from the 1990s is that US’ unipolar moment is over and strategic competition among major powers is back. US now identifies Russia and China as ‘rivals’. Its Nuclear Posture Review asserts that US faces new nuclear threats because both Russia and China are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. US therefore has to expand the role of its nuclear weapons and have a more usable and diversified nuclear arsenal. The Trump administration has embarked on a 30-year modernisation plan with a price tag of $1.2 trillion, which could go up over the years. Readiness levels at Nevada test site that has been silent since 1992 are being enhanced to permit resumption of testing at six months notice.

Russia and China have been concerned about US’ growing technological lead particularly in missile defence and conventional global precision strike capabilities. Russia has responded by exploring hypersonic delivery systems and theatre systems while China has embarked on a modernisation programme to enhance the survivability of its arsenal which is considerably smaller. In addition, both countries are also investing heavily in offensive cyber capabilities.

The new US report stops short of accusing China for a violation but refers to “a high level of activity at the Lop Nor test site throughout 2019” and concludes that together with its lack of transparency, China provokes concerns about its intent to observe the zero-yield moratorium on testing.

US claims that Russian experiments have generated nuclear yield but is unable to indicate how many such experiments were conducted in 2019. It suggests that Russia could be testing in a manner that releases nuclear energy from an explosive canister, generating suspicions about its compliance.

The New START agreement limits US and Russian arsenals but will expire in 2021 and President Trump has already indicated that he does not plan to extend it. Instead, the Trump administration would like to bring China into some kind of nuclear arms control talks, something China has avoided by pointing to the fact that US and Russia still account for over 90 percent of global nuclear arsenals.

Both China and Russia have dismissed US allegations pointing to Trump administration’s backtracking from other negotiated agreements like the Iran nuclear deal or the US-Russia INF Treaty. Tensions with China are already high with trade and technology disputes, militarisation in the South China Sea and most recently, with the Coronavirus pandemic. US could also be preparing the ground for resuming testing at Nevada.

The Cold War rivalry was already visible when the nuclear arms race began in the 1950s. New rivalries have already emerged. Resumption of nuclear testing may signal the demise of the ill-fated CTBT, marking the beginnings of a new nuclear arms race.