Nuclear Signaling, the Need for New Guard Rails

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Published in the Hindu on August 4, 2023

The conflict in Ukraine and the recourse to nuclear rhetoric have revived concerns about nuclear escalation management between the major nuclear powers. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States-Russia nuclear rivalry had taken a backseat. Instead, North Korea, Iran and India-Pakistan got attention with many analysts getting nostalgic about ‘nuclear stability’ during the Cold War. But as is becoming clear now, in today’s changed political environment, the escalation management lessons of the Cold War no longer seem to work for the U.S. and Russia.

Deterrence failure

In June 2021, U.S. and Russian Presidents, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin met in Geneva. Nuclear arms control was a high priority item on the agenda but no progress proved possible. As concerns grew about Russian troop presence in Belarus on the Ukrainian border, Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns flew to Moscow in November to spell out the consequences of aggression. In January 2022, Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken met Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva to reiterate the message. On February 24, Russia began its “special military operation” in Ukraine. U.S. attempts to deter Russian aggression had failed.

Even as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) leaders met to decide their response, Mr. Biden made it clear that the U.S. was determined to avoid a Third World War or allowing the conflict to escalate into a NATO-Russia conflict. After freezing of Russian reserves and a slew of financial, energy-related and political sanctions, other elements of military assistance, lethal and non-lethal began to take shape. Intelligence sharing and restoring Internet connectivity was the first step. The second was the supply of ammunition and some weapon systems with which the Ukrainian forces were familiar. NATO deepened its military involvement by providing gradually more and more sophisticated weapon systems, beginning with Javelin and Stinger missiles, and moving on to Patriot missile defence batteries, long range Himars, Storm Shadow and Scalp long range missiles and now F-16s. Russian attempts to deter NATO involvement had failed.

On February 7, 2022, Mr. Putin warned that “if Ukraine attempts to take back Crimea, European countries will be in conflict with Russia, which is a leading nuclear power superior to many NATO countries in terms of nuclear force.” Annual nuclear exercises, normally scheduled for autumn were announced for February 17, with Mr. Putin personally witnessing them. Announcing the launch of “special military operations”, his words of caution were, “whoever tries to hinder Russia will face consequences never seen in history.” To drive home the threat, on February 27, Russian nuclear forces were placed on a “special combat readiness” with leave for all personnel cancelled.

Even as the U.S. issued blunt warnings to Russia against using tactical nuclear weapons, in the first week of March, NATO decided against a no-fly-zone and Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria announced that they would not be sending MiG aircraft to Ukraine on account of Russian threats against their airfields from where these aircraft were to take off.

Russian officials tried to downplay the nuclear threat by pointing out that Russia would resort to nuclear use only if faced with an existential threat while U.S. officials tried to convey reassurance to their European allies that while Mr. Putin’s threats be taken seriously, there were no indications of unusual activity at nuclear sites.

President Biden declared on April 24, “We are neither encouraging nor enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders’, and adding that the “U.S. was not seeking regime change in Russia.” In short, the U.S. objectives were to support Ukraine, bolster NATO unity and avoid any direct conflict with Russia. Ukraine is not a NATO member and so does not have the security of the nuclear umbrella provided by U.S. policy of ‘extended deterrence.’

Russia’s resort to nuclear rhetoric failed to deter NATO involvement though it influenced its pace and timing. Therefore, both Russia and the U.S. are operating in a grey zone, taking turns at escalatory rhetoric even as they probe each other’s red lines. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union engaged in multiple proxy wars, Vietnam in the 1960s and Afghanistan in the 1980s, but these were in distant theatres.

Cold War lessons

Deterrence is fundamentally based on the assumption that both adversaries are rational enough to judge when costs outweigh the benefits of the act. Nuclear deterrence adds a conundrum. With their huge arsenals that provided for assured second strike capability, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union had an incentive to try a surprise first strike. This realization was crucial in shaping nuclear deterrence theory.

Thomas Schelling, whose writings during the 1960s and 1970s shaped nuclear deterrence thinking (he won the Economics Nobel in 2005) concluded that nuclear weapons were not usable but had political utility in terms of preventing a war with another nuclear power. Clearly, Schelling was looking at the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which had no territorial dispute.

Schelling also concluded that even though any use was “irrational,” the nuclear threat had to be “credible” in order to deter. This introduced a degree of uncertainty into the equation. Using his economics training, Schelling interpreted the uncertainty as risk that could be analysed in terms of probabilities. Risk was intended to induce rationality in the adversaries. Realizing the conundrum, Schelling concluded that the key to making nuclear deterrence credible is through escalation and raising the risk, that in the final analysis, “leaves something to chance.”

This, along with the lessons of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis kept the U.S. and Soviet rhetoric in check during the Cold War even as they engaged in proxy wars outside Europe, and away from NATO and Warsaw pact territories. Today, there is no Warsaw Pact and NATO has expanded to include a number of former Warsaw Pact members. The Ukraine conflict has persuaded Sweden and Finland to give up their long-standing neutrality and seek security under NATO’s nuclear umbrella.

Probing for red lines

Russia’s nuclear doctrine issued on June 2, 2020 specifies two conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons – “…in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it/or its allies” and “in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is put under threat.” Mr. Putin has declared more than once that Ukrainians and Russians are one people with a shared history; Russia therefore doesn’t see Ukraine as entirely ‘sovereign’.

Second, there is the oft-cited escalate-to-deescalate approach that implies using tactical nuclear weapons to overcome a stalemate on the battlefield, thus forcing a termination of hostilities on favourable terms. In its 2022 National Security Strategy, the U.S. rejected this by declaring that first use would not lead to de-escalation on Russian terms “but alter the nature of conflict creating potential for uncontrolled escalation.”

U.S. caution is reflected in calibrating supply of more sophisticated weapons by continuously probing Russian red lines even though Ukrainian demands continue to grow. Meanwhile, it suits Russia to increase ambiguity. It is also likely that since Russia failed to achieve its military objectives, its thresholds are evolving.

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s path breaking studies in economics showed that humans often tend to double down on bad bets because of ‘loss aversion.’ The Cold War escalation management lessons applied to a different world; today, the U.S. and Russia no longer enjoy parity and Russia’s red lines are fuzzy.

Nuclear signaling today is taking place in uncharted political territory. New guard rails are necessary if the nuclear taboo has to be preserved.

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The Future Trajectory of India’s Oldest Partnership

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Published in Hindustan Times on July 21, 2023

Last week, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi witnessed the Bastille Day parade in Paris, where a contingent of Indian troops marched alongside their French counterparts to the strains of Sare jahan se achcha and the Indian Air Force (IAF) Rafales joined in the flypast, he had reason to look back with satisfaction at the 25-year-old India-France strategic partnership and feel confident about its future. The French connection has both deepened and broadened and reflects a reassuring stability in a world marked by increasing uncertainties and new rivalries.

Today, India has ‘strategic partnerships’ with over thirty countries but France was the first. As a country that prided itself on its ‘exceptionalism,’ France has been sympathetic to similar Indian claims based on its ancient civilisation. This is why both countries were quick to voice support for multi-polarity once the Cold War ended. French discomfort with United States (US)’s unipolar moment in the 1990s was evident when it described Washington DC as a ‘hyperpower’.

Defence cooperation had begun in the 1950s when India acquired the Ouragan aircraft and continued with the Mysteres, Jaguar (Anglo-French), Mirage 2000 as well as Alize and Alouette helicopters. Cooperation in the space sector has continued since the 1960s when the Centre National d’etudes Spatiales (CNES) helped ISRO set up the Sriharikota launch site, followed by liquid engine development and joint hosting of payloads. Today, it is a relationship of near equals and the two undertake joint missions. 

The Cold War imposed limitations on the partnership. However, when the Cold War ended, France decided that its preferred partner in the Indian Ocean region would be India. In January 1998, President Jacques Chirac declared that India’s exclusion from the global nuclear order was an anomaly that needed to be rectified. After the nuclear tests in May 1998 when India declared itself a nuclear weapon state, France was the first major power to open a dialogue with India and displayed a far greater understanding of India’s security compulsions compared to other countries. It was the first P-5 country to support India’s claim for a permanent seat in an expanded and reformed UN Security Council.

The original three pillars of the strategic partnership were nuclear, space and defence; gradually, others were added – counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, tackling radicalisation in plural societies, maritime cooperation, addressing climate change, renewables and green energy resources, urban planning and developing public-private partnerships for urban infrastructure.

If this expansive agenda reflects the broadening of the partnership, four key documents issued – Joint Communique, List of Outcomes, India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap, and the comprehensive Vision 2047, reflect the growing trust and deepening of the ties.

While the earlier defence purchases were straight acquisitions, the new focus has been on developing domestic capabilities. The agreement for six Scorpene submarines to be built at Mazagaon Docks Ltd was signed in 2005 with Naval Group (then DCNS). It was a 13-year project and suffered delays due to technology absorption hiccups and building domestic sourcing capacity. The first was commissioned in 2017 and the sixth will be commissioned early-2024. India has cleared the purchase of three more. The Vision Statement states that both sides “are ready to explore more ambitious projects to develop the Indian submarine fleet.” India has a target of deploying 6 nuclear-powered SSNs by 2030 and this is a potentially significant area for cooperation.

Similarly, the agreement for acquiring 36 Rafale aircraft concluded in 2016 carried a requirement of 50% offsets amounting to ₹ 28000 crores. A new agreement for 26 Rafale Marine for the aircraft carrier is under discussion with additional offsets. On the civilian side, Indigo and Air India have signed up for 750 Airbus aircraft and Airbus is expanding its network of Indian OEMs as well as considering establishing maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facilities. Both countries are developing a Roadmap for Defence Industrial Cooperation to strengthen the defence pillar.

In 2018, the two countries had agreed on a Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region that has now been extended to the Pacific with the new Indo-Pacific Roadmap in view of its growing salience. Unlike other European countries, France with its overseas territories of Reunion island, New Caledonia and French Polynesia, is a resident power in the region. The new Roadmap is broader and covers preservation of marine biodiversity, sustainable development of maritime resources, deploying renewables like solar in the region, helping small island states develop resilient infrastructure and establishing an Indo-French Health Campus. 

Bilateral economic ties people-to-people are two aspects of the relationship that have been lagging. With annual trade of $ 15 billion, France is our fifth largest trading partner in the EU. Though nearly 1000 French companies have a presence in India, French foreign direct investment (FDI) is estimated to be $10 billion. There is an opening though. In the past, Indian companies saw United Kingdom (UK) as the entry point to Europe; now with Brexit, France can position itself as India’s entry point for Europe and Francophonie. Opening an Indian consulate in Marseille and a French office in Hyderabad will help, together with more direct flights.

The most significant development at the people-to-people level is the growth in number of Indian students and their new-found ability to get two-year work visas after their education. The target of 10000 students a year by 2025 has been met and now for postgraduate students, the visa has also been extended to five years.

One of India’s oldest relationships must now train its eyes on the next 25 years.  

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More HIT than Miss in India-Nepal Ties

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Published in the Hindu on June 22, 2023

On his return to Kathmandu after concluding his four-day official visit to India, Nepal Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ described it as “successful.” He has reason to be satisfied. This is Prachanda’s third stint as Prime Minister and compared to his earlier official visits in 2008 and 2016, the visit in 2023 delivered many more concrete outcomes. More important, many of controversial issues were successfully skirted.

Prachanda’s politics

Under Prachanda’s leadership, the Maoist Centre had fought the elections last year in coalition with the Nepali Congress (NC). There was a falling out over claims to the post of the Prime Minister, and Prachanda switched sides to team up with K P Sharma Oli-led UML. Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister on December 26. However, the NC decided to support Prachanda in a vote of confidence, suggesting that since he had emerged as a consensus PM supported by 268 members in a 275-member House, he should also go for a national consensus apolitical President. Though Prachanda had earlier agreed to support UML candidates for the post of President (due for election in March) and Speaker (in return for making him Prime Minister), he began to backtrack.

Relations between Mr. Oli and Prachanda turned sour with Mr. Oli accusing Prachanda of ‘betrayal’ and Prachanda claiming that he wanted to ensure political stability by taking all parties along. The opportunistic Oli-Prachanda alliance collapsed and by end-February, UML withdrew support. In order to stay in power, Prachanda went back to NC, ready to support its candidate for President. On March 20, NC returned the favour by helping Prachanda win a freshvote of confidence, with UML sulking in the opposition. 

A complex power sharing arrangement has been worked out with Prachanda continuing as PM for two years, followed by Madhav Nepal (CPN-Unified Socialist) for a year and then NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba for the remaining two years. Nepal’s transition to a federal republic (it began in 2008 with the abolition of the monarchy and the election of a new Constituent Assembly) has been politically tumultuous, but largely peaceful. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, two rounds of elections have been held, in 2017 and last November. Hopefully, the current coalition has enough incentive to hold together, providing an opportunity to the government to focus on the economy.

During his pathbreaking visit to Nepal in August 2014, Prime Minister Modi had invoked ‘neighborhood first’ to denote a new beginning in relations. To highlight the focus on connectivity, he coined the acronym HIT, covering Highways, Infoways, and Transways. However, relations took a downturn in 2015 with the economic blockade. Repairing the relationship has been a slow process but results are now visible, leading PM Modi to recall and revive the old acronym. 

Hydropower cooperation

For years, there have been statements about cooperation in the hydropower sector but gradually, things are looking up. Nepal is endowed with an economically viable potential of 50000 MW of hydropower, but till a decade ago, had an installed capacity of barely 1200 MW, making it dependent on electricity imports from India. Today, Nepal has an installed capacity of 2200 MW and in season, can export power to India. A 400 KV transmission is now operational. In 2021, Nepal made a modest beginning by exporting 39 MW; the following year it went up to 452 MW earning Nepali Rupees 11 billion in export earnings. In the lean season, Nepal does import power from India but its dependence has dropped from 20% to 10% during the last five years.

Both sides have finalized a long-term power trade agreement targeting export of 10000 MW within a 10-year time frame. The 900 MW Arun III project started in 2018 by SJVN (formerly the Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam) will be operational later this year. In addition, it signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the 695 MW Arun IV project last year. The National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) signed two projects last year totaling 1200 MW. During the visit, announcements were made about SJVN signing the 669 MW Lower Arun and NHPC, the 480 MW Phukot-Karnali projects.

To keep pace, work has begun on a second high voltage transmission line between Butwal and Gorakhpur and two more are planned under a Line of Credit of $679 million. By agreeing to the Nepali demand for the facility to export electricity to Bangladesh using the Indian grid, India has highlighted the prospects for sub-regional cooperation.

To facilitate movement of goods and people, the Rupaidiha-Nepalgunj Integrated Check Post was inaugurated, work begun on the Sunauli-Bhairahwa ICP and an MOU signed for another at Dodhara Chandni. The Jayanagar-Kurtha railway line, inaugurated last year is planned to be extended while more links are to taken up. After the Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline was operationalized in 2019, work has begun to extend it to Chitwan and an MOU for a new pipeline between Jhapa and Siliguri signed including terminals and other infrastructure.

Negotiations on these projects have been time consuming; the challenge is to ensure timely implementation.

Avoiding irritants

The fact that both sides successfully avoided controversial issues and public disagreements went a long way in keeping the focus on economic ties and ensuring a successful visit. Of the three difficult issues, two are of recent origin and the third is a legacy issue.

The latest issue is the Agnipath scheme that impacts the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the Indian Army’s Gurkha regiments, a practice that began in 1816 by the British Indian army. This was continued under a 1947 treaty based on ‘equal treatment’. The Agnipath revision of the terms needs to be discussed between the two armies and the concerned defence and finance officials. But a resolution is possible given the traditional ties between the two Services.

The second is the Kalapani boundary issue that was deliberately stoked as a nationalist cause by Mr. Oli in 2020 when his position as Prime Minister was under threat. He pushed through a constitutional amendment and unilaterally changed Nepal’s map. Resolving this will need time because a lasting solution will need political wisdom and understanding.

The legacy issue is the !950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In Nepal, a conviction has taken root that the Treaty is unfair to Nepal as it was imposed somehow. This ignores the reality that in 1949, the Nepali regime was perturbed by the Maoist revolution in China and the subsequent takeover of Tibet. It sought an understanding with India and the 1950 Treaty, in large measure, reflects the provisions of the 1923 Treaty between Nepal and British India. In fact, the Treaty enables Nepali nationals ‘equal treatment’ in terms of employment and permits them to apply for any government job, except for the Indian Foreign Service, Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service. Nepali nationals work in the Indian private and public sector, have joined the revenue services and in the Army, have risen to become two-star generals.

The demand to review the Treaty was officially raised first in 1995; in 1996, it was on the agenda of Foreign Secretary’s meeting. Subsequent summits have included a reference to ‘review and update’ it but no substantive talks have taken place. However, some of the cobwebs of history need to cleared so that discussions can take place in an objective manner that addresses the concerns of both countries.

For the present, as Mr. Modi and Prachanda have demonstrated, the focus on HIT will go a long way in rebuilding trust.

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Global Implications of Erdogan’s Historic Win

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Published in Hindustan Times on June 12, 2023

Last month, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won his second term in the most contested election in the last two decades, and cemented his place in Turkish history by becoming its longest-serving ruler. So far, that distinction belonged to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish republic and its first president from 1923 till his death in 1938.

The 2023 election took place against two negative developments. First, a weak economy, with inflation running at over 40% and a weakening lira that has depreciated by 80% since 2018. The second was the devastating earthquake in February this year that claimed 50000 lives and exposed that building codes had been violated with impunity by the contractors and builders because of widespread corruption.

For the first time, six Opposition parties came together determined to end to Erdogan’s autocratic rule. The emerging opposition front led by the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) evidently rattled Erdogan, and the government revived an old case against Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul.

After considerable political manoeuvrings, 74-year-old Kemal Kilicdaroglu, became the Opposition candidate. A soft-spoken former civil servant who entered politics in 1999, he made it clear that his goal was to transition Turkey to a parliamentary system and restore independence and integrity of institutions like the central bank and the judiciary.

In the run-up to the elections, opinion polls gave a slight edge to Kilicdaroglu. But in the first round on May 14, Erdogan led with 49.4% of the vote with Kilicdaroglu trailing at 45%. Since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) coalition retained its majority in parliament, Erdogan made it clear a Kilicdaroglu victory would only lead to political paralysis. In the run-off on May 28, Erdogan maintained his lead, obtaining 52.2% of the vote.

Even though Erdogan controls 90% of the print and audio-visual media, leaving the opposition to rely on social media, Kilicdaroglu was able to push Erdogan to a second round for the first time in the last twenty years. His votes came from the major urban areas, the developed coastal areas in the south and the west and the Kurdish areas in the east. His open acknowledgement that he is an Alevi and fighting on a liberal platform failed to make a dent in the rural majority Sunni heartland that remained Erdogan’s stronghold. The result is a polarised country with deep divides, on issues of Western influence and traditional culture, religion and secularism, values and identity, manifest in growing nationalism.

Erdogan’s nimble foreign policy during in recent years helped him establish an image as a nationalist. Even as he expanded Turkey’s influence in the areas that were once part of the Ottoman empire, he balanced concerns with his North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, with traditional rivals like Russia and Iran, while seeking a pole position in the Islamic world. It required brinkmanship but that appeals to the nationalist sentiment that cuts across the political spectrum.

Erdogan is closer to China and applied to join SCO but also criticised its treatment of Uighurs; is a member of NATO but bought the Russian S-400 missile defence system; seeks to improve ties with Russia but opposes it in the conflicts in Libya and Armenia-Azerbaijan; created an Organisation of Turkic States reflecting shades of neo-Ottomanism; maintains close ties with Qatar and after a downturn in ties with Saudi Arabia on the Adnan Khashoggi murder, successfully restored ties with the Arab world.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have bailed him out by providing $5 billion each to the central bank and Russia postponed a gas payment of $600 million to 2024 while agreeing to fund a $10 billion Akkuyu nuclear power plant.

Now that Syrian President Assad has beaten back resistance and is there to stay, Erdogan’s major diplomatic challenge is to reconcile with him. However, his real challenge is to stabilise the economy that has been rocked by his upside-down policies. To tackle inflation, he has been lowering interest rates and pumping in dollars to lower the Lira’s decline but reserves are trending into negative territory. He appears confident of Western support since he managed to broker the Black Sea grain export deal between Ukraine and Russia and curbed the flow of refugees into Europe.

Historically, relations with India have been low-key, with Turkey sympathetic to Pakistan on Kashmir, and countering UN Security Council expansion in the permanent category by proposing an expansion only of the non-permanent category. Despite the personal empathy between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Erdogan, borne out shared experiences of their struggle to get to the top, their recourse to nationalism and invoking a grand past, a deep religiosity and exceptional communication skills, given each leader’s current challenges, the bilateral relationship is likely to remain low-key.

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It’s Time to Tweak the Nuclear Policy

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Published in Hindustan Times on May 15, 2023

India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, stunned the world. This was not the first; in 1974, India had tested but called it a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). This time, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared that India was now a nuclear-weapon-state. Addressing parliament on the subject on May 27, he also placed a paper – “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy” – that provided the rationale for the tests and spelt out the elements of India’s doctrine that defined India as a reluctant but responsible nuclear power.

When India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, its “nuclear option” was born. In subsequent decades, preserving the option became the primary political and diplomatic objective. Through more than three decades of domestic political changes, policy continuity was sustained.

Meanwhile, Pakistan pushed ahead with its programme and by early 1980s, it was enriching uranium at Kahuta and by late 1980s, had weaponised its deterrent with Chinese help. As the frontline state in the United States’ covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to make the U.S. turn a blind eye to its nuclear developments.

There was a growing realisation that given technological advances since the 1974 PNE, the “nuclear option” could no longer remain viable and needed to be exercised. Post Cold War global developments with tightening dual-use export controls were also squeezing the Indian option. In 1995, the NPT was extended into perpetuity, freezing a nuclear order that India had long considered arbitrary and discriminatory. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in 1994 with the Clinton administration pushing to complete it in 1996.

In 1995, France and China were still undertaking tests to validate designs and acquire data that would help sustain their capabilities with ‘zero-yield’ tests in their laboratories. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao gave the green light for tests and preparatory work began at Pokhran. In early December, days before the tests were scheduled, U.S. satellites picked up imagery of activity at Pokhran. The tests were postponed till after the general elections and meanwhile, Indian stand on the CTBT negotiations hardened.

Prime Minister Vajpayee toyed with the idea of the tests in 1996 but decided against it as his tenure was a mere 13 days. The next opportunity arose when he became PM again in 1998, and the die was cast.

The 1998 declaration of India as a nuclear-weapon-state marked a decisive break. It generated its own challenges, both domestic and external. A new kind of policy continuity was crafted. Domestically, it related to the nuclear doctrine and the configuration of the nuclear arsenal into the defence and decision-making structures. Externally, it was to gain acceptance as a responsible nuclear power and second, to stabilise deterrence relations with India’s adversaries.

After 25 years, the domestic challenge is still a work in progress. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad was considered necessary. The land-based missile force has now inducted Agni IV with an estimated range of 3500 kms. Agni V and Agni VI are expected to extend the ranges to beyond 6000 kms. The nuclear submarine programme has made slow progress with Arihant having undertaken its firs patrol last year. However, it currently carries K-15 (Sagarika) missile that has a limited range of 700 kms. Longer range missiles are under development.

Though India has no intention of embarking on a nuclear arms race with any other country, it must factor in technological developments that can have an impact on the credibility of its deterrent. Increasing use of dual use systems like hypersonics and cruise missiles, conventional precision global strike weapons blur the dividing line between nuclear and conventional systems. Digitisation renders both early warning systems and command and control systems vulnerable to counter-space and offensive cyber action.

These developments have led to questions as to how to define the ‘minimum’ and whether the no-first-use policy needs review. Some critics point to Kargil in 1999 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as evidence of failure of nuclear deterrence and would advocate a more robust posture. However, such criticism is ill founded. Indian doctrine is intended to deter threat and use of nuclear weapons. Dealing with Kargil-type attacks or terrorist strikes requires building conventional and intelligence capabilities that can offer a range of response options.

The external diplomatic challenge of gaining acceptance as a responsible nuclear power has been achieved in great measure. The Vajpayee government was proactive in reaching out to key countries, particularly the U.S. since it had taken the lead in condemning the tests and calling for sanctions.

The dialogue between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh between 1998 and 2000 remains the most intense phase of bilateral engagement with 18 rounds of talks in 24 months. It remained inconclusive in not meeting either side’s stated objectives; yet, it was immensely productive in clearing the path towards the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and eventually the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement following the exceptional waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008 – another milestone that completes 15 years in 2023. The NSG waiver legitimised India’s civilian nuclear trade and has enabled over a dozen cooperation agreements to be concluded.

This has been possible because the post-1998 policy too has been marked by a similar continuity that characterised it in its early years. Today, changing geopolitics has revived rivalries among major nuclear powers even as the geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Navigating these challenges may need policy adjustments that will be strengthened by consensus and continuity.

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