Published in Hindustan Times on August 20, 2021

There is an old saying – Be careful what you wish for….China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan were the most vociferous in demanding the exit of the United States (US) from Afghanistan. Now that images of people hanging on to a C-17 Globemaster, as it taxis for take-off evoking parallels with the fall of Saigon in April 1975 have been seen with smug satisfaction in Islamabad, Tehran, Beijing and Moscow, a grim reality is seeping in. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has already expressed his unhappiness at US’ ‘hasty’ exit.

The key question is if there really is a Taliban 2.0 or just a more media savvy repackaged Taliban 1.0 that will create more regional instability. But to unravel that, let us return to how Afghanistan got here.

A messy exit

The demise of the Islamic Republic and return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan became inevitable when in February last year, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad signed an agreement with the Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Barader in Doha, committing to US withdrawal. While Khalilzad delivered the agreement for the Trump administration, President Joe Biden’s announcement on April 14, 2021 that US would be out before the 9/11 anniversary reaffirmed the unconditional withdrawal.

The US was hoping for a ‘decent interval’ between its exit and the eventual collapse of the Kabul regime but once the Taliban sensed victory, they moved in with an ‘indecent haste’.  Despite a domestic backlash against the messy withdrawal, Biden has maintained that his decision was the right one.

The reality is that a cumulative set of mistakes that made US’ continued presence a lightning rod for the insurgency. In 2001, US went into Afghanistan on a counter-terrorism mission, deluded itself that the Taliban had been defeated when they had merely escaped across the border into Pakistan, got distracted with Iraq in 2003, and then got drawn into an increasingly vicious counter-insurgency mounted by the re-energised Taliban.

Meanwhile, the narrative about ‘forever wars’ gained traction. The reality is that as Gen Doug Lute said – the US did not fight a 20-year war; it fought a one-year war, 20 times over. In any case, US had ended its combat operations in 2014 replacing it with a limited ‘train, advise and assist’ mission. While 2352 US soldiers were killed between 2001 and 2014, the number of deaths in the following six years was 96. The annual expenditure with its reduced presence was about $45 billion, a small fraction of its $700 billion defence budget.

The real problem was that without removing the sanctuaries in Pakistan, US was caught in a stalemate that made its continued presence unpopular. Its association with a local government that lacked legitimacy and was seen as corrupt and incompetent by the people, added to it.

Pakistan’s strategy paid off when the Doha office opened in 2013, beginning the process of Taliban’s legitimisation, something it had lacked in the 1990s. Changing power equations made Russia and China more wary and critical about US presence in its backyard. Biden is right that delaying the departure would not have changed anything and no astrologer could have found a propitious moment.

India’s options

Like other countries, India too supported ‘an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace and reconciliation process. But while other countries did not let this prevent their contacts with the Taliban in Doha and elsewhere, India followed it in letter and spirit. Indian officials did participate in meetings where Taliban were present but refrained from exploring any direct engagement with the Taliban. With the US out and Ashraf Ghani gone, there was no option except to withdraw all diplomatic presence, closing the embassy for all practical purposes.

While no one knows if Taliban have changed, they will find that Afghanistan has changed in the last twenty years. It is a young nation with a median age of 18 and a half years. More than two-thirds of the population is below 30, and this cohort has grown up in a conservative but open society; 60 percent of the population enjoy internet access. They, along with women, minorities will resist a return to the Islamic Emirate of the 1990s.

Further, Taliban today is not a unified entity. Mullah Barader is a co-founder of the Taliban and Mullah Omar was his brother-in-law. He was taken into custody by the ISI in 2010 to punish him for being in direct contact with President Hamid Karzai. Eight years in ISI custody are unlikely to have left him with happy memories. The Doha negotiators constitute the public face but the fighting has been done by local commanders on the ground. Quetta shura is headed by a cleric Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada and two deputies, Mullah Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar who has been overseeing military operations in the south and Sirajuddin Haqqani who heads the Haqqani network, operating in the east. There are other groups too – Al Qaeda, IS -Khorasan, Uighurs (ETIM), Uzbeks (IMU), Tajiks (Khatiba Imam al Bukhari) and Pakistani groups like the TTP, LeT, JeM, Jamaat ul Ahraar, Lashkar-e-Islam and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. All of them have linkages with Taliban fighters on the ground but power sharing negotiations may end up pitching them on opposite sides.

Another chapter in Afghanistan’s political transition that began with the coup in 1973, has ended and at present, India has little choice except to wait and watch because unlike the West, we remain part of the region.

*****

18 August, 2021

India was short-sighted in Afghanistan, should have seen it coming: Former Ambassador Rakesh Sood

‘I have no idea why the govt did not see this coming. It has been clear for a number of years that the Taliban were coming back’, former Ambassador to Afghanistan Rakesh Sood said in an interview

Ashlin Mathew

Published: 18 Aug 2021, 11:32 AMEngagement: 156

One of India’s former Ambassadors to Afghanistan and currently Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Rakesh Sood said the implications for India are negative with the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the rise of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under Taliban.

Sood, who has also served as the ambassador to Nepal and France, said India was short-sighted and could have explored other options instead of putting all its eggs in one basket.

Edited excerpts of an interview with Rakesh Sood:

India’s neighbourhood has just become unstable with Taliban having taken over. What kind of government is likely to be formed?

I think it is difficult to predict the shape of the government that will be formed. However, the statements have indicated that it will be an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their statements have been ambiguous about the rights of minorities, the rights of women and many other aspects too.

The kind of government cannot be foreseen as there are different groups amongst the Taliban. For the last few years, we have been seeing the group that has been negotiating with the rest of the world from Doha. Then there is Quetta Shura, and they are located in Quetta.

We know that one of the deputy leaders is Sirajuddin Haqqani, who heads the Haqqani network. He is particularly influential in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. Another of the deputy leaders is Mullah Omar’s son, Mohammad Yaqoob, who heads their military operations particularly in the south of the country.

Then there are the foreign terrorist groupings – The Islamic State or Daesh, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), IMU, Tajik Groups and groupings of Syria-returned fighters. Most of these groups are in the North. The power sharing between all of these groups will determine the kind of governance.

What are the implications of the Taliban takeover for India?

The implications for India are certainly negative. There are two ways of looking at it and both unfortunately carry negative implications. First is an increasing influence of Pakistan in the region and what it means for us given that we have hostile relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistan PM Imran Khan commented that Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan meant they have shaken off the shackles and have embraced freedom. Clearly, Pakistan is not exhibiting any concern about the current environment in Afghanistan.

Secondly, if there is instability in Afghanistan that is also a negative development for regional security as far as India is concerned.

Was the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan inevitable?

It could not have been avoided. In some ways, the US had accepted it. After all, last year when an agreement was signed between the United States of America and Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, which was not recognised by the US, and is known as the Taliban, it nevertheless accords the entity a tacit legitimacy. This is the most clear indication by the US that it had more or less accepted the coming into being of the Islamic Emirate and in doing so, had handed over the Afghan project to the Pakistan ISI.

It was done at the expense of the government in Kabul. Rubbing salt in the wounds was getting the government in Kabul to release 5,000 Taliban fighters who were held in custody in Afghanistan prisons.

By 2020, it was clear that the days of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan were numbered.

After having interfered in Afghanistan’s affairs and enabled Taliban for 19-20 years, the US abandoned Afghanistan. There is no help forthcoming from the UN. What does the future hold for the citizens of the country?

Unfortunately, the future looks particularly bleak for the Afghans. Afghanistan is a young country. At least 70% of its population is below the age of 30. Taliban were ousted from power 20 years ago, so nearly 70% of the population has either come of age or were born in a post-Taliban world. They have lived their lives in a conservative society, but an open society. Therefore, there is enormous amount of consternation and concern in Afghanistan especially among the younger population as to what the future holds for them.

India is the president of UNSC for the month of August. What could have India done to help the Afghanistan citizens?

India could have done nothing. If India had explored other options instead of putting all its eggs in one basket, then India could have planned better. Instead, now we have a situation in Kabul where we are trying to ensure the safety of Indian nationals who are working for other companies as well as the Indian Embassy, in a highly volatile atmosphere. We are yet to get them out.

If we had planned better, we could have evacuated them earlier while the airport was still functional before August 16. What have we achieved by delaying this process as it would take a couple of days more to get people out?

If we had foreseen the writing on the wall, we would not have lost anything. If the US could not have prevented it, then we do not have the resources to prevent it. But, we could have planned better for it.

Is it policy paralysis or lack of concerted strategy on the neighbourhood by India that delayed our response?

I have no idea why the government did not see this coming. It has been clear for a number of years that the Taliban were coming back. The process of legitimisation of Taliban became public knowledge when they opened an international office in Doha, in Qatar. It was step one towards legitimisation as they were no longer hiding in Pakistan or the border areas. They were travelling to international conferences, meeting journalists and it was a gradual process of gaining acceptance.

Various peace conferences such the Heart of Asia process, the Istanbul process, the quadrilateral process and Moscow process had them. In 2018, the US opened direct talks with the Taliban, further legitimising it, and signed an agreement last year, which I have already mentioned. So, how much more evidence did we need that the US has accepted the idea the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s days were numbered and would get replaced?

I do not know whether it was analysed as such by the government and if it was, what the government planned for it.

Should India engage with a fundamentalist organisation like Taliban?

If you look at the statements given by the Ministry of External Affairs, it has stated that we are engaging with all stakeholders. We have participated in meetings where the Taliban was present. So, it is not a question of engaging with ‘fundamentalists’ as these are all labels. We have certain interests in Afghanistan and it is the responsibility of the government to ensure the safety of the Indian citizens and the safety of those in the Indian Embassy.

Was India being impractical by not engaging with them?

India was short-sighted. We are not engaging with them to change their behavior or create a split between them and Pakistan. We should have engaged only to have our own judgment, but so that we are not left suddenly without options because we are part of this region.

Right now, it is a situation in which we were left unprepared when the Americans began to withdraw rapidly. This is the general perception. If we had engaged and come to our own conclusion on Taliban, then perhaps we could have taken a few steps to mitigate the adverse effect.

Has this given Pakistan and China an edge in the region?

Certainly. When Pakistan’s position improves, so does China’s.

Taliban seemed to take taken over cities clinically, with a plan. Could it have happened without the assistance from Pakistan’s Army?

I would think that they had assistance from Pakistan’s ISI. At first they went for the police or Army posts in remote areas. These kinds of posts are manned by a maximum of 15 persons. A Taliban group of around 50 armed men would surround them and they would be informed that their lives would be safe if they surrendered. They usually surrendered and whatever arms and ammunition they would have at the post would be taken by the Taliban.

This is how they began to move from the month of May. Even in the third week of June, Taliban had the control of about 81 districts out of 421 districts in the country. In the next four weeks, the Taliban had expanded their hold to more than 220 districts, which is more than half. By this time, they were targeting districts with customs checkpoints, from where they could gain revenue. From there they began moving to provincial capitals.

The first provincial capital (Zaranj) fell on August 6. From August 6 to August 15, they had the entire country. So, it was a fairly well planned military strategy that was put into operation taking into account that it was more important to demoralise the security forces that actually fight with them. That was the strategy that was adopted.

How do you compare the first coming of the Taliban in 1990s to the second coming of Taliban now?

The difference between 1990s and now is that when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996 to 2001, it was an uphill task for the Taliban to gain legitimacy. In 2001, there were only three countries that recognized Taliban – Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

This time they start with an advantage because they already enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy. They have a deal with the US, have travelled to China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and several other countries. That is the key difference.

• Afghanistan
• Taliban
• Ambassador Rakesh Sood
• Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Published in Economic Times on August 17, 2021

On August 15, as India celebrated its 75^th Independence Day, Kabul fell to the Taliban. Later in the day, former President Ashraf Ghani, accompanied by his aides, left the country. Current reports indicate that he may be in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Taliban fighters roam the streets of Kabul, awaiting the arrival of the Taliban leaders to take charge.

The return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was a foregone conclusion when on February 29 last year, US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad signed an agreement with the Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha, following 18 months of negotiations. The document bore a strange title – “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the U.S. as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America”. This rather clunky phrase was repeated more than a dozen times in the text of the Agreement, a clear indication that the days of the Islamic Republic, established after the Taliban were ousted in 2001, were numbered.

In a collective suspension of disbelief, the U.S. withdrawal deal in return for safe passage was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a “peace deal”. Nobody questioned the rather strange agreement that was signed between two entities that didn’t recognise each other.

Perhaps, it is just as well that the deal was signed on 29 February because by the time its anniversary comes around in 2024, the Doha Agreement would be consigned to the dustbin of history and the ignominy of the U.S. misadventure forgotten.

When Khalilzad began direct talks, he had outlined four issues – an end to violence or a ceasefire, intra-Afghan talks leading to a durable peace and reconciliation, Taliban cutting all links with international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, and a withdrawal of all U.S. and foreign forces, while also emphasising that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

Clearly the Taliban turned out to have a better appreciation of U.S. compulsions and eventually got what they had been seeking – an unconditional U.S. withdrawal. In fact, Taliban even got U.S. to persuade the Afghan government to release 5000 Taliban fighters held in custody. Intra-Afghan talks got off to a slow start and after reaching agreement of procedural issues, have remained stalled on the ‘agenda’ since last December.

No shock, only awe

President Joe Biden took charge in February and after an internal review, announced on 14^th April that U.S. would complete the withdrawal by the anniversary of 9/11. As U.S. drawdown proceeded, Taliban executed a well-planned military strategy, beginning early May. Remote police and army posts were targeted and, in most cases, the 10-15 soldiers or policemen outnumbered by groups of 40-50 Taliban fighters, realising that reinforcements were not forthcoming, surrendered, handing over the arsenal to the Taliban.

In the third week of June, Taliban controlled 80 districts out of a total of 421 districts. A month later, Taliban had expanded their hold to cover more than half the districts. On August 6, they took over Zaranj, the first of the 34 provincial capitals and in less than 10 days, they were in Kabul.

Gaming the Great Game 3.0

At present, there are nearly 6000 American soldiers in Kabul, sent in by the Biden administration to ensure an orderly evacuation of U.S. citizens amid reports that the embassy is being closed down. Other western countries are downsizing or also closing down their missions by sending in military aircraft to evacuate their nationals. While there have not been reports of violence from Kabul, the current vacuum does create uncertainty and risk.

It is likely that Pakistan, Russia, Iran and China will retain their presence in Kabul and may even take a lead in recognising the new regime once the Taliban leaders reach Kabul. These countries have been actively engaging the Taliban and in recent weeks, have welcomed Taliban delegations in their capitals. It is possible that this helped them to obtain certain assurances about the security of their personnel in Kabul.

A perception has been generated that today’s Taliban have evolved into a less hard-line Taliban 2.0 though there is little evidence to support it. Reports from some of the areas where Taliban commanders have taken control are hardly reassuring and statements by its leaders remain vague and ambiguous.

India had remained wedded to the mantra of supporting “an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” peace process, in both letter and spirit. While Indian officials have participated in events where Taliban have been present, India has been content to let others take the lead. We have therefore been unable to plan options for ensuring security of both the Indian nationals working in Afghanistan as well the diplomats at our embassy in Kabul and this remains the primary responsibility at the moment.

Under the circumstances, the Indian government needs to urgently undertake an evacuation operation. When some kind of order is restored and the nature of the regime becomes clearer, the government can take a call on how to engage with the new dispensation.

*****