Tag Archives: AFGHANISTAN

A Flurry Of Diplomatic Activity On Afghanistan

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Article for Observer Research Foundation on 21st March, 2021

A flurry of diplomatic activity on Afghanistan has begun, catalysed by the approaching May deadline for the U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan under the agreement signed on 29 February last year by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha.

The problem is that a year later, the Doha agreement is in shambles. The intra-Afghan dialogue that was supposed to begin in March finally began in September and has not made progress. Taliban had committed to cut their ties with Al Qaeda but recent statements by Afghan and U.S. officials indicate that this has not happened. Meanwhile, violence levels in Afghanistan have risen sharply in recent months. A recent UN report indicated 3035 civilian deaths and 5785 injured during 2020 with Taliban held responsible for 45 percent of the casualties.

Biden’s options

President Biden’s options are limited. He can stick to the original withdrawal date but it is a foregone conclusion that the Kabul government will not be able to last very long and the country will descent into a civil war. The option of extending the stay unilaterally means that the Taliban may resume targeting U.S. troops, something they have refrained from since the Doha deal. A third option is to negotiate a short extension with the Taliban by offering them a share in governance in return for a reduction in violence.

Khalilzad has been asked to stay on to explore the third option and kickstart the intra-Afghan peace negotiations by suggesting that a Transition Government, including the Taliban, replace the current regime in Kabul, and the UN convene an international conference with key global and regional players, and the Afghan groups, a kind of Bonn 2, somewhat reminiscent of the Bonn conference convened in November 2001 where the post-Taliban political arrangements were concluded.

Diplomacy picks up

The rationale for the U.S. approach was spelt out in identical letters by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah. It expressed concern about the growing levels of violence and shared the bleak U.S. assessment that after a U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban were likely to make rapid territorial gains unless there was a serious attempt to restart and accelerate the peace process. The new peace plan was shared by Khalilzad with Afghan leaders and Taliban in early March in Kabul and Doha respectively. It contains a roadmap to an inclusive transition government, the terms for a significant reduction in violence leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and drafting a new constitutional framework. In the larger interest, President Ghani is expected to make the sacrifice and step down. UN has been requested to convene a Foreign Minister level conference inviting the Afghan groups, China, India, Iran, Russia and the U.S. to discuss a unified approach to a durable peace.

Turkey has conveyed willingness to host the UN convened conference, possibly in April, and also a March conference between Afghan government and leaders from Kabul and the Taliban to arrive at an agreement on the transition arrangements. UN Secretary general has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative. Arnault was in Kabul from 2002-06, first as Deputy and then as Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Those were the hopeful days, though by 2006, Taliban had announced their return with a spate of suicide attacks and IEDs.

Moscow added to the diplomatic activity by convening a conference of the ‘expanded troika’ – China, Pakistan, U.S. and Russia together with Afghan leaders and the Taliban on 18 March, with intra-Afghan talks continuing on 1the following two days. The highlight was a joint statement by the four Special Representatives – Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wang Yu, Sadiq Mohammed and host Zamir Kabulov on the first day declaring that they “do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate” system that the Taliban had introduced. The joint statement recognised that the Afghan people desired peace, called for reduction in violence from all sides, asked the Taliban not to launch the Spring offensive and reiterated their call for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan government has reacted positively emphasising the Islamic Republic is the only inclusive and acceptable structure that can ensure equality and pluralism and accommodates the diversity of Afghanistan and provides stability. Taliban have responded, saying that peace talks should be expedited and U.S. should stick to its withdrawal date.

A limited consensus

However, there is a growing momentum behind the call for Ghani’s departure. Within Afghanistan, many leaders like Karzai, Qanooni, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Sayyaf etc would be happy to see Ghani go. Among the international community, U.S. sees Ghani now as an obstacle to peace and Russia, Iran and Pakistan have always seen him as too pro-U.S. Ghani has responded by suggesting that he is ready to hold early elections (these are due in 2024) and hand over power to any elected government. However, the 2019 election saw an abysmal turnout of 20 percent and the current situation is no better. Moreover, Taliban are not inclined to go the electoral route.

However, the limited consensus breaks down thereafter and Bonn 2 is not like Bonn 1. There are fundamental differences and internal changes. At Bonn 1, the four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation with these four groups in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are fighting a bloody war. Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence.

The most important internal factor is Afghan demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30 years. This large cohort has come of age post-2002 and is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears and they are united in not accepting an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

India’s role

Since 2002, India has undertaken an extensive economic cooperation programme at a cost of $ 3 billion. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours. At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.

The Biden administration realises that it needs diplomacy to ensure a managed exit from Afghanistan. It needs Russia, Pakistan and Iran (as well as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) to lean on the Taliban to agree to a short U.S. extension; it needs Russia to lean on Ghani to make the sacrifice, and it needs the UN to come back and take over the peace process, thereby enlarging the number of stakeholders. Once the Taliban join a transitional government, they should wind up the Doha office and move to Kabul so that future Afghan talks will be Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled. 

However, whether this flurry of diplomatic activity can bring lasting peace to a country that has experimented with monarchy, a socialist republic, a communist rule, an Islamic Emirate and an Islamic Republic over the last 70 years, remains  difficult to predict.

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https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/flurry-diplomatic-activity-afghanistan/

The Sum & Substance of the Afghan Deal

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Published in The Hindu on 5th March, 2020

The long-awaited deal between the US and Taliban was finally signed in Doha last Saturday by US Special Envoy Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and former Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader. On the same day, US Defence Secretary Mark Esper visited Kabul to conclude the Joint Declaration for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the two governments. Gaps and inconsistencies between the two only add to the confusion. But two facts are clear – the US is on its way out and second, this does not ensure peace for the Afghan people. As former US Defence Secretary Gen Mattis put it, “The US doesn’t lose wars, it loses interest”. But since a major power cannot be seen to be losing a war, certainly not in an election year, a re-labelling of the withdrawal becomes necessary.

Shades of Vietnam
Nearly a half century ago, President Richard Nixon had faced a similar dilemma. With more than half a million US soldiers deployed in Vietnam, it was clear that a military solution was out of question. Seeking an exit, his NSA Dr Henry Kissinger, during his secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, assured Premier Zhou Enlai that US was prepared to withdraw completely from Vietnam in return for release of US POWs and a ceasefire lasting “a decent interval”. Kissinger and Nixon knew that the deal would leave their ally, the South Vietnamese government led by President Thieu, vulnerable. In the declassified 1972 White House tapes, Nixon and Kissinger acknowledge that “South Vietnam is not going to survive and the idea is to find a formula that can hold things together for a year or two”. The ploy worked.

President Nixon was re-elected with a record margin in November 1972 on the platform that peace was at hand. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed and by end March, US had completed its withdrawal ending direct military involvement. US POWs were released but by end-1973, the ceasefire was in tatters. Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975. Approximately 20000 US soldiers died during 1972-73 (Nixon cemented the understanding during his visit to China in February 1972) and 80000 South Vietnamese soldiers died after the collapse of the ceasefire, following the decent interval. To win his re-election, Nixon had promised an honourable peace and delivered a delayed defeat but by then, the world had moved on. Dr Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. The secret assurances of 1971-72 only surfaced after four decades.

Khalilzad is no stranger to Washington politics having served in Republican administrations since the Reagan era. He understood his job perfectly when Secretary Pompeo appointed him the Special Envoy for Afghan Reconciliation in September 2018. An Afghan by birth (he came to US in his teens) and having served as US ambassador in Afghanistan, he knew full well that he was not negotiating an Afghan peace deal, he was negotiating a ‘managed’ US exit. The time line too was clear. President Trump had repeatedly declared that “great nations do not fight endless wars” and his re-election was due in the fall of 2020.

The road to Doha
President Trump’s 2017 policy aimed at breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional 5000 soldiers, giving US forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Within a year, it was clear that the policy was not working because no insurgency can be defeated as long as it enjoys safe havens and secure sanctuaries. Pakistan’s help was necessary to get the Taliban to the negotiating table.

A three-way negotiation ensued. First was the Doha track with the Taliban, a second was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi and the third was with Kabul to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the outcome. The dice was loaded because Taliban and Pakistan negotiated as a team. Within six months, they had whittled down Ambassador Khalilzad’s four objectives – a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan peace dialogue, cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, and finally, US troop withdrawal – to just the last one, with some palliatives regarding the third.

The deal was ready to be signed last September when Trump abruptly called it off stalling the process. NSA John Bolton’s dismissal (he was opposed) and the release of three high level Taliban militants including Anas Haqqani (Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother) in November helped smoothen issues.

The key features of the Doha deal are:

a. US troops to be reduced from current 14000 to 8600 by 15 June (in 135 days).

b. Withdrawal of all remaining US and foreign forces by 29 April 2021 (in 14 months).

c. Removal of Taliban from UN Security Council sanctions list by 29 May.

d. Upto 5000 Taliban prisoners and 1000 Afghan security forces prisoners to be released from Afghan and Taliban custody respectively by 10 March.

e. US sanctions against Taliban leaders to be lifted by 27 August.

f. Intra-Afghan talks to begin on 10 March.

Whither Afghanistan
Nothing reflects the fragility of the deal signed between US and Taliban in Doha better than the title – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA! This is repeated more than a dozen times in the Agreement. Ironically, US has committed to getting UN Security Council endorsement for the deal with an entity that it doesn’t recognise!

The leader of the Haqqani network and No. 2 of Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani who recently wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, remains on the US wanted list with a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death. This hardly squares with the notion that Taliban is now a US counter- terrorism partner against the IS.

The Kabul Declaration states that Afghan government will “participate in US facilitated discussion with Taliban on CBMs, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant number of prisoners on both sides”. There is no reference to numbers to be released or a deadline of 10 March linking it to commencing intra-Afghan talks, as in the Doha deal. No wonder President
Ghani angrily declared a day later that release of prisoners will be part of the agenda for the intra-Afghan talks, provoking the Taliban to declare that the truce would no longer cover Afghan security forces, creating the first of many obstacles ahead.

There is no mention of what will happen to the Taliban fighters whose numbers have suddenly inflated from earlier range of 30000 to 50000 to 60000 to 150000! Are they to be disarmed and demobilised; prepared for civilian life or integrated with the Afghan security forces? Who is expected to provide stipends to those opting for peace? Trump maintains that it is ‘time that the
war on terror is fought by someone else’ so it won’t be the US. US has described itself as a “facilitator”, a responsibility that it will be glad to share with others.

The idea of a ceasefire, which is normally the starting point for any peace process, has been made an outcome of the intra-Afghan dialogue, together with a political roadmap for the future, but without any timeframe. There is no reference to preserving the gains of the last eighteen years and with the Taliban intent on reviving the Islamic Emirate, the shape of things is clear.

Remember the duck test – if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck.

A US-Taliban Deal or an Afghan Peace Deal

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Published in Hindustan Times on 1st March, 2020

On Saturday, 29 th February, an agreement will be signed between the US and the Taliban in Doha. Widely welcomed as a ‘peace deal’, it will be claimed by US President Donald Trump as further proof of his uncanny deal-making prowess. But while the deal may well mark the end of the US war in Afghanistan whether it actually ends conflict in Afghanistan remains an open question.

Road to the deal
Negotiations began in September 2018 with the appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to initiate direct talks with Taliban. It marked a reversal of Trump’s 2017 policy based on breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional 5000 soldiers, giving US forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Since it was soon clear that the policy was not working and the Taliban insurgency could not be defeated as long as it enjoyed safe havens and secure sanctuaries, US changed track and sought Pakistan’s help to get Taliban to the negotiating table.

While US maintained that Doha talks covered four issues – cessation of hostilities, cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, an intra- Afghan peace dialogue, and finally, US troop withdrawal, Taliban made it clear that their priority was the last issue. They rejected the idea of a ceasefire, and any talks with the Afghan government describing it as a puppet regime, lacking
legitimacy. Taliban provided some assurances on the second issue but focused on a firm date for US troop withdrawal.

A deal was ready to be signed on 8th September, with a Taliban delegation scheduled to travel to Camp David, when there was a hiccup. A US soldier was killed in a car bomb attack; coupled with the negative optics of welcoming a Taliban delegation in Camp David during the week marking the 9/11 attacks anniversary led Trump to call off the deal.

Within a month, talks were revived. US demanded a ceasefire for a month as a sign of Taliban commitment but Taliban demurred. Taliban felt that too long a ceasefire would make it difficult for them to regroup their fighters once they returned to their villages. Eventually, US settled for ‘significant reduction in violence’ for a week. The week long period began in the early hours of 22nd February, setting the stage for the Doha signing.

Echoes of Vietnam
The deal provides a timetable for reducing US troops from 14000 to 8600, possibly by the end of 2020 and the kick-starting of intra-Afghan peace talks. It is unclear if there is a date for complete withdrawal of US troops or for concluding the intra-Afghan dialogue or for how long the truce will hold. What is clear is that the US war in Afghanistan will come to an end permitting Trump to deliver on his promise of bringing the soldiers home in his re-election year.

Around fifty years ago, US pursued a similar strategy in Vietnam. President Nixon had taken over in 1969 when US troop presence in Vietnam was over half a million. It was clear that a military solution was not possible. During his secret visit to Beijing in 1971 July, Nixon’s NSA Dr Kissinger told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that US would agree to a complete withdrawal of troops in return for Hanoi’s releasing US POWs and a ceasefire for “a decent interval, say 18 months or more, before a Communist takeover in Vietnam”. He assured Zhou that if the Saigon government was overthrown following “a decent interval”, US would not intervene. Neither the US public nor the South Vietnamese were privy to this exchange.

And this is exactly how it unfolded. Nixon visited China in February 1972, describing it a visit to bring about “a lasting peace in the world” and won his re-election handsomely in November 1972 promising that “peace was at hand”. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accord was signed ending direct US military involvement and withdrawal, release of POWs, ceasefire and a reunification through peaceful means. Full scale fighting erupted before end-1973. South Vietnam lost another 80000 soldiers till 30th April 1975 when Saigon finally fell. US did not intervene as its war had been over two years earlier. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Nixon resigned in 1974, facing impeachment in the Watergate scandal.

Crafting a peace deal
Many things have changed but US still cannot be seen to be losing the war in a re-election year and so the US withdrawal needs repackaging as a peace process for Afghanistan. The problem is that nobody really knows what the Taliban want and reconciling an Emirate and Shariat based system with the existing Constitution is not easy. How would Taliban fighters be demobilised? How would an amnesty and reintegration package be worked out and who pays? Would an early US withdrawal encourage the Taliban to improve their bargaining position on the battlefield? Are the major powers only ‘facilitators’ or are they collectively prepared to act as ‘guarantors’?

Addressing these is necessary for a good deal but if the search is only for “a decent interval”, the Taliban who have waited two decades can also wait out “a decent interval”.