Tag Archives: history

Donald Trump Shakes Up the Global Nuclear Order

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Published in the Hindu on November 14, 2025

Today, the global nuclear order offers a curious contradiction – since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used during the last 80 years. The global nuclear arsenals have come down from a high of 65000 bombs in late 1970s to less than 12500 today. And, despite concerns in 1960s that by 1980, there may be at least two dozen states with nuclear weapons, the total today remains nine, five (the United States, Russia, The United Ukingdom, France and China) are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who had tested before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into being and four more who developed their nuclear arsenals later (Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea).

Looking back, these would seem to be impressive achievements but nobody is celebrating. In fact, the prevailing sentiment is that the global nuclear order is under strain and the U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent announcements may weaken all three elements of the global nuclear order.

Resumption of ‘nuclear tests’

On October 30, 2025, on his way to a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in Busan, Mr. Trump announced on Truth Social, “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately.” He added, “Russia is second, China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years.”

While it was clear that the message was directed at Russia and China, it was unclear whether Mr. Trump was referring to ‘nuclear explosive testing’ or testing of nuclear weapon systems. Second, the nuclear labs (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia) and the Nevada testing facilities fall under the Department of Energy and not the Department of War.

It is no secret that China, Russia, and the U.S. are designing and developing new nuclear weapons. On October 21, Russia tested a nuclear-powered cruise missile (Burevestnik) that travelled 14000 kms, following a week later, with a test of an underwater nuclear-powered torpedo (Poseidon). China has been testing hypersonic missiles and, in 2021, tested a nuclear capable hypersonic glide vehicle carried on a rocket, capable of orbiting the earth before approaching its target from an unexpected direction that was passed off as a satellite launcher. The U.S. is producing new warheads – a variable yield B61-13 gravity bomb, a low yield W76-2 warhead for the Trident II D-5 missile, while working on a new nuclear armed submarine launched cruise missile.

Yet they have refrained from explosive testing. Russia’s last explosive test was in 1990 while the US declared a moratorium on tests in 1992. In 1993, the U.S. created a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme under the National Nuclear Security Administration to work on warhead modernisation, life extension, and development of new safety protocols in warhead design.  U.S. President Bill Clinton also took the lead in pushing negotiations in Geneva for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China and France concluded their tests in 1996, six months begore the negotiations ended.

Why CTBT lacks a definition

Twenty-nine years later, the CTBT hasn’t entered into force despite 187 countries signing it. Among the necessary ratifications, the U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, and Iran have not done so, Russia did and withdrew its ratification in 2023, and India, Pakistan and North Korea have neither signed nor ratified it. India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and have since observed a voluntary moratorium, and North Korea conducted six tests between 2006 and 2017. Given today’s geopolitics, the prospects for the CTBT entering into force appear bleak.  

Second, the CTBT obliges states “not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” The U.S. was opposed to defining the terms, and instead, worked out private understandings with Russia and China on ‘zero-yield-tests;’ this permitted hydro-nuclear tests that do not produce a self-sustaining supercritical chain reaction.

The U.S. had conducted over a thousand nuclear tests and Russia 727 tests, giving them an adequate data base. China though with only 47 tests, also went along with this understanding. Thus, the CTBT delegitimsed only nuclear-explosive testing, not nuclear weapons, the reason why India never joined it.

In 2019-20, the U.S. State Department assessed that Russia and China “may have conducted low yield nuclear tests in a manner inconsistent with the U.S. zero-yield standard” though this was negated by the CTBT organisation that declared that their monitoring network with over 300 monitoring stations spread over 89 countries had not detected any inconsistent activity.

In a TV interview on November 2, Mr. Trump doubled down on resuming nuclear testing, this time including Pakistan and North Korea among the countries testing. A clarification came the same day from energy secretary Chris Wright on Fox News, calling the US tests ‘systems-tests’, “These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call noncritical explosions,” he said. However, Mr. Trump’s intention remains unclear.

Regional and global implications

The new low-yield warheads being designed make them more usable and the new systems (hypersonics, cruise and unmanned systems) are dual capable systems, leading to renewed research for missile defences like the U.S. ‘golden dome.’ Meanwhile doctrinal changes are being considered to cope with new technological developments in cyber and space domains. This raises doubts about the nuclear taboo in coming decades.  

The sole surviving US-Russia arms control agreement, Ner Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that limits the U.S. and Russian strategic forces to 700 launchers and 1550 warheads is due to expire on Feb 4, 2026 with no prospects of any talks on the horizon. China is not a party to any arms control and its nuclear arsenal that had remained below 300, is undergoing a rapid expansion, estimated at 600 today and likely to exceed 1000 by 2030. An incipient nuclear arms race was already underway; a resumption of explosive testing will just take the lid off.

Russia and China have denied Mr. Trump’s allegations regarding clandestine tests but will follow if the U.S. resumes explosive testing; China will be the biggest beneficiary because with only 47 tests (compared to over 1000 by the U.S.), resumed tests will help it to validate new designs and accumulate data.

India has been observing a voluntary moratorium but if explosive testing resumes, India will certainly resume testing to validate its boosted fission and thermonuclear designs, tested only once in 1998. Undoubtedly, Pakistan will follow but given its growing strategic linkages with China witnessed during Op Sindoor, this need hardly add to our concerns.

Though the CTBT is not in force, it did create a norm. But a resumption of explosive testing will lead to its demise. It will also tempt the nuclear wannabes to follow and mark the unravelling of the NPT led non-proliferation regime.

The taboo against use must remain intact

The U.S. has been the most significant player in shaping the global nuclear order; it would be ironical if Mr. Trump’s actions now become the catalyst for its demise. The reality is that the present global nuclear order was shaped by the geopolitics the 20th century; the challenge today is to craft a new nuclear order that reflects the fractured geopolitics of the 21st century while ensuring that the taboo against their use remains intact.  

The UN Secretary General has cautioned that “current nuclear risks are already alarmingly high” and urged nations “to avoid all actions that could lead to miscalculation or escalation with catastrophic consequences.”  But is anyone listening?

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Political Meltdown in Nepal was a Long Time Coming

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Published in the Hindustan Times on September 11, 2025

 

Tens of thousands of demonstrators, describing themselves as Gen Z, converged near the parliament in Kathmandu on Sept 8, to protest against a ban on 26 social media platforms (including Facebook, WhatsApp, X, Instagram, Reddit, LinkedIn, Signal and YouTube) announced last week for failing to register under the new government guidelines. Even as the police resorted to batons, water cannons, and rubber bullets to disperse the protestors, the crowds continued to grow and by the end of the day, 20 young people (including a 12 year old) were dead, with reports of 400 injured.

The following day, anger had spread to other cities and government buildings including the parliament and Singha Dubar were set on fire. Private houses of leading politicians cutting across party lines, were torched, cars burnt and ministers manhandled. Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak had accepted responsibility and resigned on Sept 8 and the ban order was also reversed but the protestors were not satisfied. Finally, Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli realised that he needed to go and he resigned on Sept 9 in the afternoon. There are rumours that he was evacuated in a helicopter by the army to a secure location as his official residence at Baluwatar was considered vulnerable.   

Nepal’s political transition has been a long time in the making and has gone through multiple transitions. It began with the popular uprising in 1990, labelled as Jan Aandolan 1, leading to a new constitution that laid the foundations of multiparty democracy by curbing the role of an absolute monarchy into a constitutionally circumscribed role. However, in mid-1990s, a Maoist insurgency began to take shape in some of the poorer hill areas that gradually took hold and spread. Infighting between the political parties and the Palace provided a permissive environment for the insurgency to spread and by 2006, it had claimed 17000 lives.

In 2005, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency, dissolved parliament, dismissed the elected government, and assumed direct rule. A popular pushback led to Jan Aandolan 2 in 2006 that forced him to restore parliament. A peace process between the political parties and the Maoists, facilitated by India, led to the Maoists coming overground and emerging as a political party. Elections for a Constituent Assembly (CA) took place in 2008. The 240-year-old monarchy was abolished, Nepal emerged as a republic, and the CA began work on a new constitution for a Naya (new) Nepal.

After seven years, Nepal adopted its new constitution but the promise of a New Nepal remains a distant dream. A key reason has been weak economic development, lack of employment opportunities, growing corruption, and frequent changes of government. In the 17 years since it became a republic, Nepal has had 15 governments. The situation didn’t improve even after 2015 when the new constitution was adopted, with the last decade accounting for nine of the 17 governments.

Part of the reason is that in none of the elections since 2008 did any party manage to obtain a clear majority necessitating coalitions. This explains the political instability of short-lived coalitions. However, there has been a strange stability too, in that the leaders of the three major parties, Nepali Congress (NC), United Marxist Leninist (UML), and Maoist Centre, have been taking turns in leading the incestuous coalitions and garner the loaves and fishes of office. In the process, corruption grew visibly and the groundswell of public disenchantment was just waiting for a spark that was provided by the ill-conceived ban on the 26 social media platforms, leading to Jan Aandolan 3.   

However, there are differences. The earlier two Jan Aandolans were spearheaded by the political parties, primarily the NC and the UML and had the clear objective of wresting political power from the Monarchy and had an identifiable leadership. The Jan Aandolan 3 rejects the leaders of all political parties and there have been calls for dissolution of the parliament and even revising the constitution.

Second, there is no visible leadership. The 35-year-old Balen Shah, a rapper turned electoral phenomenon, the surprise winner to be elected Mayor of Kathmandu in 2022, is trying to emerge as a leader in Jan Aandolan 3. On September 7, he conveyed support to the protestors and after keeping quiet for a day, came out after PM Oli’s resignation urging restraint.

Another name doing the rounds is the 38-year-old Sudan Gurung, who founded the NGO Hami Nepal (Our Nepal) in 2015 following the devastating earthquake to ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered efficiently where it was most needed by mobilising youth volunteers. During the past decade, his NGO has been successful in mobilising resources for communities impacted by floods and landslides that take place with depressing regularity. Hami Nepal was heard as a slogan during the protests.

Other than conveying sorrow at the loss of innocent lives, wishing a speedy recovery to the injured, India has expressed hope that “all concerned will exercise restraint and address any issues through peaceful means and dialogue.” To ensure security and with an eye to the forthcoming Bihar elections, the border has been sealed. For the present, this is adequate even as the government remains vigilant and monitors developments to see the political actors that emerge out of the political churn of Jan Aandolan 3.

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R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended

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I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/

Remembering Dr R Chidambaram

From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)

I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.

In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.

In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.  

Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.

At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.

Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.

Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.

The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.

At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.

It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.

How and Why D&ISA Division was Created in MEA

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I write for India’s World Vol 1 Issue 1

How and Why D&ISA Division Was Created in MEA 

In early 1992, after five and a half years posted abroad, I returned to India with a growing realization of the shifting geopolitical equations, its impact on South Asia, and the challenges it would pose for Indian foreign policy that had been crafted during the Cold War years. These realisations were also shared by the Foreign Secretary and the political leadership, eventually leading to the birth of the Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.

A faraway view

My five and a half years were split between two postings: Geneva, where I served as First Secretary (Disarmament) at the Permanent Mission of India, and then Islamabad, where I was Counsellor (Political) at the High Commission of India.

Both postings provided a ringside view of changing geopolitics and its impact on South Asia.

In Geneva, the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention began to register progress as the Soviet delegation softened its position on on-site and challenge inspections. Mandatory and consultative verification was accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilaterally concluded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989 and in November, the Berlin Wall came down. In Vienna, talks began on for setting limits on conventional forces leading to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty the following year.

In 1990, tensions between India and Pakistan began to rise with growing incidents of violence and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The camps in Pakistan that had trained the mujahideen for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan were ready for new recruits. Following a crisis in summer of 1990, talks between the Foreign Secretaries were initiated to develop Confidence Building Measures, the first such talks since the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities, concluded in 1988. This led to the operationalising of the Hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) and another was set up between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Two significant conventional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) concluded in 1991 were the Agreement on Advance Notices on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres, and Troop Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts.

Coming home

By early 1992, I was back in Delhi and took charge as Director in the United Nations Division, responsible for dealing with Disarmament issues (UND). The work related to the UN in New York (General Assembly, Disarmament Commission), Geneva (negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other review conferences), and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). However, the world was changing rapidly, with new challenges and opportunities.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen states with Russia as the successor state. The bipolar world of the Cold War, came to an end. For the first time since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met at summit level (Prime Minister Narsimha Rao participated as India was a non-permanent member) to take stock of the global security environment and concluded, inter-alia, that proliferation posed a major threat to regional and global security.

On the margins of the UNSC meeting in New York, Prime Minister Rao and President George H W Bush held a bilateral meeting, concluded that the end of the Cold War provided India and the U.S. an opportunity to overcome their differences, agreeing to open a dialogue on strategic and nuclear issues that had been a source of friction since the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India.

 The dialogue commenced a few months later and continued through various ups and downs, culminating in the 123 Agreement permitting civilian nuclear cooperation in 2008.

Meanwhile restrictions on dual use items began to get tightened. In 1991, the Nuclear Suppliers Group convened after more than a decade and the following year, added Part 2 to their Guidelines covering nuclear-related-dual-use items and technologies that, in addition to having non-nuclear applications, could also contribute to the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) met to add to its Category 2 lists by adding more dual-use items and technologies, as also Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) above a certain threshold. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had concluded an agreement with a Russian entity Glavkosmos, for transfer of technology relating to cryogenic rocket engines. Despite the fact that cryogenic technology is for satellite launches and not for missiles, the U.S. sanctioned both ISRO and Glavkosmos, reflecting the focus on non-proliferation.

In 1992, India announced full diplomatic recognition to Israel with the opening of embassies in Delhi and Tel Aviv. Under the multi-track Arab-Israeli peace process underway, India became an extra-regional participant in the Arms Control and Regional Security track that worked on CBMs.

Within weeks of returning from Islamabad as Director (UND), I found that nearly three-fourths of my time was devoted not to UN related disarmament agendas but national and regional security and strategic dialogues as well as handling non-proliferation related sanctions and licensing issues for dual use items, especially relating to civilian nuclear and space programmes.

To take stock of the changes under way, an Eminent Persons Group was set with Prime Minister Rao’s approval in mid-1992, with serving and former heads of nuclear, space and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) departments.

Around this time, I put up a note to Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, explaining that the designation UND no longer described the changing nature of the work and proposed the establishment of a new division that would, in addition to the disarmament negotiations and the UN and IAEA related work, also deal with national security, non-proliferation and access to dual-use technology related issues. The proposal found acceptance and following some discussions, the new division was named Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA Division).

The nuclear dialogue with the U.S. was the first of many that followed. Discussing threat perceptions was a novel challenge for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and required much closer coordination with the Ministry of Defence. Soon, D&ISA Division had to get a Military Advisor and a Science Adviser deputed from the Services and DRDO respectively.

The evolution of an idea

Over the years, D&ISA Division also became the nodal division for handling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, a security dialogue platform, that India was invited to join as part of our “Look East” policy. As the global norm of non-proliferation gained greater traction, D&ISA division began to highlight the need for sensitising our private sector entities as some of them had been found exporting dual-use chemicals that led to adverse commentary in international media and US sanctions, even though these companies had not violated any Indian laws. An empowered group was established to develop lists of dual-use materials, equipments and technologies whose exports should be licensed only after due diligence and end-use assurances, laying the foundation for non-proliferation related export controls administered by the Ministry of Commerce.

India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and D&ISA Division became responsible for coordinating industry outreach with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers and with DRDO about winding down our chemical weapons programme.

The opening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva added the responsibility of developing the national negotiating position in close coordination with the Department of Atomic Energy. By 1995, it became clear that in order to keep India’s nuclear option viable, India could not rely on the 1974 PNE and needed to carry out a new series of nuclear tests. Withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations in 1996 followed by the nuclear tests in 1998 and working the negotiating strategy for India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power added to D&ISA Division’s work load. Together with the concerned territorial divisions, it handled the strategic dialogues with a number of countries including France, UK, Israel etc. that eventually led to the establishment of long-standing strategic partnerships.

An institution in itself

In late 2000, after nearly a nine-year stint, I left Delhi on a new assignment. India had established a new position of an Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and it was my privilege to set up the new office.

Over a quarter century later, it is gratifying to see that D&ISA Division has thrived as has the position of Ambassador for Disarmament. Many of my young colleagues who I had the privilege to work with, went on to serve in Geneva and Vienna, and head the D&ISA Division, (D B Venkatesh Verma, Suchitra Durai, G Dharmendra, Amandeep Singh Gill) with great distinction.

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