Tag Archives: INDIA

Making Sense of the Political Tsunami in Nepal

Posted on by
1

Published in The Hindu (online) on March 14, 2026

As a landlocked country, Nepal has gone through both geological and political earthquakes in recent years but the snap election held on March 5 has been nothing short of a political tsunami. The old political parties have barely scraped through and the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP), which is less than five years old, has won 125 seats out of the 165 first-past-the-past FPTP seats; with 57 proportional representation (PR) seats, it has a total tally of 182, just two short of the two-thirds mark, an unprecedented outcome in a Nepali election. Most of the political leaders who have dominated the Kathmandu scene for the last quarter century will be missing when the new House is convened. However, the RSP leaders now face a bigger challenge – of converting a stable majority into institution-based policy formulation and good governance team to deliver on the high expectations generated.

Crisis after crisis

Barely had the 21st century begun when Nepal went through its first major political crisis. On June 1, 2001, at a family dinner at the Narayanhiti Palace, Crown Prince Dipendra killed nine members of the royal family, including his father, King Birendra, and his mother, Queen Aishwarya. As Nepal mourned, he died three days as a result of a self-inflicted gun wound. King Gyanendra took over, marking a turning point for the two-century old Shah dynasty.

Meanwhile, Nepal was also struggling with a Maoist insurgency that finally ended by 2006 with the political mainstreaming of the Maoists. In the Terai, the Madhesi movement had gained momentum, backing demand for a federal structure. During his seven years, King Gyanendra changed prime-ministers six times and even abolished the National Assembly to impose direct rule. However, the political parties were able to lead a Jan Aandolan that forced him to retreat.

A Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected in 2008 that voted to abolish the monarchy marking Nepal’s second major political change. The CA’s mandate was to draft a constitution for a federal democratic Nepal in two years. The process turned out to be politically difficult and took considerably longer. After another CA election mandated by the Supreme Court in 2013, a new constitution was finally adopted in 2015.   These seven years saw six prime-ministers. The reason was simple. Both the 2008 and the 2013 elections failed to throw up clear majorities, and the leaders of the political parties – Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal -United Marxist Leninist (UML), Maoists and the Madhesi parties – devoted their time to jockeying for positions in the coalition governments.

The 2015 constitution marked Nepal’s third political turning point but the expectations of the much-awaited dawn of a naya Nepal were soon belied. From 2015 to 2025, Nepal saw seven prime-ministers but the faces were the same – UML leader K P Sharma Oli thrice, NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba twice, and Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda twice.

The lavish lifestyles of the political elite went viral on social media accompanied by tales of corruption and impunity of ‘nepo-babies’. The disconnect between a young Nepal with a median age of 26 years and a self-absorbed political leadership in its 70s, was combustible. The spark came when the Oli government banned 26 social media websites (including Facebook, X, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Signal, YouTube, and Instagram) on September 4 for failing to comply with domestic regulations. Resentment erupted as Gen Z protests on 8-9 September, leading to widespread looting and arson across Nepal. With 77 deaths due to police firings, Prime Minister Oli was forced to resign.  

Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was sworn in on September 12 to head an interim government. According to the Constitution, an interim leader should have been from the Assembly but given the anger against all the political parties, President Ram Chandra Poudel’s choice was guided by public sentiment. Ms. Karki made it clear that her goal was to ensure inclusive and peaceful elections within six months and she has delivered on her promise by bringing Nepal back on the constitutional path.

Message of the 2026 election

The Gen Z protests brought down the Oli government. The decimation of the old political forces in the 2026 elections mark 21st century Nepal’s fourth political transformational moment. Beginning 2008, when Nepal introduced PR seats along with FPTP to ensure a more balanced political representation, none of the last four elections (in 2008, 2013, 2017 and 2022) saw any political party manage a clear majority. Most Nepali observers had blamed the PR system for political instability and unwieldy coalitions. However, RSP’s victory puts that myth to rest.

The number of MPs, under 40, has gone up to 61 out of 165 FPTP members, and 52 are from RSP. NC has slipped from 89 seats in 2022 to 18 and UML from 78 to 9. Both parties had seen calls for leadership changes after the Gen Z protests. In the UML, K P Sharma Oli managed to stave it off leading to his ignominious defeat in his home constituency that he had represented since 1991, by 35-year-old Balendra (Balen) Shah, a former mayor of Kathmandu, fighting his first assembly election. NC managed an organisational reshuffle with 51-year-old Gagan Thapa easing out 79-year-old five-time PM Sher Bahadur Deuba but it happened too late to improve NC’s prospects. All the pro-Monarchy and Madhes parties have been wiped out. Evidently, identity politics (Madhes/Pahad, Khas Arya/Janjati, secularism/Hindu rashtra) was not a factor in 2026.

The credit for RSP’s victory goes to its founder chairman Rabi Lamichhane and Mr. Shah who joined the party in December-end on the understanding that while Mr. Lamichhane would continue as the party chairman, he (Balen) would be the party candidate for PM. He, together with the party symbol ghanti, became the face of the RSP campaign. It was a politically sound decision because Mr. Lamichhane’s short stint in government following the 2022 elections, as Deputy PM was marked by controversies. The first was on account of the fact that he hadn’t renounced his U.S. citizenship, and the second is an ongoing criminal case regarding financial embezzlement from a number of cooperative societies. But such was the pro-RSP wave that out of its tally of 125, 42 MPs are those who defected from other parties less than eight weeks before the elections.

Success raises its own challenges. The RSP spelt out ambitious targets in its manifesto – ensuring 7% annual growth, doubling the per capita income to $3000 and GDP to $100 billion, creating 1.2 million formal jobs to curb the daily youth migration running at 3300, delivering universal health insurance and integrated social security, and reforming public education.

Among the promised administrative and political reforms are – reducing ministries from 25 to 18, bringing in experts as ministers so that MPs only exercise oversight, merit-based bureaucracy and judiciary, a review of assets of all public officials since 1990, and constitutional amendments for a directly elected Executive with a fully PR parliament. Mr. Lamichhane and Mr. Balen will have to show that they can work together to prioritise elements from this list and put together a core team that can deliver.

Managing external relations

On the foreign policy front, establishing ground rules for relations with India, China and the U.S. will be another challenge. As Mayor of Kathmandu, Mr. Shah has been temperamental and kept aloof from media, relying instead on his social media outreach. In a country with a population of 30 million, he enjoys a following of 3.7 million on Facebook and a million on Instagram. Even during the election campaign, he spoke at only five events, for a total of 27 minutes. He is a Madhesi by birth, speaks Maithili but did not exploit it. His messaging doesn’t rely on speeches and TV interviews but social media.

His outbursts can be mercurial; last November his Facebook, “F…America F…India F…China F…UML F…congress F…RSP F…RPP F…Maobaadi You Guys all Combined can do Nothing (Smiley)” generated criticism before he deleted it. In 2023, in response to the unveiling of the mural of Akhand Bharat in India’s new parliament building, he put up a map of Greater Nepal in his office that showed parts of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal as part of Nepal. He declared that “India called its parliamentary map a cultural one, so we put up a historical map of Greater Nepal. No one should object”.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken to both Mr. Shah and Mr. Lamichhane to congratulate them and both sides have conveyed their intention to strengthen and deepen bilateral relations. Mr. Lamichhane has talked of Nepal pursuing the path of “development diplomacy”. Given the changes in Nepal, India will need to be careful about reiterating the old mantras of cultural, historical and religious ties and invoking tropes of Ayodhya-Janakpur, Kashi-Pashupatinath and, roti-beti ka rishta; it should now invest in developing a new idiom of responding to the naya Nepal. 

*****

Redeeming India’s Nuclear Power Promise

Posted on by
Reply

Published in the Hindu on July 23, 2025

If India is to meet its ambitious target of 100GW of power generating capacity by 2047, it needs foreign partners as well as private entities to participate in the nuclear sector which has been till now completely under the government

The Union Budget for 2025-26 marked a significant shift in India’s nuclear energy plan by announcing an ambitious target of 100 GW of power generating capacity by 2047, up from the present 8.18 GW. This positions nuclear power as a major pillar in India’s energy mix, given the two goals of emerging as a developed country (Viksit Bharat) by 2047 and achieving “net zero emissions” by 2070.

Simultaneously, the Nuclear Energy Mission announced a special allocation of Rs. 20000 crores to develop “at least five indigenously designed and operational Small Modular Reactors (SMR) by 2033.” Such ambitious plans will need involvement of private players, both domestic and foreign, into a hitherto government sector, requiring significant changes in the legislative, financial and regulatory framework. Government has indicated that some changes in the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010 are in the offing. However, the comprehensive reforms needed also require a change in mind set.

India’s nuclear journey

India had an early start, setting up Asia’s first nuclear research reactor, Apsara, in 1956, and beginning work on Asia’s first nuclear power reactors at Tarapore in 1963. As early as 1954, Dr Homi Bhabha, the architect of India’s nuclear programme presented a target of generating 8 GW of nuclear power by 1980!

However, the journey has been long and difficult. Following the war with China in 1962; its entry into the nuclear club in 1964; India’s decision to stay out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968; and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) test in 1974; India was excluded from the emerging nuclear order. International cooperation ceased and gradually, export controls further slowed down the nuclear power programme. The first unit at Rajasthan was barely set up while the second was under construction: it only went critical in 1981. The nuclear power target was pushed to 10 GW by 2000.

Moreover, India took time to successfully indigenise the design of the 220 MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR), employed in Rajasthan. The advantage was that it uses natural uranium as fuel unlike the design of the Tarapur Light Water Reactor (LWR), a design that used Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that India obtained from the U.S., and later, from France. Subsequently, the same 220 MW PHWR units were established at Narora, Kaiga, Kakrapar etc; the design was upgraded to 540 MW (set up at Tarapur TAPS 3 and 4 in 2005-06) and to 700 MW with two units getting operational at Kakrapar in 2024. Since the nuclear establishment was excluded from civilian exchanges, an understandable and unintended consequence of the 1974 PNE was that the it became inward looking and wary about external engagement.

After the nuclear tests in 1998, followed by intense negotiations with the U.S. and other strategic partners, India finally gained acceptance as a responsible nuclear power. It also got a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India was thus ready to resume exchanges with other nuclear powers to import both nuclear fuel and more advanced reactors to expand its nuclear energy programme.

However, the CLNDA created new difficulties that have prevented the anticipated external participation, from France and the U.S. In fact, Russia is the only country that is partnering with us at Kudankulum with six VVER-1000 power reactors because this government-to-government agreement, signed in 1988, predated the CLNDA.   

Towards green development

To become a developed country by 2047, India’s annual per capita income needs to grow from the current $2800 to $22000, and correspondingly, the GDP from the current $4 trillion to over $35 trillion. There is a well-established correlation between economic growth and energy consumption. In 2022, India’s per capita electricity consumption stood at 1,208 kWh, compared to 4,600 kWh for China, and over 12,500 kWh for the U.S.

India’s electricity generation capacity, currently at 480 GW (divided almost equally between fossil fuels and renewables), will have to grow five-fold, accounting for growth in population and urbanisation. However, solar, wind, and small hydro provide intermittent power. That is why out of 2030 TWh, the total electricity generated in 2024, renewables, with half the generation capacity, accounted for 240 TWh. Coal fired thermal plants accounted for 75 percent of the generation, the balance added by nuclear and large hydro projects.

The climate change commitments announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2021 at the Glasgow COP26, of “net zero emissions by 2070, raising non-fossil energy generation capacity to 500 GW by 2030 while meeting 50 percent of the energy demand through renewables, and achieving a carbon intensity reduction of 45 percent over 2005 levels by 2030” means that that India will not be able to rely on fossil fuels for its growth. The potential from renewables (including solar, hydro, wind, and biomass) is estimated at providing 20% of the demand and up to 25% with investments in battery and pumped storage.   The obvious candidate therefore to fuel India’s growth is nuclear power.

There is a renewed interest globally in nuclear power. It was reflected in the Dubai 2023 COP28 ‘Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy’, acknowledging nuclear power as ‘a critical input in reducing reliance on fossil fuels, enhancing energy security, and move towards a low carbon future’. in June, the IAEA and the World Bank agreed to work together to support nuclear energy in developing countries, marking a significant policy shift. World Bank President Ajay Banga pointed out, “nuclear (energy) delivers base load power, which is essential to building modern economies.” It is quite likely that the World Bank lead will be followed by other development funding banks and organisations.

Creating an enabling environment

Government is looking at three routes ahead. One is to standardise the 220 MW PHWR design and apply it to the Bharat Small Modular Reactors, that significantly reduces costs and commissioning time. This would be relevant to replacing captive thermal power plants that today account for over 100 GW and will be replaced over the next two decades.

The second track is scaling up the Nuclear Power Corporation of India  Ltd (NPCIL) plans for the 700 MW PHWR into fleet mode by facilitating land acquisition, streamlining licensing, and strengthening indigenous supply chains.

The third track is to accelerate negotiations with partners in France and the U.S. partners that have been moving at a glacial pace for the last 15 years.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, nuclear power is a sector reserved by the government. The NPCIL is a government owned company that builds, owns, and operates the PHWRs, the first two Tarapur LWRs, and the Russian designed VVERs.

Nuclear power financing is qualitatively different because of the higher upfront capital costs, lower operating costs, a lifecycle of 50-60 years, and costs associated with decommissioning and radioactive waste management. The indigenised PHWR model has a capital cost of $2 million/MW while the equivalent cost for a coal fired thermal unit is just under a million. Given NPCIL’s annual budget of $1.2 billion, government realises that to achieve the target of 100 GW, private sector companies will have to be brought into the sector, necessitating a comprehensive set of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.

Questions of majority/minority ownership, whether the nuclear operator is exclusively NPCIL; responsibility and control over the nuclear island part of the plant; and concerns over assured fuel supply and waste management responsibility will need to be considered with the potential stakeholders that include major players like Tatas, Adani, Ambani, Vedanta and L & T. The power plants will be under IAEA safeguards and ensuring this is a sovereign responsibility, necessitating a different legal framework. All these will require amendments to the 1962 Act.

A set of comprehensive amendments will also be needed for the 2010 CLNDA. The Liability Law was intended to be consistent with the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for Nuclear Damage to which India is a party. The CSC provides liability to be channelled only to the ‘operator;’ however the CLNDA added a ‘right of recourse’ by the ‘operator’ to the ‘supplier’ as well as the possibility of legal proceedings under other applicable laws. The government has tried to square the circle by providing explanations that but appears to have finally accepted the need for legal clarity through amendments.

A third area is commercial disputes relating to tariffs. Nuclear electricity tariff for NPCIL is notified under the Atomic Energy Act. Generally, commercial disputes fall under the Electricity Act and are settled by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) but a recent dispute between NPCIL and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam has led to conflicting views by the CERC and the Appellate Tribunal. The case is now under consideration before the Supreme Court. With the entry of private sector in the field, should the tariff setting come into the ‘levelized cost of energy’ as applicable to thermal, solar, wind and hydro will depend on how the question of ownership and control are determined.  

While India has had an impeccable nuclear safety record, the certification and safety oversight is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) that is ‘autonomous’ but not a legal entity and is subordinate to the Department of Atomic Energy. In 2011, a draft Bill was circulated to establish AERB as an independent regulator, but the Bill lapsed. With the entry of the private sector, the need for an independent regulator becomes paramount.

In addition, a raft of financial incentives will need to be introduced. While nuclear energy is a low-carbon energy source, it is not classified as “renewable,” like solar or wind. Revising this classification would make nuclear power projects eligible for tax incentives and specially designed ‘green financing’ instruments. Long term power-purchase-agreements and provision for viability-gap-funding are other incentives. The sector also needs to be opened for FDI participation, perhaps up to 49 percent, to ensure Indian ownership and control.  

In the past, the process of reform has been tentative. In 2011, NPCIL set up a Joint Venture (JV) with the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) but it languished till it was revived last year. It will now build and operate 4 units of 700 MW each, scheduled to come up at Mahi Banswara in Rajasthan. Land acquisition has been underway and once completed, the first unit will take seven years. A JV with Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) is also envisaged. Both REC and NTPC are PSUs and these JVs will be wholly government entities.

However, if India has to deliver on the promise of 100 GW by 2047, India needs foreign partners and the private sector. This has been accepted by the government Now it has to move forward the reform process comprehensively and decisively.  

*****

Op Sindoor: Conventional Operations Under the Nuclear Shadow

Posted on by
Reply

For CSDR dt May 28, 20225

Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states after undertaking a series of tests, the India-Pakistan crises have followed a predictable pattern. The first escalatory step is invariably a terrorist attack by one of the numerous terrorist groups based in Pakistan; India’s outrage and political, diplomatic, economic and, (since 2016) measured kinetic retaliation against specific terrorist targets, signalling a possible closure to hostilities; Pakistan’s military retaliation that sets into motion a cycle of escalation, often accompanied by nuclear sabre rattling designed to energise the international community, leading finally to a de-escalation with both countries getting a face saving exit.

The terrorist attacks permit Pakistan a degree of deniability unless a perpetrator has been captured (as happened in the Mumbai 2008 attack) though the deniability claims carry little conviction, given Pakistan’s well documented long-standing policy of nurturing such jihadi outfits. India has been a slow learner in developing and acquiring the intelligence and kinetic means to be able to track and engage in precision targeting of terrorist groups inside Pakistan. Though subjected to major terrorist attacks, especially since the 1990s, the recourse to kinetic retaliation only began in 2016. After Pahalgam, Prime Minister has described it as an expansive “new normal.”

Developing kinetic retaliation capability

In 2001, following the attack on Indian parliament by five JeM terrorists, India mobilised its ground forces with the strike formations. The process lasted weeks, giving Pakistan adequate time to prepare its counter-mobilisation. Since the U.S. needed Pakistan’s military cooperation for its Op Enduring Freedom launched against the Taliban in October 2001, and the Pakistani military claimed that it was stretched on the India front, Pakistan was prevailed upon to provide assurances of “not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.” The exercise in coercive diplomacy helped provide a reprieve for seven years.

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks are often called India’s 9/11 moment. A group of 10 LeT militants targeted 12 locations in Mumbai. The carnage lasted four days and claimed 175 lives, including nine militants. Among the dead were 29 foreign nationals from 16 countries, including six from the U.S. The captured militant provided the details of Pakistan’s involvement. While this enabled international condemnation and diplomatic measures to penalise Pakistan, the absence of any kinetic retaliation drew unfavourable comparisons in certain domestic sections with the U.S and Israel. In Pakistan, it led to a growing conviction that its tactical nuclear weapons served as an effective deterrent against any conventional military action by India.

Kinetic retaliation, from Uri to Pahalgam

Realising that its military forces were a blunt instrument ill-equipped to undertake short, sharp punitive operations, India began to build up its capabilities slowly. The 2016 attack on a military camp in Uri by four JeM militants killed 19 soldiers and provided an opportunity to employ kinetic retaliation for the first time. A coordinated set of simultaneous cross-border operations were launched by special teams to neutralise more than half a dozen terrorist launch pads. The operation was successfully projected as a shift to a more punitive approach and these “surgical strikes” was the subject of a successful Bollywood film. Pakistan found a face-saver by denying that there had been any intrusions.

In 2019, a suicide attack on a paramilitary convoy, claimed by JeM, claimed forty lives. With general elections less than two months away, the Modi government had little choice. Days later, Indian authorities announced that the IAF had carried out an air strike on a JeM training camp at Balakot, 65 kms from the LoC, in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Once again, it was described as a limited operation against a terrorist location, based on real time intelligence, and therefore pre-emptive and defensive.

Pakistan denied that there was any camp, protested at its air space violation, and the following morning, five Pakistani aircraft entered Indian airspace. Indian fighters scrambled, and in the ensuing dogfight, an Indian pilot ejected, ending up in Pakistani custody. This created a fresh crisis, leading to U.S. involvement to ensure that the pilot was released quickly. The following morning, Pakistan PM Imran Khan announced that Pakistan had demonstrated its capability and resolve by retaliating against India’s intrusion and would return the Indian pilot as a humanitarian gesture, providing a face-saver to both sides.

According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials from both countries had been in touch with the U.S. officials, blaming the other for nuclear escalation and threatening retaliation, thereby leading to U.S. involvement. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also claimed to have intervened and counselled restraint.

The Pahalgam attack on April 22 claimed 26 civilian lives. Though a series of political and economic measures were announced including putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, it was evident that the scope of the kinetic retaliation had to be larger. Eventually, nine terrorist locations, including iconic locations such as the LeT and JeM headquarters in Punjab, were targeted using loitering munitions, stand-off air-to-surface missiles and smart bombs. It was emphasised that India had targeted terrorist locations and the operation was over unless Pakistan escalated matters. The next three nights saw an escalation with strikes and counter-strikes, with both sides using drones and standoff missiles though the aircraft remained in their respective airspaces. Once again, senior U.S. officials began to engage as the crisis sharpened and news about the ceasefire was made public by President Trump shortly before the official announcements on May 10.

Evidently, the Modi government’s policy for dealing with Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks has been evolving, in keeping with improving capabilities. The first Rafale aircraft landed in India in mid-2020, with some of the weapon systems following. The Harop drone fleet was expanded post-2019 and the indigenous Sky Striker drones were ordered in 2021, including with kamikaze versions. Therefore, compared to 2019 Balakot, Indian was better placed to ensure precision targeting and avoid collateral damage, especially in populated areas like Bahawalpur and Muridke.

The lessons from Pahalgam

In his address to the nation on May 12, PM Modi announced that Op Sindoor had redefined the fight against terror and established a “new normal.” This consisted of India’s right to respond militarily since any act of terror was an act of war; India would not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail;” and India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. Two new elements can be discerned in this – while claiming a right to military response is not new as it was exercised in 2016 and 2019 too, calling every terror attack an “act of war” expands the scope of the military action that has so far been limited to terrorist locations. Second, putting together the terrorists and the ISI, puts the military on notice but what form this would take is left uncertain. In 2016, 2019 and 2025, India has consistently emphasised that its kinetic action was “non-escalatory” as it was directed at known terrorist locations and not at a military site.

Even though Op Sindoor’s objectives had not been spelt out, it is clear that on May 7, Indian forces demonstrated their capability in identifying and destroying multiple terrorist camps and related infrastructure, across a distance of 800 kms, in a speedily executed, coordinated operation using precision strike weapons. In subsequent days, the operations grew gradually and by May 10, IAF had shown its ability to penetrate Pakistan’s air defence to inflict damage on nearly all Pakistan’s forward air bases and air defence installations. Yet, this did not emerge as the prevailing narrative.

On May 7, Pakistan claimed that five Indian aircraft had been downed, a claim denied by India. The narrative therefore became one of evaluation of Chinese technologies (J-10 and JF-17 aircraft and PL-15E missiles) versus French (Rafale aircraft) and Russian (SU-30 and Mig-29) aircraft. The Indian statement on May 11, “We are in a combat scenario and losses are part of combat…we achieved all our objectives and all our pilots are back home,” if made earlier, would have prevented the misleading commentary and maintained the primacy of the Indian narrative. The fact that the IAF operated under non-escalatory rules of engagement and did not neutralise Pakistani air defences in advance was a signal to assure Pakistan that our strike was only against terrorist targets. It would also have reinforced the impact of the punitive strikes on May 10, in face of repeated Pakistani escalatory provocations.

It is reasonable to assume that the terrorist infrastructure that has been degraded will be rebuilt, presumably also at more inaccessible or concealed locations. It is highly unlikely that the ISI will dismantle the LeT, JeM or the dozen other outfits that it has nurtured over decades. A recent Gallup Pakistan poll revealed that 96 percent of the Pakistanis believe that Pakistan has emerged victorious from the four-day limited conflict. The elevation of the COAS Gen Asim Munir to Field Marshal has been welcomed by the political parties, including the PTI.

The current ceasefire is fragile and could therefore breakdown along the predictable pattern that led to Pahalgam and earlier attacks. A full-scale war like 1971 is not feasible as it is an unaffordable exercise that yields no practical military objectives. Therefore, a key take away is to define narrower objectives that yield desirable outcomes and build capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, accordingly. A realistic objective will combine three elements – degrade terrorist capabilities as decisively as possible; inflict punitive measures, political, economic, and military; and demonstrate national unity and resolve.

Exploring the ‘new normal’

The conception of a ‘new normal’ poses three key questions –                                                             

  1. Does the expansive ‘new normal’ establish deterrence?                                 
  2. Second, if deterrence fails, and there is a terrorist attack, does the ‘new normal’ lead to more rapid escalation, and does it ensure superior escalation management?                                                    
  3. And finally, does it enable de-escalation without external involvement?

Deterrence normally implies ‘deterrence by denial’ coupled with ‘deterrence by punishment.’ ‘Denial’ implies strengthening intelligence capabilities to track infiltration, movement, and communications of terrorists, to plan and prevent such attacks. It also means better preparation to reduce response times unlike in the Pahalgam instance. If the number of casualties were less than five, if the perpetrators had been killed or captured, the attack, though heinous, would have registered on a lower scale. It would deny the adversary the sense of ‘satisfaction’ at having inflicted significant harm and loss.

In case of failure of deterrence-by-denial, punitive deterrence kicks in. The terrorist needs to be convinced that punishment will be certain and severe enough to make the terrorists refrain from the act, in the first place. India has so far declared that its kinetic retaliation was based on hard intelligence and pre-emptive; pre-emption against a terrorist attack has now gained acceptance as a legitimate act of self-defence. However, a terrorist is not always guided by a rational cost benefit analysis as the scourge of suicide attacks demonstrates. Nevertheless, since the terror attacks are often green lighted by the ISI, the certainty of severe punishment does strengthen deterrence.

In the past, the limited kinetic retaliation in 2016 and 2019 failed to establish deterrence. Therefore, deterrence capabilities for both ‘denial’ and ‘punishment’ will need to be strengthened by continuous investments in new technologies, particularly cyber and space, to monitor and penetrate terrorist groups and prevent attacks as also permit engagement without contact and inflict punishment at a distance, if the ‘new normal’ has to prevent future terrorist attacks.

India needs to plan afresh for managing escalation because if every terror attack is to be considered an act of war, and no distinction is to be made between terrorists and their masterminds and sponsors, the response to any future terrorist attack will be larger in scope, raising the prospects of more rapid escalation.

In the Balakot (2019) crisis, an Indian pilot being taken captive in Pakistani territory after his aircraft was shot down, was an unforeseen escalatory development. India demanded his immediate return to maintain the narrative of its successful strike; Pakistan wanted to capitalise on its air superiority. Neither India nor Pakistan could control the escalation, leading to external involvement.

In 2025, the U.S. initially adopted a relatively detached approach – initially condemning the terrorist attack and urging Pakistan to cooperate with India, and after May 7, urging both sides to work together to de-escalate tensions. By May 9, however, the U.S. position shifted and it adopted a more active role.

During the 88-hour crisis, India managed to retain control of escalation. In the initial round, the IAF refrained from targeting Pakistan air defences, a restraint that may have led to higher operational risks. Pakistan’s retaliation was against military targets and not against civilian targets. Even as artillery shelling intensified across the LoC, there was no large-scale mobilisation of ground forces or strike formations. These were signals that both sides were exploring thresholds but not crossing them.

By May 10, the temptation for India to exploit its advantage, having neutralised Pakistan’s forward based air defences was high and could have led to a notch up the escalation ladder. It would have increased Indian reluctance to let Pakistan get a face-saving exit. Finding an off-ramps or de-escalation between nuclear adversaries requires that both sides find a face saver, though backed by competing narratives. To establish superior escalation management, India has to internalise that at every step on the escalation ladder, it has to signal Pakistan towards a face-saver, as was done successfully in the early stages of the Pahalgam crisis. This requires better narrative management so that policy shapes sentiment rather than the other way around.

Finding an off ramps without external involvement creates a different challenge. There is a tacit acknowledgement that Pakistani establishment has been complicit in sponsoring and aiding terrorist attacks in India for decades and India is justified in kinetic retaliation. At the same time, given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapon-states, nuclear sabre rattling during rising tensions grabs international attention with de-escalation emerging as the priority. Since 1998, Pakistan has successfully exploited this opening as this also serves Pakistan by obfuscating the distinction between the perpetrator and the victim of the terrorist attack.

Successive U.S. presidents have played a role in defusing crises since 1998 – President Clinton during the 1999 Kargil crisis, President Bush following the 2001 parliament attack, Presidents Bush, and Obama in 2008-09 following the Mumbai attack, and President Trump in 2019 Balakot and the 2025 Pahalgam crisis. With the sole exception of President Trump, they were prudent in not offering to mediate between India and Pakistan; the current aberration is more a reflection of the disarray in the US administration and President Trump’s propensity for impulsive pronouncements.

During Pahalgam, no nuclear threats were exchanged between India and Pakistan. The only nuclear signalling, presumably directed to the international community was the announcement by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on May 9 that a meeting of the National Command Authority was to be held the following day though he backtracked later after the phone call with Secretary of State Rubio. This did not prevent President Trump from claiming on May 12, “We stopped a nuclear conflict. I think it could have been a bad nuclear war. Millions of people could have killed” and repeating the claim after couple of days.

The contrast between Indian and Pakistani reactions to President Trump’s claims is revealing. Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif has repeated thanked President Trump for his mediation and urged him continue mediation on other issues while the Indian Foreign Office spokesperson denied on May 13 that there was any US mediation or any nuclear escalation or signalling and the ceasefire was arrived at bilaterally; further, there was no scope for any mediation and no broader talks at a any neutral venue were planned. Therefore, unlike in 2019, there was neither any nuclear brinkmanship nor any strategic mobilisation.

The ’new normal’ is a shifting line and introduces a degree of ambiguity. The attempt is to see if it strengthens deterrence. So far, both sides have shown an interest in de-escalation. However, this requires a face saver for both sides. This means that each side creates its own narrative of “victory” and can sustain it. As the stronger power, India must calibrate how far it should discredit the Pakistan military to disincentivise it from sponsoring terrorist attacks while keeping it invested in de-escalation. This is necessary to ensure that conventional operations remain below the nuclear threshold despite brinkmanship.

Today, there is an absence of established crisis management mechanisms between India and Pakistan. During Pahalgam, the only channel of communication in operation was the DGMOs hotline. Past practice and experience indicate that in the military hierarchies on both side, there remains a degree of faith in an inbuilt culture of restraint. However, it is possible that a terrorist group may deliberately act to heighten confrontation to sabotage de-escalation, severely testing the culture of restraint. At such moments, until India and Pakistan invest in building crisis management mechanisms and additional communication channels, de-escalation will continue to be out-sourced to external parties.

*****