In October 2001, when US Special Forces and CIA operatives went into Afghanistan with the express objective of removing Taliban and dismantling Al-Qaeda, could anyone have predicted that 20 years later, the US would still be militarily engaged and debating its choices?
It is this stark realisation that made President Joe Biden announce on 14 April that “it is time to end the forever war in Afghanistan,” and that all US soldiers would leave before 11 September this year. Yet, the harsh reality is that this may wind up US’s war in Afghanistan, but for the Afghans, their endless war shows no sign of ending.
Initially, Biden was critical of the arbitrary deadline of 1 May negotiated in the Doha Agreement by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, saying “it was not a very solidly negotiated deal.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasised “a responsible withdrawal” and NSA Jake Sullivan assured that the Doha deal would be reviewed to see if the Taliban was delivering on its assurances “to cut ties with terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan, and to engage in meaningful negotiations with Afghan government and other stakeholders.”
After weeks of hectic diplomacy, it was clear that the original flaws of the year-old Doha agreement could not be fixed. It may have been sold to the world as a ‘peace deal’ but for the Taliban, it was a ‘US withdrawal deal’ under which they had stopped targeting US troops and in turn, the US was supposed to leave by 1 May. For the Taliban, a ceasefire was an outcome of the intra-Afghan talks and their continuing military pressure was part of strengthening their bargaining position.
Biden is the fourth US president to deal with the Afghan war and was determined not to pass the legacy on to his successor. His deadline is as arbitrary as Trump’s, only more symbolic. The key change was made clear in Biden’s interview to CBS that if the Taliban returned, “the US bore zero responsibility for it.” In short, the Afghans were responsible for their future and the US was not providing any guarantees.
This is perfectly consistent with the long held Indian position of supporting “an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” peace process. Why then are we so perturbed by the impending US departure? India’s geography will ensure our presence though our role will undergo changes. US leaves because it can India stays because it belongs.
At the 2001 Bonn Conference, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance that had emerged as an influential player, following the Taliban’s ouster. During the last twenty years, India’s economic cooperation programme has earned it the distinction of being Afghanistan’s preferred development partner. We may have relied on ‘soft power’ for two decades but we need to remember that it is not the only instrument in the ‘smart power’ tool-kit.
The common perception that with the return of the Taliban, India will be marginalised, is an oversimplification. It is true that India has been lethargic in pushing a visible engagement with the Taliban but its projects in every province of Afghanistan gives it the political heft and the linkages, cutting across ethnic and sectarian divides.
Nobody really knows if the Taliban’s ideology has changed but, as the Taliban themselves will soon realise, Afghanistan in 2021 is very different from the Afghanistan in 1990s when they came to power. Nearly three-fourths of Afghan population today is below 30 and though conservative, is used to living in an open society. There is a belated realisation among significant external partners like Iran, Russia and China that while they all pushed for US’ exit, their reservations about Taliban taking centre stage are only growing.
Speaking at the 2021 Raisina Dialogue last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif emphasised that “Taliban have to be engaged but on democratic and inclusive terms”. Russia reflected similar concerns and at the Moscow extended troika conference on 18 March, got US, Pakistan and China to sign on to a joint statement expressing a shared opposition to any restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
There are ample opportunities for India to explore new engagements but it needs to overcome its diffidence because its vision for Afghanistan is one shared by the large majority of the Afghan people.
President Joe Biden is the third president to grapple with the challenge of managing a U.S. exit from Afghanistan. Both Barack Obama and Donald Trump undertook detailed policy reviews, announced new initiatives but ended up passing the buck. And each time, the problem became more intractable. After 20 years of military engagement, during which U.S. troop presence exceeded 100000 a decade ago and is now down to 2500, U.S. policy is again at cross roads. President Biden is no stranger to the Af-Pak challenge, having visited the region nearly a dozen times as Senator and as VP but the cumulative errors of omission and commission over two decades make Biden’s challenge greater.
What Obama and Trump Achieved Obama had pledged to end what he called the “dumb war” in Iraq and turn around the “good war in Afghanistan that we have to win”. Eventually, his policy review in 2009 led him to announce a surge in US troop presence to battle what was increasingly seen as a counter-insurgency (COIN), with a drawdown beginning 18 months later, in mid-2011. The goal was to seize and clear territory, hold and re-build on the peace and hand it over within 18 months to the Afghans. Gen David Petraeus, who had overseen a similar surge followed by a drawdown in Iraq, took command in Afghanistan to implement Obama’s policy. By end-2014, US troop presence was down to 8,500 and Operation Enduring Freedom was replaced by Operation Resolute Support. US troops no longer had a combat role; their primary role was to train, advise and assist the Afghan security and defence forces that had been increased and whose capabilities were enhanced. The downside of Obama’s policy was that with more drone attacks and heightened counter-insurgency operations, the fight became increasingly seen as one between Americans and Afghans. According to the US COIN handbook, the operation needed a force of 20 soldiers per thousand of the population, amounting to a US-NATO force of 500000, that was politically impossible to muster (1) .
Taking over in 2017, President Trump ordered another review and then declared in August that the “U.S. was seeking an honourable and enduring outcome”. He agreed to Gen John Nicholson’s request to send an extra 5,000 soldiers to turn the tide against the Taliban, raising U.S. troop presence to 13,500 (2) . A year later, he changed course and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed to pursue peace and reconciliation talks with the Taliban; thus did the Doha process begin (3) .
On 29 February 2020 in Doha, Khalilzad signed an agreement with the Taliban Dy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. The document bore a curious title – “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA” – which perhaps reflected the mistrust between the parties and consequently, the fragility of the deal (4) . It is just as well that the deal was signed on 29 February with its anniversary due in 2024, by which time its ignominy would be forgotten.
Biden’s Options More than a year since the Doha agreement was inked, it is commonly held that it is in tatters. The problem is that it was packaged as a “peace deal” while it was, in reality, a “withdrawal deal”. As the latter, it was initially on track but the US elections in November intervened and growing violence levels in Afghanistan shifted the focus back to a ‘peace deal’. Under the Doha terms, the US is to withdraw its remaining 2500 (and the 1000 troops for counter- terrorism operations) troops from Afghanistan by 1 May in return for unverified counterterrorism guarantees and the open-ended negotiation of an intra- Afghan peace agreement that would bring some stability to Afghanistan. The latter two conditions have not been met, and Biden is faced with the choice of either keeping to the deadline or finding other options.
The problem is that there are no good options. If Biden pulls out all 3,500 troops by May – as Trump had promised during the campaign – it is a foregone conclusion that the fragile government in Kabul would collapse, possibly within the year, and ignite a bloody civil war. The US could try to negotiate a brief extension of the deadline but this would need cooperation from the Taliban – something that is not forthcoming. Nevertheless, an extension is unlikely to help unless the Taliban are pressured to fulfil their commitments; this is not possible without cooperation from Pakistan, Iran and Russia. The US could also decide to extend its stay unilaterally, since NATO has already declared that “the conditions of withdrawal have not been met” and the alliance will withdraw “only when the time is right” 5 . NATO members, (other than the US) have another 7,500 soldiers in Afghanistan. While this may give comfort to the Kabul regime, it is unlikely to stem the steady military gains of the Taliban over the last twelve months. Given that Taliban links with Al Qaeda have remained intact and IS – Khorasan is active in some of the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, the US could also decide to extend its war indefinitely, by maintaining a small counterterrorism force, together with NATO, to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for such terrorist groups in future. This is unlikely to go down well in Afghanistan or in the region. Therefore, the Biden administration must find the lesser evil. This could be a short extension of stay, perhaps for six months until November, with Taliban acceptance and some reduction in violence as part of a renewed push towards intra-Afghan negotiations.
President Biden has acknowledged that “it was not a very solidly negotiated deal”. (6) However, the administration’s helplessness is apparent in the fact that Ambassador Khalilzad has been retained – he who delivered the flawed February 2020 agreement under Trump has been retained and is now tasked with transforming the old agreement into a new one that will enjoy support in Kabul, with the Taliban and in key global capitals.
The U.S. Dilemma The US’ problem is not in withdrawing from Afghanistan; it is in managing the optics of such an exit. It needs to ensure a decent interval after its departure so that the Afghan chapter can be finally closed. This will need a deal with Taliban, who can sense military victory and therefore have little reason to oblige. They emphasise that a ceasefire was never promised and they have upheld what they did commit: “no attacks on departing U.S. forces”. Since a ceasefire cannot now be introduced on the agenda, Khalilzad is reduced to pleading for a “significant reduction in violence”, hoping that the quantum of reduction and its duration (if the Taliban agrees) will be a politically sellable “decent interval” in the Western narrative.
The term ‘decent interval’ has a chequered past in US history. In the late 1960s, the administration of Richard Nixon had realised that a military solution in Vietnam was not possible and tasked Henry Kissinger to negotiate a US exit. During Kissinger’s covert visit to China in July 1971, he assured Premier Zhou Enlai that the US would completely withdraw from Vietnam in return for the release of US POWs and a ceasefire lasting a “decent interval” of perhaps 18 months or so. Kissinger and Nixon knew that the deal would leave their ally, the South Vietnamese government led by President Nguyen Van Thieu, vulnerable. In the declassified 1972 White House tapes, Nixon and Kissinger acknowledge that “South Vietnam is not going to survive and the idea is to find a formula that can hold things together for a year or two”. Nixon reaffirmed the assurance during his pathbreaking visit to China the following year in February (7) . The plan worked.
President Nixon was re-elected on a peace platform in November 1972, scoring a record margin against his rival. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed and by end March, US had completed its withdrawal from Vietnam, ending its direct military involvement in the conflict. US POWs were released. By end-1973, the ceasefire was in tatters: Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975. To win re-election in 1972, Nixon promised an honourable peace and delivered a delayed defeat but by then, the world had moved on. Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. The secret assurances given by Kissinger and Nixon in 1971-72 seeking only a “decent interval” surfaced after four decades.
Today, a “decent interval” does not have to be 24 months, only as long as it takes for people in the west to lose interest, easily manipulable in today’s 24/7 news cycle-driven, crisis-prone age. As former Defence Secretary Gen James Mattis put it, “U.S. does not lose wars, it only loses interest” (8) . But the problem both Obama and Trump faced was getting to the “decent interval” even as they realised that the US had outlived its welcome.
A cumulative set of errors fuelled the Western fatigue with the Afghan project: a belief in 2002 that the Taliban had been defeated when they had only dispersed to safe havens and sanctuaries in Pakistan; introducing a highly centralised Presidential system that lacked institutions to provide checks and balances, resulting in weak local governance; the focus shifting to the disastrous war in Iraq in 2003; the gradual return of the Taliban beginning in 2005 and US inability to check Pakistan’s duplicity on the matter; growing factionalism; rising opium production that fuelled the insurgency; corruption; announcing the troop surge in 2009 along with the drawdown beginning in 2011; and a growing legitimisation of Taliban as a political force, cemented by the opening of the Doha office in 2013, spearheaded by some European states like UK, Norway and Germany. Put simply, the Taliban sponsors (Pakistan’s ISI) remained consistently loyal and the government in Kabul lost its supporters. The US failure lay not in its inability to transform Afghanistan, but in failing to change Pakistan’s policy of “run with the hare and hunt with the hounds” or as the late Gen Zia ul Haq explained the art of handling the U.S. – “The water in Afghanistan must be kept boiling at the right temperature, but not boil over”.
What to Expect from Bonn 2 Pakistan has consistently maintained that the Bonn agreement hammered out in 2001 was fatally flawed because it excluded the Taliban and the only way to rectify it is to do a Bonn 2. Khalilzad has been able to sell this notion to the Biden team. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has written identical letters (9) to President Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Chairperson of the High Council for National Reconciliation, indicating that while the policy review has not been completed, an initial conclusion is that peace talks need to be accelerated. A draft agreement to jumpstart the intra-Afghan peace talks is doing the rounds -it contains provisions for bringing in a transition government based on power sharing with the Taliban and proposes a Bonn 2 under the auspices of the United Nations (10).
This may provide the elusive “decent interval” to enable a “responsible U.S. withdrawal” if the Taliban agrees and President Ghani steps down. Still, this is unlikely to bring peace to Afghanistan. The reason is that calling it “Bonn 2” implies a desire to turn back the clock, and yet as the old saying goes – you can’t step in the same river twice. Bonn 1 was not a peace conference. The four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other and were not likely to do so; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation in Afghanistan with these four groups. These four would hardly have countenanced Taliban in Bonn; nor could U.S. have allowed it given the ties between Taliban and Al Qaeda. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are at war. The Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence. Most important, the US can no longer count on the same kind of support it received from Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran in 2001.
The most important internal factor is Afghanistan’s demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30. This large cohort is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears. The only thing they are all agree upon is that they will not accept a return to the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan. Taliban have remained opaque about their stand on issues of concern like democracy, constitution, human rights etc other than dropping vague hints that their positions have evolved. Fortunately for the Taliban (and for their Pakistani backers), there are quite a few “useful idiots” who maintain that the Taliban have changed, pointing to their clever use of social media or the fact that do not want to be isolated as was the case in 1990s. Yet, no Afghan believes that the Taliban will take part in elections or have any interest in sharing power.
There is consensus among all Afghans for peace but no consensus on the price that can be paid for it. On the other hand, the Taliban are not the Viet Cong; they are reportedly fractured and questions have surfaced about the control of the Quetta shura on all those fighting in the field. Lack of an internal consensus makes it easier for Afghanistan’s neighbours to find their preferred powerbrokers. A decade ago, Taliban numbers were estimated at 6,000; today, estimates are upward of 60,000. The US has assured that its financial commitment for Afghanistan stands but this will quickly dry up when the chain of command in the Afghan army or the police force starts breaking down because of disunity among the leaders.
The Afghan vision of a sovereign, independent, democratic and plural Afghanistan is not subscribed to by all its neighbours, preventing a regional consensus. With growing rivalry between the major powers, consensus too, is limited to ensuring an early US exit. As the Kabul government realises, proxy wars are easy but peace by proxy is not possible. In the absence of a consensus, the Afghans are not left with no good options that can bring them closer to their vision. Internal rivalries, conflicting interests among the countries in the region and divergent and often unstated objectives have rendered peace-making in Afghanistan an impossible act of political balancing.
Russia has stepped up its role in recent years by opening up channels with the Taliban, supporting the Doha process, sponsoring the troika of Russia, China and US, an expanded troika that includes Pakistan, and the Moscow format that includes India, Iran and Central Asian and other states. Its core interest is in preventing destabilisation in the region, any long-term U.S. presence and a check on the opium production. In returning to the scene, Russia has sought to wipe out the legacy of the 1979-89 intervention successfully as the attendance at the conferences it has sponsored shows.
Even a tenuous and vaguely worded Doha agreement between the US and the Taliban took 18 months to work out. It would be difficult to expect an agreement in the next eight weeks on a transition government and a significant reduction in violence. For the US, the “least bad” option of an exit even without a “decent interval” is still an option; for the Afghans yearning for peace, there is no quick solution that Bonn 2 can bring about. However, the call for President Ghani to step down in the interest for peace is gathering momentum. Iran, Russia and Pakistan favour it too (for their own reasons) as do a number of Afghan leaders who have been antagonised by his attitude and behaviour. This convergence creates the illusion of a consensus but it is only limited to seeing the exit of the Ghani government and not beyond.
India’s Options In the post-Taliban phase, India undertook an extensive development programme covering humanitarian assistance (food assistance, nutritious school child feeding and deploying medical teams), infrastructure development (Zaranj-Delaram highway, Pul e Khumri power transmission link to Kabul and sub-stations, Salma dam, parliament building), over 700 reconstruction projects covering health centres, schools, small roads and bridges) and capacity development by providing both short term and long term courses in India and setting up training centres in Afghanistan. Today, there are over 16,000 Afghan students pursuing higher education in India and during the last two decades, over 60,000 graduates, post-graduates and other professionals have returned to Afghanistan. Indian assistance, estimated at $3 billion dollars, has been spread across all provinces, cutting across ethnic lines. In undertaking these activities, India has sought to work with the newly created institutions rather than through preferred partners.
This approach has helped India to build upon the age-old cultural ties between the two countries. Zahiruddin Mohammed (Babur), founder of the Moghul empire finds his resting place at Bagh e Babur in Kabul, a favoured picnic garden was restored (funded by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture) by a renowned Indian architect specialising in preservation of Moghul era monuments and gardens. Afghanistan’s beloved national poet Abdul Qadir ‘Bedil’ (or Bedil Dehlavi in north India) died in Delhi in the 18th century. He earned his renown as a poet at the Moghul court and was also considered a Sufi saint. His shrine Bagh e Bedil, in Delhi remains popular among Afghan visitors to Delhi. Building on this, a sports stadium on the outskirts of Delhi, serves as the training ground for the Afghan cricket team, with India providing coaching and technical support. Hindi language movies (or the Bollywood industry) are an abiding link, surviving even the political upheavals.
India is also the traditional market for Afghanistan’s horticultural produce. In the absence of road links through Pakistan, a dedicated air freight corridor set up in 2018, has seen nearly 500 flights that have ferried 5000 MT of Afghan exports to India. However, India has not hosted Taliban delegations, preferring to follow the lead of the Afghan government, in keeping with its stated position of supporting “an Afghan led, Afghan controlled and Afghan owned” peace process. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours.
At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.
Conclusion
By the end of 2021, it is more than likely that the US and NATO troops would have already left Afghanistan. It is also likely that if Russia, Pakistan and Iran exert influence on Taliban to agree to a six-month extension, violence levels may come down for a brief interlude. A Transition Government is almost a certainty given the growing domestic and the international consensus that President Ghani should step down.
Given the wide divergences, however, the interim government might not last long once the US leaves. Under the circumstances, Taliban may not announce a Spring offensive for 2021 but the signs for 2022 are ominous.
Indeed, in Afghanistan, things come together in different ways but fall apart according to the same script: the fragmentation of the regime in Kabul (11).
(1) Obama’s Wars by Bob Woodward (Simon and Schuster 2010) provides a detailed account of the debates leading to the ‘surge’ decision. The January 2017 article in New York Times looks at how Obama saw his dilemmas when he was demitting office in January 2017 – https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/asia/obama-afghanistan-war.html
Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Haneef Atmar, was in Delhi this week to brief Indian authorities on the recent spurt in diplomatic activity as the Joe Biden administration approaches the May deadline for United States (US) troops to exit Afghanistan. The problem is that the intra-Afghan peace talks have barely moved forward since the Doha agreement signed a year ago between U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Barader and violence levels have been steadily rising, especially since last October.
US policy shifts
Biden is the third president to deal with the challenge of bringing US troops back home. In 2009, Barack Obama described Afghanistan as “the necessary war that U.S. must win”. He approved a surge in troop presence, from 55,000 to over 100,000 soldiers, and also quadrupled the number of drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan but U.S. failed to blunt the Taliban insurgency. By May 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Obama realised that the real failure lay not in transforming Afghanistan but in changing Pakistan’s policy of continuing to provide sanctuaries to Taliban even while claiming credit as major U.S. partner in stabilising Afghanistan. Frustrated, he reduced the troop presence to 8500 by the time he left office in 2017.
Announcing his policy in August 2017, Donald Trump said that though his “original instinct was to pull out”, he had been persuaded by Pentagon to push for “an honourable and enduring outcome” and added 5000 troops while easing restrictions on use of airpower. However, after a year, he too changed track and Khalilzad was appointed to open negotiations with the Taliban that eventually led to the February 2020 deal. By the time Trump left, US troops were reduced to 2500.
The title of the deal – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA – showed that Taliban’s ideology had not changed and the deal was doomed to failure. Yet, such was the willingness to suspend disbelief that Khalilzad successfully persuaded everyone that it was “a peace deal” and not a “US withdrawal deal”, and the mouse he pulled out of the hat was a rabbit. A year later, that uncomfortable reality can’t be denied. While no American soldiers have died in combat in Afghanistan in last twelve months, the monthly death toll is 800 Afghan security forces and 250 Afghan civilians.
A new peace plan
The Biden administration is therefore seeking a “responsible withdrawal”. In an interview last week, Biden said that in view of the prevailing situation, it is difficult for the US to leave by May and a short extension may be needed. A new peace plan has been developed and Khalilzad retained to pull another rabbit out of a hat.
The new plan envisages replacing the present government by a transitional government that includes the Taliban, and establishing a 21-member commission (including 10 Taliban nominees) to draft a new constitution. Taliban and government should reach an agreement for a 90-day “significant reduction in violence” to create a conducive environment for diplomatic efforts. To energise the stalled Doha talks, Turkey has been invited to host a meeting between Taliban and the Afghan government and other representatives to work this out. A United Nations (UN) conference (on the lines of the Bonn Conference in 2001 that worked out the political road map for a post-Taliban Afghanistan) involving US, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India, along with Taliban and other Afghan groups is proposed to discuss a unified approach.
Renewed diplomacy
UN Secretary General has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to lead the UN efforts and prepare for the international conference. Arnault knows Afghanistan well, having been there from 2002-06, as Deputy and then head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.
Last week, Moscow hosted a meeting of the expanded troika (U.S., China, Pakistan and Russia) together with Taliban and Afghan government and other leaders led by Abdullah Abdullah, head of the High Council for National Reconciliation. While the intra-Afghan talks were contentious, the four ‘extended troika’ states issued a joint statement recognising the Afghan peoples desire for peace, calling for a reduction in violence on all sides, expediting negotiations for a political settlement, urging Taliban not to launch a Spring offensive and underlining that they do not support a return to the Islamic Emirate system.
President Ashraf Ghani is unwilling to step down to make way for a transitional government, suggesting early elections instead but the Taliban are not interested in the electoral route. Last two elections in Afghanistan were marred by controversy which were resolved only because US leaned heavily on Ghani and Abdullah to share power instead. A number of prominent Afghan leaders, unhappy with Ghani, have supported a transition as have Russia, Iran and Pakistan, leaving Ghani with no options.
The political reality is the Taliban had more loyal and consistent backers in Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence, while the Kabul government steadily lost legitimacy because of its own incompetence and disunity, and because its backers in the West eventually lost patience and interest. By end-2021, the US may have ended its longest war, but for Afghanistan, the uncertainties are only increasing.
Article for Observer Research Foundation on 21st March, 2021
A flurry of diplomatic activity on Afghanistan has begun, catalysed by the approaching May deadline for the U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan under the agreement signed on 29 February last year by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha.
The problem is that a year later, the Doha agreement is in shambles. The intra-Afghan dialogue that was supposed to begin in March finally began in September and has not made progress. Taliban had committed to cut their ties with Al Qaeda but recent statements by Afghan and U.S. officials indicate that this has not happened. Meanwhile, violence levels in Afghanistan have risen sharply in recent months. A recent UN report indicated 3035 civilian deaths and 5785 injured during 2020 with Taliban held responsible for 45 percent of the casualties.
Biden’s options
President Biden’s options are limited. He can stick to the original withdrawal date but it is a foregone conclusion that the Kabul government will not be able to last very long and the country will descent into a civil war. The option of extending the stay unilaterally means that the Taliban may resume targeting U.S. troops, something they have refrained from since the Doha deal. A third option is to negotiate a short extension with the Taliban by offering them a share in governance in return for a reduction in violence.
Khalilzad has been asked to stay on to explore the third option and kickstart the intra-Afghan peace negotiations by suggesting that a Transition Government, including the Taliban, replace the current regime in Kabul, and the UN convene an international conference with key global and regional players, and the Afghan groups, a kind of Bonn 2, somewhat reminiscent of the Bonn conference convened in November 2001 where the post-Taliban political arrangements were concluded.
Diplomacy picks up
The rationale for the U.S. approach was spelt out in identical letters by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah. It expressed concern about the growing levels of violence and shared the bleak U.S. assessment that after a U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban were likely to make rapid territorial gains unless there was a serious attempt to restart and accelerate the peace process. The new peace plan was shared by Khalilzad with Afghan leaders and Taliban in early March in Kabul and Doha respectively. It contains a roadmap to an inclusive transition government, the terms for a significant reduction in violence leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and drafting a new constitutional framework. In the larger interest, President Ghani is expected to make the sacrifice and step down. UN has been requested to convene a Foreign Minister level conference inviting the Afghan groups, China, India, Iran, Russia and the U.S. to discuss a unified approach to a durable peace.
Turkey has conveyed willingness to host the UN convened conference, possibly in April, and also a March conference between Afghan government and leaders from Kabul and the Taliban to arrive at an agreement on the transition arrangements. UN Secretary general has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative. Arnault was in Kabul from 2002-06, first as Deputy and then as Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Those were the hopeful days, though by 2006, Taliban had announced their return with a spate of suicide attacks and IEDs.
Moscow added to the diplomatic activity by convening a conference of the ‘expanded troika’ – China, Pakistan, U.S. and Russia together with Afghan leaders and the Taliban on 18 March, with intra-Afghan talks continuing on 1the following two days. The highlight was a joint statement by the four Special Representatives – Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wang Yu, Sadiq Mohammed and host Zamir Kabulov on the first day declaring that they “do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate” system that the Taliban had introduced. The joint statement recognised that the Afghan people desired peace, called for reduction in violence from all sides, asked the Taliban not to launch the Spring offensive and reiterated their call for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan government has reacted positively emphasising the Islamic Republic is the only inclusive and acceptable structure that can ensure equality and pluralism and accommodates the diversity of Afghanistan and provides stability. Taliban have responded, saying that peace talks should be expedited and U.S. should stick to its withdrawal date.
A limited consensus
However, there is a growing momentum behind the call for Ghani’s departure. Within Afghanistan, many leaders like Karzai, Qanooni, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Sayyaf etc would be happy to see Ghani go. Among the international community, U.S. sees Ghani now as an obstacle to peace and Russia, Iran and Pakistan have always seen him as too pro-U.S. Ghani has responded by suggesting that he is ready to hold early elections (these are due in 2024) and hand over power to any elected government. However, the 2019 election saw an abysmal turnout of 20 percent and the current situation is no better. Moreover, Taliban are not inclined to go the electoral route.
However, the limited consensus breaks down thereafter and Bonn 2 is not like Bonn 1. There are fundamental differences and internal changes. At Bonn 1, the four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation with these four groups in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are fighting a bloody war. Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence.
The most important internal factor is Afghan demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30 years. This large cohort has come of age post-2002 and is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears and they are united in not accepting an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
India’s role
Since 2002, India has undertaken an extensive economic cooperation programme at a cost of $ 3 billion. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours. At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.
The Biden administration realises that it needs diplomacy to ensure a managed exit from Afghanistan. It needs Russia, Pakistan and Iran (as well as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) to lean on the Taliban to agree to a short U.S. extension; it needs Russia to lean on Ghani to make the sacrifice, and it needs the UN to come back and take over the peace process, thereby enlarging the number of stakeholders. Once the Taliban join a transitional government, they should wind up the Doha office and move to Kabul so that future Afghan talks will be Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled.
However, whether this flurry of diplomatic activity can bring lasting peace to a country that has experimented with monarchy, a socialist republic, a communist rule, an Islamic Emirate and an Islamic Republic over the last 70 years, remains difficult to predict.
Last week, on 12 September the much awaited intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Afghan High Council for National Reconciliation opened in Doha, nineteen years after the 9/11 attacks on US homeland that stunned the world and marked the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, its local sponsors. The initiation of intra-Afghan talks was a key element in the US-Taliban peace deal signed in Doha on 29 February between US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader. Originally planned to begin on 10 March, the process had to overcome many hurdles along the way providing a small glimpse of the difficult road that lies ahead.
US-Taliban deal The Trump administration soon realised that its 2017 policy of breaking the military stalemate by a small increase in US troops was not working and soon reverted to seeking a managed exit. As the former Defence Secretary General Mattis put it, “the US doesn’t lose wars, it loses interest”. Political optics demanded a re-labelling of the withdrawal.
Direct negotiations with the Taliban began two years ago with Ambassador Khalilzad’s appointment as Special Envoy. Actually, it became a three-way negotiation. The Doha track was with the Taliban, a second track was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi to cajole the Pakistan Army to lean on the Taliban to get them to the negotiating table and the third was with Kabul to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the Doha outcome.
Originally Ambassador Khalilzad had spelt out four objectives – an end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan dialogue for a lasting peace, Taliban cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, and US troop withdrawal. Within months, the Taliban had whittled these down to just the last one with some palliatives regarding the third. Instead of an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled reconciliation, it had become a US led and Taliban controlled process with nobody claiming ownership or responsibility.
Time lines were fixed for the US drawdown by mid-June (followed by complete withdrawal by April 2021) and for removal of Taliban from the UN Security Council sanctions list by end-May. The Taliban have released 1000 members of Afghan security forces and the Afghan authorities have freed over 5000 Taliban from their custody. This process took longer than originally foreseen but has now been completed. The two elements that remained open ended in the US- Taliban deal are the ceasefire declaration and the intra-Afghan talks.
The uncertainties ahead By end-June, US had reduced its troop presence to 8600 as promised and in early September, CENTCOM commander Gen Kenneth McKenzie indicated that by November the numbers would be down to 4500. Despite two brief 3 day truces in May and August for Eid al Fitr and Eid al Adha, the levels of violence showed no respite. Speaking the Doha at the opening session, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Chairman of the High Council regretted that more than 12000 Afghans had been killed and another 15000 injured since end-February. The number of attacks on government security forces and installations averaged over eighty a week.
A report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued in July covering the second quarter of 2020 assessed that “the Taliban has calibrated the use of violence to continue undermining the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces while keeping it at a level that encourages the US troops to leave”. The report expressed scepticism about whether the Taliban had cut ties with Al Qaeda and stated that “the Islamic State-Khorasan retains the ability to conduct mass casualty attacks”. A UN Sanctions Monitoring Team Report concerning IS and Al Qaeda also issued in July concluded that “Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent continues to operate under the Taliban umbrella in Nimroz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces with 400-600 fighters in the country”.
Perhaps nothing reflects the challenges facing the intra-Afghan negotiations more starkly than the title of the US-Taliban Doha deal – “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA”. This awkward phrase is repeated more than a dozen times in the Agreement. The leader of the Haqqani Network Sirajuddin Haqqani who is also the second in command of the Taliban happens to be on the US wanted list with a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death. All this is difficult to reconcile with the notion that US considers the Taliban a partner in counter-terrorism operations against the IS and other terrorist groups.
In an op-ed in the Washington Post on 14 August, President Ashraf Ghani wrote that “the Afghan people want peace” and that is why the government “made the decision to take another risk for peace”. Calling on the Taliban to sit across from Afghan representatives to arrive at a political resolution, he added that “we acknowledge the Taliban as part of our reality” and urged that “the Taliban must, in turn, acknowledge the changed reality of today’s Afghanistan”.
The current reality is that 74 percent of Afghan population is below 30 and has lived, for most part, in a conservative but open society. However, the Taliban continue to maintain the Kabul administration as an imported Western structure for continued American occupation. Senior members of the Afghan government continue to be targeted including Vice President Amrullah Saleh who narrowly escaped an IED attack on his motorcade (9 September) even as 11 innocent Afghans lost their lives.
Evolving Indian position Addressing the opening session of the Doha meeting, EAM Dr Jaishankar reiterated that the peace process must be “Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” but Indian policy has evolved from its earlier hands-off approach to the Taliban. Speaking to Indian media a few months ago on separate occasions, both Ambassador Khalilzad and Russian Special Envoy Ambassador Zamir Kabulov bluntly pointed out that if India had concerns regarding anti-India activities of terrorist groups, it must engage directly with the Taliban. In other words, if India wanted to be invited to the party, it must be prepared to get up and dance.
The reality is major powers have limited interests. For the US, the peace talks provide President Trump an exit opportunity weeks before his re-election bid. EU has made it clear that its financial contribution will depend on the security environment and the human rights record. China can always lean on Pakistan to preserve its security and connectivity interests. For Russia, blocking the drug supply and keeping its southern periphery secure from extremist influences is key. That is why no major power is taking ownership for the reconciliation talks but merely content with being facilitators.
A report issued last month by the Heart of Asia Society, a Kabul based think tank observes that “the prospect for peace in Afghanistan depends on regional consensus to support the peace process as much as it depends on actual progress in the intra-Afghan talks”. India’s vision of a sovereign, united, stable, plural and democratic Afghanistan is one that is shared by a large constituency in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic and provincial lines. A more active engagement will enable India to work with like minded forces in the region to ensure that the vacuum created by the US withdrawal does not lead to an unravelling of the gains registered during the last two decades.
RAKESH SOOD 