AUKUS Alliance – How (Not) to Win Friends

Published in Hindustan Times on September 25, 2021

Last week witnessed the aukward birth of a new security alliance – AUKUS –  bringing together Australia, United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), coupled with a deal involving US and UK building eight nuclear attack submarines for Australia. The announcement was guaranteed to create waves in the Indo-Pacific but the fall out of Australia cancelling the five-year old deal with France for a dozen diesel powered attack submarines created bigger waves across the Atlantic.

The objective of AUKUS is “to deal with rapidly evolving threats” and it envisages closer intelligence sharing and cooperation in areas of AI, cyber warfare and quantum computing. The three are already part of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network, together with Canada and New Zealand. Up to this point, it would have been seen as an attempt to shore up an Anglo-Saxon grouping in the Indo-Pacific, attracting dismissive commentary from Beijing and mild speculation about how AUKUS would engage with the Quad. It is the abrupt cancelling of the submarine deal that has shocked and angered France.

There is more than just the Euros 31 billion at stake. Both Australia and France saw it then as a long-term investment and recognition of shared interests in the region. It is true that there was some unhappiness about growing costs and time delays. The hard fact is that in last five years Australia’s threat perceptions about China have radically changed. Relations have nosedived with Australia curbing Chinese influence activities and cutting out Huawei and China has retaliated with significant sanctions on Australian imports.

Yet the reason that France reacted angrily and Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian described it “a stab in the back” is because Prime Minister Scott Morrison had visited Paris in June. The outcome was a highly publicised Vision Statement, a long-term strategy for enhancing partnership through the Australia-France Initiative (AFiniti). It was followed by the inaugural session of the 2+2 Strategic Dialogue between the Foreign and Defence Ministers on 29-30 August. For Le-Drian, it was a blow because he had negotiated and concluded the deal in 2016 as Defence Minister during the Hollande period.

In 2015, Australia had specifically sought diesel-electric boats. France outbid competition from Germany and Japan with the Barracuda nuclear attack submarine, modified into a conventionally powered Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A design. An unwritten understanding was that if the nuclear-power option was to be explored, it would be available. Former Australian PM Tony Abbott has been urging a switch since 2017. In 2016, Australia concluded that US would not share nuclear propulsion technology. USA has shared it only with UK but that relationship is different as the US even supplies UK the Trident SLBMs.

In a biting comment about the US, Le Drian complained that “this brutal, unilateral and unpredictable decision looks very much like what Mr Trump used to do, Allies don’t do this to each other, it’s rather insufferable”. France has recalled its ambassadors from US and Australia for ‘consultations’ to convey its displeasure. Asked about UK, he dismissively said that it was just “the third wheel” and UK’s “opportunism had been a characteristic trait”.

The reactions in the region have been along predictable lines. China has called it “irresponsible” and warned that it can “exacerbate an arms race”. Japan and Taiwan have welcomed the submarine deal while South Korea has been muted. Indonesia and Malaysia have voiced concerns.

With the Quad summit taking place in Washington, Foreign Secretary Shringla distanced the Quad – “a plurilateral grouping of four countries that have a shared vision of their attributes and values” from AUKUS – “a security alliance between three countries”, adding that “from our perspective, it is neither relevant to the Quad nor will it have any impact on its functioning”.

Following a telephone conversation between Joe Biden and Emmanuel Macron, both sides have tried to put a lid on the issue; both leaders will meet next month and the French ambassador will return to Washington. However, the French will recalibrate its ties with the Anglosphere. Unlike UK, France has always seen itself as an independent global player and preferred greater autonomy while being pragmatic about the US lead. This attribute has been a key factor underlying its close strategic partnership with India that dates back to 1998.

India’s nuclear submarine programme (ATV) began in the 1980s but progress has been slow. That is why India has been leasing Russian nuclear attack submarines (INS Chakra I and II) since the 1980s and Chakra III is due in 2025. India’s programme switched after 1998 to the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) class with Arihant deployed, and Arighat now on trials. It will move in tandem with development of longer range SLBMs, K-5 and K-6 with 5000 kms and 6000 kms range respectively.

The shortfall is in achieving the target of 24 submarines, 18 diesel-electric and six nuclear-powered, originally set out in 1999. Six conventional boats are being built under Project 75; six more conventional vessels were cleared by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) earlier this this year under Project 75 I with deployments scheduled for 2030s.

The Navy has agreed to give up the third aircraft carrier in order to fast-track the six nuclear attack submarines project. Now that US has breached the taboo regarding nuclear propulsion and cleared the way, the time has come for India and France to set a new milestone for strengthening their strategic partnership. As French strategist Bruno Tertrais explained, “Trump didn’t care about allies; Biden does, but perhaps not all of them equally”.

*****

Why France Is A Reliable Strategic Partner For India

Published in Hindustan Times on 20th January, 2020

Since the end of the Cold War, India has signed ‘Strategic Partnership’ agreements with more than thirty-five countries. Among the earliest was the one with France, signed in January 1998, during President Jacques Chirac’s visit to India. Last week, the strength of this partnership was in evidence at the UN Security Council when China sought to raise the subject of Kashmir in an informal, closed door session, originally convened to discuss the situation in Mali. France, supported by Russia and the US and other non-permanent members, led the move to block the Chinese initiative.

Roots of ‘strategic convergence’
India and France share a common trait of civilisational exceptionalism and after the Cold War ended, both countries were quick to espouse the virtues of multipolarity. French discomfort with a unipolar system was clear when French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine described USA as a hyperpuissance. Visualising the changing geopolitics with focus shirting from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific, France decided on India as its preferred partner in the Indian Ocean. Even before India’s nuclear tests in 1998, France declared that India’s exclusion from the global nuclear order was an anomaly that needed to be rectified. After the nuclear tests, France displayed an instinctual understanding of India’s security compulsions.

The strategic dialogue begun in 1998 has grown over the years to cover nuclear, space, defence, cyber security, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation. Bilateral military exercises between the three Services, beginning with the navies in 2001, followed by the air forces in 2004 and the armies in 2011, have now became a regular feature. Cooperation in the space domain began in the 1960s with French assistance to set up the Indian launch facility at Sriharikota but languished in later years because of export controls. The dialogue helped restart this cooperation and ISRO and CNES now work on joint missions. After the US cut off nuclear fuel supplies for Tarapur in 1984, France became the fuel supplier. Following the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008, India and France signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement providing the framework for building the French EPR reactors in India.

Theatrics in the UNSC

Regarding Kashmir, France maintains that it is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and therefore does not merit discussion in the UN fora. China had first raised Kashmir at Pakistan’s behest in August, shortly after Article 370 was abrogated and the state of Jammu and Kashmir divided into two union territories. On 16th August last year, the UN Security Council held an informal closed-door session, the first time Kashmir had appeared on the agenda of the UNSC after 1965. India’s stand that the developments in Kashmir were an internal matter received considerable support. An attempt was made again by China in December to take up the issue but finessed by France and other countries.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had addressed a fresh letter on Kashmir to the UNSC in January and this time China decided to introduce it into a previously scheduled meeting (convened to discuss the situation in Mali) under the agenda provision of ‘Any Other Items’. French
lead was quickly endorsed by the other permanent and a number of non- permanent members bringing the meeting to a closure. On that day, Foreign Minister Qureshi was in New York calling on the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

The Chinese action coming after the informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held in Mamallapuram in October makes it clear that China remains insensitive to India’s core concerns. The announcements on ‘strategic communications’, that differences do not become disputes and the plans of holding 70 major events in the two countries to mark 70 years of establishment of diplomatic relations are unlikely to put a gloss on growing differences over CPEC, BRI, Indo-Pacific, China’s veto on India’s membership of the NSG and attempts to block the listing of Masood Azhar as a terrorist.

Establishing a comfort level
A close strategic partnership with Russia was forged during the height of the Cold War and it has stood the test of time. Yet there are occasional murmurs in Moscow about India’s growing proximity to the US, particularly in the Quad (a grouping of Australia, Japan, US and India) which Foreign Minister Lavrov described as a ‘divisive concept’ last week at the Raisina Dialogue in Delhi. Delhi too has been blindsided by Russia’s new engagement with the Taliban and by extension, Pakistan.

The strategic partnership with the US is more recent but has developed strong roots with more than 50 bilateral dialogues covering all aspects of bilateral relations. Beginning from scratch just a decade ago, US has also emerged as a key defence supplier. Yet, it is clear that US has its own
interests in the region when it comes to Pakistan, Iran and its negotiations with Taliban.

The test for a strategic partnership is not that there must be convergence on all issues; the test is that where there are differences, these are expressed in private and not publicly. This is where the India-France strategic partnership, nurtured over two decades, demonstrates its resilience.