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Op Sindoor: Conventional Operations Under the Nuclear Shadow

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For CSDR dt May 28, 20225

Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states after undertaking a series of tests, the India-Pakistan crises have followed a predictable pattern. The first escalatory step is invariably a terrorist attack by one of the numerous terrorist groups based in Pakistan; India’s outrage and political, diplomatic, economic and, (since 2016) measured kinetic retaliation against specific terrorist targets, signalling a possible closure to hostilities; Pakistan’s military retaliation that sets into motion a cycle of escalation, often accompanied by nuclear sabre rattling designed to energise the international community, leading finally to a de-escalation with both countries getting a face saving exit.

The terrorist attacks permit Pakistan a degree of deniability unless a perpetrator has been captured (as happened in the Mumbai 2008 attack) though the deniability claims carry little conviction, given Pakistan’s well documented long-standing policy of nurturing such jihadi outfits. India has been a slow learner in developing and acquiring the intelligence and kinetic means to be able to track and engage in precision targeting of terrorist groups inside Pakistan. Though subjected to major terrorist attacks, especially since the 1990s, the recourse to kinetic retaliation only began in 2016. After Pahalgam, Prime Minister has described it as an expansive “new normal.”

Developing kinetic retaliation capability

In 2001, following the attack on Indian parliament by five JeM terrorists, India mobilised its ground forces with the strike formations. The process lasted weeks, giving Pakistan adequate time to prepare its counter-mobilisation. Since the U.S. needed Pakistan’s military cooperation for its Op Enduring Freedom launched against the Taliban in October 2001, and the Pakistani military claimed that it was stretched on the India front, Pakistan was prevailed upon to provide assurances of “not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.” The exercise in coercive diplomacy helped provide a reprieve for seven years.

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks are often called India’s 9/11 moment. A group of 10 LeT militants targeted 12 locations in Mumbai. The carnage lasted four days and claimed 175 lives, including nine militants. Among the dead were 29 foreign nationals from 16 countries, including six from the U.S. The captured militant provided the details of Pakistan’s involvement. While this enabled international condemnation and diplomatic measures to penalise Pakistan, the absence of any kinetic retaliation drew unfavourable comparisons in certain domestic sections with the U.S and Israel. In Pakistan, it led to a growing conviction that its tactical nuclear weapons served as an effective deterrent against any conventional military action by India.

Kinetic retaliation, from Uri to Pahalgam

Realising that its military forces were a blunt instrument ill-equipped to undertake short, sharp punitive operations, India began to build up its capabilities slowly. The 2016 attack on a military camp in Uri by four JeM militants killed 19 soldiers and provided an opportunity to employ kinetic retaliation for the first time. A coordinated set of simultaneous cross-border operations were launched by special teams to neutralise more than half a dozen terrorist launch pads. The operation was successfully projected as a shift to a more punitive approach and these “surgical strikes” was the subject of a successful Bollywood film. Pakistan found a face-saver by denying that there had been any intrusions.

In 2019, a suicide attack on a paramilitary convoy, claimed by JeM, claimed forty lives. With general elections less than two months away, the Modi government had little choice. Days later, Indian authorities announced that the IAF had carried out an air strike on a JeM training camp at Balakot, 65 kms from the LoC, in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Once again, it was described as a limited operation against a terrorist location, based on real time intelligence, and therefore pre-emptive and defensive.

Pakistan denied that there was any camp, protested at its air space violation, and the following morning, five Pakistani aircraft entered Indian airspace. Indian fighters scrambled, and in the ensuing dogfight, an Indian pilot ejected, ending up in Pakistani custody. This created a fresh crisis, leading to U.S. involvement to ensure that the pilot was released quickly. The following morning, Pakistan PM Imran Khan announced that Pakistan had demonstrated its capability and resolve by retaliating against India’s intrusion and would return the Indian pilot as a humanitarian gesture, providing a face-saver to both sides.

According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials from both countries had been in touch with the U.S. officials, blaming the other for nuclear escalation and threatening retaliation, thereby leading to U.S. involvement. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also claimed to have intervened and counselled restraint.

The Pahalgam attack on April 22 claimed 26 civilian lives. Though a series of political and economic measures were announced including putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, it was evident that the scope of the kinetic retaliation had to be larger. Eventually, nine terrorist locations, including iconic locations such as the LeT and JeM headquarters in Punjab, were targeted using loitering munitions, stand-off air-to-surface missiles and smart bombs. It was emphasised that India had targeted terrorist locations and the operation was over unless Pakistan escalated matters. The next three nights saw an escalation with strikes and counter-strikes, with both sides using drones and standoff missiles though the aircraft remained in their respective airspaces. Once again, senior U.S. officials began to engage as the crisis sharpened and news about the ceasefire was made public by President Trump shortly before the official announcements on May 10.

Evidently, the Modi government’s policy for dealing with Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks has been evolving, in keeping with improving capabilities. The first Rafale aircraft landed in India in mid-2020, with some of the weapon systems following. The Harop drone fleet was expanded post-2019 and the indigenous Sky Striker drones were ordered in 2021, including with kamikaze versions. Therefore, compared to 2019 Balakot, Indian was better placed to ensure precision targeting and avoid collateral damage, especially in populated areas like Bahawalpur and Muridke.

The lessons from Pahalgam

In his address to the nation on May 12, PM Modi announced that Op Sindoor had redefined the fight against terror and established a “new normal.” This consisted of India’s right to respond militarily since any act of terror was an act of war; India would not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail;” and India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. Two new elements can be discerned in this – while claiming a right to military response is not new as it was exercised in 2016 and 2019 too, calling every terror attack an “act of war” expands the scope of the military action that has so far been limited to terrorist locations. Second, putting together the terrorists and the ISI, puts the military on notice but what form this would take is left uncertain. In 2016, 2019 and 2025, India has consistently emphasised that its kinetic action was “non-escalatory” as it was directed at known terrorist locations and not at a military site.

Even though Op Sindoor’s objectives had not been spelt out, it is clear that on May 7, Indian forces demonstrated their capability in identifying and destroying multiple terrorist camps and related infrastructure, across a distance of 800 kms, in a speedily executed, coordinated operation using precision strike weapons. In subsequent days, the operations grew gradually and by May 10, IAF had shown its ability to penetrate Pakistan’s air defence to inflict damage on nearly all Pakistan’s forward air bases and air defence installations. Yet, this did not emerge as the prevailing narrative.

On May 7, Pakistan claimed that five Indian aircraft had been downed, a claim denied by India. The narrative therefore became one of evaluation of Chinese technologies (J-10 and JF-17 aircraft and PL-15E missiles) versus French (Rafale aircraft) and Russian (SU-30 and Mig-29) aircraft. The Indian statement on May 11, “We are in a combat scenario and losses are part of combat…we achieved all our objectives and all our pilots are back home,” if made earlier, would have prevented the misleading commentary and maintained the primacy of the Indian narrative. The fact that the IAF operated under non-escalatory rules of engagement and did not neutralise Pakistani air defences in advance was a signal to assure Pakistan that our strike was only against terrorist targets. It would also have reinforced the impact of the punitive strikes on May 10, in face of repeated Pakistani escalatory provocations.

It is reasonable to assume that the terrorist infrastructure that has been degraded will be rebuilt, presumably also at more inaccessible or concealed locations. It is highly unlikely that the ISI will dismantle the LeT, JeM or the dozen other outfits that it has nurtured over decades. A recent Gallup Pakistan poll revealed that 96 percent of the Pakistanis believe that Pakistan has emerged victorious from the four-day limited conflict. The elevation of the COAS Gen Asim Munir to Field Marshal has been welcomed by the political parties, including the PTI.

The current ceasefire is fragile and could therefore breakdown along the predictable pattern that led to Pahalgam and earlier attacks. A full-scale war like 1971 is not feasible as it is an unaffordable exercise that yields no practical military objectives. Therefore, a key take away is to define narrower objectives that yield desirable outcomes and build capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, accordingly. A realistic objective will combine three elements – degrade terrorist capabilities as decisively as possible; inflict punitive measures, political, economic, and military; and demonstrate national unity and resolve.

Exploring the ‘new normal’

The conception of a ‘new normal’ poses three key questions –                                                             

  1. Does the expansive ‘new normal’ establish deterrence?                                 
  2. Second, if deterrence fails, and there is a terrorist attack, does the ‘new normal’ lead to more rapid escalation, and does it ensure superior escalation management?                                                    
  3. And finally, does it enable de-escalation without external involvement?

Deterrence normally implies ‘deterrence by denial’ coupled with ‘deterrence by punishment.’ ‘Denial’ implies strengthening intelligence capabilities to track infiltration, movement, and communications of terrorists, to plan and prevent such attacks. It also means better preparation to reduce response times unlike in the Pahalgam instance. If the number of casualties were less than five, if the perpetrators had been killed or captured, the attack, though heinous, would have registered on a lower scale. It would deny the adversary the sense of ‘satisfaction’ at having inflicted significant harm and loss.

In case of failure of deterrence-by-denial, punitive deterrence kicks in. The terrorist needs to be convinced that punishment will be certain and severe enough to make the terrorists refrain from the act, in the first place. India has so far declared that its kinetic retaliation was based on hard intelligence and pre-emptive; pre-emption against a terrorist attack has now gained acceptance as a legitimate act of self-defence. However, a terrorist is not always guided by a rational cost benefit analysis as the scourge of suicide attacks demonstrates. Nevertheless, since the terror attacks are often green lighted by the ISI, the certainty of severe punishment does strengthen deterrence.

In the past, the limited kinetic retaliation in 2016 and 2019 failed to establish deterrence. Therefore, deterrence capabilities for both ‘denial’ and ‘punishment’ will need to be strengthened by continuous investments in new technologies, particularly cyber and space, to monitor and penetrate terrorist groups and prevent attacks as also permit engagement without contact and inflict punishment at a distance, if the ‘new normal’ has to prevent future terrorist attacks.

India needs to plan afresh for managing escalation because if every terror attack is to be considered an act of war, and no distinction is to be made between terrorists and their masterminds and sponsors, the response to any future terrorist attack will be larger in scope, raising the prospects of more rapid escalation.

In the Balakot (2019) crisis, an Indian pilot being taken captive in Pakistani territory after his aircraft was shot down, was an unforeseen escalatory development. India demanded his immediate return to maintain the narrative of its successful strike; Pakistan wanted to capitalise on its air superiority. Neither India nor Pakistan could control the escalation, leading to external involvement.

In 2025, the U.S. initially adopted a relatively detached approach – initially condemning the terrorist attack and urging Pakistan to cooperate with India, and after May 7, urging both sides to work together to de-escalate tensions. By May 9, however, the U.S. position shifted and it adopted a more active role.

During the 88-hour crisis, India managed to retain control of escalation. In the initial round, the IAF refrained from targeting Pakistan air defences, a restraint that may have led to higher operational risks. Pakistan’s retaliation was against military targets and not against civilian targets. Even as artillery shelling intensified across the LoC, there was no large-scale mobilisation of ground forces or strike formations. These were signals that both sides were exploring thresholds but not crossing them.

By May 10, the temptation for India to exploit its advantage, having neutralised Pakistan’s forward based air defences was high and could have led to a notch up the escalation ladder. It would have increased Indian reluctance to let Pakistan get a face-saving exit. Finding an off-ramps or de-escalation between nuclear adversaries requires that both sides find a face saver, though backed by competing narratives. To establish superior escalation management, India has to internalise that at every step on the escalation ladder, it has to signal Pakistan towards a face-saver, as was done successfully in the early stages of the Pahalgam crisis. This requires better narrative management so that policy shapes sentiment rather than the other way around.

Finding an off ramps without external involvement creates a different challenge. There is a tacit acknowledgement that Pakistani establishment has been complicit in sponsoring and aiding terrorist attacks in India for decades and India is justified in kinetic retaliation. At the same time, given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapon-states, nuclear sabre rattling during rising tensions grabs international attention with de-escalation emerging as the priority. Since 1998, Pakistan has successfully exploited this opening as this also serves Pakistan by obfuscating the distinction between the perpetrator and the victim of the terrorist attack.

Successive U.S. presidents have played a role in defusing crises since 1998 – President Clinton during the 1999 Kargil crisis, President Bush following the 2001 parliament attack, Presidents Bush, and Obama in 2008-09 following the Mumbai attack, and President Trump in 2019 Balakot and the 2025 Pahalgam crisis. With the sole exception of President Trump, they were prudent in not offering to mediate between India and Pakistan; the current aberration is more a reflection of the disarray in the US administration and President Trump’s propensity for impulsive pronouncements.

During Pahalgam, no nuclear threats were exchanged between India and Pakistan. The only nuclear signalling, presumably directed to the international community was the announcement by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on May 9 that a meeting of the National Command Authority was to be held the following day though he backtracked later after the phone call with Secretary of State Rubio. This did not prevent President Trump from claiming on May 12, “We stopped a nuclear conflict. I think it could have been a bad nuclear war. Millions of people could have killed” and repeating the claim after couple of days.

The contrast between Indian and Pakistani reactions to President Trump’s claims is revealing. Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif has repeated thanked President Trump for his mediation and urged him continue mediation on other issues while the Indian Foreign Office spokesperson denied on May 13 that there was any US mediation or any nuclear escalation or signalling and the ceasefire was arrived at bilaterally; further, there was no scope for any mediation and no broader talks at a any neutral venue were planned. Therefore, unlike in 2019, there was neither any nuclear brinkmanship nor any strategic mobilisation.

The ’new normal’ is a shifting line and introduces a degree of ambiguity. The attempt is to see if it strengthens deterrence. So far, both sides have shown an interest in de-escalation. However, this requires a face saver for both sides. This means that each side creates its own narrative of “victory” and can sustain it. As the stronger power, India must calibrate how far it should discredit the Pakistan military to disincentivise it from sponsoring terrorist attacks while keeping it invested in de-escalation. This is necessary to ensure that conventional operations remain below the nuclear threshold despite brinkmanship.

Today, there is an absence of established crisis management mechanisms between India and Pakistan. During Pahalgam, the only channel of communication in operation was the DGMOs hotline. Past practice and experience indicate that in the military hierarchies on both side, there remains a degree of faith in an inbuilt culture of restraint. However, it is possible that a terrorist group may deliberately act to heighten confrontation to sabotage de-escalation, severely testing the culture of restraint. At such moments, until India and Pakistan invest in building crisis management mechanisms and additional communication channels, de-escalation will continue to be out-sourced to external parties.

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The New Normal after Pahalgam, India’s Response

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Published in The Hindu on May 17, 2025

Operation Sindoor is on ‘pause’ and though the ceasefire began somewhat shakily on Saturday evening (May 10), it seems to be holding. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) – India and Pakistan – had a follow-up conversation and discussed further de-escalatory measures to reduce troop presence in the forward areas that had seen a buildup in recent weeks.

Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror…setting a new standard and a new normal in counter-terrorism measures.” Kinetic retaliation is not new. The Modi government conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the Uri attack, and an air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019 following the Pulwama suicide attack. Yet, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.  

88 hours to ceasefire

After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear that the Indian government would respond with force. The only question of when and in what manner. The measures announced in the days that followed such as reducing diplomatic presence, switching off trade, closing down the Wagah-Attari border crossing, cancelling existing visas, and putting the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, were a strong response but not a substitute for kinetic retaliation.

The intervening fortnight till May 7 was used in finalising targets for kinetic retaliation and ramping up diplomatic engagement at all levels. Post 2019, Indian authorities were certain that sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would compel a calibrated military response. This demanded planning and periodic updating, based on evolving technical capabilities. Eventually, nine targets were chosen out of nearly two dozen options.  The intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, in Delhi and other key capitals, prepared the ground to ensure an acceptance (though sometimes with caveats) of India’s right to target the terrorists and their infrastructure.  India’s challenge was to restore red lines while managing the escalation narrative and leaving a de-escalation option open.

Shortly after the May 7 early morning strike was concluded, the Pakistan DGMO Maj Gen Kashif Abdullah was informed of the nine locations targeted as these were closely associated with designated terrorist groups, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), JeM, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. India emphasised that Op Sindoor was against the terrorists and not the Pakistani military or the Pakistani people. It added that if the Pakistani forces responded, India would reserve the right to retaliate.

Pakistan acknowledged the strike (at six locations) and claimed that it had downed between five to six Indian aircraft, including some Rafale fighter jets, though this was denied by India. It offered an off-ramps de-escalation option – Pakistan claiming success in terms of taking down Indian aircraft, playing down the impact of Indian strikes, and taking the issue of violation of its territory to the United Nations Security Council where it is currently a non-permanent member.

However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to bolster its faltering image and vowed military retaliation. The following two nights, Pakistan mounted escalating drone intrusions, together with some loitering munitions and missile firings, over 36 locations along the 3,300 kilometre-long border, more with the intent to probe for gaps in India’s air defences. India retaliated, with its declared quid pro quo plus policy, targeting Pakistani air bases and air defence units. However, Pakistan denied its intrusions even as it blamed India for repeated violations and attacks. Its air space remained open for civilian air traffic, prompting an Indian warning on May 9 that this was jeopardising civilian air traffic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting on May 9 to approve the next tranche of the IMF Extended Fund Facility (loan to Pakistan) necessitated prudence.  

The night of 9-10 May witnessed a dramatic escalation. Pakistan claimed to have struck 26 Indian targets “to reestablish deterrence after repeated Indian attacks.” India acknowledged “limited damage to equipment and personnel at air force stations Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur, and Bhuj.” Indian response on the morning of May 10 was ferocious and targeted nine military airfields from Skardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahim Yar Khan and Jacobabad in the south as well as three forward air defence units. The stand-off weapons used included the Scalp and BrahMos missiles as well as Crystal Maze, Hammer and Spice 2000 precision guided munitions.

The previous 24 hours had seen intense diplomatic activity with a flurry of telephone calls between Washington, Islamabad, and Delhi. Following a conversation between the two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into effect at 1700 hours on May 10.

The U.S.’s role

Initially, the U.S. adopted a hands-off approach with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting on May 8 that the U.S. was not going to get involved “in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” However, within 24 hours, the U.S. assessment changed as it picked up signs of more cross-border strikes and reports that Pakistan was scheduling a meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA). While Mr. Vance spoke to PM Modi on the evening of May 9 (Indian time), sharing the U.S.’s concerns about a “dramatic escalation” and again the following day (Indian time), U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, following it up with calls to his counterparts India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif announced on May 10 that no meeting of the NCA had taken place.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s message on May 10 pre-empted the official announcement about the ceasefire raising questions about the U.S.’s role. The fact is that after 1998, the U.S. has played a role in de-escalating multiple crises: Kargil in 1999, the Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram in 2001, Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, the exception being the 2016 surgical strikes that Pakistan denied had happened. Yet, none of these instances have led to U.S. mediation and there is little reason to think otherwise this time. There are only two ways of avoiding external intervention – first, increase the economic and military differential with Pakistan, and second, have independent communication channels between the two countries.   

Conflict under the nuclear shadow

Since 1998 when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states, Pakistan’s approach has been to reduce the space for conventional war, by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use. The objective is to constrain India’s space for a kinetic response to a terrorist attack. However, this is no longer working.  If the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ made kinetic retaliation the new normal, Balakot enlarged it in 2019 by introducing air power, and Operation Sindoor has expanded it to cover all of Pakistan. So far, India has emphasised that it has been retaliating against terrorist targets – launch pads across the LoC in 2016, Balakot training camp in 2019, and the nine locations now (Operation Sindoor). However, Mr. Modi has added a new dimension.

In the expansive ‘new normal’ that he outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to respond militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, but added that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts Pakistani military on notice that the next time, India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist targets. The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go together; terror and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”

By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, Mr. Modi is seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang but this requires a significant expansion in conventional capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defences and adopt a network-centric-approach that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for surveillance, communication and targeting, will need to be introduced. Simultaneously, India needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led to Pahalgam, in order to better plan, predict and prevent future Pahalgams. Only then will the expansive ‘new normal’ be a credible deterrent against future terrorist attacks.

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ARMOUR-1971 Cavalry Officers Association My chapter : A Politico–Diplomatic Perspective

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My chapter : A Politico–Diplomatic Perspective

1971 is widely remembered as a liberation war, a war that led to the creation of a new country. It was not the first of the India-Pakistan wars; the two countries had been to war twice earlier, in 1947-48 and again in 1965. It was also not to be the last one, as Kargil war showed us in 1999. Yet, of all four, the 1971 war is remembered as the decisive one. All wars and battles lead to outcomes, invariably interpreted as victory or defeat by the protagonists and the India-Pakistan wars are no different. None of the four wars succeeded in ending the hostile relationship between the two because they remained inconclusive but the 1971 war is still accepted as a decisive victory for India. That is how history remembers it fifty years later; for it achieved an outcome that changed the map of the region forever.

Battles are fought on land, in the air and in the seas and oceans but outcomes of wars are also determined in meeting rooms and conference halls. 1971 is seen as a decisive victory for India because it reflected an Indian victory in shaping the narrative, domestically, regionally and globally. Yet, like in all wars, there were uncertainties and India had to cater for the unexpected. There were unanticipated developments that forced Indian leaders to adapt and modify goalposts but without losing control of the historical narrative. This article seeks to explore the dimensions of the 1971 war not on the battlefield but around conference tables and tension filled meeting rooms.

Seeds of the conflict

The war began in 1971 but the root causes go further back into history. A short appreciation illustrates how it helped Indian leaders shape the political narrative and take certain decisions. The seeds of differences between the leaders of East Pakistan and West Pakistan had been sown even before 1947. The ill-conceived partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon in 1905 provoked widespread resentment and agitations and had to be revoked in 1911. However, it heightened a sense of political awareness among the Muslims of Bengal. It is worth recalling that the Muslim League was founded in 1906 in Dhaka by the Nawab of Dhaka and included many prominent Bengali Muslims like Shaheed Suhrawardy, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Fazlul Haq. In subsequent years, the Muslim League leadership began to be dominated by Muslims from the north and west and very often, these leaders came from more elitist backgrounds.

In 1946, distance between the Bengali leaders of the League and Jinnah were surfacing and find mention in Suhrawardy’s letter to Chowdhary Khaliquzzaman. By this time, partition of India was emerging as a likely outcome, and while in the west, there were contiguous Muslim majority areas, the same was not the case in Bengal and Bihar. Suhrawardy reflected concerns about Muslims where they were in minority provinces and questioned Jinnah’s obsession with partition.

A key reason was that the Bengali Muslim identity was deeply rooted in the culture and linguistic traditions of Bengal. Bengali Muslims did not take to adoption of Urdu, Arabic or Persian instruments to emphasise their religious identity. In this sense, they were akin to the Muslim communities of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. They were influenced more by Bhakti and Sufi traditions than by Hanafi or Wahabi influences. However, the political tides took their toll and Pakistan emerged with two units – East and West Pakistan separated by 1500 miles of India in the middle.

After Liaqat Ali’s assassination in 1952, though both Shaheed Suhrawardy and Khwaja Nazimuddin served briefly as Prime Ministers, the power centre was shifting westwards. The erosion of East Pakistan’s autonomy began soon after 1947. Bengali Muslim League leaders were often given short shrift. Discussions on the constitution came to an impasse because West Pakistan was unwilling to accept a legislature that would have greater Bengali representation based on populations of the two wings. Jinnah’s fiat in 1951 about Urdu as the national language led to riots in Dhaka.

By 1954, the Awami faction of the Pakistan Muslim League had dropped the first two words and emerged as the Awami League. The growing marginalisation of the Muslim League at the hands of the Awami League led Gen Ayub Khan to overthrow the civilian government and declare martial law in 1958. A similar electoral outcome in 1970 eventually led Awami League to spearhead the call for independence in 1971.

Along with political discrimination, East Pakistan also suffered growing economic discrimination. The Planning Commission of Pakistan provided the most conclusive data in its reports. In 1949-50, the per capita income in East Pakistan was Rs 288 compared to Rs 351 in West Pakistan. By 1969-70, the disparity had widened and East Pakistan’s figure had risen to Rs 331, while West Pakistan’s per capita income had grown to Rs 533. Similar discrepancies were visible in terms of infrastructure, health and educational facilities. East Pakistan received 25 percent of investment despite being home to over half the population. Its share of Pakistan’s export earnings was between 50 and 70 percent during this period but its share of imports ranged between 25 and 30 percent. According to the Planning Commission, the net transfer of resources during these two decades from East to West was $ 2.6 billion.

The economic domination was made easier by the military rule that reinforced the West Pakistani domination in the military forces and the civil services. By 1970, 84 percent of the civil service and 85 percent of the diplomatic service was West Pakistani as was 95 percent of the army. Among the air force pilots, 89 percent were from the West. It is this frustration that led Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as President of the Awami League to announce the 6-point demand in 1966 for restructuring of the Pakistani state in a manner that would provide autonomy to the East.

The points included a federal parliamentary government; devolution of power with federal government authority restricted to defence and foreign affairs; effective measures to prevent flight of capital from East to West or two separate and freely convertible currencies; revenue and taxation powers with federating units and a percentage of the revenue to be given to the centre; separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; and, the setting up a separate para-military force for East Pakistan. As the 6 points gained greater traction, the groundswell of protests grew and Gen Ayub Khan was forced to resign in 1969.

His successor Gen Yahya Khan initially declared martial law but was then forced to convene general elections in December 1970. In a National Assembly of 313 members, Awami League made a clean sweep in the east, winning 167 seats; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s PPP was a distant second with 88 seats. It was clear that Sheikh Mujib would be the next PM while his party would also provide the Chief Minister for East Pakistan. Bhutto began to raise questions about Sheikh Mujib’s authority to change the constitution in keeping with the 6-point agenda and demanded equal authority as a representative of the West though his party had not won any seat in NWFP or Balochistan. The election outcome was a perfect reflection of the polarisation of the political structures.

Till this point, India had made no comments on the situation except to welcome the holding of the general elections so that a democratically elected government would take over from the military rulers. However, the National Assembly was never convened. Protests broke out in march against the delays, leading to firing and casualties in East Pakistan. As protests spread, martial law provisions were implemented ruthlessly. Sheikh Mujib refused to enter into a power sharing arrangement at the centre that Bhutto proposed or dilute his demands for autonomy. The last round of talks ended on 25 March and Bhutto returned to Karachi even as the National Assembly was to convene the following day. That night Operation Searchlight was launched, a brutal, genocidal crackdown, across the board aimed at crushing any dissent. Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown out to Rawalpindi.

India gets involved

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the issue in parliament, criticising the military repression, expressing concern and urging restoration of democratic processes. Supportive resolutions were adopted by consensus. Overflights of Pakistani aircraft were suspended. After Sheikh Mujib’s arrest, the other members of the Awami leadership escaped entering border districts of West Bengal. In early April, an independent government of Bangla Desh was established on the border, its location was named Mujibnagar. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was declared President in absentia; Syed Nazrul Islam and Tajuddin Ahmed were appointed Vice President and Prime Minister respectively. Further, India gave refuge to the East Pakistani military and para-military elements who were escaping the brutal crackdown overseen by Lt Gen Tikka Khan.  

The few East Pakistani army officers deployed in the east defected; the two senior most were Col M A G Osmani and Major Ziaur Rahman and the others in West Pakistan were put under house arrest. An underground resistance took shape under the leadership of Major Rahman. The youth wing of the Awami League reconstituted themselves as the Mukti Bahini under the leadership of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni (Sheikh Mujib’s nephew), Tofail Ahmed and ‘Tiger’ Kader Siddiqui. Together, they formed the core of the resistance. In some of the sub-districts, they captured treasuries and acquired some weapons. With these resources, they turned to India for help and Indian intelligence agencies, led by the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) got involved.

The outflow of refugees that had been a trickle soon turned into a torrent. By mid-May, neighbouring states of Assam, Tripura and West Bengal were hosting over five million refugees stretching the local resources. India began to agitate the East Pakistan issue as a humanitarian and refugee crisis in the relevant United Nations bodies in New York and Geneva. Internally, a Core Group was set up under Principal Secretary to PM P N Haksar, including Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee D P Dhar, Foreign Secretary T N Kaul, R&AW chief R N Kao and PN Dhar, Secretary to PM. At the cabinet level, Mrs Indira Gandhi consulted Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, Finance Minister Y B Chavan and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh.

Initially, Mrs Gandhi favoured the idea of giving immediate recognition to Bangla Desh as a free country with a government in exile but others including Swaran Singh felt that India needed time to prepare the ground for gaining broad international acceptance; otherwise, India ran the risk of being blamed for interfering in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country and encouraging secession. It was also clear that immediate recognition would very likely lead to military operations in East Pakistan and Jagjivan Ram and Army chief Gen S H F J Manekshaw both sought time for adequate planning and resourcing as the conflict could also escalate into the western theatre, leading to a two-front situation.

Accordingly, an evolutionary policy approach was adopted with the necessary preparations to exercise the military option at a later date. The political understanding was that the Pakistan regime needed to respect the outcome of the December election and for this, the first step is the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and commencement of a political dialogue. The second decision was to demand an end to the military crackdown in East Pakistan and a return of the troops to their barracks so that conditions for the return of the refugees could begin to be created. While the international community, especially key major powers needed to be approached to use their influence with Pakistan for the above two points, UN and its agencies would be sensitised to the refugee crisis to generate relief and rehabilitation assistance. Finally, resources for the military option were cleared so that necessary procurement could be fast tracked. Gen Manekshaw had the lessons of 1962 war with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan in mind and needed a better trained and better equipped force. Further, he also needed far greater coordination with the Air Force and Navy than had been in evidence earlier.

From June to December, the Ministry of External Affairs became the instrument for the campaign on the first two points, even as senior political leaders led by Mrs Gandhi visited selected capitals. Following closure of Indian air space, Pakistani aircraft had been using Colombo as a transit point. After some reluctance, Sri Lanka was finally persuaded in end-July to withdraw this facility. By this time the number of refugees had crossed eight million. Pakistan refused to release Sheikh Mujib, accused India of seeking a break-up of Pakistan, called the refugees as ‘rebels and secessionists’ and continued its crackdown.

The first fortnight of July unveiled a new surprise. On 6 July, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger landed in Delhi for talks. His message was to urge India to be patient even as news were breaking about US having resumed military supplies to Pakistan. After two days of bruising meetings in Delhi he took off for Islamabad. After a day, he feigned illness, ostensibly went to Nathiagali to recover, while he took off for his secret visit to Beijing that had been in the making and for which, Gen Yahya Khan had played the go-between. After returning to Islamabad, having recovered from his illness and returned to the US. On 15 July, US president Richard Nixon announced to a stunned world that he had accepted an invitation to visit China. As the details of Pakistan’s role emerged, Indian leaders were forced to review their options.

As we now know, Washington was fully aware of the developments in East Pakistan. The US Consul General in Dhaka Archer Blood sent a telegram to Washington in end-March, days after the beginning of Operation Searchlight, titled ‘Selective Genocide’. When it did not elicit a response, it was followed up in subsequent weeks with more details of the killings and then finally he and twenty of his colleagues sent the now famous ‘Dissent Telegram’, conveying disagreement with US policy on Pakistan and describing it as ‘moral bankruptcy’. By end-April, he was sacked from the post and returned to the US where he was assigned to the Personnel Department. US never asked for the release of Sheikh Mujib or criticised Gen Yahya Khan for the military crackdown; it merely asked him to seek a political solution.

Even when US Ambassador in Islamabad Joseph Farland reported that Pakistan could not hold on to its eastern wing, Kissinger’s response was that the US needed six months to pull off the China visit. The US effort therefore was to prevent India from going for the military option. The last straw was the message conveyed by Kissinger to Indian Ambassador L K Jha on 17 July that in case a war broke out between India and Pakistan and China got involved on Pakistan’s side, US would be unable to help India.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Friendship and Co-operation had been under discussion for a couple of years. There was already movement to fast track it and D P Dhar had been following it up. It was now finalised and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko flew to Delhi for the signing on 7 August. It included a significant clause calling for mutual consultations in the event of a threat to either party. Indian military planners had to factor in not just a two-front war with Pakistan but also the possibility of China upping the ante in the north-east. This was not an exaggerated notion. After the 1965 war, Bhutto had visualised that in the next conflict, coordination with China would be essential, in the north-east and particularly close to Sikkim down to the ‘chicken’s neck’. Bhutto was an influential leader and his own political ambitions had contributed to the East Pakistan crisis. From India’s point of view, a non-hostile Bangla Desh was strategically preferable to a hostile East Pakistan. Further, it was a negation of the two-nation theory that had formed the basis of the creation of Pakistan in the first place. The die was cast.

Setting the stage

Swaran Singh resumed his travels to key European capitals and US and Canada. K C Pant visited a number of Asian and Latin American capitals. Mohammed Yunus took on the responsibility of covering the Arab countries. The response was disappointing. Even where there was sympathy, there was a reluctance to get drawn into an issue that had larger ramifications. Territorial break-up of a state was difficult to accept and Pakistan was a member of Western military alliances, SEATO and CENTO. China and the US were openly supporting Pakistan and the Islamic world displayed a clear sympathy for Pakistan.  NAM was moribund.

However, international public opinion was getting energised. Media had begun to carry harrowing stories and pictures of the refugee camps. Joan Baez took up the cause in a series of concerts called Song for Bangla Desh. Pandit Ravi Shankar and George Harrison organised the Concert for Bangla Desh bringing together the Beatles, Eric Clapton and Bob Dylan, among others. In October-November, visits to the refugee camps by people like Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Senator Edward Kennedy and prominent French intellectual Andre Malraux kept the world opinion sensitised to the humanitarian tragedy. 

Meanwhile, at home, arrangements were made to enable the government in exile to establish contact with East Pakistani diaspora in other countries. The entire Bengali component of the Pakistani consulate in Calcutta had resigned and had joined the establishment in Mujibnagar. A Branch Secretariat of the MEA to coordinate the different needs and requirements of the growing refugee camps as well as the government in exile, was established in Calcutta, with representation from other branches of the government. Indian missions abroad were receiving requests for asylum from East Pakistani diplomats and officials that needed vetting. Gen Yahya Khan was threatening to charge Sheikh Mujib with treason and subject him to a court martial.

A last-ditch diplomatic exercise was set to unfold at the UN General Assembly in the third week of September. It was vital to ensure that India’s options not be constrained by any move by Pakistan, in concert with the US, through the Security Council. Even delaying tactics were to be blocked. Pakistan’s appeal was for preserving the territorial integrity of a member state. It was mooted that Pakistan may be receptive to taking back only the Muslim refugees provided the international community paid for their resettlement. The 1970 election was forgotten. Awami League was declared a secessionist party and therefore to be disbanded. Once West Pakistan’s authority was restored, a civilian government would be put in place. In the UN, the majority of the countries only addressed the humanitarian aspect and shied away from addressing the political issues. Some suggested that India and Pakistan should settle it bilaterally. Less than half a dozen countries supported the idea of respecting the will of the people reflected in the electoral outcome. The idea of a liberation struggle found no takers.

Even as India explored the possibility of a delegation of the Bangla Desh government in exile to visit New York to address the UN and engage directly with people, US Consulate in Calcutta was seeking to establish its own links with some members of the government in exile in order to explore if they were open to direct talks with the Yahya regime and create an embarrassing split. Meanwhile the Mukti Bahini had stepped up its activities in East Pakistan. Domestic public opinion in India was urging Mrs Gandhi to be more forthcoming in supporting the Mukti Bahini and recognising the government in exile. By mid-November it was clear that operational support for the freedom fighters needed to be stepped up, the liberation war could not be a prolonged affair and, Indian military action was inevitable.

In October-November, Mrs Gandhi undertook a series of foreign visits covering Moscow, Bonn, Paris, London and concluding with Washington on 4-5 November. The responses were along predictable lines. US had opened links to the Soviet Union suggesting that détente could be jeopardised if they encouraged India to declare war on Pakistan. In Moscow, Soviet leaders supported the calls for an end to the military crackdown and the killings as also release of Sheikh Mujib to enable a political settlement; in private talks, Premier Kosygin cautioned that a war might worsen the situation for India. She got a sympathetic hearing in Paris and Bonn from President Pompidou and Chancellor Willy Brandt respectively but a lukewarm reception in London. By this time, a Pakistani military build up on the western front had raised the prospects of war. After a frosty meeting with President Nixon in White House on 4 November, Mrs Gandhi decided to use the second meeting the following day on other global issues, completely bypassing the East Pakistan crisis.

The last of the doubts in Mrs Gandhi’s mind about avoiding war had vanished. She realised that that the international community could not support a return of the refugees. Moreover, the Mukti Bahini was becoming resentful at the restraints imposed on them by India. Pakistan adopted a policy of hot pursuit into India in the eastern sector, including using its airplanes. India responded in kind. Conflict broke out at Boyra on 22 November. The western sector was put on high alert. After some reservations on the part of Eastern Command the political decision was taken to set up a joint command with Col Osmani leading the freedom fighters. Mrs Gandhi was flying back from Calcutta to Delhi on 3 December when she learnt that Pakistani airplanes had undertaken pre-emptive strikes against Indian airfields in the western sector.

After landing in Delhi, an emergency meeting of the Cabinet was convened. A state of war with Pakistan was declared. Formal recognition was given to the state of Bangla Desh and they were invited to open a diplomatic mission in Delhi.

The 14-day war of 1971

The objectives of the military campaign were clear. In the east, it had to be the decisive defeat of the Pakistan army ensuring the transformation of East Pakistan into a free republic of Bangla Desh; in the west, it was to ensure that Pakistan was unable to make any gains in Jammu and Kashmir while exploring any possibilities for capturing territory in Rajasthan and Sindh that could be politically useful at the negotiating table. The force levels were deployed accordingly. Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen J S Aurora had a little over three corps assisted by two divisions of Mukti Bahini and the irregulars. This enabled the opening up of four fronts – from the west, north, north-east and east, simultaneously. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant along with two frigates and other supporting vessels was deployed on the eastern front. A significant force multiplier was the nearly 12 squadrons of the Indian Air Force deployed along the nine airfields in the east for supporting each of the four ground attack lines whose strategy was to bypass the major the major urban centres thereby cutting off the Pakistani forces and surround Dhaka. The Mukti Bahini played a key role in providing intelligence and undertaking sabotage for shaping the battlefield. In contrast, force levels in the west were more evenly balanced.

On the diplomatic front, the action shifted in the UN from the General Assembly to the Security Council. Pakistan accused India of creating and supporting a separatist movement in East Pakistan and now giving it open military support. India emphasised the socio-economic and political reasons for the growth of the liberation movement, the influx of the refugees and Pakistan’s aggression with air strikes on 3 December. Most states urged an immediate ceasefire and opening of a political dialogue without addressing the deeper political causes.

More than twenty resolutions were introduced in the Security Council. The US resolution called for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of the forces to their own borders to create an environment conducive to the return of the refugees with the help of the UN Secretary General. Many western country resolutions were similar to the US resolution. The USSR resolution called for a political settlement in East Pakistan that could end the hostilities and urged Pakistani forces from violence against its citizens. A Polish resolution urged that power be transferred to the elected representatives. China’s resolution condemned Indian aggression and demanded the withdrawal of Indian forces. Between December 4-16, USSR exercised a veto in support of India on seven occasions. The result was that the Security Council was prevented from taking any punitive actions against India that could have interfered with the liberation struggle and been a strategic setback for India.

Foreign Minister Swaran Singh arrived in New York on 10 December to present India’s case to the Security Council. Pakistan was represented by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Swaran Singh delivered his speech over two days as he sought consecutive translation instead of simultaneous translation, in view of the gravity of the situation. By 14 December, that the conflict in the east would end within the next 48 hours. Even USSR was urging India to move towards an end to the conflict. On 16 December, Swaran Singh informed the Security Council about the surrender of Dhaka and the following day at 2000 hrs (IST), India declared a unilateral ceasefire on the western front. Swaran Singh urged the Security Council to ensure that Pakistan reciprocated the unilateral ceasefire. After a dramatic tearing up of the draft resolutions, Bhutto blamed the Security Council for its inaction and staged a walk out. On his return to Pakistan, he took over as President and Civilian Martial Law Administrator from Gen Yahya Khan on 20 December. The following day, the Security Council adopted the resolution (UNSCR 307 of 1971) noting the ceasefire and urging both sides to ensure its durability.

While the fighting was on, US pulled out all the stops to put pressure on India. Chinese leadership was informed by Kissinger that US would support China if China were to take measures to neutralise any threat perceptions from India. On 12 December, China conveyed that having considered the options, it would be best to get a ceasefire through the Security Council. US also told USSR that détente process could be jeopardised if USSR did not use its influence on India to de-escalate the situation. To add to it, an 11-warship group, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise from the Seventh Fleet entered the Bay of Bengal on 13 December in an exercise in coercive diplomacy. The justification used that it was needed to safeguard the foreigners and evacuate them from Chittagong if necessary. Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers Firyubin and Kuznetsov visited Delhi for consultations. The message was that USSR would deal with the Seventh Fleet incursion, India should wrap up its operations in East Pakistan and immediately thereafter, announce a ceasefire on the western front. A Soviet naval task force including at least one nuclear submarine was directed to the area, with appropriate signalling. Eventually, the USS Enterprise departed just as Dhaka surrendered.

Such was the extent of self-delusion in the White House that immediately after the ceasefire, Kissinger congratulated Nixon for having saved West Pakistan. There had been no evidence that India had the resources or plans to dismember West Pakistan. However, flawed intelligence assessments were employed by the White House to deceive US friends and convince China that it was credible US military threats that had thwarted Indian plans.

The return to politics

In many ways wars become more interesting when the fighting stops. Negotiations begin. The spoils of war have to be legitimised. Negotiations are critical even though media attention moves on in search of new headlines. The 1971 war was no different. Keeping 93000 prisoners of war in safe custody while managing the post-war situation in terms of ensuring Sheikh Mujib’s return to Dhaka and keeping the logistics chains moving was a challenge. Pakistani prisoners were vulnerable to the Mukti Bahini, some of whom wanted to exact revenge, and they knew it.

In Pakistan, Bhutto was negotiating with Sheikh Mujib, asking him to intercede with India for the return of the POWs and give an assurance that no war crimes trials were conducted. Sheikh Mujib was flown to Ankara and then to London on January 8, 1972. He conveyed a message that he would fly back on a British airways special flight to Dhaka but would like to stop in Delhi to thank Mrs Gandhi and the people of India personally. On 9 January, he landed at Palam and after being received by Mrs Gandhi and the entire cabinet, the two leaders proceeded to the Parade Ground where a hundred thousand people had assembled to felicitate him. A couple of hours later, he left for Dhaka, landing in his own free country in the afternoon, to a tumultuous welcome by millions of his citizens.

India established its diplomatic presence in Bangla Desh when J N Dixit (later to become Foreign Secretary and NSA) presented his Letter of Commission as Minister in-charge of the Indian diplomatic mission, on 17 January to President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka. Bangla Desh was facing acute shortages of food supplies and health facilities; there was a breakdown in administrative structures and elements of Pakistan army had escaped and assembled into groups in the Chittagong hill tracts. Sheikh Mujib made three requests to Mrs Gandhi, for deputing Indian civil servants to run the district administrations for six months till Bangla Desh officials could take over, a continuing presence of Indian military to mop up the remnants of the Pakistan army, and across the board economic assistance for rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure and setting up a national airline and shipping line. All these were accepted. The Indian Navy helped clear the mines at Chittagong port. A brigade was deployed at Cox’s Bazaar. In February, Sheikh Mujib visited Calcutta to thank the people and in March, Mrs Gandhi became the first leader to visit Dhaka. Both visits were resoundingly successful.

Bhutto had set about repairing ties with the Islamic world by undertaking visits to Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria in January 1972. He also swallowed his disappointment with US and China and set about strengthening his diplomatic position for the negotiations with India. He withdrew from the Commonwealth but maintained cordial relations with UK. Two rounds of bilateral talks were held in Murree in February and April and the Simla summit was convened in July 1972. Bhutto’s objectives were – to secure the release of POWs, to prevent any war crimes trials, to maintain Pakistan’s stand on Jammu and Kashmir undiluted, and manage the optics to appear as an equal and not a vanquished party. On the Indian side, there were two views on whether to drive through a final settlement on Kashmir or set a process in motion. The negotiations were often on the verge of a breakdown. It is known that on 2 July Bhutto sought a long private meeting with Mrs Gandhi where some of the outstanding issues were ironed out. The Simla Agreement was signed late that night. There has been considerable speculation about whether there was a secret text or verbal assurances but so far, there is no conclusive evidence. The POWs were released. Kashmir was to be settled bilaterally and a Line of Control came into being.

Bhutto also was moving to normalise relations with Sheikh Mujib. OIC countries linked Bangla Desh’s admission to this and Sheikh Mujib visited Lahore in February 1974 to participate in the OIC summit. Pakistan recognised Bangla Desh and in July 1974, Bhutto paid an official visit to Dhaka. It was clear that Bhutto was seeking to play on the Islamic sentiments to reduce the extent of the Indian influence. It also opened an option for Bangla Desh to navigate between India and Pakistan when needed.

Later in 1974, India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion creating ripples across the globe and in the region. Sikkim was integrated into India in 1975. Later that year, political imperatives led Mrs Gandhi to declare a state of national emergency that lasted 21 months. In the elections held in 1977, she lost power. In Bangla Desh, Sheikh Mujib was assassinated in August 1975 and by the end of the year, military rule had been established in Bangla Desh by Gen Ziaur Rahman, earlier a key leader of the Mukti Bahini. In Pakistan, Bhutto won the elections in 1977 but allegations of rigging led to a military coup and later that year, he was deposed by Gen Zia ul Haq and executed two years later.

History had moved on.

Conclusion

Looking back, it is only fair to judge that 1971 reflected a combination of strategic decisiveness among the political leadership, a responsiveness to the changing ground reality, unity across the party lines, a setting out of clear political objectives and a relationship of trust in the advice rendered by the military leadership. An objective assessment of military strength was made as also its application in the different zones of war, the diplomatic, military and political actors worked on a common script, that enabled India to claim that it was on the right side of history.

The best laid plans are often the first casualty when conflict begins. However, in 1971, the military plans had been backed by training and where necessary, the local commanders exercised initiative.  Covert operations by the committed Mukti Bahini in the east provided valuable insights to the Indian army as it progressed without getting bogged down in attrition warfare. The Indian Air Force had understood the lessons from the 1965 war and was able to integrate much more closely with the army operations in both sectors. The psychological impact of strikes on the Governor’s House in Dhaka, oil refineries in Karachi and Sui gas fields in Balochistan was considerable. The navy’s strategy of keeping INS Vikrant in the Andamans while the PNS Ghazi was prowling the Bay of Bengal was a clever tactic that yielded rich dividends once PNS Ghazi was neutralised.

Taking on an adversarial US and understanding the limits of Soviet political support also demanded taking political calls at appropriate times.

Finally, the 1971 war provided an important chapter in shaping India’s strategic culture.

*****

Selected Background Readings:

Srinath Raghavan, A Global History of the Creation of Bangla Desh (Harvard University Press, 2013)

J N Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (Books Today, India Today Group, 2002)

Arjun Subramaniam, India’s Wars – A Military History 1947-1971 (Harper Collins, 2016)

John Gill, An Atlas of the 1971 India-Pakistan War (National Defence University Press, 2003)

Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (Public Affairs, 2015)

Gary J Bass, The Blood Telegram (Random House, 2013)

While these provide a broad perspective, there are, in addition, numerous accounts and memoirs of the personalities directly involved in the political and military decision making.