Published in India’s World on January 9, 2025
My Interview to India’s World on India-U.S. ties
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R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended
I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025
https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/
Remembering Dr R Chidambaram
From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)
I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.
In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.
In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.
Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.
At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.
Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.
Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.
Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.
The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.
At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.
It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.
How and Why D&ISA Division was Created in MEA
I write for India’s World Vol 1 Issue 1
In early 1992, after five and a half years posted abroad, I returned to India with a growing realization of the shifting geopolitical equations, its impact on South Asia, and the challenges it would pose for Indian foreign policy that had been crafted during the Cold War years. These realisations were also shared by the Foreign Secretary and the political leadership, eventually leading to the birth of the Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.
A faraway view
My five and a half years were split between two postings: Geneva, where I served as First Secretary (Disarmament) at the Permanent Mission of India, and then Islamabad, where I was Counsellor (Political) at the High Commission of India.
Both postings provided a ringside view of changing geopolitics and its impact on South Asia.
In Geneva, the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention began to register progress as the Soviet delegation softened its position on on-site and challenge inspections. Mandatory and consultative verification was accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilaterally concluded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989 and in November, the Berlin Wall came down. In Vienna, talks began on for setting limits on conventional forces leading to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty the following year.
In 1990, tensions between India and Pakistan began to rise with growing incidents of violence and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The camps in Pakistan that had trained the mujahideen for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan were ready for new recruits. Following a crisis in summer of 1990, talks between the Foreign Secretaries were initiated to develop Confidence Building Measures, the first such talks since the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities, concluded in 1988. This led to the operationalising of the Hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) and another was set up between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Two significant conventional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) concluded in 1991 were the Agreement on Advance Notices on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres, and Troop Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts.
Coming home
By early 1992, I was back in Delhi and took charge as Director in the United Nations Division, responsible for dealing with Disarmament issues (UND). The work related to the UN in New York (General Assembly, Disarmament Commission), Geneva (negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other review conferences), and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). However, the world was changing rapidly, with new challenges and opportunities.
In December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen states with Russia as the successor state. The bipolar world of the Cold War, came to an end. For the first time since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met at summit level (Prime Minister Narsimha Rao participated as India was a non-permanent member) to take stock of the global security environment and concluded, inter-alia, that proliferation posed a major threat to regional and global security.
On the margins of the UNSC meeting in New York, Prime Minister Rao and President George H W Bush held a bilateral meeting, concluded that the end of the Cold War provided India and the U.S. an opportunity to overcome their differences, agreeing to open a dialogue on strategic and nuclear issues that had been a source of friction since the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India.
The dialogue commenced a few months later and continued through various ups and downs, culminating in the 123 Agreement permitting civilian nuclear cooperation in 2008.
Meanwhile restrictions on dual use items began to get tightened. In 1991, the Nuclear Suppliers Group convened after more than a decade and the following year, added Part 2 to their Guidelines covering nuclear-related-dual-use items and technologies that, in addition to having non-nuclear applications, could also contribute to the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) met to add to its Category 2 lists by adding more dual-use items and technologies, as also Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) above a certain threshold. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had concluded an agreement with a Russian entity Glavkosmos, for transfer of technology relating to cryogenic rocket engines. Despite the fact that cryogenic technology is for satellite launches and not for missiles, the U.S. sanctioned both ISRO and Glavkosmos, reflecting the focus on non-proliferation.
In 1992, India announced full diplomatic recognition to Israel with the opening of embassies in Delhi and Tel Aviv. Under the multi-track Arab-Israeli peace process underway, India became an extra-regional participant in the Arms Control and Regional Security track that worked on CBMs.
Within weeks of returning from Islamabad as Director (UND), I found that nearly three-fourths of my time was devoted not to UN related disarmament agendas but national and regional security and strategic dialogues as well as handling non-proliferation related sanctions and licensing issues for dual use items, especially relating to civilian nuclear and space programmes.
To take stock of the changes under way, an Eminent Persons Group was set with Prime Minister Rao’s approval in mid-1992, with serving and former heads of nuclear, space and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) departments.
Around this time, I put up a note to Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, explaining that the designation UND no longer described the changing nature of the work and proposed the establishment of a new division that would, in addition to the disarmament negotiations and the UN and IAEA related work, also deal with national security, non-proliferation and access to dual-use technology related issues. The proposal found acceptance and following some discussions, the new division was named Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA Division).
The nuclear dialogue with the U.S. was the first of many that followed. Discussing threat perceptions was a novel challenge for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and required much closer coordination with the Ministry of Defence. Soon, D&ISA Division had to get a Military Advisor and a Science Adviser deputed from the Services and DRDO respectively.
The evolution of an idea
Over the years, D&ISA Division also became the nodal division for handling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, a security dialogue platform, that India was invited to join as part of our “Look East” policy. As the global norm of non-proliferation gained greater traction, D&ISA division began to highlight the need for sensitising our private sector entities as some of them had been found exporting dual-use chemicals that led to adverse commentary in international media and US sanctions, even though these companies had not violated any Indian laws. An empowered group was established to develop lists of dual-use materials, equipments and technologies whose exports should be licensed only after due diligence and end-use assurances, laying the foundation for non-proliferation related export controls administered by the Ministry of Commerce.
India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and D&ISA Division became responsible for coordinating industry outreach with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers and with DRDO about winding down our chemical weapons programme.
The opening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva added the responsibility of developing the national negotiating position in close coordination with the Department of Atomic Energy. By 1995, it became clear that in order to keep India’s nuclear option viable, India could not rely on the 1974 PNE and needed to carry out a new series of nuclear tests. Withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations in 1996 followed by the nuclear tests in 1998 and working the negotiating strategy for India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power added to D&ISA Division’s work load. Together with the concerned territorial divisions, it handled the strategic dialogues with a number of countries including France, UK, Israel etc. that eventually led to the establishment of long-standing strategic partnerships.
An institution in itself
In late 2000, after nearly a nine-year stint, I left Delhi on a new assignment. India had established a new position of an Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and it was my privilege to set up the new office.
Over a quarter century later, it is gratifying to see that D&ISA Division has thrived as has the position of Ambassador for Disarmament. Many of my young colleagues who I had the privilege to work with, went on to serve in Geneva and Vienna, and head the D&ISA Division, (D B Venkatesh Verma, Suchitra Durai, G Dharmendra, Amandeep Singh Gill) with great distinction.
*****
Why Pakistan and Afghanistan Matter?
A Conversation with Vivek Katju, moderated by Dr Jaimini Bhagwati at CSEP on October 23, 2024
What makes the India-France ‘Strategic Partnership’ Tick
Published in the Hindu on February 1, 2024
The French President, Emmanuel Macron, was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day, making it his third visit to India, after his 2018 State Visit and last year for the G-20 summit hosted by India. Coming within six months of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit last year as the Chief Guest at France’s Bastille Day, it is clear that the two countries do share a ‘Strategic Partnership’ that is special. It is no secret that United States President Joseph Biden had been invited initially and his visit was to be followed by a Quad summit that had been accepted by the Australian and Japanese leaders when Mr. Biden declared his inability to travel. The fact that Mr. Macron stepped in readily speaks for the personal ties that he and Mr. Modi have established and the importance they attribute to the relationship.
Origins of strategic convergence
President Jacques Chirac was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day in 1998 when India established its first Strategic Partnership. In a significant statement, Mr. Chirac declared that India’s exclusion from the global nuclear order was an anomaly that needed to be rectified. The ‘Strategic Partnership’ was tested when India undertook its series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. France was the first country to open a dialogue with India and displayed a greater understanding of India’s security compulsions compared to other countries. It was the first P-5 country to support India’s claim for a permanent seat in an expanded and reformed UN Security Council.
India and France have valued strategic autonomy, in their own fashion. India adopted non-alignment. After the Second World War, France was one of the founding members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 and hosted the NATO headquarters; it withdrew from its Integrated Military Command in 1966 due to reservations over U.S. insistence on subordinating French nuclear deterrent to NATO and accepting any collective control that Gen Charles de Gaulle felt would dilute French sovereignty, forcing NATO to shift its headquarters to Brussels.
After the Cold War ended, both countries were quick to espouse the virtues of multipolarity. French discomfort with a unipolar system was clear when French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine described USA as a hyperpuissance and openly spoke out in favour of multipolarity, forming a natural convergence with India’s ambitions of seeking strategic autonomy. As a resident power in the Indian Ocean, France was quick to realise the geopolitical focus shifting from the Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific and decided on India as its preferred partner in the region.
Both France and India share a common trait of ‘civilisation exceptionalism’ and pride themselves on their ‘argumentative intellectualism’ but have wisely refrained from preaching to each other. Though part of the western world, France, as a non-Anglo-Saxon nation, found it easier and more natural to engage with India on equal terms.
Building the Partnership
The nuclear dialogue established in May 1998 grew into a broader strategic dialogue elevated to the level to the National Security Advisers. From the original three pillars of nuclear, space and defence, the agenda gradually expanded to include counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and cyber-security issues. Convergence has also evolved on global challenges like climate change, reform of multilateral development institutions, a globally beneficial Artificial Intelligence, and as the Joint Statement indicates, ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza.
On the defence side, six Scorpene submarines have been built by Mazagaon Docks Shipbuilders Limited with transfer of technology from the Naval Group. Technology sharing memoranda of understanding and acquisitions of short-range missiles and radar equipment were concluded. Joint exercises between the navies, air forces and the armies were instituted in 2001, 2004 and 2011 respectively. The government-to-government agreement for 36 Rafale aircraft, salvaged out of the prolonged negotiations for the original 126 which were at an impasse, has been concluded. Its offset target of 50 percent (nearly Rs 25000 crores), has helped in building up India’s budding aerospace industry.
During Mr. Modi’s visit last year, an announcement regarding a further acquisition of three more Scorpenes with enhanced features of air-independent-propulsion and 26 Rafale M aircraft for India’s new aircraft carrier was made, with negotiations to be concluded by the end of 2024.
Mr. Macron’s visit saw the conclusion of an India-France for Defence Industrial Roadmap that fits in with the goal of atmanirbharta. Tata Advanced Systems Ltd and Airbus concluded an agreement to set up a final assembly line by 2026 for H125 civilian helicopters. A final assembly line for C-295 military transport aircraft has already been set up in Vadodara by the two partners. Collaboration between Safran, DRDO and its Gas Turbine Research Establishment is being stepped up for designing, developing, and producing an aircraft engine for India’s fifth generation aircraft (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) with 100 % transfer of technology. This is a major step forward from the agreement concluded with the U.S. to permit technology transfer to HAL to produce General Electric F-414 engine to power Tejas Mk2 fighter aircraft. However, the GE engine is a 1990s design while the Safran project will entail defining parameters, co-designing, engineering, certification, in addition to production. Akasa Air has signed a $5 billion agreement for 300 LEAP-1B engines to power its fleet acquisition of 170 Boeing MAX aircraft. This engine is a Safran-GE JV product and together with Safran’s Snecma engines powering Rafale and Rafale M, sets the stage for it to set up a maintenance, repair, and operations in India.
Cooperation in the space domain began in the 1960s with French assistance to set up the Indian launch facility at Sriharikota but languished in later years because of export controls. The strategic dialogue helped restart this cooperation and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and French Space Agency (CNES) now work on joint missions. The visit saw a new MoU being signed between New Space India Ltd, a Government of India company under the Department of Space and the commercial arm of ISRO, and French satellite launch company Arianespace for collaboration on space launches. In addition, with France converting its air-force into the French Air and Space Force and India setting up Defence Space Agency, the two ministries of defence are looking to work together in optimising space domain awareness.
Broadening and deepening the partnership
The challenge for both countries has been to take the partnership out of the government domains into the commercial and civilian spaces. As a result, Joint Working Groups on a range of subjects covering agriculture, environment, civil aviation, IT and telecom, urban development, transportation, culture, and tourism have been set up over the years.
One of the success stories has been the growing number of Indian students now going to France for higher education. A decade ago, it was less than 3000 and today it is upwards of 10000. The target is now 30000 by 2030. The visa issue is being addressed with a five-year Schengen visa for Indians who pursue a post-graduate course in France. The operationalisation of the Young Professional Scheme under the Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement will help. Last year the University Grants Commission revised rules regarding foreign universities setting up campuses in India. Sorbonne University, established in the 13th century, is globally renowned, and has had a campus in the United Arab Emirates since 2006. A campus in India should be identified as a priority objective.
There are nearly 1000 French companies present in India including 39 of the CAC 40 (the most influential benchmark of performance in the French economy) while nearly 150 Indian businesses have established a presence in France. In the past, Indian companies saw the United Kingdom as the entry point for Europe; post-Brexit, France is an entry point for Europe and Francophonie!
‘Strategic Partnership’ does not require convergence on all issues but sensitivity so that differences, where these exist, are expressed in private and not publicly. This is where India-France ties, nurtured over the last quarter century, reflect maturity and resilience.
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RAKESH SOOD 