Published in the Hindu on April 6, 2026

In the 2025-26 Budget speech, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced that India’s installed nuclear power generation capacity would rise from 8180 MW  to 100,000 MW (100 GW) by 2047. She also signalled transformative legislative changes, leading to the introduction and rapid passage of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill in December 2025.

The scope of change envisaged is dramatic. All nuclear activity had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The SHANTI Act promises a transformation of India’s nuclear energy landscape by bringing in private companies to build, own and operate nuclear power plants, provides a statutory status to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and revises the liability framework to encourage private and even foreign investment. The 1962 Atomic Energy Act and the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) stand repealed and replaced by the SHANTI Act (2025).

However, to realise the promise of 100 GW will need putting the nuts and bolts of implementation in place, the notification of supportive Rules and Regulations, consonant with the transformative spirit underlying the SHANTI Act.

Driving the reforms

 Two key pronouncements drive the reform: achieving  Viksit Bharat (Developed India) by 2047 and net zero emissions by 2070. As society moves up the development ladder, the nature of energy consumption shifts to electricity from the traditional modes of energy like firewood, fossil fuels for transport and heating, and coal for industry. Consequently, the “net zero” target also imposes a parallel shift away from fossil fuel-based power generation towards renewables and other low carbon options.

In 2024, India’s per capita electricity generation was 1418 kWh (kilo-watt-hour) compared to 7097 kWh for China and 12701 kWh for the  United States. The OECD average is a little above 8000 kWh. This indicates the distance India needs to travel to achieve the goal of Viksit Bharat. The second goal of “net zero” imposes its own conditionalities. In 2024, India’s per capita energy consumption was 7893 kWh, indicating that only one-fifth of the energy consumption is from electricity.

In June 2025, India’s electricity generating capacity reached 476 GW (giga-watt) and approximately 50 percent was non-fossil fuel sources. Renewable sources made up 227 GW, consisting of solar power 111 GW, wind power 51 GW, hydro power 48 GW with an additional 5GW from micro-hydel projects and bioenergy 12 GW. In addition, nuclear power – which is seen as low carbon and not strictly renewable as it consumes fissile material as fuel – was 8.8 GW. Thermal power, primarily based on coal accounted for 240 GW. India has committed to increasing the installed capacity of renewables to 500 GW by 2030.  

However, the installed capacity does not reveal the full picture. Renewable sources generation depends on the time of day, climatic and seasonal conditions and geography. India generated a total of 1824 TWh (tera-watt-hours) during 2024-25. The renewable sources accounted for 403 TWh (solar 144 TWh, wind 83 TWh, hydro power 160 TWh and bioenergy 16 TWh). Nuclear power accounted for 57 TWh while thermal power generation was 1363 TWh. Thermal power therefore accounted for 75% of the electricity generated with 50% of the generating capacity compared to 50% renewables capacity providing 22%, while nuclear power contributed 3% with 1.8% of generating capacity. The reason is that thermal and nuclear sources provide for steady baseload power. For renewables to provide at scale, large investments in energy storage become essential. This is why renewables capacity growth is now facing headwinds with projects of 40 GW languishing without power-purchase contracts.

India’s nuclear power journey and options

Conservative estimates indicate that India will need to grow its electricity generating capacity to over 2000 GW to reach Viksit Bharat levels. Even with more efficient and cheaper battery storage, renewables like solar and wind farms are about ten times more land intensive compared to thermal power plants; since coal is inconsistent with “net zero”, nuclear power remains the preferred baseload means to achieve “net-zero.”

India’s first nuclear power reactor went operational in 1969 in Tarapur. Today, Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) is managing 24 nuclear power plants with an installed capacity of 8780 MW (one reactor in Rawatbhata has been shut down). The two oldest are Boiling Water Reactors (BWR), two at Kudankulum are Russian design VVERs (PWR) and the balance are Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR). The original design was 220 MW; this has been successfully indigenised and adapted to 540 MW and 700 MW designs.

The DAE budget has averaged between Rs. 24000 and 26000 crores during the last three years. India’s 700 MW PHWR construction cost is $2 million per MW, among the lowest globally for nuclear power. To add 90 GW over the next two decades would need an outlay of over $200 billion (Rs 18 lakh crores), only feasible with private investment; both domestic and foreign.

In 2017, government gave administrative and financial approval for building 10 reactors of 700 MW each in fleet mode but work hasn’t begun. The logic of fleet mode was to streamline production to gain economies of scale. Three other locations, Jaitapur for six reactors of 1650 MW each based on a French (EdF) design, Mithi Virdi and Kovvada to have six reactors each of 1000 MW capacity with Westinghouse-Toshiba and GE-Hitachi designs, have been mentioned for over a decade. The likely power generation costs from these unproven designs are likely to be over $5 million per MW.

Many industries have captive power plants, ranging from 10 MW to 200 MW and most of these are fossil fuel based. Current estimates for the installed capacity are 90 GW with plants of 100 MW and above accounting for two-thirds capacity. The government has allocated Rs. 20000 crores to research and develop five indigenous models of Small Modular Reactors (SMR) of 5 MW, 55 MW and 200 MW capacity by 2033. Meanwhile, the indigenised 220 MW PHWR model (15 are currently operational), can be a reliable work horse. With efficient project management, some amount of modularisation, and economies of scale, the time from first pour-of-concrete to going-on-stream can be reduced to 40 months. Steel, primary metals, cement, petrochemicals and paper industries and now, the data centres, have shown interest.

Three-front nuclear strategy

To achieve the 100 GW target requires careful planning across three fronts. The EdF and Westinghouse designs are comparatively new and will need to be indigenised to bring down costs. China has demonstrated this by building a supporting industry base, and plans to build 33 reactors of 1000 MW each at below $2 million per MW over 10 years. Second, DAE should identify institutions to accelerate R&D for the indigenous SMRs, especially of the Molten Salt Reactor design. Another research area is use of Thorium cladding with HALEU (High Assay Low Enriched Uranium) that can provide an alternative to the Breeder Reactor route in order to permit early exploitation of India’s thorium reserves. Third, the indigenised 220 MW PHWR model is ready to be modularised as an economically viable replacement for a number of captive power plants and some Indian private sector companies (L&T, TCE, Kirloskar etc.) have the requisite design, fabrication, and construction experience.  Since nuclear power generation requires high upfront capital costs but low operating costs over a long (60 years) operating life, an appropriate financing model will need to be worked out. Existing exclusion zone regulations, intended for multiple reactors at one site will need to be modified for captive single unit reactors.

Conceptually, the SHANTI Act attempts a division between the strategic and defence related nuclear activities and the civilian power generation; now the Rules and Regulations to be issued must make this clear. Issues of nuclear power tariffs, ownership of nuclear fuel, waste management, insurance and liability, dispute settlement mechanism, and an autonomous regulator will need to be dealt with in a transparent manner. Only then will the SHANTI Act deliver on its promise.

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