A soldier, diplomat, politician, mentor

Published in The Hindu on 29th of September, 2020

I first met Jaswant Singh in the days following India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. As the MEA official dealing with nuclear issues, I was to draft PM Vajpayee’s address to parliament due to open on 27 May while handling the flood of communications with our Embassies and outreach with Delhi-based Embassies and media.

Every few days, Vajpayee would convene a meeting to take stock of the international fallout and Jaswant Singh, then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, was a permanent invitee. As the draft speech and the nuclear policy paper went back and forth, Vajpayee’s trust and regard for him soon became evident. Jaswant Singh had spent under a decade in the army but clearly had studied and thought deeply about India’s security dilemmas and challenges. He also had a vision of 21 st -century India that Vajpayee shared. Hardly surprising, then, that the following month, he was entrusted with the responsibility of opening dialogue with the USA, a daunting task because the Clinton administration had come down heavily on India, taking the lead in the UN Security Council in drafting a highly critical resolution and imposing sanctions.

Bill Clinton had originally planned a visit to India in early 1998, postponed to late 1998 because of the elections that brought the Vajpayee government to power. The nuclear tests left the US administration stunned and embarrassed. Jaswant Singh was visiting New York for a UN meeting in early June; a message was conveyed to the White House that he would be available to come to
Washington for talks. While he was not Foreign Minister, he held cabinet rank as Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was travelling, so it was appropriate that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (who would be acting Secretary) could engage the visitor.

And thus began the dialogue between India and the USA, an engagement that is best described as the most intense, the most inconclusive and yet, the most productive. After 16 meetings between June ’98 and September 2000 in seven cities, the tide turned with the highly successful Clinton visit in March 2000 and Vajpayee’s return visit in September when Clinton hosted his largest state dinner at the White House. From “estranged democracies”, India and the US became “natural partners for the 21st century”. I was privileged to be a part of the team and consider it a masterclass in diplomatic negotiations.

The US position was guided by progress on five benchmarks for India that were also part of the UN Security Council resolution – sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that had been concluded in 1996; join the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations being pushed in Geneva; accept a freeze on developing nuclear arsenal; tighten export controls on sensitive materials and technologies; and engage in dialogue to reduce tensions with Pakistan.

Jaswant Singh took Vajpayee’s speech and the nuclear policy paper tabled in parliament as his reference frame. He elaborated on India’s security concerns, elements of credible minimum deterrence as evidence of India’s restraint, adoption of a no-first-use use policy to ensure stability, voluntary declaration of a moratorium on further nuclear testing and India’s continuing commitment to responsible non-proliferation despite not being party to the NPT.

While both agreed that neither was looking for short cuts, Strobe emphasised compliance with the benchmarks while Jaswant focussed on securing better appreciation of India’s security compulsions that would compel any democratic government to do what India had.

Ramrod straight, beetle-browed, wearing his trademark army-style khaki bush shirt, Jaswant Singh’s most distinctive feature was his resonant baritone that he used equally skilfully, to make a short, decisive point and close a discussion or to spin long, complex sentences to stymie an inquisitive journalist or leave his interlocutor pondering.

Another hallmark was his recourse to homespun aphorisms. In the early days of his dialogue with Strobe, Jaswant cited an old saying, “There is merit in asking for directions only if we know the village we are going to”. As Strobe later acknowledged, “Jaswant’s strategy was more directional than destinational” and laid the grounds for the lifting of sanctions, introducing the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership leading to the 2008 civilian nuclear deal.

On another occasion in Manila in July 1998, we had our first meeting since the tests with the Chinese on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The meeting began frostily, with Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan blaming India for itsprovocative actions. He added, “There is an old Chinese saying – he who ties a knot must untie the knot”. Jaswant arched his eyebrows and said, “In my
village in Rajasthan, we too have a saying – it takes two hands to untie a knot”.

The meeting with Tang, scheduled to last for 20 minutes lasted an hour. Before the end of the year, I was in Beijing to lay the ground for a new security dialogue between the two countries.

Rest in peace, valiant soldier, for you did your country proud.

Iran Ties Need Quiet Diplomacy

Published in The Hindu on 18th July, 2020

Recent reports that Iran’s Transportation Minister Mohammed Eslami had launched the track laying programme for the 600 km long rail link between Chabahar and Zahidan last week sparked concerns that India was being excluded from the project. Iran has since clarified that it is not the case and India could join the project at a later stage. This keeps the door open for IRCON
which has been associated with the project even as India continues with the development of Chabahar port.

Connectivity for Afghanistan
Providing connectivity for Afghanistan through Iran in order to lessen its dependence on Karachi port has enjoyed support in Delhi, Kabul and Tehran since 2003. Chabahar port on Iran’s Makran coast, just 1000 kms from Kandla, is well situated but road and rail links from Chabahar to Zahidan and then 200 kms further on to Zaranj in Afghanistan, need to be built. With Iran under sanctions during the Ahmedinejad years (2005-13), there was little progress. IRCON had prepared engineering studies estimating that the 800 km long railway project would need an outlay of $1.5 billion. Meanwhile, India concentrated on the 220 km road to connect Zaranj to Delaram on the Herat highway. This was completed in 2008 at a cost of $150 million.

Things moved forward after 2015 when sanctions on Iran eased with the signing of the JCPOA. An MOU was signed with Iran during Prime Minister Modis’s visit to Tehran in 2016 to equip and operate two terminals at the Shahid Beheshti port as part of Phase I of the project. Another milestone was the signing of the Trilateral Transit and Transport Corridor treaty between Afghanistan, Iran and India. In addition to $85 million of capital investment, India also committed to provide a line of credit of $150 million for port container tracks. Phase I was declared operational in 2018 and India’s wheat shipments to Afghanistan have been using this route. An SEZ at Chabahar was planned but re-imposition of US sanctions has slowed investments into the SEZ.

India was given a waiver from US sanctions to continue cooperation on Chabahar as it contributed to Afghanistan’s development. Despite the waiver, the project has suffered delays because of the time taken by US treasury to actually clear the import of heavy equipment like rail mounted gantry cranes, mobile harbour cranes etc. With regard to the rail-track project, a financing MOU was signed under which India undertook to provide $500 million worth of rolling stock and signalling equipment including $150 million of steel rail tracks. In fact, the railway tracks currently being laid are those supplied by IRCON. Iranian responsibility was for local works of land levelling and procurement. The MOU between IRCON and Construction and Development of Transport Infrastructure Co expired last year. Further, the Iranian company undertaking some of the works, Khatab al Anbiya was listed by the US as Special Designated Entity leading IRCON to suggest to the Iranians to appoint another contractor.

Meanwhile, Iran has ambitious plans to extend the railway line from Zahidan to Mashad (about 1000 kms) and then another 150 kms onwards to Sarakhs on the border with Turkmenistan. Another plan is to link it with the INSTC towards Bandar Anzali on the Caspian Sea. In 2011, a consortium of seven Indian companies led by SAIL had also successfully bid for mining rights at Hajigak mines in Afghanistan that contain large reserves of iron ore. However, developments at Hajigak remain stalled because of the precarious security situation in Afghanistan continues.

Why Iran Needs China
In 2016 January, just as sanctions were eased, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tehran and proposed a long term comprehensive, strategic partnership programme that would involve Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure and assured supplies of Iranian oil and gas at concessional rates. Reluctant to be tied in too close a Chinese embrace, Iran kept the negotiations going for years. China patiently permitted a limited barter trade; SINOPEC prolonged its negotiations on developing the Yadavaran oilfield while CNPC pulled out of the South Pars gas project last year, after initially promising to take over the French company Total’s stake.

Meanwhile tensions in the region have been growing since last year with missile strikes in Saudi Arabia claimed by the Houthis and a US drone strike in January killing IRGC chief Gen Qassim Soleimani. During the last four weeks, there have been more than half a dozen mysterious explosions including at the ballistic missile liquid fuel production facility at Khojir, advanced centrifuge assembly shed in Natanz and the shipyard at Bushehr. Reports attribute these to US and Israeli agencies in an attempt to provoke Iran before the US elections.

In May, US announced that it wanted UN Security Council to continue the ban on Iranian acquisition of conventional weapons. UNSC Resolution 2231 was adopted in July 2015 by consensus to endorse the JCPOA and contains a 5-year restriction on Iran’s importing conventional weapons that ends on 18 October. Even though US unilaterally quit the JCPOA, it is threatening to invoke the automatic snapback of sanctions provisions of JCPOA. UK and France have criticised US duplicity but are unlikely to exercise a veto. At the same time, Iran hopes that November may bring about a change in the White House that opens options for dialogue.

Iran’s Balancing Act
Just as it has been a tricky exercise for India to navigate between US and Iran to keep the Chabahar project going, the Rouhani administration has found it difficult balancing act to manage the hardliners at home while coping with Trump administration’s policy of ‘maximum pressure’.

Russia and China are the only countries to veto US moves in the UN Security Council. Even so, the Iran- China comprehensive, strategic partnership roadmap has run into opposition in the Majlis. After the recent elections, the Reformists are down from 120 seats to 20 while the Principlists (Conservatives) are up from 86 to 221 seats in a house of 290 members. A former IRGC Air Force commander Mohammed Ghalibaf, former Mayor of Tehran who ran unsuccessfully for President against Rouhani in 2013 and 2017 has been elected the new Speaker. Hard liners have accused Foreign Minister Zarif of undue secrecy surrounding the agreement amid rumours that China may be taking over Kish island and that Chinese troops would be stationed in Iran to secure Chinese companies and investments.

Iran may well be considering a long-term partnership with China but Iranian negotiators are wary of growing Chinese mercantilist tendencies. It is true that China has greater capacity to resist US sanctions compared to India but Iran realises the advantage of working with its only partner that enjoys a sanctions waiver from US for Chabahar since it provides connectivity for land-locked Afghanistan. Iran and India also share an antipathy to a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. This is why Iran would like to keep the door open. Nevertheless, India needs to improve its implementation record of infrastructure projects that it has taken up in its neighbourhood. There are numerous tales of Indian cooperation projects in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar etc suffering delays and cost over-runs that only make it easier for China to expand its footprint in our neighbourhood. The key is to continue to remain politically engaged with Iran so that there is a better appreciation of each other’s sensitivities and compulsions.

US To Withdraw From Open Skies Treaty

Publication for Observer Research Foundation

On 21 May, US President Donald Trump announced that US was serving notice of its intent to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). Concluded in 1992, the OST entered into force in 2002 and currently has 35 members (1) (Kyrgyzstan is a signatory but hasn’t yet ratified). Canada and Hungary are the depositary states. The reason provided is continuing Russian non-compliance with the OST which has led US to conclude that it is no longer in US interest to remain a party. Trump added that the US decision will take effect after six months (as provided in the treaty text) but US can reconsider if Russia returns to full compliance.

Unravelling Arms Control
The US decision had been anticipated and is in keeping with recent US decisions to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA, signed between US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and EU and Iran) on 8 May 2018, followed by the withdrawal from the US-Russia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) on 2 August 2019.

Two more nuclear related treaties are at risk. The New START treaty between Russia and the US imposes a ceiling on operational strategic nuclear weapons of 700 launchers and 1550 warheads each, was concluded in 2010 and is due to lapse in February 2021 unless extended for a period of five years. President Trump has indicated that he is not in favour of the extension.

The second is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which was concluded in 1996 but has not entered into force. It prohibits countries from carrying out nuclear test explosions but earlier this year US voiced suspicions that both Russia and China were carrying out low yield nuclear tests in violation of the understanding on zero-yield threshold. US has signed but not ratified the CTBT and there are indications that it may be planning to test.

Negotiating the OST
The concept underlying the OST is aerial reconnaissance flights by unarmed aircraft over each other’s territories as a means of promoting confidence, trust and stability between potential adversaries. It was first proposed by US President Dwight Eisenhower in mid-1955 in Geneva to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin but found no traction. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea was revived in December 1989 by US President George Bush and accepted by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations commenced between NATO and Warsaw Pact members supported by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, which continues to host the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna) and were concluded on 24 March 1992. It entered into force on 1 January 2002. Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in mid-1991, months before the break-up of the Soviet Union and 27 out of 29 NATO members are party to the OST.

The OST establishes a regime for conduct of short notice flights by unarmed aircraft over territories of States Parties in accordance with established “quotas” spelt out in the treaty taking into account the size of the country. For example, US has a quota of 42 flights, the same as Russia (it is a joint quota with Belarus) while Portugal has a quota of 2 flights. The quota defines both the number of flights that a country can mount as also the number of flights it can host. The latter is called a “passive quota” and the former, “active quota”. States Parties can form groups to redistribute their active quotas as long as the absolute ceilings are observed. Since 2002, nearly 1500 flights have been undertaken by member states. In recent years, US has mounted an average of 14-16 flights a year while Russia has mounted between 4 and 9 flights annually.

Time frames are stipulated for providing notice to the observed state with flight plans and possible refuelling stops which are needed, particularly across the large territories of US, Canada and Russia. The observed state can propose changes and there are rules regarding deviations. The kind of aircraft to be used by each state are already agreed upon as also the sensors to be mounted on the aircraft. Four kinds of sensors are authorised – optical panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras with real time display, infra-red line-scanning devices and sideways looking synthetic aperture radar. A copy of the data collected is provided to the observed state and other countries can also obtain access to the data. Periodic review conferences have been held where technical issues regarding developments in sensor technology are discussed to redefine approved lists.

Why US is leaving

While Russia and other countries have upgraded both the aircraft and the sensors, US surveillance aircraft modernisation has been held up for lack of funds. Part of the reason is that US is able to obtain equally good or better data from its satellites. No other country can match US’ satellite monitoring capabilities. Sharing of satellite imagery is restricted and accordingly managed bilaterally by US. For the US, the OST is not particularly useful as an intelligence gathering tool but the reality is that it was always intended as a confidence building and transparency measure. As tensions between US and Russia have grown, US has become more interested in restricting transparency over its territory.

Since 2015, US has voiced concerns about instances of Russian non- compliance in terms of either delaying clearances or imposing onerous restrictions. The recent report on compliance issued by the US State department cited instances of Russian non-compliance in 2019 by imposing a limit of 500 kms over Kaliningrad and creating highly restrictive flight corridors in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US has also cited undue restrictions on flights over eastern Ukraine Crimea. The stage was therefore set for the US withdrawal.

The US has been increasingly concerned that Russia is using its overflights over US critical infrastructure to develop actionable intelligence and possibly mapping it for possible future offensive cyber operations. In 2017, an overflight request over the Trump golf estate in Bedford (New Jersey) raised concerns in the White House. This led the US to conclude that Russia was converting the transparency measure into an intimidation measure by weaponizing it. Reacting with a tit for tat approach was not in US interest.

US allies have expressed regret over the US decision. Russia has bluntly rejected US allegations of non-compliance, calling it a pretext for US moves to turn its back on multilaterally negotiated arms control treaties, citing the JCPOA and INF Treaty as examples. However, it has refrained from any indications regarding its response. Clearly, the OST is of limited utility for Russia if US territory is excluded and limited only to Europe and Canada. The OST may limp along for a while even after the US withdrawal takes effect after six months but the countdown for it has begun.

NOTES

(1) Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

At The Edge Of A New Nuclear Arms Race

Published in The Hindu on 27th April, 2020

Last week, a report issued by the US State Department on “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments” raised concerns that China might be conducting nuclear tests with low yields at its Lop Nor test site, in violation of its Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) undertakings.

The US report also claims that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that produced a nuclear yield and were inconsistent with ‘zero yield’ understanding underlying the CTBT though it was uncertain about how many such experiments had been conducted.

Russia and China have rejected US claims but with growing rivalry among major powers, the report is a likely harbinger of new nuclear arms race which would also mark the demise of the CTBT that came into being in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter century.

What does the CTBT ban
For decades, a ban on nuclear testing was seen as the necessary first step towards curbing the nuclear arms race but Cold War politics made it impossible. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 banning underwater and atmospheric tests but this only drove testing underground. By the time the CTBT negotiations began in Geneva in 1994, global politics had changed. The Cold War was over and the nuclear arms race was over. USSR had broken up and its principal testing site, Semipalatinsk, was in Kazakhstan (Russia still had access to Novaya Zemlya near the Arctic circle). In 1991, Russia declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, followed by the US in 1992. By this time, US had conducted 1054 tests and Russia, 715.

Negotiations were often contentious. France and China continued testing claiming that they had conducted far fewer tests and needed to validate new designs since the CTBT did not imply an end to nuclear deterrence. France and US even toyed with the idea of a CTBT that would permit testing at a low threshold, below 500 tonnes of TNT equivalent. This was one-thirtieth of the 15000 tonne Little Boy, the bomb US dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Civil society and the non-nuclear weapon states reacted negatively to such an idea and it was dropped. Some countries proposed that the best way to verify a comprehensive test ban would be to permanently shut down all test sites, an idea that was unwelcome to the nuclear weapon states.

Eventually, US came up with the idea of defining the “comprehensive test ban” as a “zero yield” test ban that would prohibit supercritical hydro-nuclear tests but not sub-critical hydrodynamic nuclear tests. Once UK and France came on board, US was able to prevail upon Russia and China to accept this understanding. After all, this was the moment of US’ unipolar supremacy. At home, the Clinton administration satisfied the hawks by announcing a Science Based Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Programme, a generously funded project to keep the nuclear labs in business and the Pentagon happy. Accordingly, the CTBT prohibits all parties from carrying out “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”; these terms are neither defined nor elaborated.

Why the CTBT lacks authority
Another controversy arose regarding the entry-into-force provisions (Article 14) of the treaty. After India’s proposals for anchoring the CTBT in a disarmament framework did not find acceptance, in June 1996, India announced its decision to withdraw from the negotiations. Unhappy at this turn, UK, China and Pakistan took the lead in revising the entry-into-force provisions. The new provisions listed 44 countries by name whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to enter into force and included India. India protested that this attempt at arm twisting violated a country’s sovereign right to decide if it wanted to join a treaty but was ignored. The CTBT was adopted by a majority vote and opened for signature.

Of the 44 listed countries, to date only 36 have ratified the treaty. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and USA have signed but not ratified. China maintains that it will only ratify it after US does so but the Republican dominated Senate had rejected it in 1999. In addition, North Korea, India and Pakistan are the three who have not signed. All three have also undertaken tests after 1996; India and Pakistan in May 1998 and North Korea six times between 2006 and 2017. The CTBT has therefore not entered into force and lacks legal authority.

Nevertheless, an international organisation to verify the CTBT was established in Vienna with a staff of about 230 persons and an annual budget of $ 130 million. Ironically, US is the largest contributor with a share of $17 million. The CTBTO runs an elaborate verification system built around a network of over 325 seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic (underwater) monitoring stations. The CTBTO has refrained from backing the US allegations.

A new nuclear arms race
The key change from the 1990s is that US’ unipolar moment is over and strategic competition among major powers is back. US now identifies Russia and China as ‘rivals’. Its Nuclear Posture Review asserts that US faces new nuclear threats because both Russia and China are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. US therefore has to expand the role of its nuclear weapons and have a more usable and diversified nuclear arsenal. The Trump administration has embarked on a 30-year modernisation plan with a price tag of $1.2 trillion, which could go up over the years. Readiness levels at Nevada test site that has been silent since 1992 are being enhanced to permit resumption of testing at six months notice.

Russia and China have been concerned about US’ growing technological lead particularly in missile defence and conventional global precision strike capabilities. Russia has responded by exploring hypersonic delivery systems and theatre systems while China has embarked on a modernisation programme to enhance the survivability of its arsenal which is considerably smaller. In addition, both countries are also investing heavily in offensive cyber capabilities.

The new US report stops short of accusing China for a violation but refers to “a high level of activity at the Lop Nor test site throughout 2019” and concludes that together with its lack of transparency, China provokes concerns about its intent to observe the zero-yield moratorium on testing.

US claims that Russian experiments have generated nuclear yield but is unable to indicate how many such experiments were conducted in 2019. It suggests that Russia could be testing in a manner that releases nuclear energy from an explosive canister, generating suspicions about its compliance.

The New START agreement limits US and Russian arsenals but will expire in 2021 and President Trump has already indicated that he does not plan to extend it. Instead, the Trump administration would like to bring China into some kind of nuclear arms control talks, something China has avoided by pointing to the fact that US and Russia still account for over 90 percent of global nuclear arsenals.

Both China and Russia have dismissed US allegations pointing to Trump administration’s backtracking from other negotiated agreements like the Iran nuclear deal or the US-Russia INF Treaty. Tensions with China are already high with trade and technology disputes, militarisation in the South China Sea and most recently, with the Coronavirus pandemic. US could also be preparing the ground for resuming testing at Nevada.

The Cold War rivalry was already visible when the nuclear arms race began in the 1950s. New rivalries have already emerged. Resumption of nuclear testing may signal the demise of the ill-fated CTBT, marking the beginnings of a new nuclear arms race.