Tag Archives: NUCLEAR

Remaking the Nuclear Order in West Asia

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Published in The Hindu on July 8, 2025

While both the U.S. and Israel agree that Iran cannot be allowed to have a bomb, Mr. Netanyahu goes one step forward to deny Iran any nuclear capabilities. However, for Iran, nuclear deterrent assumes a greater importance now, even if there is a change of regime

There is hardly any political leader who understands the laws of political survival better than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Realising that he is in a morass with respect to Gaza where Hamas has not yet been dismantled even though its leaders have been killed, and all hostages have not been brought home resulting in growing domestic pressure, Mr. Netanyahu employed an old tactic – to distract attention from a crisis you cannot get out off, create another crisis.

Israel’s surprise strikes on Iran, launched on June 13, created a new and larger crisis. The military action has been spectacularly successful, with the U.S. finally coming on board. For the moment, PM Netanyahu is firmly back in the driver’s seat, but this has also opened a Pandora’s Box of what next.

Israel’s calculations

Mr. Netanyahu wants to keep Israel as the only nuclear power in the region. He is convinced that the Libyan model, where the nuclear programme was completely dismantled, is the only acceptable option, preferably with a change of regime. In 2015, he opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) primarily because it conceded a limited uranium enrichment right to Iran.  

Since mid-April, five rounds of talks took place between U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, with a sixth round due on June 15 in Muscat. After stumbling over the issue of Iran insisting on its right to enrichment as a party of to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), some progress was registered on the idea of a regional nuclear fuel consortium to provide fuel for the reactors in the region. Its location remained under discussion, making Mr. Netanyahu nervous.

On June 11, PM Netanyahu barely survived a motion tabled by the opposition seeking to dissolve parliament, leading to early elections that are currently due in October 2026. PM Netanyahu has been facing domestic opposition since early 2023 due to his attempts at pushing though controversial judicial reforms that were widely seen as curbing judicial independence. The Hamas attack on October 7 had provided a reprieve that has lasted nearly two years. Given Mr. Netanyahu’s multiple domestic legal challenges, a continuing war is his “get-out-of-jail” card.

During the 20-month war, the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah has been decapitated, and a change of regime in Damascus last December doused Iran’s “ring of fire.” On two occasions in 2024, Israel directly engaged Iran and, in the process, knocked out its air defences around Tehran and other critical installations.

Having buried the two-state-solution, and with Iran at its weakest, Mr. Netanyahu must have felt that this was the ideal time to neutralise Iranian nuclear and missile threats. The Iranians are known for their frustratingly convoluted negotiating style and given U.S. President Donald Trump’s impatience, Mr. Netanyahu was able to convince him that a little military pressure would make them more accommodating.

Iran’s miscalculations

As recently as March 26, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard in her annual intelligence threat assessment to Congress stated, “the Intelligence Community continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme that he suspended in 2003”. This gave Iran’s leadership a misplaced confidence that as long as the negotiations continued on the idea of a regional enrichment facility, the U.S. would block any military strike by Israel.

However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report in May criticising “Iran’s general lack of cooperation” and the near doubling of its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium to over 400 kgs since February proved to be more damaging that Iran anticipated. This heightened Iranian concerns about the threat of sanctions-snapback by the UN Security Council, which was waived in 2015 following the adoption of the JCPOA.  

Iran knew that given its ageing air force, it was dependent on its stocks of drones and missiles. Despite the debacles of the Hamas and the Hezbollah leaderships, Iran underestimated the extent of Mossad’s penetration of its systems, evidenced by the targeted assassinations of its key military leaders and nuclear and missile scientists.

The entry of the U.S.

When the U.S. began to withdraw non-essential staff from its embassies in the region in early June, it was anticipating Israel’s likely military action. In the past, U.S. reluctance to get involved had prevented Israel from military strikes but this time, Mr Netanyahu took a gamble and it paid off. Impressed with the success of the Israel’s military actions, Mr. Trump ordered supportive strikes on June 22, with B-2 bombers dropping GBU-57 ‘bunker-busters’ on Fordow and Natanz, and Tomahawk cruise missiles hitting Isfahan. Some advance notice was provided to Iran, possibly via Qatar. Following token retaliation by Iran the following day, Mr. Trump declared an end to the “12-day-war”.

Israel thus claimed victory, Mr. Trump declared the underground sites “obliterated,” the Gulf states heaved a sigh of relief, and for Iran’s Supreme Leader, regime survival was a victory. Iran suffered over 600 casualties, and all its air defences and half its stock of missile launchers, were destroyed. It failed to take down a single Israeli aircraft though it did bring down some drones. Of the 500 missiles that Iran fired, over 30 were able to get through causing 30 casualties.

While Mr Netanyahu’s suggestion that sustained military pressure may bring about a regime change in Tehran has some support from the Iran-hawks in Washington, it is anathema to Mr. Trump’s MAGA support base, wary of entanglements abroad. The U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, were messy and costly, leaving behind a legacy of instability. Iran is three times larger, and Iranians are a people with a deep sense of nationalism based on their civilisational history. The current theocratic regime may be weak and its replacement may be less religious, but no less nationalist, and would therefore push ahead with the nuclear deterrent. Mr. Netanyahu may not be averse to a forced regime change but the U.S. and the Gulf Arabs would not want to open this Pandora’s box.

Iran’s nuclear capability

Iran has had an ambitious civilian nuclear programme going back to the 1950s. It joined the NPT in 1970. Initially, the Islamic regime was uninterested in the nuclear programme, seeing it as a part of Western influence. This changed after the Iran-Iraq war and in the 1990s, it began developing a clandestine enrichment capability.  The 2002 disclosures by a group of Iranian exiles, followed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, led the Supreme Leader to shift direction and aim for threshold status rather than develop a full-fledged nuclear weapon. The centrifuges and higher levels of enrichment also provided for bargaining space as Iran could negotiate for sanctions relief with the U.S.

Today, the situation has changed. Iran’s proxies (except for the Houthis) have been decimated and its missile and drone capabilities found wanting. The threshold state is no longer a safe place. Therefore, a nuclear deterrent assumes greater importance, even if there is a change of regime.

Questions remain about the extent of damage to the underground centrifuge sites as well as the fate of the 400 kg of the 60% enriched uranium stockpile. While the scale of the attacks makes resumption of Iran-U.S. talks tricky, Iran has raised the stakes by terminating IAEA inspector’s access to its nuclear sites.  Mr. Trump would like to conclude a deal with Iran to build on his success with the ceasefire. He would do well to remember the U.S. scholar Thomas Schelling’s advice that successful coercion requires both a credible threat as well as credible reassurance, if Iran is to be ‘persuaded’ during any future talks.

There has always been a difference between the U.S. and Israeli positions – both agree that Iran cannot be allowed to have a bomb, but Mr Netanyahu goes one step further to deny Iran any nuclear capabilities. However, since Mr. Trump has obliged him with the June 22 strikes, he may find it difficult to deny Mr. Trump his Iran deal provided the Iranians play the game.

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Iran is learning the hard way that being a nuclear threshold state isn’t safe anymore

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Published in The Print on June 24, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is delighted that his gamble has paid off. After decimating Iran’s proxies – Hamas and Hezbollah, and substantially weakening Iranian air defences through air strikes last year, Netanyahu was convinced that this was the most opportune moment to target Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. The challenge was to get US President Donald Trump to join him in the exercise.

And Trump did. In the early hours of June 22, the US targeted three nuclear locations in Iran: Fordaw, Natanz (another enrichment site), and Isfahan (a uranium conversion site). After declaring that the nuclear sites were “totally and completely obliterated,” Trump added, “NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE.”

Hours later, Iran responded with a missile strike on US forces at the Al Udeid air base in Qatar, causing no damage or casualties. The move appears to have been a choreographed exercise, reminiscent of Iran’s retaliation in January 2020after Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani was killed in Iraq. Meanwhile Trump has declared that “a full and complete ceasefire” will be in effect shortly, though neither Iran nor Israel has confirmed it yet.

Iran’s nuclear programme – a long journey

Iran’s nuclear journey has been long and tortuous. It began under the Shah’s regime in the 1950s with a civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed with the U.S. and the first research reactor went critical in 1967. Since then, the nuclear programme has been seen as a symbol of scientific progress and a source of nationalist pride.

Iran became an original state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 when it entered into force, placing all its activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Shah embarked on an ambitious civil nuclear power generation programme signing cooperation agreements with Germany and France. Siemens began work on the Bushehr power reactors (2x1200MW) in 1975 but later withdrew. The plants finally went online in 2011 with Russian assistance.

After the Islamic Revolution, nuclear activity came to a standstill as the clerical regime saw it as a source of Western influence. However, sometime in the 1990s, opinions changed and gradually, nuclear research activities were gradually revived. By then, nuclear controls had tightened, curbing exports of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, though these remained permitted under the NPT. Iran revived its civilian nuclear power projects and, also began establishing a clandestine enrichment facility. It received assistance from the A. Q. Khan network as also from China to develop capabilities across the entire nuclear fuel cycle. In parallel, Iran began developing missiles.

In 2002, the nuclear activity was exposed by a group of Iranian exiles. It became clear that the regular IAEA inspections had failed to detect the clandestine programme. Negotiations began in 2003, initially with the three European powers and later including the U.S. These collapsed when President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad took over and starting in 2006, Iran was subjected to successive UN Security Council sanctions. By this time Iran had established its first enrichment facility at Natanz.

Around that time, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, describing them as un-Islamic. The general assessment is that while the fatwa was respected, Iran pursued the technical capabilities to become a nuclear threshold state. As recently as March 26, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence stated in an official briefing to the Congress: “The Intelligence Community continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme that he suspended in 2003”. This assessment has also been made by Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA.

Can Iran remain a nuclear threshold state?

In 2009, a hitherto secret underground enrichment facility at Fordaw was exposed. Israel and the U.S. cooperated in the 2008 Stuxnet covert operation, which destroyed a large number of centrifuges before the Iranians discovered the computer malware in 2010. Thereafter, Iran expanded its uranium enrichment programme, leading eventually to talks that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.

Under the JCPOA, Iran accepted rigorous IAEA inspections and permanent camera monitoring. However, beginning 2019 – one year after the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA – Iran began scaling back its adherence to the additional inspection measures, observing only the basic safeguards mandated by the NPT. On May31, an IAEA report revealed that Iran had rapidly increased its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium to 408 kg, enough to be enriched further relatively quickly to weapons-grade (90%) levels, and sufficient for approx. 8-10 bombs. On June 12, the IAEA declared – for the first time in over 20 years – that Iran was non-compliant with its nuclear obligations under the NPT. Israel, which is not a party to the NPT, struck on June 13, and the U.S. followed on June 22.

All major nuclear sites – including the research reactor in Tehran, enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordaw, the heavy water reactor at Arak, the fuel fabrication and research reactor at Isfahan, and the suspected military site at Parchin – have been repeatedly targeted. There are questions about the extent of damage to the centrifuges, particularly at the underground sites at Fordaw and Mt Kolang Gaz La near Natanz. The whereabouts of the 408 kg of 60% enriched uranium also remain a matter of speculation. IAEA monitoring has not detected any enhanced radioactivity around the sites. Further details will only emerge after the IAEA resumes inspections, contingent on renewed talks between Iran and the U.S. and the prospect of a new deal.

Meanwhile, Iran’s leaders are likely to conclude that remaining a nuclear threshold state is a dangerous position to be in, especially when the adversary is a nuclear-armed state. The Ukraine war and the use of nuclear sabre rattling further underscores this lesson. Other countries in Asia are also likely to draw their own conclusions, revealing the growing fragility of the global nuclear regime.

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Fordaw-ard Thinking

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Published in Times of India on June 23, 2025

When Israel launched surprise strikes on Iran on June 13, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knew he was taking a calculated gamble. But the stakes were high. If he succeeded in taking out the nuclear and missile threats that he called “existential,” his political future would be secure but to achieve that, he had to bring the U.S. into the war. Only the U.S. had the bunker buster bombs (GBU-57) and the B-2 heavy bombers, necessary to take out Fordaw, the underground enrichment facility near Qom.

After urging Iran to come back to the negotiating table, on June 19, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he was “giving Iran a period of time-two weeks would be the maximum”. Simultaneously, he had also asked for military options to be prepared. Two US aircraft carrier task forces, USS Nimitz and USS Gerald Ford were deployed to the region, adding another 150 fighter aircraft, to bolster the USS Carl Vinson; B-2 bombers were flying into Diego Garcia.

Mr. Trump knew that his MAGA support base was opposed to the U.S. getting involved in a war in the Middle East. He too was eager to do a deal with Iran but had bought into Mr. Netanyahu’s line that some amount of military pressure would help in persuading Iran to be more reasonable.

Israel’s calculus works

Finally, Mr. Netanyahu’s gamble paid off. In the early hours of June 22, three B-2 bombers successfully dropped two GBU-57 bombs each at Fordaw and U.S. submarines fired at least 30 Tomahawk missiles at the nuclear facilities at Natanz and Isfahan. Announcing the destruction of the nuclear sites, Mr Trump added with a characteristic flourish, “NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE.” A one-off strike by the U.S. that leads to negotiations with a chastened Iran may yet be the best outcome for Mr. Trump.

Iran retaliated by targeting Tel Aviv and Haifa with two waves of rocket strikes. However, the question is whether Iran will now accept Mr. Trump’s invitation to resume talks or escalate by hitting U.S. assets and bases in the region?   

Iran’s leadership can be pragmatic. It is one thing to continue the missile and drone exchanges with Israel for another week but a pragmatic Iranian leadership would not want to take on the U.S. directly. It may prefer to save the Islamic regime by accepting talks with the U.S. and getting the Israelis off their backs.

There are indications that the U.S. had informed Iran in advance about the impending strikes so that casualties could be minimised. Unlike Israel that would like to see the end of the theocratic regime even if there is no plan for a day after and it leads to wider regional instability, the U.S. will be cautious as will its allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, and all three carry influence in the Trump White House. 

Iran’s nuclear journey

The Islamic revolution in Iran was a year old when Iraq attacked in 1980. The war lasted eight years causing heavy losses, over half a million dead. Eventually, to save the regime, Ayatollah Khomenei accepted a UN brokered ceasefire in 1988. Iraq’s blatant use of chemical weapons was largely ignored by the Western countries and the Soviet Union was preoccupied in trying to manage an exit from the quagmire of Afghanistan. It is during this period that Iranian leaders began to consider the need for a nuclear deterrent, though as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it had forsworn the development of nuclear weapons and had accepted full-scope-safeguards by the IAEA.

It had followed India and Pakistan’s different nuclear paths but neither of the two had joined the NPT. Another example was North Korea; it joined the NPT in 1985 and announced its intention of quitting in 1993 leading to a flurry of negotiations. In 1994, it put its withdrawal notice on hold as it concluded a Framework Agreement with the Clinton administration taking the lead. However, after President George Bush included it in his “axis of evil” speech, it withdrew from the NPT in 2002 and carried out its first test in 2006. Iran’s conclusion was to remain within the NPT and develop capabilities that would lead it to becoming a threshold state, without crossing the red line.

With the losses it has incurred, both material and human, Iran will have to review its strategy but it will need breathing room for it, only possible by concluding a deal with Mr. Trump. President Pezeshkian is considered a ‘moderate’ but enjoys the support of the Supreme Leader and Foreign Minister Hassan Aragchi is a consummate nuclear negotiator who was also involved with the JCPOA negotiations. As a negotiating tactic, the Iranian Majlis could pass a resolution recommending withdrawal from the NPT. As a civilisational state, Iran understands the virtues of patience, rooted in the confidence of its longevity.

A weakening nuclear regime

For other countries pondering over their nuclear security, the writing on the wall is clear. Deterring a nuclear adversary is not going to be possible with threshold status; it needs a nuclear deterrent. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s when India claimed to safeguard it ’nuclear option’, today, threshold status is a dangerous place to be in. Countries that enjoy the U.S.’ extended nuclear umbrella will also undertake a rethink. Meanwhile, China will be pleased at the prospects of U.S. getting involved in the Middle East, whether in negotiations or in bombings.

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Op Sindoor: Conventional Operations Under the Nuclear Shadow

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For CSDR dt May 28, 20225

Since 1998, when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states after undertaking a series of tests, the India-Pakistan crises have followed a predictable pattern. The first escalatory step is invariably a terrorist attack by one of the numerous terrorist groups based in Pakistan; India’s outrage and political, diplomatic, economic and, (since 2016) measured kinetic retaliation against specific terrorist targets, signalling a possible closure to hostilities; Pakistan’s military retaliation that sets into motion a cycle of escalation, often accompanied by nuclear sabre rattling designed to energise the international community, leading finally to a de-escalation with both countries getting a face saving exit.

The terrorist attacks permit Pakistan a degree of deniability unless a perpetrator has been captured (as happened in the Mumbai 2008 attack) though the deniability claims carry little conviction, given Pakistan’s well documented long-standing policy of nurturing such jihadi outfits. India has been a slow learner in developing and acquiring the intelligence and kinetic means to be able to track and engage in precision targeting of terrorist groups inside Pakistan. Though subjected to major terrorist attacks, especially since the 1990s, the recourse to kinetic retaliation only began in 2016. After Pahalgam, Prime Minister has described it as an expansive “new normal.”

Developing kinetic retaliation capability

In 2001, following the attack on Indian parliament by five JeM terrorists, India mobilised its ground forces with the strike formations. The process lasted weeks, giving Pakistan adequate time to prepare its counter-mobilisation. Since the U.S. needed Pakistan’s military cooperation for its Op Enduring Freedom launched against the Taliban in October 2001, and the Pakistani military claimed that it was stretched on the India front, Pakistan was prevailed upon to provide assurances of “not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.” The exercise in coercive diplomacy helped provide a reprieve for seven years.

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks are often called India’s 9/11 moment. A group of 10 LeT militants targeted 12 locations in Mumbai. The carnage lasted four days and claimed 175 lives, including nine militants. Among the dead were 29 foreign nationals from 16 countries, including six from the U.S. The captured militant provided the details of Pakistan’s involvement. While this enabled international condemnation and diplomatic measures to penalise Pakistan, the absence of any kinetic retaliation drew unfavourable comparisons in certain domestic sections with the U.S and Israel. In Pakistan, it led to a growing conviction that its tactical nuclear weapons served as an effective deterrent against any conventional military action by India.

Kinetic retaliation, from Uri to Pahalgam

Realising that its military forces were a blunt instrument ill-equipped to undertake short, sharp punitive operations, India began to build up its capabilities slowly. The 2016 attack on a military camp in Uri by four JeM militants killed 19 soldiers and provided an opportunity to employ kinetic retaliation for the first time. A coordinated set of simultaneous cross-border operations were launched by special teams to neutralise more than half a dozen terrorist launch pads. The operation was successfully projected as a shift to a more punitive approach and these “surgical strikes” was the subject of a successful Bollywood film. Pakistan found a face-saver by denying that there had been any intrusions.

In 2019, a suicide attack on a paramilitary convoy, claimed by JeM, claimed forty lives. With general elections less than two months away, the Modi government had little choice. Days later, Indian authorities announced that the IAF had carried out an air strike on a JeM training camp at Balakot, 65 kms from the LoC, in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Once again, it was described as a limited operation against a terrorist location, based on real time intelligence, and therefore pre-emptive and defensive.

Pakistan denied that there was any camp, protested at its air space violation, and the following morning, five Pakistani aircraft entered Indian airspace. Indian fighters scrambled, and in the ensuing dogfight, an Indian pilot ejected, ending up in Pakistani custody. This created a fresh crisis, leading to U.S. involvement to ensure that the pilot was released quickly. The following morning, Pakistan PM Imran Khan announced that Pakistan had demonstrated its capability and resolve by retaliating against India’s intrusion and would return the Indian pilot as a humanitarian gesture, providing a face-saver to both sides.

According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials from both countries had been in touch with the U.S. officials, blaming the other for nuclear escalation and threatening retaliation, thereby leading to U.S. involvement. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also claimed to have intervened and counselled restraint.

The Pahalgam attack on April 22 claimed 26 civilian lives. Though a series of political and economic measures were announced including putting in abeyance the Indus Water Treaty, it was evident that the scope of the kinetic retaliation had to be larger. Eventually, nine terrorist locations, including iconic locations such as the LeT and JeM headquarters in Punjab, were targeted using loitering munitions, stand-off air-to-surface missiles and smart bombs. It was emphasised that India had targeted terrorist locations and the operation was over unless Pakistan escalated matters. The next three nights saw an escalation with strikes and counter-strikes, with both sides using drones and standoff missiles though the aircraft remained in their respective airspaces. Once again, senior U.S. officials began to engage as the crisis sharpened and news about the ceasefire was made public by President Trump shortly before the official announcements on May 10.

Evidently, the Modi government’s policy for dealing with Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks has been evolving, in keeping with improving capabilities. The first Rafale aircraft landed in India in mid-2020, with some of the weapon systems following. The Harop drone fleet was expanded post-2019 and the indigenous Sky Striker drones were ordered in 2021, including with kamikaze versions. Therefore, compared to 2019 Balakot, Indian was better placed to ensure precision targeting and avoid collateral damage, especially in populated areas like Bahawalpur and Muridke.

The lessons from Pahalgam

In his address to the nation on May 12, PM Modi announced that Op Sindoor had redefined the fight against terror and established a “new normal.” This consisted of India’s right to respond militarily since any act of terror was an act of war; India would not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail;” and India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. Two new elements can be discerned in this – while claiming a right to military response is not new as it was exercised in 2016 and 2019 too, calling every terror attack an “act of war” expands the scope of the military action that has so far been limited to terrorist locations. Second, putting together the terrorists and the ISI, puts the military on notice but what form this would take is left uncertain. In 2016, 2019 and 2025, India has consistently emphasised that its kinetic action was “non-escalatory” as it was directed at known terrorist locations and not at a military site.

Even though Op Sindoor’s objectives had not been spelt out, it is clear that on May 7, Indian forces demonstrated their capability in identifying and destroying multiple terrorist camps and related infrastructure, across a distance of 800 kms, in a speedily executed, coordinated operation using precision strike weapons. In subsequent days, the operations grew gradually and by May 10, IAF had shown its ability to penetrate Pakistan’s air defence to inflict damage on nearly all Pakistan’s forward air bases and air defence installations. Yet, this did not emerge as the prevailing narrative.

On May 7, Pakistan claimed that five Indian aircraft had been downed, a claim denied by India. The narrative therefore became one of evaluation of Chinese technologies (J-10 and JF-17 aircraft and PL-15E missiles) versus French (Rafale aircraft) and Russian (SU-30 and Mig-29) aircraft. The Indian statement on May 11, “We are in a combat scenario and losses are part of combat…we achieved all our objectives and all our pilots are back home,” if made earlier, would have prevented the misleading commentary and maintained the primacy of the Indian narrative. The fact that the IAF operated under non-escalatory rules of engagement and did not neutralise Pakistani air defences in advance was a signal to assure Pakistan that our strike was only against terrorist targets. It would also have reinforced the impact of the punitive strikes on May 10, in face of repeated Pakistani escalatory provocations.

It is reasonable to assume that the terrorist infrastructure that has been degraded will be rebuilt, presumably also at more inaccessible or concealed locations. It is highly unlikely that the ISI will dismantle the LeT, JeM or the dozen other outfits that it has nurtured over decades. A recent Gallup Pakistan poll revealed that 96 percent of the Pakistanis believe that Pakistan has emerged victorious from the four-day limited conflict. The elevation of the COAS Gen Asim Munir to Field Marshal has been welcomed by the political parties, including the PTI.

The current ceasefire is fragile and could therefore breakdown along the predictable pattern that led to Pahalgam and earlier attacks. A full-scale war like 1971 is not feasible as it is an unaffordable exercise that yields no practical military objectives. Therefore, a key take away is to define narrower objectives that yield desirable outcomes and build capabilities, both kinetic and non-kinetic, accordingly. A realistic objective will combine three elements – degrade terrorist capabilities as decisively as possible; inflict punitive measures, political, economic, and military; and demonstrate national unity and resolve.

Exploring the ‘new normal’

The conception of a ‘new normal’ poses three key questions –                                                             

  1. Does the expansive ‘new normal’ establish deterrence?                                 
  2. Second, if deterrence fails, and there is a terrorist attack, does the ‘new normal’ lead to more rapid escalation, and does it ensure superior escalation management?                                                    
  3. And finally, does it enable de-escalation without external involvement?

Deterrence normally implies ‘deterrence by denial’ coupled with ‘deterrence by punishment.’ ‘Denial’ implies strengthening intelligence capabilities to track infiltration, movement, and communications of terrorists, to plan and prevent such attacks. It also means better preparation to reduce response times unlike in the Pahalgam instance. If the number of casualties were less than five, if the perpetrators had been killed or captured, the attack, though heinous, would have registered on a lower scale. It would deny the adversary the sense of ‘satisfaction’ at having inflicted significant harm and loss.

In case of failure of deterrence-by-denial, punitive deterrence kicks in. The terrorist needs to be convinced that punishment will be certain and severe enough to make the terrorists refrain from the act, in the first place. India has so far declared that its kinetic retaliation was based on hard intelligence and pre-emptive; pre-emption against a terrorist attack has now gained acceptance as a legitimate act of self-defence. However, a terrorist is not always guided by a rational cost benefit analysis as the scourge of suicide attacks demonstrates. Nevertheless, since the terror attacks are often green lighted by the ISI, the certainty of severe punishment does strengthen deterrence.

In the past, the limited kinetic retaliation in 2016 and 2019 failed to establish deterrence. Therefore, deterrence capabilities for both ‘denial’ and ‘punishment’ will need to be strengthened by continuous investments in new technologies, particularly cyber and space, to monitor and penetrate terrorist groups and prevent attacks as also permit engagement without contact and inflict punishment at a distance, if the ‘new normal’ has to prevent future terrorist attacks.

India needs to plan afresh for managing escalation because if every terror attack is to be considered an act of war, and no distinction is to be made between terrorists and their masterminds and sponsors, the response to any future terrorist attack will be larger in scope, raising the prospects of more rapid escalation.

In the Balakot (2019) crisis, an Indian pilot being taken captive in Pakistani territory after his aircraft was shot down, was an unforeseen escalatory development. India demanded his immediate return to maintain the narrative of its successful strike; Pakistan wanted to capitalise on its air superiority. Neither India nor Pakistan could control the escalation, leading to external involvement.

In 2025, the U.S. initially adopted a relatively detached approach – initially condemning the terrorist attack and urging Pakistan to cooperate with India, and after May 7, urging both sides to work together to de-escalate tensions. By May 9, however, the U.S. position shifted and it adopted a more active role.

During the 88-hour crisis, India managed to retain control of escalation. In the initial round, the IAF refrained from targeting Pakistan air defences, a restraint that may have led to higher operational risks. Pakistan’s retaliation was against military targets and not against civilian targets. Even as artillery shelling intensified across the LoC, there was no large-scale mobilisation of ground forces or strike formations. These were signals that both sides were exploring thresholds but not crossing them.

By May 10, the temptation for India to exploit its advantage, having neutralised Pakistan’s forward based air defences was high and could have led to a notch up the escalation ladder. It would have increased Indian reluctance to let Pakistan get a face-saving exit. Finding an off-ramps or de-escalation between nuclear adversaries requires that both sides find a face saver, though backed by competing narratives. To establish superior escalation management, India has to internalise that at every step on the escalation ladder, it has to signal Pakistan towards a face-saver, as was done successfully in the early stages of the Pahalgam crisis. This requires better narrative management so that policy shapes sentiment rather than the other way around.

Finding an off ramps without external involvement creates a different challenge. There is a tacit acknowledgement that Pakistani establishment has been complicit in sponsoring and aiding terrorist attacks in India for decades and India is justified in kinetic retaliation. At the same time, given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapon-states, nuclear sabre rattling during rising tensions grabs international attention with de-escalation emerging as the priority. Since 1998, Pakistan has successfully exploited this opening as this also serves Pakistan by obfuscating the distinction between the perpetrator and the victim of the terrorist attack.

Successive U.S. presidents have played a role in defusing crises since 1998 – President Clinton during the 1999 Kargil crisis, President Bush following the 2001 parliament attack, Presidents Bush, and Obama in 2008-09 following the Mumbai attack, and President Trump in 2019 Balakot and the 2025 Pahalgam crisis. With the sole exception of President Trump, they were prudent in not offering to mediate between India and Pakistan; the current aberration is more a reflection of the disarray in the US administration and President Trump’s propensity for impulsive pronouncements.

During Pahalgam, no nuclear threats were exchanged between India and Pakistan. The only nuclear signalling, presumably directed to the international community was the announcement by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on May 9 that a meeting of the National Command Authority was to be held the following day though he backtracked later after the phone call with Secretary of State Rubio. This did not prevent President Trump from claiming on May 12, “We stopped a nuclear conflict. I think it could have been a bad nuclear war. Millions of people could have killed” and repeating the claim after couple of days.

The contrast between Indian and Pakistani reactions to President Trump’s claims is revealing. Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif has repeated thanked President Trump for his mediation and urged him continue mediation on other issues while the Indian Foreign Office spokesperson denied on May 13 that there was any US mediation or any nuclear escalation or signalling and the ceasefire was arrived at bilaterally; further, there was no scope for any mediation and no broader talks at a any neutral venue were planned. Therefore, unlike in 2019, there was neither any nuclear brinkmanship nor any strategic mobilisation.

The ’new normal’ is a shifting line and introduces a degree of ambiguity. The attempt is to see if it strengthens deterrence. So far, both sides have shown an interest in de-escalation. However, this requires a face saver for both sides. This means that each side creates its own narrative of “victory” and can sustain it. As the stronger power, India must calibrate how far it should discredit the Pakistan military to disincentivise it from sponsoring terrorist attacks while keeping it invested in de-escalation. This is necessary to ensure that conventional operations remain below the nuclear threshold despite brinkmanship.

Today, there is an absence of established crisis management mechanisms between India and Pakistan. During Pahalgam, the only channel of communication in operation was the DGMOs hotline. Past practice and experience indicate that in the military hierarchies on both side, there remains a degree of faith in an inbuilt culture of restraint. However, it is possible that a terrorist group may deliberately act to heighten confrontation to sabotage de-escalation, severely testing the culture of restraint. At such moments, until India and Pakistan invest in building crisis management mechanisms and additional communication channels, de-escalation will continue to be out-sourced to external parties.

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The New Normal after Pahalgam, India’s Response

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Published in The Hindu on May 17, 2025

Operation Sindoor is on ‘pause’ and though the ceasefire began somewhat shakily on Saturday evening (May 10), it seems to be holding. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) – India and Pakistan – had a follow-up conversation and discussed further de-escalatory measures to reduce troop presence in the forward areas that had seen a buildup in recent weeks.

Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror…setting a new standard and a new normal in counter-terrorism measures.” Kinetic retaliation is not new. The Modi government conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the Uri attack, and an air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019 following the Pulwama suicide attack. Yet, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.  

88 hours to ceasefire

After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear that the Indian government would respond with force. The only question of when and in what manner. The measures announced in the days that followed such as reducing diplomatic presence, switching off trade, closing down the Wagah-Attari border crossing, cancelling existing visas, and putting the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, were a strong response but not a substitute for kinetic retaliation.

The intervening fortnight till May 7 was used in finalising targets for kinetic retaliation and ramping up diplomatic engagement at all levels. Post 2019, Indian authorities were certain that sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would compel a calibrated military response. This demanded planning and periodic updating, based on evolving technical capabilities. Eventually, nine targets were chosen out of nearly two dozen options.  The intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, in Delhi and other key capitals, prepared the ground to ensure an acceptance (though sometimes with caveats) of India’s right to target the terrorists and their infrastructure.  India’s challenge was to restore red lines while managing the escalation narrative and leaving a de-escalation option open.

Shortly after the May 7 early morning strike was concluded, the Pakistan DGMO Maj Gen Kashif Abdullah was informed of the nine locations targeted as these were closely associated with designated terrorist groups, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), JeM, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. India emphasised that Op Sindoor was against the terrorists and not the Pakistani military or the Pakistani people. It added that if the Pakistani forces responded, India would reserve the right to retaliate.

Pakistan acknowledged the strike (at six locations) and claimed that it had downed between five to six Indian aircraft, including some Rafale fighter jets, though this was denied by India. It offered an off-ramps de-escalation option – Pakistan claiming success in terms of taking down Indian aircraft, playing down the impact of Indian strikes, and taking the issue of violation of its territory to the United Nations Security Council where it is currently a non-permanent member.

However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to bolster its faltering image and vowed military retaliation. The following two nights, Pakistan mounted escalating drone intrusions, together with some loitering munitions and missile firings, over 36 locations along the 3,300 kilometre-long border, more with the intent to probe for gaps in India’s air defences. India retaliated, with its declared quid pro quo plus policy, targeting Pakistani air bases and air defence units. However, Pakistan denied its intrusions even as it blamed India for repeated violations and attacks. Its air space remained open for civilian air traffic, prompting an Indian warning on May 9 that this was jeopardising civilian air traffic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting on May 9 to approve the next tranche of the IMF Extended Fund Facility (loan to Pakistan) necessitated prudence.  

The night of 9-10 May witnessed a dramatic escalation. Pakistan claimed to have struck 26 Indian targets “to reestablish deterrence after repeated Indian attacks.” India acknowledged “limited damage to equipment and personnel at air force stations Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur, and Bhuj.” Indian response on the morning of May 10 was ferocious and targeted nine military airfields from Skardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahim Yar Khan and Jacobabad in the south as well as three forward air defence units. The stand-off weapons used included the Scalp and BrahMos missiles as well as Crystal Maze, Hammer and Spice 2000 precision guided munitions.

The previous 24 hours had seen intense diplomatic activity with a flurry of telephone calls between Washington, Islamabad, and Delhi. Following a conversation between the two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into effect at 1700 hours on May 10.

The U.S.’s role

Initially, the U.S. adopted a hands-off approach with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting on May 8 that the U.S. was not going to get involved “in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” However, within 24 hours, the U.S. assessment changed as it picked up signs of more cross-border strikes and reports that Pakistan was scheduling a meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA). While Mr. Vance spoke to PM Modi on the evening of May 9 (Indian time), sharing the U.S.’s concerns about a “dramatic escalation” and again the following day (Indian time), U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, following it up with calls to his counterparts India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif announced on May 10 that no meeting of the NCA had taken place.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s message on May 10 pre-empted the official announcement about the ceasefire raising questions about the U.S.’s role. The fact is that after 1998, the U.S. has played a role in de-escalating multiple crises: Kargil in 1999, the Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram in 2001, Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, the exception being the 2016 surgical strikes that Pakistan denied had happened. Yet, none of these instances have led to U.S. mediation and there is little reason to think otherwise this time. There are only two ways of avoiding external intervention – first, increase the economic and military differential with Pakistan, and second, have independent communication channels between the two countries.   

Conflict under the nuclear shadow

Since 1998 when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states, Pakistan’s approach has been to reduce the space for conventional war, by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use. The objective is to constrain India’s space for a kinetic response to a terrorist attack. However, this is no longer working.  If the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ made kinetic retaliation the new normal, Balakot enlarged it in 2019 by introducing air power, and Operation Sindoor has expanded it to cover all of Pakistan. So far, India has emphasised that it has been retaliating against terrorist targets – launch pads across the LoC in 2016, Balakot training camp in 2019, and the nine locations now (Operation Sindoor). However, Mr. Modi has added a new dimension.

In the expansive ‘new normal’ that he outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to respond militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, but added that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts Pakistani military on notice that the next time, India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist targets. The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go together; terror and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”

By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, Mr. Modi is seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang but this requires a significant expansion in conventional capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defences and adopt a network-centric-approach that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for surveillance, communication and targeting, will need to be introduced. Simultaneously, India needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led to Pahalgam, in order to better plan, predict and prevent future Pahalgams. Only then will the expansive ‘new normal’ be a credible deterrent against future terrorist attacks.

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