As Prospects of Arms Control Wane, The Rise of Nuclear Risks

Posted on March 10, 2022 by rakeshsood13

Published in Hindustan Times on March 9, 2022

New uncertainties surround the outcome of war in Ukraine. Will President Vladimir Putin further tighten military pressure or accept assurances about Ukrainian neutrality? Will he settle for a corridor to the Crimean Peninsula or insist that Kiev falls?

Whichever way the conflict ends, one outcome is clear – nuclear weapons are here to stay and any prospects for nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament have receded further.

In 1991, when the Soviet Union broke up into 15 independent sovereign republics, Russia became the successor state to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A key challenge was that in addition to Russia, three republics hosted Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Ukraine had the largest nuclear infrastructure with missile factories and naval shipyards, with nearly 5000 warheads on its territory.

Semipalatinsk, the nuclear weapon testing site was in Kazakhstan. While the launch codes rested with the Russian leadership, there was significant nuclear expertise available among the local population.

The prospects of three new states claiming ownership of readymade nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of sizeable quantities of fissile material was a nightmare scenario for the both President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in the late 1960s, had originally been given a lifespan of 25 years and in 1995, a decision was due regarding its future.

The rub was that the NPT only recognised countries that had done a nuclear test before January 1, 1967 as nuclear weapon states, a definition that covered five countries – the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, China and Russia as the successor to the USSR) – that conveniently happened to be the permanent members of the UN Security Council, wielding veto power. Neither were these five willing to allow new countries in; nor did Russia and China like the idea of new nuclear neighbours.

A massive political and diplomatic effort was mounted, led by the US, with Russia and the Europeans adding their efforts, to get the three to voluntarily renounce nuclear ambitions, return the weapons to Russia and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) audited the nuclear sites and facilities, closing down some and bringing others under permanent inspections, thereby certifying to their denuclearisation. While Belarus and Kazakhstan fell into line, in Ukraine the issue provoked an internal debate as it also produced the SS-24, a 3- stage solid fuel MIRVed ICBM with 10 warheads and a range of 10000 kms.

The combination of saam, daam, danda, bhed (by whatever means possible) eventually worked. At a conference in Budapest in December 1994, three identical Memorandum on Security Assurances were signed relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the NPT and the three depositary states of the NPT, the US, the UK and Russia, provided security assurances in return. Similar assurances were also provided separately by France and China. These included respecting the independence and sovereignty, refraining from interference or any threat to use force and seeking UN Security Council action in case any of the three countries were subjected to any aggression.

In May 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

In 2014, following the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the question of Russian violation of the Budapest Memorandum came up. Russia claimed that what had taken place in Crimea was a “revolution”; a referendum in Crimea had declared independence and voted to join Russia. Russia was not obliged to force people to stay in Ukraine against their will and further accused the US of interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs by instigating the Euromaidan protests that led to the fall of the government. US legal experts pointed out that since it was a Memorandum and not a treaty, the obligations were declaratory in character.

Hardly surprising then that addressing the Munich Security Conference last month, Zelensky bemoaned the fact that Ukraine had given up its nuclear weapons in returns for security assurances that never materialised and wondered aloud if Ukraine should withdraw from the Budapest Memorandum.

Warning the NATO to stay out of the Ukraine conflict, Putin warned of “never encountered consequences” and days later, on February 27, announced that “the deterrence forces had been put into a special mode of combat service”. His spokesman explained that this was a reaction to deter any possible confrontation between NATO and Russian troops. Putin’s nuclear sabre rattling has been condemned in Europe and US called it “unacceptable escalation”.

Putin is hardly the first to engage in such theatrics. In 2017, US President Donald Trump warned North Korea with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” and North Korea responded by calling Trump “a dotard” threatening to hit Guam “enveloping it in fire”. Later, Trump described Kim Jong-un as “the rocket man on a suicide mission for himself and his regime” while North Korea “vowed to tame the mentally deranged US dotard with Fire”.

Interestingly, on February 27, former Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe voiced the idea of Japan hosting US nuclear weapons, something that has been taboo in view of Japan’s three “Nos”: No development, No possession, and No introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory. The reason was a possible conflict of China over Taiwan. Though PM Fumio Kishida dismissed the idea, China reacted strongly blaming Japanese militarism and slamming such notions.

Growing nuclear rhetoric, together with new nuclear doctrines defining new roles for nuclear weapons are being explored by the major nuclear powers; however, other technologically capable countries are observing and will draw their own conclusions.

With receding prospects for arms control, nuclear risks in the 21^st century are inexorably rising.

*****

The Beginning of a New Nuclear Arms Race?

Posted on January 14, 2022 by rakeshsood13

Published in the Hindustan Times on January 13, 2022

Mixed signals emerging in 2022 reflect the challenge in dealing with rising nuclear risks in an increasingly polarised world. On the face of it, the January 3 Joint Statement by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races should have been a matter of global relief. However, statements and actions by the US, Russian and Chinese leaders indicate growing tensions and the beginnings of a new nuclear arms race with rapidly receding prospects of any arms control.

The Statement reiterated the declaration made by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and underlined that nuclear weapons “serve defensive purposes.” The five leaders also committed to create a security environment “more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

Yet, the message failed to convey a new found sense of commitment for nuclear disarmament. First, four other states possessing nuclear weapons (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) were missing because they hadn’t been invited to join. Second, the statement was a collection of pious homilies, at odds with ground reality.

The Statement was intended for the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and only the five are party to the NPT; the other four are not because of a quirky arbitrariness that the NPT only recognises a nuclear weapon state if it exploded a bomb before January 1, 1967! The conference thrice postponed thrice and scheduled to begin on January 4, but Omicron intervened. The statement was negotiated by diplomats and released as planned.

The following day, reality intervened rudely as Chinaese President Xi Jinping signed off on the annual mobilisation order for the military for 2022, instructing “the armed forces to closely follow the evolution of technology, warfare and rivals, better combine training with combat operations, to develop an elite force capable of fighting and winning wars.” Simultaneously, China declared that it will continue to modernise its nuclear arsenal while urging the US and Russia to reduce their stockpiles.

It is true that Russia and the US have approx. 6000 weapons each compared to China’s modest arsenal estimated at 350 warheads. However, from satellite imagery of at least four new missile storage sites being developed, testing of a hypersonic glide vehicle capable of fractional orbital bombardment and larger ICBMs and SLBMs, the Chinese arsenal is expected to double by 2027 and treble by 2030.

Russia too has been modernising its nuclear arsenal for a decade. New ICBMs, Topol and Yars, are being deployed and Sarmat, capable of going over the South Pole, evading US missile defences, has been tested. In addition, Russia has deployed a hypersonic missile Zircon, is in the process of deploying a hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard, and testing a nuclear-powered torpedo to be used by underwater drones. Russia has maintained a large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons (2000-4000 bombs) giving rise to apprehensions about early use in a conflict.

The last US Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 announced a significant shift by recommending an increase in the types of weapons in the arsenal as also in their potential role, reflecting new strategic rivalries. The Review retreated from the earlier goal of seeking to limit the role of nuclear weapons to the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attacks; and instead, widened it to hedge against emergence of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats and to prevail against both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks. For this, the US is developing more flexible and tailored nuclear options including low-yield weapons.

Ahead of the US-Russia Strategic Stability Talks that began this week in Geneva, Russia has presented two parallel draft texts, to the US and NATO, aimed at securing legally binding security guarantees. Shifting the focus away from Ukraine, Russia is demanding an undertaking about no eastward expansion of NATO, withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe and restricting NATO forces to its 1997 boundaries. This has sent reverberations all through Europe, making the 14 east European and Baltic states more eager to cling to the US nuclear umbrella.

Meanwhile, US warships continue exercises in the western Pacific, undertaking more Freedom of Navigation Operations through the South China sea even as Chinese aircraft violate the Taiwan ADIZ with growing impunity. The announcement of AUKUS with US and UK joining up to provide nuclear powered submarines to Australia, a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT, is directed at growing Chinese assertive behaviour.

This reality is not lost on the other parties to the NPT and this is why 86 of them have signed on to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that entered into force in January 2021. These countries are concerned about growing nuclear risks and unhappy that the NPT’s five nuclear powers have not undertaken any meaningful steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers like to pretend that the TPNW doesn’t exist, setting the scene for a contentious Conference whenever it takes place.

NPT is not the only arms control treaty under strain. ABM treaty and the INF Treaty between US and Russia are already history. Both these countries have exited from the Open Skies Treaty. The CTBT has not entered into force after 25 years.

The real reason is that the old arms control model was a product of the Cold War reflecting a bipolar world. The challenge now is to create an arms control model that reflects the reality of today’s multipolar world.

*****