Donald Trump Shakes Up the Global Nuclear Order

Published in the Hindu on November 14, 2025

Today, the global nuclear order offers a curious contradiction – since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used during the last 80 years. The global nuclear arsenals have come down from a high of 65000 bombs in late 1970s to less than 12500 today. And, despite concerns in 1960s that by 1980, there may be at least two dozen states with nuclear weapons, the total today remains nine, five (the United States, Russia, The United Ukingdom, France and China) are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who had tested before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into being and four more who developed their nuclear arsenals later (Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea).

Looking back, these would seem to be impressive achievements but nobody is celebrating. In fact, the prevailing sentiment is that the global nuclear order is under strain and the U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent announcements may weaken all three elements of the global nuclear order.

Resumption of ‘nuclear tests’

On October 30, 2025, on his way to a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in Busan, Mr. Trump announced on Truth Social, “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately.” He added, “Russia is second, China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years.”

While it was clear that the message was directed at Russia and China, it was unclear whether Mr. Trump was referring to ‘nuclear explosive testing’ or testing of nuclear weapon systems. Second, the nuclear labs (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia) and the Nevada testing facilities fall under the Department of Energy and not the Department of War.

It is no secret that China, Russia, and the U.S. are designing and developing new nuclear weapons. On October 21, Russia tested a nuclear-powered cruise missile (Burevestnik) that travelled 14000 kms, following a week later, with a test of an underwater nuclear-powered torpedo (Poseidon). China has been testing hypersonic missiles and, in 2021, tested a nuclear capable hypersonic glide vehicle carried on a rocket, capable of orbiting the earth before approaching its target from an unexpected direction that was passed off as a satellite launcher. The U.S. is producing new warheads – a variable yield B61-13 gravity bomb, a low yield W76-2 warhead for the Trident II D-5 missile, while working on a new nuclear armed submarine launched cruise missile.

Yet they have refrained from explosive testing. Russia’s last explosive test was in 1990 while the US declared a moratorium on tests in 1992. In 1993, the U.S. created a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme under the National Nuclear Security Administration to work on warhead modernisation, life extension, and development of new safety protocols in warhead design.  U.S. President Bill Clinton also took the lead in pushing negotiations in Geneva for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China and France concluded their tests in 1996, six months begore the negotiations ended.

Why CTBT lacks a definition

Twenty-nine years later, the CTBT hasn’t entered into force despite 187 countries signing it. Among the necessary ratifications, the U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, and Iran have not done so, Russia did and withdrew its ratification in 2023, and India, Pakistan and North Korea have neither signed nor ratified it. India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and have since observed a voluntary moratorium, and North Korea conducted six tests between 2006 and 2017. Given today’s geopolitics, the prospects for the CTBT entering into force appear bleak.  

Second, the CTBT obliges states “not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” The U.S. was opposed to defining the terms, and instead, worked out private understandings with Russia and China on ‘zero-yield-tests;’ this permitted hydro-nuclear tests that do not produce a self-sustaining supercritical chain reaction.

The U.S. had conducted over a thousand nuclear tests and Russia 727 tests, giving them an adequate data base. China though with only 47 tests, also went along with this understanding. Thus, the CTBT delegitimsed only nuclear-explosive testing, not nuclear weapons, the reason why India never joined it.

In 2019-20, the U.S. State Department assessed that Russia and China “may have conducted low yield nuclear tests in a manner inconsistent with the U.S. zero-yield standard” though this was negated by the CTBT organisation that declared that their monitoring network with over 300 monitoring stations spread over 89 countries had not detected any inconsistent activity.

In a TV interview on November 2, Mr. Trump doubled down on resuming nuclear testing, this time including Pakistan and North Korea among the countries testing. A clarification came the same day from energy secretary Chris Wright on Fox News, calling the US tests ‘systems-tests’, “These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call noncritical explosions,” he said. However, Mr. Trump’s intention remains unclear.

Regional and global implications

The new low-yield warheads being designed make them more usable and the new systems (hypersonics, cruise and unmanned systems) are dual capable systems, leading to renewed research for missile defences like the U.S. ‘golden dome.’ Meanwhile doctrinal changes are being considered to cope with new technological developments in cyber and space domains. This raises doubts about the nuclear taboo in coming decades.  

The sole surviving US-Russia arms control agreement, Ner Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that limits the U.S. and Russian strategic forces to 700 launchers and 1550 warheads is due to expire on Feb 4, 2026 with no prospects of any talks on the horizon. China is not a party to any arms control and its nuclear arsenal that had remained below 300, is undergoing a rapid expansion, estimated at 600 today and likely to exceed 1000 by 2030. An incipient nuclear arms race was already underway; a resumption of explosive testing will just take the lid off.

Russia and China have denied Mr. Trump’s allegations regarding clandestine tests but will follow if the U.S. resumes explosive testing; China will be the biggest beneficiary because with only 47 tests (compared to over 1000 by the U.S.), resumed tests will help it to validate new designs and accumulate data.

India has been observing a voluntary moratorium but if explosive testing resumes, India will certainly resume testing to validate its boosted fission and thermonuclear designs, tested only once in 1998. Undoubtedly, Pakistan will follow but given its growing strategic linkages with China witnessed during Op Sindoor, this need hardly add to our concerns.

Though the CTBT is not in force, it did create a norm. But a resumption of explosive testing will lead to its demise. It will also tempt the nuclear wannabes to follow and mark the unravelling of the NPT led non-proliferation regime.

The taboo against use must remain intact

The U.S. has been the most significant player in shaping the global nuclear order; it would be ironical if Mr. Trump’s actions now become the catalyst for its demise. The reality is that the present global nuclear order was shaped by the geopolitics the 20th century; the challenge today is to craft a new nuclear order that reflects the fractured geopolitics of the 21st century while ensuring that the taboo against their use remains intact.  

The UN Secretary General has cautioned that “current nuclear risks are already alarmingly high” and urged nations “to avoid all actions that could lead to miscalculation or escalation with catastrophic consequences.”  But is anyone listening?

*****

Remaking the Nuclear Order in West Asia

Published in The Hindu on July 8, 2025

While both the U.S. and Israel agree that Iran cannot be allowed to have a bomb, Mr. Netanyahu goes one step forward to deny Iran any nuclear capabilities. However, for Iran, nuclear deterrent assumes a greater importance now, even if there is a change of regime

There is hardly any political leader who understands the laws of political survival better than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Realising that he is in a morass with respect to Gaza where Hamas has not yet been dismantled even though its leaders have been killed, and all hostages have not been brought home resulting in growing domestic pressure, Mr. Netanyahu employed an old tactic – to distract attention from a crisis you cannot get out off, create another crisis.

Israel’s surprise strikes on Iran, launched on June 13, created a new and larger crisis. The military action has been spectacularly successful, with the U.S. finally coming on board. For the moment, PM Netanyahu is firmly back in the driver’s seat, but this has also opened a Pandora’s Box of what next.

Israel’s calculations

Mr. Netanyahu wants to keep Israel as the only nuclear power in the region. He is convinced that the Libyan model, where the nuclear programme was completely dismantled, is the only acceptable option, preferably with a change of regime. In 2015, he opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) primarily because it conceded a limited uranium enrichment right to Iran.  

Since mid-April, five rounds of talks took place between U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, with a sixth round due on June 15 in Muscat. After stumbling over the issue of Iran insisting on its right to enrichment as a party of to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), some progress was registered on the idea of a regional nuclear fuel consortium to provide fuel for the reactors in the region. Its location remained under discussion, making Mr. Netanyahu nervous.

On June 11, PM Netanyahu barely survived a motion tabled by the opposition seeking to dissolve parliament, leading to early elections that are currently due in October 2026. PM Netanyahu has been facing domestic opposition since early 2023 due to his attempts at pushing though controversial judicial reforms that were widely seen as curbing judicial independence. The Hamas attack on October 7 had provided a reprieve that has lasted nearly two years. Given Mr. Netanyahu’s multiple domestic legal challenges, a continuing war is his “get-out-of-jail” card.

During the 20-month war, the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah has been decapitated, and a change of regime in Damascus last December doused Iran’s “ring of fire.” On two occasions in 2024, Israel directly engaged Iran and, in the process, knocked out its air defences around Tehran and other critical installations.

Having buried the two-state-solution, and with Iran at its weakest, Mr. Netanyahu must have felt that this was the ideal time to neutralise Iranian nuclear and missile threats. The Iranians are known for their frustratingly convoluted negotiating style and given U.S. President Donald Trump’s impatience, Mr. Netanyahu was able to convince him that a little military pressure would make them more accommodating.

Iran’s miscalculations

As recently as March 26, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard in her annual intelligence threat assessment to Congress stated, “the Intelligence Community continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme that he suspended in 2003”. This gave Iran’s leadership a misplaced confidence that as long as the negotiations continued on the idea of a regional enrichment facility, the U.S. would block any military strike by Israel.

However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report in May criticising “Iran’s general lack of cooperation” and the near doubling of its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium to over 400 kgs since February proved to be more damaging that Iran anticipated. This heightened Iranian concerns about the threat of sanctions-snapback by the UN Security Council, which was waived in 2015 following the adoption of the JCPOA.  

Iran knew that given its ageing air force, it was dependent on its stocks of drones and missiles. Despite the debacles of the Hamas and the Hezbollah leaderships, Iran underestimated the extent of Mossad’s penetration of its systems, evidenced by the targeted assassinations of its key military leaders and nuclear and missile scientists.

The entry of the U.S.

When the U.S. began to withdraw non-essential staff from its embassies in the region in early June, it was anticipating Israel’s likely military action. In the past, U.S. reluctance to get involved had prevented Israel from military strikes but this time, Mr Netanyahu took a gamble and it paid off. Impressed with the success of the Israel’s military actions, Mr. Trump ordered supportive strikes on June 22, with B-2 bombers dropping GBU-57 ‘bunker-busters’ on Fordow and Natanz, and Tomahawk cruise missiles hitting Isfahan. Some advance notice was provided to Iran, possibly via Qatar. Following token retaliation by Iran the following day, Mr. Trump declared an end to the “12-day-war”.

Israel thus claimed victory, Mr. Trump declared the underground sites “obliterated,” the Gulf states heaved a sigh of relief, and for Iran’s Supreme Leader, regime survival was a victory. Iran suffered over 600 casualties, and all its air defences and half its stock of missile launchers, were destroyed. It failed to take down a single Israeli aircraft though it did bring down some drones. Of the 500 missiles that Iran fired, over 30 were able to get through causing 30 casualties.

While Mr Netanyahu’s suggestion that sustained military pressure may bring about a regime change in Tehran has some support from the Iran-hawks in Washington, it is anathema to Mr. Trump’s MAGA support base, wary of entanglements abroad. The U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, were messy and costly, leaving behind a legacy of instability. Iran is three times larger, and Iranians are a people with a deep sense of nationalism based on their civilisational history. The current theocratic regime may be weak and its replacement may be less religious, but no less nationalist, and would therefore push ahead with the nuclear deterrent. Mr. Netanyahu may not be averse to a forced regime change but the U.S. and the Gulf Arabs would not want to open this Pandora’s box.

Iran’s nuclear capability

Iran has had an ambitious civilian nuclear programme going back to the 1950s. It joined the NPT in 1970. Initially, the Islamic regime was uninterested in the nuclear programme, seeing it as a part of Western influence. This changed after the Iran-Iraq war and in the 1990s, it began developing a clandestine enrichment capability.  The 2002 disclosures by a group of Iranian exiles, followed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, led the Supreme Leader to shift direction and aim for threshold status rather than develop a full-fledged nuclear weapon. The centrifuges and higher levels of enrichment also provided for bargaining space as Iran could negotiate for sanctions relief with the U.S.

Today, the situation has changed. Iran’s proxies (except for the Houthis) have been decimated and its missile and drone capabilities found wanting. The threshold state is no longer a safe place. Therefore, a nuclear deterrent assumes greater importance, even if there is a change of regime.

Questions remain about the extent of damage to the underground centrifuge sites as well as the fate of the 400 kg of the 60% enriched uranium stockpile. While the scale of the attacks makes resumption of Iran-U.S. talks tricky, Iran has raised the stakes by terminating IAEA inspector’s access to its nuclear sites.  Mr. Trump would like to conclude a deal with Iran to build on his success with the ceasefire. He would do well to remember the U.S. scholar Thomas Schelling’s advice that successful coercion requires both a credible threat as well as credible reassurance, if Iran is to be ‘persuaded’ during any future talks.

There has always been a difference between the U.S. and Israeli positions – both agree that Iran cannot be allowed to have a bomb, but Mr Netanyahu goes one step further to deny Iran any nuclear capabilities. However, since Mr. Trump has obliged him with the June 22 strikes, he may find it difficult to deny Mr. Trump his Iran deal provided the Iranians play the game.

*****

Diplomatic Discussions Are Best Held In Camera

For Trump, It’s All For Good TV

Published in The Print on March 7, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/diplomatic-discussions-are-best-held-in-camera-for-trump-its-all-for-good-tv/2537827/

Last Friday, the Oval Office provided an unusual stage for diplomatic theatre that stunned audiences around the world. The live telecast of the unscripted exchange between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian and US President Donald Trump, a former reality TV star, with J D Vance playing a supporting role, has become the stuff of diplomatic legend, with reactions ranging from applause and awe to shock and horror.

Perhaps, there was a hint of what was to come when Trump remarked “Oh, you are all dressed up,” as he welcomed Zelensky to the White House. Or in an early question by a reporter about why he wasn’t wearing a suit in “United States’ highest office?” But if so, it didn’t register with Zelensky. When Vance praised Trump’s efforts at diplomacy and Zelensky questioned it, Vance belligerently accused him of being “disrespectful” instead of being “thanking the president.” Zelensky remonstrated but Trump intervened, telling him that he didn’t “have the  cards” and blamed him for “gambling with World War III.” Minutes later, Trump ordered the media to leave but added that “This (their spat) is going to be great television.”

Since then, the signalling has continued through media and X. On 1 March, Trump said that “Zelensky is not ready for peace.” The following day, Zelensky said after his London meeting that a peace deal is “still very very far away” angering Trump, who responded that “America will not put up with this for longer.” On 3 March, US announced that it was pausing all aid to Ukraine, even as European leaders were finding ways of repairing the damage. Meanwhile, on Saturday, Elon Musk tweeted “I agree” to a post from someone who wrote, “It’s time to leave NATO and the UN.”

Political leaders make use of media, including social media, for signalling to different audiences, both at home and abroad. But there is a good reason why diplomatic discussions and negotiations are conducted in camera. It permits the parties concerned to protect the image of the leaders, allow diplomatic summitry to maintain the aura of gravitas of diplomatic summitry, and control  the narrative. The Trump-Zelensky encounter is an example of how both sides lost control of the plot.

Some policy analysts feel that US outreach to Putin is to dilute the Russia-China bond, reminiscent of the 1971 Kissinger visit to China to divide the Communist bloc. But the parallel is misplaced. In 1971, cracks were visible in the China-Soviet relationship, and second, the US was not creating a divide within the Western bloc.

The substance of US diplomacy

Zelensky knew that he held the weaker hand. Had he kept it in mind in the Oval Office, he could have sidestepped the provocation. Trump and Vance revel in the in-your-face approach, both domestically and with other leaders. However, exposing a growing US-Europe divide on Ukraine and other issues only weakens the US hand by giving comfort to Putin and Xi Jinping.

Realism has always been an integral part of diplomacy. Political leaders, whether democrats or autocrats, instinctively know that idealism is not the strategy for survival. Writing in the fourth century B.C., Greek historian Thucydides described the powerful Athenian delegation bluntly informing the weaker Melians, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Closer home, Kautilya elaborated how diplomacy and persuasion can amplify the effectiveness of power in the Arthashastra.

US presidents have never been idealists. Even President Roosevelt, the key architect of the United Nations, was clear that the real power would be exercised by the Security Council and within that, by the Permanent Members who enjoy veto powers. At the same time, he also realised that the principle of equality of sovereign states had to be respected to get a buy-in by all countries and so the General Assembly became the premier annual gathering. And this when the US accounted for 50 percent of global GDP!

Nixon extricated the US from Vietnam but needed the fig leaf of the Paris Peace Accords negotiated in 1973. Just as Biden used the agreement Trump had concluded with the Taliban to engineer the US exit from Afghanistan. Both were guided by realism but needed the diplomatic cover. During the Cold War, successive US presidents supported military dictatorships in pursuit of realism but couched it as a defence of democracy and the free world. Yet, when faced with the Soviet crackdowns in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the value-based diplomacy quickly yielded to realist prudence. 

Therefore, Trumpian diplomacy is not a departure from US diplomatic practice in substance; its change is more in Trump’s style of diplomacy. He may desire to Make America Great Again but he presides over an America that no longer enjoys the primacy it enjoyed in 1945 or 1991. Though President Theodore Roosevelt’s advice “speak softly and carry a big stick” was given at the beginning of the 20th century before the age of TV and social media, it remains valid because as President Abraham Lincoln famously said, “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.” Trump would do well to heed the advice of his predecessors and not be seduced by his own voice on Truth Social.

*****

How and Why D&ISA Division was Created in MEA

I write for India’s World Vol 1 Issue 1

In early 1992, after five and a half years posted abroad, I returned to India with a growing realization of the shifting geopolitical equations, its impact on South Asia, and the challenges it would pose for Indian foreign policy that had been crafted during the Cold War years. These realisations were also shared by the Foreign Secretary and the political leadership, eventually leading to the birth of the Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.

A faraway view

My five and a half years were split between two postings: Geneva, where I served as First Secretary (Disarmament) at the Permanent Mission of India, and then Islamabad, where I was Counsellor (Political) at the High Commission of India.

Both postings provided a ringside view of changing geopolitics and its impact on South Asia.

In Geneva, the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention began to register progress as the Soviet delegation softened its position on on-site and challenge inspections. Mandatory and consultative verification was accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilaterally concluded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989 and in November, the Berlin Wall came down. In Vienna, talks began on for setting limits on conventional forces leading to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty the following year.

In 1990, tensions between India and Pakistan began to rise with growing incidents of violence and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The camps in Pakistan that had trained the mujahideen for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan were ready for new recruits. Following a crisis in summer of 1990, talks between the Foreign Secretaries were initiated to develop Confidence Building Measures, the first such talks since the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities, concluded in 1988. This led to the operationalising of the Hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) and another was set up between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Two significant conventional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) concluded in 1991 were the Agreement on Advance Notices on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres, and Troop Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts.

Coming home

By early 1992, I was back in Delhi and took charge as Director in the United Nations Division, responsible for dealing with Disarmament issues (UND). The work related to the UN in New York (General Assembly, Disarmament Commission), Geneva (negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other review conferences), and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). However, the world was changing rapidly, with new challenges and opportunities.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen states with Russia as the successor state. The bipolar world of the Cold War, came to an end. For the first time since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met at summit level (Prime Minister Narsimha Rao participated as India was a non-permanent member) to take stock of the global security environment and concluded, inter-alia, that proliferation posed a major threat to regional and global security.

On the margins of the UNSC meeting in New York, Prime Minister Rao and President George H W Bush held a bilateral meeting, concluded that the end of the Cold War provided India and the U.S. an opportunity to overcome their differences, agreeing to open a dialogue on strategic and nuclear issues that had been a source of friction since the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India.

 The dialogue commenced a few months later and continued through various ups and downs, culminating in the 123 Agreement permitting civilian nuclear cooperation in 2008.

Meanwhile restrictions on dual use items began to get tightened. In 1991, the Nuclear Suppliers Group convened after more than a decade and the following year, added Part 2 to their Guidelines covering nuclear-related-dual-use items and technologies that, in addition to having non-nuclear applications, could also contribute to the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) met to add to its Category 2 lists by adding more dual-use items and technologies, as also Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) above a certain threshold. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had concluded an agreement with a Russian entity Glavkosmos, for transfer of technology relating to cryogenic rocket engines. Despite the fact that cryogenic technology is for satellite launches and not for missiles, the U.S. sanctioned both ISRO and Glavkosmos, reflecting the focus on non-proliferation.

In 1992, India announced full diplomatic recognition to Israel with the opening of embassies in Delhi and Tel Aviv. Under the multi-track Arab-Israeli peace process underway, India became an extra-regional participant in the Arms Control and Regional Security track that worked on CBMs.

Within weeks of returning from Islamabad as Director (UND), I found that nearly three-fourths of my time was devoted not to UN related disarmament agendas but national and regional security and strategic dialogues as well as handling non-proliferation related sanctions and licensing issues for dual use items, especially relating to civilian nuclear and space programmes.

To take stock of the changes under way, an Eminent Persons Group was set with Prime Minister Rao’s approval in mid-1992, with serving and former heads of nuclear, space and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) departments.

Around this time, I put up a note to Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, explaining that the designation UND no longer described the changing nature of the work and proposed the establishment of a new division that would, in addition to the disarmament negotiations and the UN and IAEA related work, also deal with national security, non-proliferation and access to dual-use technology related issues. The proposal found acceptance and following some discussions, the new division was named Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA Division).

The nuclear dialogue with the U.S. was the first of many that followed. Discussing threat perceptions was a novel challenge for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and required much closer coordination with the Ministry of Defence. Soon, D&ISA Division had to get a Military Advisor and a Science Adviser deputed from the Services and DRDO respectively.

The evolution of an idea

Over the years, D&ISA Division also became the nodal division for handling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, a security dialogue platform, that India was invited to join as part of our “Look East” policy. As the global norm of non-proliferation gained greater traction, D&ISA division began to highlight the need for sensitising our private sector entities as some of them had been found exporting dual-use chemicals that led to adverse commentary in international media and US sanctions, even though these companies had not violated any Indian laws. An empowered group was established to develop lists of dual-use materials, equipments and technologies whose exports should be licensed only after due diligence and end-use assurances, laying the foundation for non-proliferation related export controls administered by the Ministry of Commerce.

India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and D&ISA Division became responsible for coordinating industry outreach with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers and with DRDO about winding down our chemical weapons programme.

The opening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva added the responsibility of developing the national negotiating position in close coordination with the Department of Atomic Energy. By 1995, it became clear that in order to keep India’s nuclear option viable, India could not rely on the 1974 PNE and needed to carry out a new series of nuclear tests. Withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations in 1996 followed by the nuclear tests in 1998 and working the negotiating strategy for India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power added to D&ISA Division’s work load. Together with the concerned territorial divisions, it handled the strategic dialogues with a number of countries including France, UK, Israel etc. that eventually led to the establishment of long-standing strategic partnerships.

An institution in itself

In late 2000, after nearly a nine-year stint, I left Delhi on a new assignment. India had established a new position of an Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and it was my privilege to set up the new office.

Over a quarter century later, it is gratifying to see that D&ISA Division has thrived as has the position of Ambassador for Disarmament. Many of my young colleagues who I had the privilege to work with, went on to serve in Geneva and Vienna, and head the D&ISA Division, (D B Venkatesh Verma, Suchitra Durai, G Dharmendra, Amandeep Singh Gill) with great distinction.

*****