Posted on 14 July, 2021
2021: Afghanistan’s Year of Reckoning
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A New Chapter in Afghanistan
Published in India Today on 25 April, 2021
In October 2001, when US Special Forces and CIA operatives went into Afghanistan with the express objective of removing Taliban and dismantling Al-Qaeda, could anyone have predicted that 20 years later, the US would still be militarily engaged and debating its choices?
It is this stark realisation that made President Joe Biden announce on 14 April that “it is time to end the forever war in Afghanistan,” and that all US soldiers would leave before 11 September this year. Yet, the harsh reality is that this may wind up US’s war in Afghanistan, but for the Afghans, their endless war shows no sign of ending.
Initially, Biden was critical of the arbitrary deadline of 1 May negotiated in the Doha Agreement by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, saying “it was not a very solidly negotiated deal.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasised “a responsible withdrawal” and NSA Jake Sullivan assured that the Doha deal would be reviewed to see if the Taliban was delivering on its assurances “to cut ties with terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan, and to engage in meaningful negotiations with Afghan government and other stakeholders.”
After weeks of hectic diplomacy, it was clear that the original flaws of the year-old Doha agreement could not be fixed. It may have been sold to the world as a ‘peace deal’ but for the Taliban, it was a ‘US withdrawal deal’ under which they had stopped targeting US troops and in turn, the US was supposed to leave by 1 May. For the Taliban, a ceasefire was an outcome of the intra-Afghan talks and their continuing military pressure was part of strengthening their bargaining position.
Biden is the fourth US president to deal with the Afghan war and was determined not to pass the legacy on to his successor. His deadline is as arbitrary as Trump’s, only more symbolic. The key change was made clear in Biden’s interview to CBS that if the Taliban returned, “the US bore zero responsibility for it.” In short, the Afghans were responsible for their future and the US was not providing any guarantees.
This is perfectly consistent with the long held Indian position of supporting “an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” peace process. Why then are we so perturbed by the impending US departure? India’s geography will ensure our presence though our role will undergo changes. US leaves because it can India stays because it belongs.
At the 2001 Bonn Conference, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance that had emerged as an influential player, following the Taliban’s ouster. During the last twenty years, India’s economic cooperation programme has earned it the distinction of being Afghanistan’s preferred development partner. We may have relied on ‘soft power’ for two decades but we need to remember that it is not the only instrument in the ‘smart power’ tool-kit.
The common perception that with the return of the Taliban, India will be marginalised, is an oversimplification. It is true that India has been lethargic in pushing a visible engagement with the Taliban but its projects in every province of Afghanistan gives it the political heft and the linkages, cutting across ethnic and sectarian divides.
Nobody really knows if the Taliban’s ideology has changed but, as the Taliban themselves will soon realise, Afghanistan in 2021 is very different from the Afghanistan in 1990s when they came to power. Nearly three-fourths of Afghan population today is below 30 and though conservative, is used to living in an open society. There is a belated realisation among significant external partners like Iran, Russia and China that while they all pushed for US’ exit, their reservations about Taliban taking centre stage are only growing.
Speaking at the 2021 Raisina Dialogue last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif emphasised that “Taliban have to be engaged but on democratic and inclusive terms”. Russia reflected similar concerns and at the Moscow extended troika conference on 18 March, got US, Pakistan and China to sign on to a joint statement expressing a shared opposition to any restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
There are ample opportunities for India to explore new engagements but it needs to overcome its diffidence because its vision for Afghanistan is one shared by the large majority of the Afghan people.
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In Kabul, be ready for political uncertainty
Published in Hindustan Times on 26th March, 2021
Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Haneef Atmar, was in Delhi this week to brief Indian authorities on the recent spurt in diplomatic activity as the Joe Biden administration approaches the May deadline for United States (US) troops to exit Afghanistan. The problem is that the intra-Afghan peace talks have barely moved forward since the Doha agreement signed a year ago between U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Barader and violence levels have been steadily rising, especially since last October.
US policy shifts
Biden is the third president to deal with the challenge of bringing US troops back home. In 2009, Barack Obama described Afghanistan as “the necessary war that U.S. must win”. He approved a surge in troop presence, from 55,000 to over 100,000 soldiers, and also quadrupled the number of drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan but U.S. failed to blunt the Taliban insurgency. By May 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Obama realised that the real failure lay not in transforming Afghanistan but in changing Pakistan’s policy of continuing to provide sanctuaries to Taliban even while claiming credit as major U.S. partner in stabilising Afghanistan. Frustrated, he reduced the troop presence to 8500 by the time he left office in 2017.
Announcing his policy in August 2017, Donald Trump said that though his “original instinct was to pull out”, he had been persuaded by Pentagon to push for “an honourable and enduring outcome” and added 5000 troops while easing restrictions on use of airpower. However, after a year, he too changed track and Khalilzad was appointed to open negotiations with the Taliban that eventually led to the February 2020 deal. By the time Trump left, US troops were reduced to 2500.
The title of the deal – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA – showed that Taliban’s ideology had not changed and the deal was doomed to failure. Yet, such was the willingness to suspend disbelief that Khalilzad successfully persuaded everyone that it was “a peace deal” and not a “US withdrawal deal”, and the mouse he pulled out of the hat was a rabbit. A year later, that uncomfortable reality can’t be denied. While no American soldiers have died in combat in Afghanistan in last twelve months, the monthly death toll is 800 Afghan security forces and 250 Afghan civilians.
A new peace plan
The Biden administration is therefore seeking a “responsible withdrawal”. In an interview last week, Biden said that in view of the prevailing situation, it is difficult for the US to leave by May and a short extension may be needed. A new peace plan has been developed and Khalilzad retained to pull another rabbit out of a hat.
The new plan envisages replacing the present government by a transitional government that includes the Taliban, and establishing a 21-member commission (including 10 Taliban nominees) to draft a new constitution. Taliban and government should reach an agreement for a 90-day “significant reduction in violence” to create a conducive environment for diplomatic efforts. To energise the stalled Doha talks, Turkey has been invited to host a meeting between Taliban and the Afghan government and other representatives to work this out. A United Nations (UN) conference (on the lines of the Bonn Conference in 2001 that worked out the political road map for a post-Taliban Afghanistan) involving US, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India, along with Taliban and other Afghan groups is proposed to discuss a unified approach.
Renewed diplomacy
UN Secretary General has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to lead the UN efforts and prepare for the international conference. Arnault knows Afghanistan well, having been there from 2002-06, as Deputy and then head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.
Last week, Moscow hosted a meeting of the expanded troika (U.S., China, Pakistan and Russia) together with Taliban and Afghan government and other leaders led by Abdullah Abdullah, head of the High Council for National Reconciliation. While the intra-Afghan talks were contentious, the four ‘extended troika’ states issued a joint statement recognising the Afghan peoples desire for peace, calling for a reduction in violence on all sides, expediting negotiations for a political settlement, urging Taliban not to launch a Spring offensive and underlining that they do not support a return to the Islamic Emirate system.
President Ashraf Ghani is unwilling to step down to make way for a transitional government, suggesting early elections instead but the Taliban are not interested in the electoral route. Last two elections in Afghanistan were marred by controversy which were resolved only because US leaned heavily on Ghani and Abdullah to share power instead. A number of prominent Afghan leaders, unhappy with Ghani, have supported a transition as have Russia, Iran and Pakistan, leaving Ghani with no options.
The political reality is the Taliban had more loyal and consistent backers in Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence, while the Kabul government steadily lost legitimacy because of its own incompetence and disunity, and because its backers in the West eventually lost patience and interest. By end-2021, the US may have ended its longest war, but for Afghanistan, the uncertainties are only increasing.
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A Flurry Of Diplomatic Activity On Afghanistan
Article for Observer Research Foundation on 21st March, 2021
A flurry of diplomatic activity on Afghanistan has begun, catalysed by the approaching May deadline for the U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan under the agreement signed on 29 February last year by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha.
The problem is that a year later, the Doha agreement is in shambles. The intra-Afghan dialogue that was supposed to begin in March finally began in September and has not made progress. Taliban had committed to cut their ties with Al Qaeda but recent statements by Afghan and U.S. officials indicate that this has not happened. Meanwhile, violence levels in Afghanistan have risen sharply in recent months. A recent UN report indicated 3035 civilian deaths and 5785 injured during 2020 with Taliban held responsible for 45 percent of the casualties.
Biden’s options
President Biden’s options are limited. He can stick to the original withdrawal date but it is a foregone conclusion that the Kabul government will not be able to last very long and the country will descent into a civil war. The option of extending the stay unilaterally means that the Taliban may resume targeting U.S. troops, something they have refrained from since the Doha deal. A third option is to negotiate a short extension with the Taliban by offering them a share in governance in return for a reduction in violence.
Khalilzad has been asked to stay on to explore the third option and kickstart the intra-Afghan peace negotiations by suggesting that a Transition Government, including the Taliban, replace the current regime in Kabul, and the UN convene an international conference with key global and regional players, and the Afghan groups, a kind of Bonn 2, somewhat reminiscent of the Bonn conference convened in November 2001 where the post-Taliban political arrangements were concluded.
Diplomacy picks up
The rationale for the U.S. approach was spelt out in identical letters by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah. It expressed concern about the growing levels of violence and shared the bleak U.S. assessment that after a U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban were likely to make rapid territorial gains unless there was a serious attempt to restart and accelerate the peace process. The new peace plan was shared by Khalilzad with Afghan leaders and Taliban in early March in Kabul and Doha respectively. It contains a roadmap to an inclusive transition government, the terms for a significant reduction in violence leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and drafting a new constitutional framework. In the larger interest, President Ghani is expected to make the sacrifice and step down. UN has been requested to convene a Foreign Minister level conference inviting the Afghan groups, China, India, Iran, Russia and the U.S. to discuss a unified approach to a durable peace.
Turkey has conveyed willingness to host the UN convened conference, possibly in April, and also a March conference between Afghan government and leaders from Kabul and the Taliban to arrive at an agreement on the transition arrangements. UN Secretary general has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative. Arnault was in Kabul from 2002-06, first as Deputy and then as Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Those were the hopeful days, though by 2006, Taliban had announced their return with a spate of suicide attacks and IEDs.
Moscow added to the diplomatic activity by convening a conference of the ‘expanded troika’ – China, Pakistan, U.S. and Russia together with Afghan leaders and the Taliban on 18 March, with intra-Afghan talks continuing on 1the following two days. The highlight was a joint statement by the four Special Representatives – Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wang Yu, Sadiq Mohammed and host Zamir Kabulov on the first day declaring that they “do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate” system that the Taliban had introduced. The joint statement recognised that the Afghan people desired peace, called for reduction in violence from all sides, asked the Taliban not to launch the Spring offensive and reiterated their call for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan government has reacted positively emphasising the Islamic Republic is the only inclusive and acceptable structure that can ensure equality and pluralism and accommodates the diversity of Afghanistan and provides stability. Taliban have responded, saying that peace talks should be expedited and U.S. should stick to its withdrawal date.
A limited consensus
However, there is a growing momentum behind the call for Ghani’s departure. Within Afghanistan, many leaders like Karzai, Qanooni, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Sayyaf etc would be happy to see Ghani go. Among the international community, U.S. sees Ghani now as an obstacle to peace and Russia, Iran and Pakistan have always seen him as too pro-U.S. Ghani has responded by suggesting that he is ready to hold early elections (these are due in 2024) and hand over power to any elected government. However, the 2019 election saw an abysmal turnout of 20 percent and the current situation is no better. Moreover, Taliban are not inclined to go the electoral route.
However, the limited consensus breaks down thereafter and Bonn 2 is not like Bonn 1. There are fundamental differences and internal changes. At Bonn 1, the four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation with these four groups in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are fighting a bloody war. Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence.
The most important internal factor is Afghan demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30 years. This large cohort has come of age post-2002 and is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears and they are united in not accepting an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
India’s role
Since 2002, India has undertaken an extensive economic cooperation programme at a cost of $ 3 billion. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours. At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.
The Biden administration realises that it needs diplomacy to ensure a managed exit from Afghanistan. It needs Russia, Pakistan and Iran (as well as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) to lean on the Taliban to agree to a short U.S. extension; it needs Russia to lean on Ghani to make the sacrifice, and it needs the UN to come back and take over the peace process, thereby enlarging the number of stakeholders. Once the Taliban join a transitional government, they should wind up the Doha office and move to Kabul so that future Afghan talks will be Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled.
However, whether this flurry of diplomatic activity can bring lasting peace to a country that has experimented with monarchy, a socialist republic, a communist rule, an Islamic Emirate and an Islamic Republic over the last 70 years, remains difficult to predict.
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https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/flurry-diplomatic-activity-afghanistan/
US To Withdraw From Open Skies Treaty
Publication for Observer Research Foundation
On 21 May, US President Donald Trump announced that US was serving notice of its intent to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). Concluded in 1992, the OST entered into force in 2002 and currently has 35 members (1) (Kyrgyzstan is a signatory but hasn’t yet ratified). Canada and Hungary are the depositary states. The reason provided is continuing Russian non-compliance with the OST which has led US to conclude that it is no longer in US interest to remain a party. Trump added that the US decision will take effect after six months (as provided in the treaty text) but US can reconsider if Russia returns to full compliance.
Unravelling Arms Control
The US decision had been anticipated and is in keeping with recent US decisions to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA, signed between US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and EU and Iran) on 8 May 2018, followed by the withdrawal from the US-Russia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) on 2 August 2019.
Two more nuclear related treaties are at risk. The New START treaty between Russia and the US imposes a ceiling on operational strategic nuclear weapons of 700 launchers and 1550 warheads each, was concluded in 2010 and is due to lapse in February 2021 unless extended for a period of five years. President Trump has indicated that he is not in favour of the extension.
The second is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which was concluded in 1996 but has not entered into force. It prohibits countries from carrying out nuclear test explosions but earlier this year US voiced suspicions that both Russia and China were carrying out low yield nuclear tests in violation of the understanding on zero-yield threshold. US has signed but not ratified the CTBT and there are indications that it may be planning to test.
Negotiating the OST
The concept underlying the OST is aerial reconnaissance flights by unarmed aircraft over each other’s territories as a means of promoting confidence, trust and stability between potential adversaries. It was first proposed by US President Dwight Eisenhower in mid-1955 in Geneva to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin but found no traction. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea was revived in December 1989 by US President George Bush and accepted by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations commenced between NATO and Warsaw Pact members supported by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, which continues to host the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna) and were concluded on 24 March 1992. It entered into force on 1 January 2002. Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in mid-1991, months before the break-up of the Soviet Union and 27 out of 29 NATO members are party to the OST.
The OST establishes a regime for conduct of short notice flights by unarmed aircraft over territories of States Parties in accordance with established “quotas” spelt out in the treaty taking into account the size of the country. For example, US has a quota of 42 flights, the same as Russia (it is a joint quota with Belarus) while Portugal has a quota of 2 flights. The quota defines both the number of flights that a country can mount as also the number of flights it can host. The latter is called a “passive quota” and the former, “active quota”. States Parties can form groups to redistribute their active quotas as long as the absolute ceilings are observed. Since 2002, nearly 1500 flights have been undertaken by member states. In recent years, US has mounted an average of 14-16 flights a year while Russia has mounted between 4 and 9 flights annually.
Time frames are stipulated for providing notice to the observed state with flight plans and possible refuelling stops which are needed, particularly across the large territories of US, Canada and Russia. The observed state can propose changes and there are rules regarding deviations. The kind of aircraft to be used by each state are already agreed upon as also the sensors to be mounted on the aircraft. Four kinds of sensors are authorised – optical panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras with real time display, infra-red line-scanning devices and sideways looking synthetic aperture radar. A copy of the data collected is provided to the observed state and other countries can also obtain access to the data. Periodic review conferences have been held where technical issues regarding developments in sensor technology are discussed to redefine approved lists.
Why US is leaving
While Russia and other countries have upgraded both the aircraft and the sensors, US surveillance aircraft modernisation has been held up for lack of funds. Part of the reason is that US is able to obtain equally good or better data from its satellites. No other country can match US’ satellite monitoring capabilities. Sharing of satellite imagery is restricted and accordingly managed bilaterally by US. For the US, the OST is not particularly useful as an intelligence gathering tool but the reality is that it was always intended as a confidence building and transparency measure. As tensions between US and Russia have grown, US has become more interested in restricting transparency over its territory.
Since 2015, US has voiced concerns about instances of Russian non- compliance in terms of either delaying clearances or imposing onerous restrictions. The recent report on compliance issued by the US State department cited instances of Russian non-compliance in 2019 by imposing a limit of 500 kms over Kaliningrad and creating highly restrictive flight corridors in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. US has also cited undue restrictions on flights over eastern Ukraine Crimea. The stage was therefore set for the US withdrawal.
The US has been increasingly concerned that Russia is using its overflights over US critical infrastructure to develop actionable intelligence and possibly mapping it for possible future offensive cyber operations. In 2017, an overflight request over the Trump golf estate in Bedford (New Jersey) raised concerns in the White House. This led the US to conclude that Russia was converting the transparency measure into an intimidation measure by weaponizing it. Reacting with a tit for tat approach was not in US interest.
US allies have expressed regret over the US decision. Russia has bluntly rejected US allegations of non-compliance, calling it a pretext for US moves to turn its back on multilaterally negotiated arms control treaties, citing the JCPOA and INF Treaty as examples. However, it has refrained from any indications regarding its response. Clearly, the OST is of limited utility for Russia if US territory is excluded and limited only to Europe and Canada. The OST may limp along for a while even after the US withdrawal takes effect after six months but the countdown for it has begun.
NOTES
(1) Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States
RAKESH SOOD 