Tag Archives: U.S.

After the US Exit, The Afghanistan Road Map

Posted on by
Reply

Published in Hindustan Times on 29 April, 2021

Everyone agrees that 2021 will be a year of reckoning for Afghanistan; thereafter, the narratives begin to diverge. For the US, it marks the end of America’s longest war. For the Taliban, 2021 marks their victory over the most powerful military force, the sole superpower. In popular mythmaking, it adds to the notion of Afghanistan as the graveyard of empires.

For the Afghans, it is the opening of yet another page in their unending conflict that began in 1973 with the coup by Sardar Mohammed Daud who deposed his cousin, King Zahir Shah, replacing the 200 year old monarchy with a socialist republic and sparking a chain of events leading to the Soviet intervention in 1979, the CIA-ISI jihad against the godless Communists during the 1980s, the collapse of the Communist regime and the deadly infighting among the Mujahiddin, emergence of the Taliban in 1994 and US entry in 2001 a month after the 9/11 attacks.

What makes the current chapter tragic is that the US intervention enjoyed the support of the international community and was also welcomed by the vast majority of the Afghan population. More than thirty countries contributed troops to the International Security Assistance Force; the UN Security Council backed it unanimously; and a large UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan was set up to coordinate international assistance for Afghan reconstruction and development.

Two decades later, having spent nearly $1.5 trillion on its war operations and nearly 2400 US soldiers killed, the US has no good options. A cumulative set of errors have led to a US fatigue with the Afghan project: A belief in 2002 that the Taliban was defeated when they had only dispersed to sanctuaries in Pakistan; introducing a centralised presidential system that lacked institutions for checks and balances, resulting in weak local governance; shifting focus to the disastrous war in Iraq in 2003; gradual return of the Taliban beginning in 2005 and US failure to check Pakistan’s duplicity on the matter; inability to curb opium production that fuelled the insurgency; President Barack Obama announcing the troop surge in 2009 along with the drawdown 18 months later; a growing legitimisation of Taliban as a political force, cemented by the opening of the Doha office in 2013, prodded by UK, Norway and Germany; and finally, the Doha agreement last year, packaged as a peace deal but essentially a US withdrawal deal.

During the past two decades, as Senator, as Vice-President, and now as President, Joe Biden has been through hundreds of briefings on Afghanistan and visited the region over a dozen times. He believed that the objective of delivering justice to those who perpetrated the 9/11 attack on the US had been achieved and the terrorist threat to the US homeland from Afghanistan was such that it did not require a permanent US military presence in Afghanistan. Yet, he did give diplomacy a chance. There was a new peace plan and a flurry of diplomatic activity for a Bonn 2 conference under UN auspices. Within a month, it was clear that it wouldn’t work. Taliban rejected any idea of a ceasefire; many Afghan politicians liked the idea of Ghani stepping down; and an unhappy Ghani suggested early elections instead. Biden announced the new deadline of implementing the withdrawal before 11 September.

However, a Taliban takeover is not a foregone conclusion as long as US funding continues and the Afghan security forces maintain the integrity of the chain of command. The Taliban will also learn that the Afghanistan of 2021 is very different from that of 1994. Nearly three-fourths of the Afghan population is below 30 and is used to living in a conservative but open society.

If the Kabul regime is divided so is the Taliban. There are at least five groupings: Mullah Haibatullah, head of the Quetta shura, Mullah Baradar, head of the Doha office and the public face, Mullah Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar, Sirajuddin Haqqani who is the deputy leader and heads the Haqqani network out of Waziristan with his independent link with the ISI and ties with Al Qaeda, and the most hardline Helmand group led by Mullah Zakir and Mullah Sadr Ibrahim; in addition, there are many front line fighters whose commanders accept little external authority. Moreover, the region hosts 5000 foreign fighters with shifting allegiances.

Now that the US exit is a reality, concerns in Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China about restraining the Taliban from emerging as the sole power centre are surfacing. In a meeting in Moscow last month, the extended troika consisting of China, Pakistan, US and Russia issued a joint statement opposing the restoration of an Islamic Emirate. At the Raisina Dialogue recently, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif bluntly warned that an Islamic Emirate “is an existential threat to Pakistan and a national security threat to Iran and India.” He emphasised the need for an inclusive peace, not a Taliban-dictated peace.

For the last few years, India has been content with the mantra of “an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” peace process. In the new environment, we need to get over our hesitations and actively explore new coalitions that will safeguard our national interests.

*****

A New Chapter in Afghanistan

Posted on by
Reply

Published in India Today on 25 April, 2021

In October 2001, when US Special Forces and CIA operatives went into Afghanistan with the express objective of removing Taliban and dismantling Al-Qaeda, could anyone have predicted that 20 years later, the US would still be militarily engaged and debating its choices?

It is this stark realisation that made President Joe Biden announce on 14 April that “it is time to end the forever war in Afghanistan,” and that all US soldiers would leave before 11 September this year. Yet, the harsh reality is that this may wind up US’s war in Afghanistan, but for the Afghans, their endless war shows no sign of ending.

Initially, Biden was critical of the arbitrary deadline of 1 May negotiated in the Doha Agreement by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, saying “it was not a very solidly negotiated deal.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasised “a responsible withdrawal” and NSA Jake Sullivan assured that the Doha deal would be reviewed to see if the Taliban was delivering on its assurances “to cut ties with terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan, and to engage in meaningful negotiations with Afghan government and other stakeholders.”

After weeks of hectic diplomacy, it was clear that the original flaws of the year-old Doha agreement could not be fixed. It may have been sold to the world as a ‘peace deal’ but for the Taliban, it was a ‘US withdrawal deal’ under which they had stopped targeting US troops and in turn, the US was supposed to leave by 1 May. For the Taliban, a ceasefire was an outcome of the intra-Afghan talks and their continuing military pressure was part of strengthening their bargaining position.

Biden is the fourth US president to deal with the Afghan war and was determined not to pass the legacy on to his successor. His deadline is as arbitrary as Trump’s, only more symbolic. The key change was made clear in Biden’s interview to CBS that if the Taliban returned, “the US bore zero responsibility for it.” In short, the Afghans were responsible for their future and the US was not providing any guarantees.

This is perfectly consistent with the long held Indian position of supporting “an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled” peace process. Why then are we so perturbed by the impending US departure? India’s geography will ensure our presence though our role will undergo changes. US leaves because it can India stays because it belongs.

At the 2001 Bonn Conference, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance that had emerged as an influential player, following the Taliban’s ouster. During the last twenty years, India’s economic cooperation programme has earned it the distinction of being Afghanistan’s preferred development partner. We may have relied on ‘soft power’ for two decades but we need to remember that it is not the only instrument in the ‘smart power’ tool-kit.

The common perception that with the return of the Taliban, India will be marginalised, is an oversimplification. It is true that India has been lethargic in pushing a visible engagement with the Taliban but its projects in every province of Afghanistan gives it the political heft and the linkages, cutting across ethnic and sectarian divides.

Nobody really knows if the Taliban’s ideology has changed but, as the Taliban themselves will soon realise, Afghanistan in 2021 is very different from the Afghanistan in 1990s when they came to power. Nearly three-fourths of Afghan population today is below 30 and though conservative, is used to living in an open society. There is a belated realisation among significant external partners like Iran, Russia and China that while they all pushed for US’ exit, their reservations about Taliban taking centre stage are only growing.

Speaking at the 2021 Raisina Dialogue last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif emphasised that “Taliban have to be engaged but on democratic and inclusive terms”. Russia reflected similar concerns and at the Moscow extended troika conference on 18 March, got US, Pakistan and China to sign on to a joint statement expressing a shared opposition to any restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

There are ample opportunities for India to explore new engagements but it needs to overcome its diffidence because its vision for Afghanistan is one shared by the large majority of the Afghan people.

*****

In Kabul, be ready for political uncertainty

Posted on by
Reply

Published in Hindustan Times on 26th March, 2021

Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Haneef Atmar, was in Delhi this week to brief Indian authorities on the recent spurt in diplomatic activity as the Joe Biden administration approaches the May deadline for United States (US) troops to exit Afghanistan. The problem is that the intra-Afghan peace talks have barely moved forward since the Doha agreement signed a year ago between U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban deputy leader Mullah Barader and violence levels have been steadily rising, especially since last October.

US policy shifts

Biden is the third president to deal with the challenge of bringing US troops back home. In 2009, Barack Obama described Afghanistan as “the necessary war that U.S. must win”. He approved a surge in troop presence, from 55,000 to over 100,000 soldiers, and also quadrupled the number of drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan but U.S. failed to blunt the Taliban insurgency. By May 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Obama realised that the real failure lay not in transforming Afghanistan but in changing Pakistan’s policy of continuing to provide sanctuaries to Taliban even while claiming credit as major U.S. partner in stabilising Afghanistan. Frustrated, he reduced the troop presence to 8500 by the time he left office in 2017.

Announcing his policy in August 2017, Donald Trump said that though his “original instinct was to pull out”, he had been persuaded by Pentagon to push for “an honourable and enduring outcome” and added 5000 troops while easing restrictions on use of airpower. However, after a year, he too changed track and Khalilzad was appointed to open negotiations with the Taliban that eventually led to the February 2020 deal. By the time Trump left, US troops were reduced to 2500.

The title of the deal – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA – showed that Taliban’s ideology had not changed and the deal was doomed to failure. Yet, such was the willingness to suspend disbelief that Khalilzad successfully persuaded everyone that it was “a peace deal” and not a “US withdrawal deal”, and the mouse he pulled out of the hat was a rabbit. A year later, that uncomfortable reality can’t be denied. While no American soldiers have died in combat in Afghanistan in last twelve months, the monthly death toll is 800 Afghan security forces and 250 Afghan civilians.

A new peace plan

The Biden administration is therefore seeking a “responsible withdrawal”. In an interview last week, Biden said that in view of the prevailing situation, it is difficult for the US to leave by May and a short extension may be needed. A new peace plan has been developed and Khalilzad retained to pull another rabbit out of a hat.

The new plan envisages replacing the present government by a transitional government that includes the Taliban, and establishing a 21-member commission (including 10 Taliban nominees) to draft a new constitution. Taliban and government should reach an agreement for a 90-day “significant reduction in violence” to create a conducive environment for diplomatic efforts. To energise the stalled Doha talks, Turkey has been invited to host a meeting between Taliban and the Afghan government and other representatives to work this out. A United Nations (UN) conference (on the lines of the Bonn Conference in 2001 that worked out the political road map for a post-Taliban Afghanistan) involving US, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India, along with Taliban and other Afghan groups is proposed to discuss a unified approach.

Renewed diplomacy

UN Secretary General has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to lead the UN efforts and prepare for the international conference. Arnault knows Afghanistan well, having been there from 2002-06, as Deputy and then head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

Last week, Moscow hosted a meeting of the expanded troika (U.S., China, Pakistan and Russia) together with Taliban and Afghan government and other leaders led by Abdullah Abdullah, head of the High Council for National Reconciliation. While the intra-Afghan talks were contentious, the four ‘extended troika’ states issued a joint statement recognising the Afghan peoples desire for peace, calling for a reduction in violence on all sides, expediting negotiations for a political settlement, urging Taliban not to launch a Spring offensive and underlining that they do not support a return to the Islamic Emirate system.

President Ashraf Ghani is unwilling to step down to make way for a transitional government, suggesting early elections instead but the Taliban are not interested in the electoral route. Last two elections in Afghanistan were marred by controversy which were resolved only because US leaned heavily on Ghani and Abdullah to share power instead. A number of prominent Afghan leaders, unhappy with Ghani, have supported a transition as have Russia, Iran and Pakistan, leaving Ghani with no options.

The political reality is the Taliban had more loyal and consistent backers in Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence, while the Kabul government steadily lost legitimacy because of its own incompetence and disunity, and because its backers in the West eventually lost patience and interest. By end-2021, the US may have ended its longest war, but for Afghanistan, the uncertainties are only increasing.

*****

A Flurry Of Diplomatic Activity On Afghanistan

Posted on by
Reply

Article for Observer Research Foundation on 21st March, 2021

A flurry of diplomatic activity on Afghanistan has begun, catalysed by the approaching May deadline for the U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan under the agreement signed on 29 February last year by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder and Deputy Leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader in Doha.

The problem is that a year later, the Doha agreement is in shambles. The intra-Afghan dialogue that was supposed to begin in March finally began in September and has not made progress. Taliban had committed to cut their ties with Al Qaeda but recent statements by Afghan and U.S. officials indicate that this has not happened. Meanwhile, violence levels in Afghanistan have risen sharply in recent months. A recent UN report indicated 3035 civilian deaths and 5785 injured during 2020 with Taliban held responsible for 45 percent of the casualties.

Biden’s options

President Biden’s options are limited. He can stick to the original withdrawal date but it is a foregone conclusion that the Kabul government will not be able to last very long and the country will descent into a civil war. The option of extending the stay unilaterally means that the Taliban may resume targeting U.S. troops, something they have refrained from since the Doha deal. A third option is to negotiate a short extension with the Taliban by offering them a share in governance in return for a reduction in violence.

Khalilzad has been asked to stay on to explore the third option and kickstart the intra-Afghan peace negotiations by suggesting that a Transition Government, including the Taliban, replace the current regime in Kabul, and the UN convene an international conference with key global and regional players, and the Afghan groups, a kind of Bonn 2, somewhat reminiscent of the Bonn conference convened in November 2001 where the post-Taliban political arrangements were concluded.

Diplomacy picks up

The rationale for the U.S. approach was spelt out in identical letters by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation Dr Abdullah. It expressed concern about the growing levels of violence and shared the bleak U.S. assessment that after a U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban were likely to make rapid territorial gains unless there was a serious attempt to restart and accelerate the peace process. The new peace plan was shared by Khalilzad with Afghan leaders and Taliban in early March in Kabul and Doha respectively. It contains a roadmap to an inclusive transition government, the terms for a significant reduction in violence leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and drafting a new constitutional framework. In the larger interest, President Ghani is expected to make the sacrifice and step down. UN has been requested to convene a Foreign Minister level conference inviting the Afghan groups, China, India, Iran, Russia and the U.S. to discuss a unified approach to a durable peace.

Turkey has conveyed willingness to host the UN convened conference, possibly in April, and also a March conference between Afghan government and leaders from Kabul and the Taliban to arrive at an agreement on the transition arrangements. UN Secretary general has announced the appointment of veteran French diplomat Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative. Arnault was in Kabul from 2002-06, first as Deputy and then as Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Those were the hopeful days, though by 2006, Taliban had announced their return with a spate of suicide attacks and IEDs.

Moscow added to the diplomatic activity by convening a conference of the ‘expanded troika’ – China, Pakistan, U.S. and Russia together with Afghan leaders and the Taliban on 18 March, with intra-Afghan talks continuing on 1the following two days. The highlight was a joint statement by the four Special Representatives – Ambassadors Khalilzad, Wang Yu, Sadiq Mohammed and host Zamir Kabulov on the first day declaring that they “do not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate” system that the Taliban had introduced. The joint statement recognised that the Afghan people desired peace, called for reduction in violence from all sides, asked the Taliban not to launch the Spring offensive and reiterated their call for a negotiated settlement. The Afghan government has reacted positively emphasising the Islamic Republic is the only inclusive and acceptable structure that can ensure equality and pluralism and accommodates the diversity of Afghanistan and provides stability. Taliban have responded, saying that peace talks should be expedited and U.S. should stick to its withdrawal date.

A limited consensus

However, there is a growing momentum behind the call for Ghani’s departure. Within Afghanistan, many leaders like Karzai, Qanooni, Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, Sayyaf etc would be happy to see Ghani go. Among the international community, U.S. sees Ghani now as an obstacle to peace and Russia, Iran and Pakistan have always seen him as too pro-U.S. Ghani has responded by suggesting that he is ready to hold early elections (these are due in 2024) and hand over power to any elected government. However, the 2019 election saw an abysmal turnout of 20 percent and the current situation is no better. Moreover, Taliban are not inclined to go the electoral route.

However, the limited consensus breaks down thereafter and Bonn 2 is not like Bonn 1. There are fundamental differences and internal changes. At Bonn 1, the four groups invited (Rome, Cyprus and Peshawar groups and the Northern Alliance) were not fighting each other; Bonn 1 only sought to set up a road map for political normalisation with these four groups in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. For Bonn 2, there are essentially two parties, Taliban and the Afghan government who are fighting a bloody war. Taliban have gained legitimacy, expanded their presence and are militarily strong. The Kabul government is internationally recognised but has lost considerable legitimacy because of its disunity, consequent fragility and incompetence.

The most important internal factor is Afghan demographics – a median age of 18.4 years with 46 percent of Afghan population below 15 years and another 28 percent between 16-30 years. This large cohort has come of age post-2002 and is used to living in a conservative but open society. If the Doha agreement generated concerns among youth, women and minorities (and the Afghan government), the new proposal confirms their worst fears and they are united in not accepting an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

India’s role

Since 2002, India has undertaken an extensive economic cooperation programme at a cost of $ 3 billion. The absence of a shared border and focus on using ‘soft power’ reflects the reality that India lacks the leverage to play ‘spoiler’, unlike Afghanistan’s other neighbours. At Bonn I, India was invited because it had been a key supporter (along with Russia and Iran) of the Northern Alliance. Today, India is invited because it has acquired the distinction of being the preferred development partner. This realisation is not lost on the Taliban either who have been supportive of India’s developmental role.

The Biden administration realises that it needs diplomacy to ensure a managed exit from Afghanistan. It needs Russia, Pakistan and Iran (as well as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) to lean on the Taliban to agree to a short U.S. extension; it needs Russia to lean on Ghani to make the sacrifice, and it needs the UN to come back and take over the peace process, thereby enlarging the number of stakeholders. Once the Taliban join a transitional government, they should wind up the Doha office and move to Kabul so that future Afghan talks will be Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled. 

However, whether this flurry of diplomatic activity can bring lasting peace to a country that has experimented with monarchy, a socialist republic, a communist rule, an Islamic Emirate and an Islamic Republic over the last 70 years, remains  difficult to predict.

*****

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/flurry-diplomatic-activity-afghanistan/

Stress Test For American Democracy

Posted on by
Reply

Published in The Hindu on 20th January, 2021

The oldest democracy has been subjected to its most severe stress test; it came to the brink, stared at the abyss and just managed to clear it. The U.S. may have survived the test but considerable damage has been done; defining pictures of 20000 National Guard troops deployed in and around the Capital and an outgoing President who has been impeached a second time in his term, a week before he relinquishes office, have hurt US self-image as also its global standing. It is a grim reminder that democracy, however deeply rooted, can’t be taken for granted and needs constant nurturing and protection to prevent its descent into populism and mobocracy.

A Polarising Election

The stress test began two months earlier when incumbent President Donald Trump refused to accept the election outcome, alleging that his victory had been stolen through fraudulent means. The 2020 election was the most polarising the U.S. has seen and what happened on 6 January was its reflection. The certification of the results by Congress will get Mr. Trump out of the White House but Trumpism will be a much tougher challenge to deal with. In an election that saw the highest turnout (nearly 67 percent) since 1900, if Joe Biden won over 81 million votes, Mr. Trump managed an impressive tally of 74 million. The county wise election map of the US reveals that Mr. Biden won in 509 counties that account for over 70 percent of US GDP, while Mr. Trump won in 2547 counties that provide the rest.

Even though media channels including Fox News had called the results by 5 November, Mr. Trump refused to make the traditional concession speech, insisting that the election had been rigged. Legal challenges were mounted by his supporters in many states. By end-November, the recounts had been completed and legal challenges disposed of. The election result remained unchanged. Attorney General William Barr, a known Trump supporter, announced on 1 December that the Justice Department had not uncovered any significant fraud that could have affected the results of the presidential election. On 14 December, the Electoral College met in each of the State capitals to formalise the Biden victory by casting 306 votes for Biden/Harris versus 232 for Trump/Pence.

The results were conveyed to the Congress for certification, but Mr. Trump had still not given up. He continued to urge Vice-President Pence, who was to chair the Congress session on 6 January, to use his authority to question the returns submitted from the swing states. Mr. Pence demurred, pointing out that he had no “unilateral authority” to overturn the electoral votes submitted.

Mr. Trump had been urging his supporters to stage a protest in Washington against the certification, sending out tweets, “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild”. On that day, addressing his protesters, he sent them to Capitol, urging, “If you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore”. Hours later, the mob had stormed Capitol, disrupting the proceedings. The dedicated Capitol police force proved inadequate and the National Guard was called in. Five people died. After a day that will be remembered as one of the darkest days in U.S. history, Congress certified Mr. Biden’s victory clearing the way for him to be sworn in the 46th President of USA on 20 January.

Yet, the shock at the events and Mr. Trump’s role in inciting his supporters led to growing demands for him to step down. Mr. Pence was reluctant to invoke the 25th Amendment (it was designed to deal with a president suffering incapacitation) leading to the House passing an impeachment motion on 13 January. The charges framed included “threatening the integrity of the democratic system, interfering with peaceful transition of power and imperilling a coequal branch of government”. While many Republicans did hold Trump responsible, they were reluctant on impeaching and finally, only 10 of them supported the motion that was carried by 232 votes against 197.

The fate of the impeachment motion is uncertain in the Senate. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell though privately supportive of impeachment, has not indicated how he would vote. Given the requirement of two-thirds majority for conviction and the Senate at fifty-fifty, it is difficult to gauge if there will be 17 Republican Senators needed. In 2019, Mr. Trump was impeached by the House over his dealings with Ukraine but cleared by the Senate. For the Democrats, the impeachment is as much about Mr. Trump as it is about indicting Trumpism. For the Republican Party however, it is a polarising moment. The question its leaders need to introspect over is why they allowed Mr. Trump to take over the GOP. A recent poll suggests that 64% of the Republican voters remain convinced that the election was stolen. GOP’s challenge is how to reject Trumpism while retaining the Trump supporters.

The brutal reality is that in 2016, Republicans held the House, the Senate and won the White House but in the last four years, they first lost the House and now have lost both the White House and their Senate majority. This is despite the record turnout and in the process, the country has been badly divided. Purging GOP of Trumpism will not be easy especially if Trump does plan to run again in 2024. That is why there is talk of invoking the 14th Amendment provisions by which a simple majority in the Congress can bar Mr. Trump from running for any federal office.

Populism and Social Media

Somewhat belatedly, Twitter and Facebook removed Trump’s accounts and along with a number of other right-leaning platforms linked to QAnon. Apple and Google stopped carrying the right-wing chat group Parler App while Amazon declined to host its data on its servers, effectively killing it. This has led to legitimate questions about free speech, the monopoly of social media platforms, the viability of their economic model and who should determine policy in the digital public domain. The European Union is accelerating consideration of new rules to guide content moderation policies of social media networks.

In How to Lose A Country (2019), Turkish writer Ece Temelkuren writes about how a democracy descends into populism, majoritarianism and finally authoritarianism. Opposition is delegitimised, the leader claims to represent the real people, who claim title to victimhood thereby aggressively claiming their dignity; and the elites become either irrelevant or, worse, instruments of oppression. Terms of political discourse shift, secular liberals become “sickular libtards”, facts are questioned and an alt-reality takes shape firing up the believers. This risk is not new but social media is a tool that aids such manipulation.

The U.S. is not the first democratic society to face this threat and even as Mr. Biden tackles the challenges of COVID-19 and economic recovery, his real challenge will be rebuilding the traditions of democratic discourse aimed at enlarging the centrist consensus. With Ms. Harris casting the tie-breaker in the Senate, Democrats control the Congress, though taking recourse to this thin majority will only exacerbate divisions and mutual recriminations. That is the legacy of Trumpism that must be undone if U.S. democracy has to successfully graduate from its stress test.

*****