Tag Archives: U.S.

Fordaw-ard Thinking

Posted on by
Reply

Published in Times of India on June 23, 2025

When Israel launched surprise strikes on Iran on June 13, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knew he was taking a calculated gamble. But the stakes were high. If he succeeded in taking out the nuclear and missile threats that he called “existential,” his political future would be secure but to achieve that, he had to bring the U.S. into the war. Only the U.S. had the bunker buster bombs (GBU-57) and the B-2 heavy bombers, necessary to take out Fordaw, the underground enrichment facility near Qom.

After urging Iran to come back to the negotiating table, on June 19, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he was “giving Iran a period of time-two weeks would be the maximum”. Simultaneously, he had also asked for military options to be prepared. Two US aircraft carrier task forces, USS Nimitz and USS Gerald Ford were deployed to the region, adding another 150 fighter aircraft, to bolster the USS Carl Vinson; B-2 bombers were flying into Diego Garcia.

Mr. Trump knew that his MAGA support base was opposed to the U.S. getting involved in a war in the Middle East. He too was eager to do a deal with Iran but had bought into Mr. Netanyahu’s line that some amount of military pressure would help in persuading Iran to be more reasonable.

Israel’s calculus works

Finally, Mr. Netanyahu’s gamble paid off. In the early hours of June 22, three B-2 bombers successfully dropped two GBU-57 bombs each at Fordaw and U.S. submarines fired at least 30 Tomahawk missiles at the nuclear facilities at Natanz and Isfahan. Announcing the destruction of the nuclear sites, Mr Trump added with a characteristic flourish, “NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE.” A one-off strike by the U.S. that leads to negotiations with a chastened Iran may yet be the best outcome for Mr. Trump.

Iran retaliated by targeting Tel Aviv and Haifa with two waves of rocket strikes. However, the question is whether Iran will now accept Mr. Trump’s invitation to resume talks or escalate by hitting U.S. assets and bases in the region?   

Iran’s leadership can be pragmatic. It is one thing to continue the missile and drone exchanges with Israel for another week but a pragmatic Iranian leadership would not want to take on the U.S. directly. It may prefer to save the Islamic regime by accepting talks with the U.S. and getting the Israelis off their backs.

There are indications that the U.S. had informed Iran in advance about the impending strikes so that casualties could be minimised. Unlike Israel that would like to see the end of the theocratic regime even if there is no plan for a day after and it leads to wider regional instability, the U.S. will be cautious as will its allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, and all three carry influence in the Trump White House. 

Iran’s nuclear journey

The Islamic revolution in Iran was a year old when Iraq attacked in 1980. The war lasted eight years causing heavy losses, over half a million dead. Eventually, to save the regime, Ayatollah Khomenei accepted a UN brokered ceasefire in 1988. Iraq’s blatant use of chemical weapons was largely ignored by the Western countries and the Soviet Union was preoccupied in trying to manage an exit from the quagmire of Afghanistan. It is during this period that Iranian leaders began to consider the need for a nuclear deterrent, though as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it had forsworn the development of nuclear weapons and had accepted full-scope-safeguards by the IAEA.

It had followed India and Pakistan’s different nuclear paths but neither of the two had joined the NPT. Another example was North Korea; it joined the NPT in 1985 and announced its intention of quitting in 1993 leading to a flurry of negotiations. In 1994, it put its withdrawal notice on hold as it concluded a Framework Agreement with the Clinton administration taking the lead. However, after President George Bush included it in his “axis of evil” speech, it withdrew from the NPT in 2002 and carried out its first test in 2006. Iran’s conclusion was to remain within the NPT and develop capabilities that would lead it to becoming a threshold state, without crossing the red line.

With the losses it has incurred, both material and human, Iran will have to review its strategy but it will need breathing room for it, only possible by concluding a deal with Mr. Trump. President Pezeshkian is considered a ‘moderate’ but enjoys the support of the Supreme Leader and Foreign Minister Hassan Aragchi is a consummate nuclear negotiator who was also involved with the JCPOA negotiations. As a negotiating tactic, the Iranian Majlis could pass a resolution recommending withdrawal from the NPT. As a civilisational state, Iran understands the virtues of patience, rooted in the confidence of its longevity.

A weakening nuclear regime

For other countries pondering over their nuclear security, the writing on the wall is clear. Deterring a nuclear adversary is not going to be possible with threshold status; it needs a nuclear deterrent. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s when India claimed to safeguard it ’nuclear option’, today, threshold status is a dangerous place to be in. Countries that enjoy the U.S.’ extended nuclear umbrella will also undertake a rethink. Meanwhile, China will be pleased at the prospects of U.S. getting involved in the Middle East, whether in negotiations or in bombings.

*****

The New Normal after Pahalgam, India’s Response

Posted on by
Reply

Published in The Hindu on May 17, 2025

Operation Sindoor is on ‘pause’ and though the ceasefire began somewhat shakily on Saturday evening (May 10), it seems to be holding. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) – India and Pakistan – had a follow-up conversation and discussed further de-escalatory measures to reduce troop presence in the forward areas that had seen a buildup in recent weeks.

Addressing the nation on Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror…setting a new standard and a new normal in counter-terrorism measures.” Kinetic retaliation is not new. The Modi government conducted “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 after the Uri attack, and an air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019 following the Pulwama suicide attack. Yet, the Pahalgam response was qualitatively different.  

88 hours to ceasefire

After the Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear that the Indian government would respond with force. The only question of when and in what manner. The measures announced in the days that followed such as reducing diplomatic presence, switching off trade, closing down the Wagah-Attari border crossing, cancelling existing visas, and putting the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, were a strong response but not a substitute for kinetic retaliation.

The intervening fortnight till May 7 was used in finalising targets for kinetic retaliation and ramping up diplomatic engagement at all levels. Post 2019, Indian authorities were certain that sooner or later, there would be a terrorist attack of a magnitude that would compel a calibrated military response. This demanded planning and periodic updating, based on evolving technical capabilities. Eventually, nine targets were chosen out of nearly two dozen options.  The intense diplomatic engagement at all levels, in Delhi and other key capitals, prepared the ground to ensure an acceptance (though sometimes with caveats) of India’s right to target the terrorists and their infrastructure.  India’s challenge was to restore red lines while managing the escalation narrative and leaving a de-escalation option open.

Shortly after the May 7 early morning strike was concluded, the Pakistan DGMO Maj Gen Kashif Abdullah was informed of the nine locations targeted as these were closely associated with designated terrorist groups, Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT), JeM, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. India emphasised that Op Sindoor was against the terrorists and not the Pakistani military or the Pakistani people. It added that if the Pakistani forces responded, India would reserve the right to retaliate.

Pakistan acknowledged the strike (at six locations) and claimed that it had downed between five to six Indian aircraft, including some Rafale fighter jets, though this was denied by India. It offered an off-ramps de-escalation option – Pakistan claiming success in terms of taking down Indian aircraft, playing down the impact of Indian strikes, and taking the issue of violation of its territory to the United Nations Security Council where it is currently a non-permanent member.

However, Pakistan’s military leadership saw it as an opportunity to bolster its faltering image and vowed military retaliation. The following two nights, Pakistan mounted escalating drone intrusions, together with some loitering munitions and missile firings, over 36 locations along the 3,300 kilometre-long border, more with the intent to probe for gaps in India’s air defences. India retaliated, with its declared quid pro quo plus policy, targeting Pakistani air bases and air defence units. However, Pakistan denied its intrusions even as it blamed India for repeated violations and attacks. Its air space remained open for civilian air traffic, prompting an Indian warning on May 9 that this was jeopardising civilian air traffic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) board meeting on May 9 to approve the next tranche of the IMF Extended Fund Facility (loan to Pakistan) necessitated prudence.  

The night of 9-10 May witnessed a dramatic escalation. Pakistan claimed to have struck 26 Indian targets “to reestablish deterrence after repeated Indian attacks.” India acknowledged “limited damage to equipment and personnel at air force stations Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur, and Bhuj.” Indian response on the morning of May 10 was ferocious and targeted nine military airfields from Skardu and Chaklala in the north to Rahim Yar Khan and Jacobabad in the south as well as three forward air defence units. The stand-off weapons used included the Scalp and BrahMos missiles as well as Crystal Maze, Hammer and Spice 2000 precision guided munitions.

The previous 24 hours had seen intense diplomatic activity with a flurry of telephone calls between Washington, Islamabad, and Delhi. Following a conversation between the two DGMOs in the afternoon, a ceasefire came into effect at 1700 hours on May 10.

The U.S.’s role

Initially, the U.S. adopted a hands-off approach with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting on May 8 that the U.S. was not going to get involved “in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” However, within 24 hours, the U.S. assessment changed as it picked up signs of more cross-border strikes and reports that Pakistan was scheduling a meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA). While Mr. Vance spoke to PM Modi on the evening of May 9 (Indian time), sharing the U.S.’s concerns about a “dramatic escalation” and again the following day (Indian time), U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir, following it up with calls to his counterparts India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif announced on May 10 that no meeting of the NCA had taken place.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s message on May 10 pre-empted the official announcement about the ceasefire raising questions about the U.S.’s role. The fact is that after 1998, the U.S. has played a role in de-escalating multiple crises: Kargil in 1999, the Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram in 2001, Mumbai in 2008 and Balakot in 2019, the exception being the 2016 surgical strikes that Pakistan denied had happened. Yet, none of these instances have led to U.S. mediation and there is little reason to think otherwise this time. There are only two ways of avoiding external intervention – first, increase the economic and military differential with Pakistan, and second, have independent communication channels between the two countries.   

Conflict under the nuclear shadow

Since 1998 when both India and Pakistan emerged as nuclear-weapon-states, Pakistan’s approach has been to reduce the space for conventional war, by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use. The objective is to constrain India’s space for a kinetic response to a terrorist attack. However, this is no longer working.  If the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ made kinetic retaliation the new normal, Balakot enlarged it in 2019 by introducing air power, and Operation Sindoor has expanded it to cover all of Pakistan. So far, India has emphasised that it has been retaliating against terrorist targets – launch pads across the LoC in 2016, Balakot training camp in 2019, and the nine locations now (Operation Sindoor). However, Mr. Modi has added a new dimension.

In the expansive ‘new normal’ that he outlined on May 12, he reiterated India’s right to respond militarily to any terror attack and not be deterred by “nuclear blackmail”, but added that India would not differentiate between terrorists and their masterminds or the governments sponsoring terrorism. This addition puts Pakistani military on notice that the next time, India’s kinetic response under an Operation Sindoor 2.0 may not be limited to terrorist targets. The hardening position is evident in his statement, “terror and talks cannot go together; terror and trade cannot go together; water and blood cannot flow together.”

By expanding the scope of conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, Mr. Modi is seeking to nullify the nuclear overhang but this requires a significant expansion in conventional capabilities. Capabilities to suppress hostile air defences and adopt a network-centric-approach that seamlessly integrates manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based support for surveillance, communication and targeting, will need to be introduced. Simultaneously, India needs to draw lessons from the intelligence and security lapses that led to Pahalgam, in order to better plan, predict and prevent future Pahalgams. Only then will the expansive ‘new normal’ be a credible deterrent against future terrorist attacks.

*****

Diplomatic Discussions Are Best Held In Camera

Posted on by
Reply

For Trump, It’s All For Good TV

Published in The Print on March 7, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/diplomatic-discussions-are-best-held-in-camera-for-trump-its-all-for-good-tv/2537827/

Last Friday, the Oval Office provided an unusual stage for diplomatic theatre that stunned audiences around the world. The live telecast of the unscripted exchange between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian and US President Donald Trump, a former reality TV star, with J D Vance playing a supporting role, has become the stuff of diplomatic legend, with reactions ranging from applause and awe to shock and horror.

Perhaps, there was a hint of what was to come when Trump remarked “Oh, you are all dressed up,” as he welcomed Zelensky to the White House. Or in an early question by a reporter about why he wasn’t wearing a suit in “United States’ highest office?” But if so, it didn’t register with Zelensky. When Vance praised Trump’s efforts at diplomacy and Zelensky questioned it, Vance belligerently accused him of being “disrespectful” instead of being “thanking the president.” Zelensky remonstrated but Trump intervened, telling him that he didn’t “have the  cards” and blamed him for “gambling with World War III.” Minutes later, Trump ordered the media to leave but added that “This (their spat) is going to be great television.”

Since then, the signalling has continued through media and X. On 1 March, Trump said that “Zelensky is not ready for peace.” The following day, Zelensky said after his London meeting that a peace deal is “still very very far away” angering Trump, who responded that “America will not put up with this for longer.” On 3 March, US announced that it was pausing all aid to Ukraine, even as European leaders were finding ways of repairing the damage. Meanwhile, on Saturday, Elon Musk tweeted “I agree” to a post from someone who wrote, “It’s time to leave NATO and the UN.”

Political leaders make use of media, including social media, for signalling to different audiences, both at home and abroad. But there is a good reason why diplomatic discussions and negotiations are conducted in camera. It permits the parties concerned to protect the image of the leaders, allow diplomatic summitry to maintain the aura of gravitas of diplomatic summitry, and control  the narrative. The Trump-Zelensky encounter is an example of how both sides lost control of the plot.

Some policy analysts feel that US outreach to Putin is to dilute the Russia-China bond, reminiscent of the 1971 Kissinger visit to China to divide the Communist bloc. But the parallel is misplaced. In 1971, cracks were visible in the China-Soviet relationship, and second, the US was not creating a divide within the Western bloc.

The substance of US diplomacy

Zelensky knew that he held the weaker hand. Had he kept it in mind in the Oval Office, he could have sidestepped the provocation. Trump and Vance revel in the in-your-face approach, both domestically and with other leaders. However, exposing a growing US-Europe divide on Ukraine and other issues only weakens the US hand by giving comfort to Putin and Xi Jinping.

Realism has always been an integral part of diplomacy. Political leaders, whether democrats or autocrats, instinctively know that idealism is not the strategy for survival. Writing in the fourth century B.C., Greek historian Thucydides described the powerful Athenian delegation bluntly informing the weaker Melians, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Closer home, Kautilya elaborated how diplomacy and persuasion can amplify the effectiveness of power in the Arthashastra.

US presidents have never been idealists. Even President Roosevelt, the key architect of the United Nations, was clear that the real power would be exercised by the Security Council and within that, by the Permanent Members who enjoy veto powers. At the same time, he also realised that the principle of equality of sovereign states had to be respected to get a buy-in by all countries and so the General Assembly became the premier annual gathering. And this when the US accounted for 50 percent of global GDP!

Nixon extricated the US from Vietnam but needed the fig leaf of the Paris Peace Accords negotiated in 1973. Just as Biden used the agreement Trump had concluded with the Taliban to engineer the US exit from Afghanistan. Both were guided by realism but needed the diplomatic cover. During the Cold War, successive US presidents supported military dictatorships in pursuit of realism but couched it as a defence of democracy and the free world. Yet, when faced with the Soviet crackdowns in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the value-based diplomacy quickly yielded to realist prudence. 

Therefore, Trumpian diplomacy is not a departure from US diplomatic practice in substance; its change is more in Trump’s style of diplomacy. He may desire to Make America Great Again but he presides over an America that no longer enjoys the primacy it enjoyed in 1945 or 1991. Though President Theodore Roosevelt’s advice “speak softly and carry a big stick” was given at the beginning of the 20th century before the age of TV and social media, it remains valid because as President Abraham Lincoln famously said, “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.” Trump would do well to heed the advice of his predecessors and not be seduced by his own voice on Truth Social.

*****

R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended

Posted on by
Reply

I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/

Remembering Dr R Chidambaram

From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)

I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.

In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.

In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.  

Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.

At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.

Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.

Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.

The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.

At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.

It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.