To gain legitimacy, any global order needs to fulfil two conditions. First, a convergence among the major powers of the day; and, second, successfully presenting the outcome as a global public good to the rest of the world. The global nuclear order (GNO) was no exception but, today, it is under strain.
Lessons of the Cold War
The GNO was created in the shadow of the Cold War, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., leading the Western and the Socialist blocs, respectively. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the two came perilously close to launching a nuclear war, both President John F. Kennedy and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev understood two political realities. First, as the two nuclear super-powers, they needed bilateral mechanisms to prevent tensions from escalating to the nuclear level. And, second, nuclear weapons were dangerous and, therefore, their spread should be curbed. This convergence created the GNO.
During the Cuban crisis, a secret back-channel between President Kennedy’s brother Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, helped resolve the crisis. The first bilateral measure was the Hot Line, established in 1963, to enable the leaders to communicate directly. The Hot Line (later upgraded into Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres) was followed by arms control negotiations as the two nuclear superpowers sought to manage their nuclear arms race and maintain strategic stability.
To control proliferation, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. initiated multilateral negotiations in Geneva in 1965 on a treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Three years later, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), opened for signature. It began modestly with less than sixty parties but today, it is widely described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear order with 191 adherents.
The third element of the global nuclear order came into existence in 1975. India had chosen not to sign the NPT, and in 1974, stunned the world by conducting an underground nuclear explosion, or PNE. Seven countries (the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., Canada, France, Japan, and West Germany) held a series of meetings in London and concluded that ad-hoc export controls were urgently needed to ensure that nuclear technology, transferred for peaceful purposes, not be used for PNEs. London Club (as it was originally known) sounded inappropriate and later transformed into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, consisting of 48 countries today, which observe common guidelines for exporting nuclear and related dual-use materials, equipment, and technologies. Though Soviet Union and India enjoyed close relations, having signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971, U.S.S.R. was committed to upholding the GNO, and a founding member of the London Club.
Sustaining the nuclear order
The GNO has held reasonably well, particularly on two fronts. First, the taboo against nuclear weapons has held since 1945. It is a matter of debate how far the U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control process helped preserve the taboo or whether it was just plain luck but the fact is that humanity has survived 75 years of the nuclear age without blowing itself up.
Second, non-proliferation has been a success. Despite dire predictions of more than twenty countries possessing nuclear weapons by the 1970s, (there were five in 1968 – the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France, and China) only four countries have since gone nuclear, i.e., India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Even after the Cold War ended, non-proliferation remained a shared objective and Moscow and Washington cooperated to ensure that Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan that hosted Soviet nuclear weapons and possessed some capabilities, were denuclearised. In 1995, the NPT, originally concluded for 25 years, was extended into perpetuity.
On other counts, the record is mixed. Arms control did not end the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear race; in fact, their arsenals grew from 28,000 bombs in 1962 to over 65,000 bombs in the early 1980s but the dialogue and some agreements provided a semblance of managing the arms race. Agreements like SALT I and II, ABM treaty, INF Treaty, START I and the New START were concluded. Since the late 1980s, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals have declined sharply, to below 12,000 bombs today, though much of this can be attributed to the end of the Cold War rivalry and the breakup of the U.S.S.R.
The two nuclear hegemons shared a notion of ‘strategic stability’ based on assured second strike capability, guaranteed by the enormous arsenals that both had built up. This eliminated any incentive to strike first ensuring deterrence stability. Arms control negotiations led to parity in strategic capacities creating a sense of arms race stability, and fail-safe communication links provided crisis management stability. These understandings of nuclear deterrence in a bipolar world outlasted the Cold War but are under question.
Changing geopolitics
Today’s nuclear world is no longer a bipolar world. The U.S. faces a more assertive China, determined to regain influence, regionally and globally. This rivalry is different from the Cold War because both economies are closely intertwined and further, China is an economic and technological peer rival. China has resented the U.S.’s naval presence in the South China and East China Seas and since the last Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, has steadily built up its naval and missile capabilities. These were on display in August last year to demonstrate changing power equations following Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
Changing geopolitics has taken its toll on the treaties between the U.S. and Russia. In 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and in 2019, from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on grounds that Russia was violating it. The only remaining agreement, New START, will lapse in 2026; its verification meetings were suspended during the COVID-19 outbreak and never resumed. Strategic stability talks began in 2021 following the Geneva meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, but collapsed with the Ukraine war. Last month, Russia de-ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to bring it on a par with the U.S., raising concerns about the resumption of nuclear testing. As U.S. relations with Russia went into a nosedive, the U.S. is facing a new situation of two nuclear peer rivals who are exploring new roles for more usable weapons. Moreover, Russian nuclear sabre rattling to warn North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the U.S. against escalation in Ukraine has revived nuclear concerns. The old definitions of strategic stability no longer hold.
The Cold War convergence on non-proliferation has run its course; also, nuclear weapons technology is a 75-year-old technology. The U.S. has always had a pragmatic streak shaping its policy approaches. It turned a blind eye when Israel went nuclear in the 1960s-70s and again, when China helped Pakistan with its nuclear programme in the 1980s. More recently, the nuclear submarine AUKUS deal (Australia, U.K., U.S.) with Australia, a non-nuclear weapon state, is raising concerns in the NPT community.
During the 1970s, South Korea began to actively consider a nuclear weapons programme, spurred by the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. However, France withdrew its offer to supply a reprocessing plant to South Korea under U.S. pressure in 1975-76 and South Korea was persuaded to join the NPT. Recent opinion polls indicate a 70% support for developing a national nuclear deterrent and 40% for reintroducing U.S. nuclear weapons (withdrawn in 1991) on its territory.
From 1977 to 1988, the U.S. actively subverted Taiwan’s nuclear weapons programme as it stepped up a normalisation of ties with China. As a nuclear victim, the Japanese public retains a strong anti-nuclear sentiment but there is a shift, visible in Japan’s decision to double its defence spending over next five years.
During the Cold War, the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella tied its European allies closer. Today, domestic compulsions are turning the U.S. inwards, raising questions in the minds of its allies about its ‘extended deterrence’ guarantees, especially in East Asia. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have the technical capabilities to develop their independent nuclear deterrents within a short time, given political will. It is only a matter of time before U.S. pragmatism reaches the inevitable conclusion that more independent nuclear deterrent capabilities may be the best way to handle the rivalry with China.
1971 is widely remembered as a liberation war, a war that led to the creation of a new country. It was not the first of the India-Pakistan wars; the two countries had been to war twice earlier, in 1947-48 and again in 1965. It was also not to be the last one, as Kargil war showed us in 1999. Yet, of all four, the 1971 war is remembered as the decisive one. All wars and battles lead to outcomes, invariably interpreted as victory or defeat by the protagonists and the India-Pakistan wars are no different. None of the four wars succeeded in ending the hostile relationship between the two because they remained inconclusive but the 1971 war is still accepted as a decisive victory for India. That is how history remembers it fifty years later; for it achieved an outcome that changed the map of the region forever.
Battles are fought on land, in the air and in the seas and oceans but outcomes of wars are also determined in meeting rooms and conference halls. 1971 is seen as a decisive victory for India because it reflected an Indian victory in shaping the narrative, domestically, regionally and globally. Yet, like in all wars, there were uncertainties and India had to cater for the unexpected. There were unanticipated developments that forced Indian leaders to adapt and modify goalposts but without losing control of the historical narrative. This article seeks to explore the dimensions of the 1971 war not on the battlefield but around conference tables and tension filled meeting rooms.
Seeds of the conflict
The war began in 1971 but the root causes go further back into history. A short appreciation illustrates how it helped Indian leaders shape the political narrative and take certain decisions. The seeds of differences between the leaders of East Pakistan and West Pakistan had been sown even before 1947. The ill-conceived partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon in 1905 provoked widespread resentment and agitations and had to be revoked in 1911. However, it heightened a sense of political awareness among the Muslims of Bengal. It is worth recalling that the Muslim League was founded in 1906 in Dhaka by the Nawab of Dhaka and included many prominent Bengali Muslims like Shaheed Suhrawardy, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Fazlul Haq. In subsequent years, the Muslim League leadership began to be dominated by Muslims from the north and west and very often, these leaders came from more elitist backgrounds.
In 1946, distance between the Bengali leaders of the League and Jinnah were surfacing and find mention in Suhrawardy’s letter to Chowdhary Khaliquzzaman. By this time, partition of India was emerging as a likely outcome, and while in the west, there were contiguous Muslim majority areas, the same was not the case in Bengal and Bihar. Suhrawardy reflected concerns about Muslims where they were in minority provinces and questioned Jinnah’s obsession with partition.
A key reason was that the Bengali Muslim identity was deeply rooted in the culture and linguistic traditions of Bengal. Bengali Muslims did not take to adoption of Urdu, Arabic or Persian instruments to emphasise their religious identity. In this sense, they were akin to the Muslim communities of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. They were influenced more by Bhakti and Sufi traditions than by Hanafi or Wahabi influences. However, the political tides took their toll and Pakistan emerged with two units – East and West Pakistan separated by 1500 miles of India in the middle.
After Liaqat Ali’s assassination in 1952, though both Shaheed Suhrawardy and Khwaja Nazimuddin served briefly as Prime Ministers, the power centre was shifting westwards. The erosion of East Pakistan’s autonomy began soon after 1947. Bengali Muslim League leaders were often given short shrift. Discussions on the constitution came to an impasse because West Pakistan was unwilling to accept a legislature that would have greater Bengali representation based on populations of the two wings. Jinnah’s fiat in 1951 about Urdu as the national language led to riots in Dhaka.
By 1954, the Awami faction of the Pakistan Muslim League had dropped the first two words and emerged as the Awami League. The growing marginalisation of the Muslim League at the hands of the Awami League led Gen Ayub Khan to overthrow the civilian government and declare martial law in 1958. A similar electoral outcome in 1970 eventually led Awami League to spearhead the call for independence in 1971.
Along with political discrimination, East Pakistan also suffered growing economic discrimination. The Planning Commission of Pakistan provided the most conclusive data in its reports. In 1949-50, the per capita income in East Pakistan was Rs 288 compared to Rs 351 in West Pakistan. By 1969-70, the disparity had widened and East Pakistan’s figure had risen to Rs 331, while West Pakistan’s per capita income had grown to Rs 533. Similar discrepancies were visible in terms of infrastructure, health and educational facilities. East Pakistan received 25 percent of investment despite being home to over half the population. Its share of Pakistan’s export earnings was between 50 and 70 percent during this period but its share of imports ranged between 25 and 30 percent. According to the Planning Commission, the net transfer of resources during these two decades from East to West was $ 2.6 billion.
The economic domination was made easier by the military rule that reinforced the West Pakistani domination in the military forces and the civil services. By 1970, 84 percent of the civil service and 85 percent of the diplomatic service was West Pakistani as was 95 percent of the army. Among the air force pilots, 89 percent were from the West. It is this frustration that led Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as President of the Awami League to announce the 6-point demand in 1966 for restructuring of the Pakistani state in a manner that would provide autonomy to the East.
The points included a federal parliamentary government; devolution of power with federal government authority restricted to defence and foreign affairs; effective measures to prevent flight of capital from East to West or two separate and freely convertible currencies; revenue and taxation powers with federating units and a percentage of the revenue to be given to the centre; separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; and, the setting up a separate para-military force for East Pakistan. As the 6 points gained greater traction, the groundswell of protests grew and Gen Ayub Khan was forced to resign in 1969.
His successor Gen Yahya Khan initially declared martial law but was then forced to convene general elections in December 1970. In a National Assembly of 313 members, Awami League made a clean sweep in the east, winning 167 seats; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s PPP was a distant second with 88 seats. It was clear that Sheikh Mujib would be the next PM while his party would also provide the Chief Minister for East Pakistan. Bhutto began to raise questions about Sheikh Mujib’s authority to change the constitution in keeping with the 6-point agenda and demanded equal authority as a representative of the West though his party had not won any seat in NWFP or Balochistan. The election outcome was a perfect reflection of the polarisation of the political structures.
Till this point, India had made no comments on the situation except to welcome the holding of the general elections so that a democratically elected government would take over from the military rulers. However, the National Assembly was never convened. Protests broke out in march against the delays, leading to firing and casualties in East Pakistan. As protests spread, martial law provisions were implemented ruthlessly. Sheikh Mujib refused to enter into a power sharing arrangement at the centre that Bhutto proposed or dilute his demands for autonomy. The last round of talks ended on 25 March and Bhutto returned to Karachi even as the National Assembly was to convene the following day. That night Operation Searchlight was launched, a brutal, genocidal crackdown, across the board aimed at crushing any dissent. Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown out to Rawalpindi.
India gets involved
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the issue in parliament, criticising the military repression, expressing concern and urging restoration of democratic processes. Supportive resolutions were adopted by consensus. Overflights of Pakistani aircraft were suspended. After Sheikh Mujib’s arrest, the other members of the Awami leadership escaped entering border districts of West Bengal. In early April, an independent government of Bangla Desh was established on the border, its location was named Mujibnagar. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was declared President in absentia; Syed Nazrul Islam and Tajuddin Ahmed were appointed Vice President and Prime Minister respectively. Further, India gave refuge to the East Pakistani military and para-military elements who were escaping the brutal crackdown overseen by Lt Gen Tikka Khan.
The few East Pakistani army officers deployed in the east defected; the two senior most were Col M A G Osmani and Major Ziaur Rahman and the others in West Pakistan were put under house arrest. An underground resistance took shape under the leadership of Major Rahman. The youth wing of the Awami League reconstituted themselves as the Mukti Bahini under the leadership of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni (Sheikh Mujib’s nephew), Tofail Ahmed and ‘Tiger’ Kader Siddiqui. Together, they formed the core of the resistance. In some of the sub-districts, they captured treasuries and acquired some weapons. With these resources, they turned to India for help and Indian intelligence agencies, led by the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) got involved.
The outflow of refugees that had been a trickle soon turned into a torrent. By mid-May, neighbouring states of Assam, Tripura and West Bengal were hosting over five million refugees stretching the local resources. India began to agitate the East Pakistan issue as a humanitarian and refugee crisis in the relevant United Nations bodies in New York and Geneva. Internally, a Core Group was set up under Principal Secretary to PM P N Haksar, including Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee D P Dhar, Foreign Secretary T N Kaul, R&AW chief R N Kao and PN Dhar, Secretary to PM. At the cabinet level, Mrs Indira Gandhi consulted Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, Finance Minister Y B Chavan and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh.
Initially, Mrs Gandhi favoured the idea of giving immediate recognition to Bangla Desh as a free country with a government in exile but others including Swaran Singh felt that India needed time to prepare the ground for gaining broad international acceptance; otherwise, India ran the risk of being blamed for interfering in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country and encouraging secession. It was also clear that immediate recognition would very likely lead to military operations in East Pakistan and Jagjivan Ram and Army chief Gen S H F J Manekshaw both sought time for adequate planning and resourcing as the conflict could also escalate into the western theatre, leading to a two-front situation.
Accordingly, an evolutionary policy approach was adopted with the necessary preparations to exercise the military option at a later date. The political understanding was that the Pakistan regime needed to respect the outcome of the December election and for this, the first step is the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and commencement of a political dialogue. The second decision was to demand an end to the military crackdown in East Pakistan and a return of the troops to their barracks so that conditions for the return of the refugees could begin to be created. While the international community, especially key major powers needed to be approached to use their influence with Pakistan for the above two points, UN and its agencies would be sensitised to the refugee crisis to generate relief and rehabilitation assistance. Finally, resources for the military option were cleared so that necessary procurement could be fast tracked. Gen Manekshaw had the lessons of 1962 war with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan in mind and needed a better trained and better equipped force. Further, he also needed far greater coordination with the Air Force and Navy than had been in evidence earlier.
From June to December, the Ministry of External Affairs became the instrument for the campaign on the first two points, even as senior political leaders led by Mrs Gandhi visited selected capitals. Following closure of Indian air space, Pakistani aircraft had been using Colombo as a transit point. After some reluctance, Sri Lanka was finally persuaded in end-July to withdraw this facility. By this time the number of refugees had crossed eight million. Pakistan refused to release Sheikh Mujib, accused India of seeking a break-up of Pakistan, called the refugees as ‘rebels and secessionists’ and continued its crackdown.
The first fortnight of July unveiled a new surprise. On 6 July, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger landed in Delhi for talks. His message was to urge India to be patient even as news were breaking about US having resumed military supplies to Pakistan. After two days of bruising meetings in Delhi he took off for Islamabad. After a day, he feigned illness, ostensibly went to Nathiagali to recover, while he took off for his secret visit to Beijing that had been in the making and for which, Gen Yahya Khan had played the go-between. After returning to Islamabad, having recovered from his illness and returned to the US. On 15 July, US president Richard Nixon announced to a stunned world that he had accepted an invitation to visit China. As the details of Pakistan’s role emerged, Indian leaders were forced to review their options.
As we now know, Washington was fully aware of the developments in East Pakistan. The US Consul General in Dhaka Archer Blood sent a telegram to Washington in end-March, days after the beginning of Operation Searchlight, titled ‘Selective Genocide’. When it did not elicit a response, it was followed up in subsequent weeks with more details of the killings and then finally he and twenty of his colleagues sent the now famous ‘Dissent Telegram’, conveying disagreement with US policy on Pakistan and describing it as ‘moral bankruptcy’. By end-April, he was sacked from the post and returned to the US where he was assigned to the Personnel Department. US never asked for the release of Sheikh Mujib or criticised Gen Yahya Khan for the military crackdown; it merely asked him to seek a political solution.
Even when US Ambassador in Islamabad Joseph Farland reported that Pakistan could not hold on to its eastern wing, Kissinger’s response was that the US needed six months to pull off the China visit. The US effort therefore was to prevent India from going for the military option. The last straw was the message conveyed by Kissinger to Indian Ambassador L K Jha on 17 July that in case a war broke out between India and Pakistan and China got involved on Pakistan’s side, US would be unable to help India.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Friendship and Co-operation had been under discussion for a couple of years. There was already movement to fast track it and D P Dhar had been following it up. It was now finalised and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko flew to Delhi for the signing on 7 August. It included a significant clause calling for mutual consultations in the event of a threat to either party. Indian military planners had to factor in not just a two-front war with Pakistan but also the possibility of China upping the ante in the north-east. This was not an exaggerated notion. After the 1965 war, Bhutto had visualised that in the next conflict, coordination with China would be essential, in the north-east and particularly close to Sikkim down to the ‘chicken’s neck’. Bhutto was an influential leader and his own political ambitions had contributed to the East Pakistan crisis. From India’s point of view, a non-hostile Bangla Desh was strategically preferable to a hostile East Pakistan. Further, it was a negation of the two-nation theory that had formed the basis of the creation of Pakistan in the first place. The die was cast.
Setting the stage
Swaran Singh resumed his travels to key European capitals and US and Canada. K C Pant visited a number of Asian and Latin American capitals. Mohammed Yunus took on the responsibility of covering the Arab countries. The response was disappointing. Even where there was sympathy, there was a reluctance to get drawn into an issue that had larger ramifications. Territorial break-up of a state was difficult to accept and Pakistan was a member of Western military alliances, SEATO and CENTO. China and the US were openly supporting Pakistan and the Islamic world displayed a clear sympathy for Pakistan. NAM was moribund.
However, international public opinion was getting energised. Media had begun to carry harrowing stories and pictures of the refugee camps. Joan Baez took up the cause in a series of concerts called Song for Bangla Desh. Pandit Ravi Shankar and George Harrison organised the Concert for Bangla Desh bringing together the Beatles, Eric Clapton and Bob Dylan, among others. In October-November, visits to the refugee camps by people like Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Senator Edward Kennedy and prominent French intellectual Andre Malraux kept the world opinion sensitised to the humanitarian tragedy.
Meanwhile, at home, arrangements were made to enable the government in exile to establish contact with East Pakistani diaspora in other countries. The entire Bengali component of the Pakistani consulate in Calcutta had resigned and had joined the establishment in Mujibnagar. A Branch Secretariat of the MEA to coordinate the different needs and requirements of the growing refugee camps as well as the government in exile, was established in Calcutta, with representation from other branches of the government. Indian missions abroad were receiving requests for asylum from East Pakistani diplomats and officials that needed vetting. Gen Yahya Khan was threatening to charge Sheikh Mujib with treason and subject him to a court martial.
A last-ditch diplomatic exercise was set to unfold at the UN General Assembly in the third week of September. It was vital to ensure that India’s options not be constrained by any move by Pakistan, in concert with the US, through the Security Council. Even delaying tactics were to be blocked. Pakistan’s appeal was for preserving the territorial integrity of a member state. It was mooted that Pakistan may be receptive to taking back only the Muslim refugees provided the international community paid for their resettlement. The 1970 election was forgotten. Awami League was declared a secessionist party and therefore to be disbanded. Once West Pakistan’s authority was restored, a civilian government would be put in place. In the UN, the majority of the countries only addressed the humanitarian aspect and shied away from addressing the political issues. Some suggested that India and Pakistan should settle it bilaterally. Less than half a dozen countries supported the idea of respecting the will of the people reflected in the electoral outcome. The idea of a liberation struggle found no takers.
Even as India explored the possibility of a delegation of the Bangla Desh government in exile to visit New York to address the UN and engage directly with people, US Consulate in Calcutta was seeking to establish its own links with some members of the government in exile in order to explore if they were open to direct talks with the Yahya regime and create an embarrassing split. Meanwhile the Mukti Bahini had stepped up its activities in East Pakistan. Domestic public opinion in India was urging Mrs Gandhi to be more forthcoming in supporting the Mukti Bahini and recognising the government in exile. By mid-November it was clear that operational support for the freedom fighters needed to be stepped up, the liberation war could not be a prolonged affair and, Indian military action was inevitable.
In October-November, Mrs Gandhi undertook a series of foreign visits covering Moscow, Bonn, Paris, London and concluding with Washington on 4-5 November. The responses were along predictable lines. US had opened links to the Soviet Union suggesting that détente could be jeopardised if they encouraged India to declare war on Pakistan. In Moscow, Soviet leaders supported the calls for an end to the military crackdown and the killings as also release of Sheikh Mujib to enable a political settlement; in private talks, Premier Kosygin cautioned that a war might worsen the situation for India. She got a sympathetic hearing in Paris and Bonn from President Pompidou and Chancellor Willy Brandt respectively but a lukewarm reception in London. By this time, a Pakistani military build up on the western front had raised the prospects of war. After a frosty meeting with President Nixon in White House on 4 November, Mrs Gandhi decided to use the second meeting the following day on other global issues, completely bypassing the East Pakistan crisis.
The last of the doubts in Mrs Gandhi’s mind about avoiding war had vanished. She realised that that the international community could not support a return of the refugees. Moreover, the Mukti Bahini was becoming resentful at the restraints imposed on them by India. Pakistan adopted a policy of hot pursuit into India in the eastern sector, including using its airplanes. India responded in kind. Conflict broke out at Boyra on 22 November. The western sector was put on high alert. After some reservations on the part of Eastern Command the political decision was taken to set up a joint command with Col Osmani leading the freedom fighters. Mrs Gandhi was flying back from Calcutta to Delhi on 3 December when she learnt that Pakistani airplanes had undertaken pre-emptive strikes against Indian airfields in the western sector.
After landing in Delhi, an emergency meeting of the Cabinet was convened. A state of war with Pakistan was declared. Formal recognition was given to the state of Bangla Desh and they were invited to open a diplomatic mission in Delhi.
The 14-day war of 1971
The objectives of the military campaign were clear. In the east, it had to be the decisive defeat of the Pakistan army ensuring the transformation of East Pakistan into a free republic of Bangla Desh; in the west, it was to ensure that Pakistan was unable to make any gains in Jammu and Kashmir while exploring any possibilities for capturing territory in Rajasthan and Sindh that could be politically useful at the negotiating table. The force levels were deployed accordingly. Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen J S Aurora had a little over three corps assisted by two divisions of Mukti Bahini and the irregulars. This enabled the opening up of four fronts – from the west, north, north-east and east, simultaneously. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant along with two frigates and other supporting vessels was deployed on the eastern front. A significant force multiplier was the nearly 12 squadrons of the Indian Air Force deployed along the nine airfields in the east for supporting each of the four ground attack lines whose strategy was to bypass the major the major urban centres thereby cutting off the Pakistani forces and surround Dhaka. The Mukti Bahini played a key role in providing intelligence and undertaking sabotage for shaping the battlefield. In contrast, force levels in the west were more evenly balanced.
On the diplomatic front, the action shifted in the UN from the General Assembly to the Security Council. Pakistan accused India of creating and supporting a separatist movement in East Pakistan and now giving it open military support. India emphasised the socio-economic and political reasons for the growth of the liberation movement, the influx of the refugees and Pakistan’s aggression with air strikes on 3 December. Most states urged an immediate ceasefire and opening of a political dialogue without addressing the deeper political causes.
More than twenty resolutions were introduced in the Security Council. The US resolution called for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of the forces to their own borders to create an environment conducive to the return of the refugees with the help of the UN Secretary General. Many western country resolutions were similar to the US resolution. The USSR resolution called for a political settlement in East Pakistan that could end the hostilities and urged Pakistani forces from violence against its citizens. A Polish resolution urged that power be transferred to the elected representatives. China’s resolution condemned Indian aggression and demanded the withdrawal of Indian forces. Between December 4-16, USSR exercised a veto in support of India on seven occasions. The result was that the Security Council was prevented from taking any punitive actions against India that could have interfered with the liberation struggle and been a strategic setback for India.
Foreign Minister Swaran Singh arrived in New York on 10 December to present India’s case to the Security Council. Pakistan was represented by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Swaran Singh delivered his speech over two days as he sought consecutive translation instead of simultaneous translation, in view of the gravity of the situation. By 14 December, that the conflict in the east would end within the next 48 hours. Even USSR was urging India to move towards an end to the conflict. On 16 December, Swaran Singh informed the Security Council about the surrender of Dhaka and the following day at 2000 hrs (IST), India declared a unilateral ceasefire on the western front. Swaran Singh urged the Security Council to ensure that Pakistan reciprocated the unilateral ceasefire. After a dramatic tearing up of the draft resolutions, Bhutto blamed the Security Council for its inaction and staged a walk out. On his return to Pakistan, he took over as President and Civilian Martial Law Administrator from Gen Yahya Khan on 20 December. The following day, the Security Council adopted the resolution (UNSCR 307 of 1971) noting the ceasefire and urging both sides to ensure its durability.
While the fighting was on, US pulled out all the stops to put pressure on India. Chinese leadership was informed by Kissinger that US would support China if China were to take measures to neutralise any threat perceptions from India. On 12 December, China conveyed that having considered the options, it would be best to get a ceasefire through the Security Council. US also told USSR that détente process could be jeopardised if USSR did not use its influence on India to de-escalate the situation. To add to it, an 11-warship group, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise from the Seventh Fleet entered the Bay of Bengal on 13 December in an exercise in coercive diplomacy. The justification used that it was needed to safeguard the foreigners and evacuate them from Chittagong if necessary. Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers Firyubin and Kuznetsov visited Delhi for consultations. The message was that USSR would deal with the Seventh Fleet incursion, India should wrap up its operations in East Pakistan and immediately thereafter, announce a ceasefire on the western front. A Soviet naval task force including at least one nuclear submarine was directed to the area, with appropriate signalling. Eventually, the USS Enterprise departed just as Dhaka surrendered.
Such was the extent of self-delusion in the White House that immediately after the ceasefire, Kissinger congratulated Nixon for having saved West Pakistan. There had been no evidence that India had the resources or plans to dismember West Pakistan. However, flawed intelligence assessments were employed by the White House to deceive US friends and convince China that it was credible US military threats that had thwarted Indian plans.
The return to politics
In many ways wars become more interesting when the fighting stops. Negotiations begin. The spoils of war have to be legitimised. Negotiations are critical even though media attention moves on in search of new headlines. The 1971 war was no different. Keeping 93000 prisoners of war in safe custody while managing the post-war situation in terms of ensuring Sheikh Mujib’s return to Dhaka and keeping the logistics chains moving was a challenge. Pakistani prisoners were vulnerable to the Mukti Bahini, some of whom wanted to exact revenge, and they knew it.
In Pakistan, Bhutto was negotiating with Sheikh Mujib, asking him to intercede with India for the return of the POWs and give an assurance that no war crimes trials were conducted. Sheikh Mujib was flown to Ankara and then to London on January 8, 1972. He conveyed a message that he would fly back on a British airways special flight to Dhaka but would like to stop in Delhi to thank Mrs Gandhi and the people of India personally. On 9 January, he landed at Palam and after being received by Mrs Gandhi and the entire cabinet, the two leaders proceeded to the Parade Ground where a hundred thousand people had assembled to felicitate him. A couple of hours later, he left for Dhaka, landing in his own free country in the afternoon, to a tumultuous welcome by millions of his citizens.
India established its diplomatic presence in Bangla Desh when J N Dixit (later to become Foreign Secretary and NSA) presented his Letter of Commission as Minister in-charge of the Indian diplomatic mission, on 17 January to President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka. Bangla Desh was facing acute shortages of food supplies and health facilities; there was a breakdown in administrative structures and elements of Pakistan army had escaped and assembled into groups in the Chittagong hill tracts. Sheikh Mujib made three requests to Mrs Gandhi, for deputing Indian civil servants to run the district administrations for six months till Bangla Desh officials could take over, a continuing presence of Indian military to mop up the remnants of the Pakistan army, and across the board economic assistance for rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure and setting up a national airline and shipping line. All these were accepted. The Indian Navy helped clear the mines at Chittagong port. A brigade was deployed at Cox’s Bazaar. In February, Sheikh Mujib visited Calcutta to thank the people and in March, Mrs Gandhi became the first leader to visit Dhaka. Both visits were resoundingly successful.
Bhutto had set about repairing ties with the Islamic world by undertaking visits to Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria in January 1972. He also swallowed his disappointment with US and China and set about strengthening his diplomatic position for the negotiations with India. He withdrew from the Commonwealth but maintained cordial relations with UK. Two rounds of bilateral talks were held in Murree in February and April and the Simla summit was convened in July 1972. Bhutto’s objectives were – to secure the release of POWs, to prevent any war crimes trials, to maintain Pakistan’s stand on Jammu and Kashmir undiluted, and manage the optics to appear as an equal and not a vanquished party. On the Indian side, there were two views on whether to drive through a final settlement on Kashmir or set a process in motion. The negotiations were often on the verge of a breakdown. It is known that on 2 July Bhutto sought a long private meeting with Mrs Gandhi where some of the outstanding issues were ironed out. The Simla Agreement was signed late that night. There has been considerable speculation about whether there was a secret text or verbal assurances but so far, there is no conclusive evidence. The POWs were released. Kashmir was to be settled bilaterally and a Line of Control came into being.
Bhutto also was moving to normalise relations with Sheikh Mujib. OIC countries linked Bangla Desh’s admission to this and Sheikh Mujib visited Lahore in February 1974 to participate in the OIC summit. Pakistan recognised Bangla Desh and in July 1974, Bhutto paid an official visit to Dhaka. It was clear that Bhutto was seeking to play on the Islamic sentiments to reduce the extent of the Indian influence. It also opened an option for Bangla Desh to navigate between India and Pakistan when needed.
Later in 1974, India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion creating ripples across the globe and in the region. Sikkim was integrated into India in 1975. Later that year, political imperatives led Mrs Gandhi to declare a state of national emergency that lasted 21 months. In the elections held in 1977, she lost power. In Bangla Desh, Sheikh Mujib was assassinated in August 1975 and by the end of the year, military rule had been established in Bangla Desh by Gen Ziaur Rahman, earlier a key leader of the Mukti Bahini. In Pakistan, Bhutto won the elections in 1977 but allegations of rigging led to a military coup and later that year, he was deposed by Gen Zia ul Haq and executed two years later.
History had moved on.
Conclusion
Looking back, it is only fair to judge that 1971 reflected a combination of strategic decisiveness among the political leadership, a responsiveness to the changing ground reality, unity across the party lines, a setting out of clear political objectives and a relationship of trust in the advice rendered by the military leadership. An objective assessment of military strength was made as also its application in the different zones of war, the diplomatic, military and political actors worked on a common script, that enabled India to claim that it was on the right side of history.
The best laid plans are often the first casualty when conflict begins. However, in 1971, the military plans had been backed by training and where necessary, the local commanders exercised initiative. Covert operations by the committed Mukti Bahini in the east provided valuable insights to the Indian army as it progressed without getting bogged down in attrition warfare. The Indian Air Force had understood the lessons from the 1965 war and was able to integrate much more closely with the army operations in both sectors. The psychological impact of strikes on the Governor’s House in Dhaka, oil refineries in Karachi and Sui gas fields in Balochistan was considerable. The navy’s strategy of keeping INS Vikrant in the Andamans while the PNS Ghazi was prowling the Bay of Bengal was a clever tactic that yielded rich dividends once PNS Ghazi was neutralised.
Taking on an adversarial US and understanding the limits of Soviet political support also demanded taking political calls at appropriate times.
Finally, the 1971 war provided an important chapter in shaping India’s strategic culture.
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Selected Background Readings:
Srinath Raghavan, A Global History of the Creation of Bangla Desh (Harvard University Press, 2013)
J N Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (Books Today, India Today Group, 2002)
Arjun Subramaniam, India’s Wars – A Military History 1947-1971 (Harper Collins, 2016)
John Gill, An Atlas of the 1971 India-Pakistan War (National Defence University Press, 2003)
Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (Public Affairs, 2015)
Gary J Bass, The Blood Telegram (Random House, 2013)
While these provide a broad perspective, there are, in addition, numerous accounts and memoirs of the personalities directly involved in the political and military decision making.
The conflict in Ukraine and the recourse to nuclear rhetoric have revived concerns about nuclear escalation management between the major nuclear powers. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States-Russia nuclear rivalry had taken a backseat. Instead, North Korea, Iran and India-Pakistan got attention with many analysts getting nostalgic about ‘nuclear stability’ during the Cold War. But as is becoming clear now, in today’s changed political environment, the escalation management lessons of the Cold War no longer seem to work for the U.S. and Russia.
Deterrence failure
In June 2021, U.S. and Russian Presidents, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin met in Geneva. Nuclear arms control was a high priority item on the agenda but no progress proved possible. As concerns grew about Russian troop presence in Belarus on the Ukrainian border, Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns flew to Moscow in November to spell out the consequences of aggression. In January 2022, Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken met Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva to reiterate the message. On February 24, Russia began its “special military operation” in Ukraine. U.S. attempts to deter Russian aggression had failed.
Even as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) leaders met to decide their response, Mr. Biden made it clear that the U.S. was determined to avoid a Third World War or allowing the conflict to escalate into a NATO-Russia conflict. After freezing of Russian reserves and a slew of financial, energy-related and political sanctions, other elements of military assistance, lethal and non-lethal began to take shape. Intelligence sharing and restoring Internet connectivity was the first step. The second was the supply of ammunition and some weapon systems with which the Ukrainian forces were familiar. NATO deepened its military involvement by providing gradually more and more sophisticated weapon systems, beginning with Javelin and Stinger missiles, and moving on to Patriot missile defence batteries, long range Himars, Storm Shadow and Scalp long range missiles and now F-16s. Russian attempts to deter NATO involvement had failed.
On February 7, 2022, Mr. Putin warned that “if Ukraine attempts to take back Crimea, European countries will be in conflict with Russia, which is a leading nuclear power superior to many NATO countries in terms of nuclear force.” Annual nuclear exercises, normally scheduled for autumn were announced for February 17, with Mr. Putin personally witnessing them. Announcing the launch of “special military operations”, his words of caution were, “whoever tries to hinder Russia will face consequences never seen in history.” To drive home the threat, on February 27, Russian nuclear forces were placed on a “special combat readiness” with leave for all personnel cancelled.
Even as the U.S. issued blunt warnings to Russia against using tactical nuclear weapons, in the first week of March, NATO decided against a no-fly-zone and Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria announced that they would not be sending MiG aircraft to Ukraine on account of Russian threats against their airfields from where these aircraft were to take off.
Russian officials tried to downplay the nuclear threat by pointing out that Russia would resort to nuclear use only if faced with an existential threat while U.S. officials tried to convey reassurance to their European allies that while Mr. Putin’s threats be taken seriously, there were no indications of unusual activity at nuclear sites.
President Biden declared on April 24, “We are neither encouraging nor enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders’, and adding that the “U.S. was not seeking regime change in Russia.” In short, the U.S. objectives were to support Ukraine, bolster NATO unity and avoid any direct conflict with Russia. Ukraine is not a NATO member and so does not have the security of the nuclear umbrella provided by U.S. policy of ‘extended deterrence.’
Russia’s resort to nuclear rhetoric failed to deter NATO involvement though it influenced its pace and timing. Therefore, both Russia and the U.S. are operating in a grey zone, taking turns at escalatory rhetoric even as they probe each other’s red lines. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union engaged in multiple proxy wars, Vietnam in the 1960s and Afghanistan in the 1980s, but these were in distant theatres.
Cold War lessons
Deterrence is fundamentally based on the assumption that both adversaries are rational enough to judge when costs outweigh the benefits of the act. Nuclear deterrence adds a conundrum. With their huge arsenals that provided for assured second strike capability, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union had an incentive to try a surprise first strike. This realization was crucial in shaping nuclear deterrence theory.
Thomas Schelling, whose writings during the 1960s and 1970s shaped nuclear deterrence thinking (he won the Economics Nobel in 2005) concluded that nuclear weapons were not usable but had political utility in terms of preventing a war with another nuclear power. Clearly, Schelling was looking at the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which had no territorial dispute.
Schelling also concluded that even though any use was “irrational,” the nuclear threat had to be “credible” in order to deter. This introduced a degree of uncertainty into the equation. Using his economics training, Schelling interpreted the uncertainty as risk that could be analysed in terms of probabilities. Risk was intended to induce rationality in the adversaries. Realizing the conundrum, Schelling concluded that the key to making nuclear deterrence credible is through escalation and raising the risk, that in the final analysis, “leaves something to chance.”
This, along with the lessons of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis kept the U.S. and Soviet rhetoric in check during the Cold War even as they engaged in proxy wars outside Europe, and away from NATO and Warsaw pact territories. Today, there is no Warsaw Pact and NATO has expanded to include a number of former Warsaw Pact members. The Ukraine conflict has persuaded Sweden and Finland to give up their long-standing neutrality and seek security under NATO’s nuclear umbrella.
Probing for red lines
Russia’s nuclear doctrine issued on June 2, 2020 specifies two conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons – “…in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it/or its allies” and “in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is put under threat.” Mr. Putin has declared more than once that Ukrainians and Russians are one people with a shared history; Russia therefore doesn’t see Ukraine as entirely ‘sovereign’.
Second, there is the oft-cited escalate-to-deescalate approach that implies using tactical nuclear weapons to overcome a stalemate on the battlefield, thus forcing a termination of hostilities on favourable terms. In its 2022 National Security Strategy, the U.S. rejected this by declaring that first use would not lead to de-escalation on Russian terms “but alter the nature of conflict creating potential for uncontrolled escalation.”
U.S. caution is reflected in calibrating supply of more sophisticated weapons by continuously probing Russian red lines even though Ukrainian demands continue to grow. Meanwhile, it suits Russia to increase ambiguity. It is also likely that since Russia failed to achieve its military objectives, its thresholds are evolving.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s path breaking studies in economics showed that humans often tend to double down on bad bets because of ‘loss aversion.’ The Cold War escalation management lessons applied to a different world; today, the U.S. and Russia no longer enjoy parity and Russia’s red lines are fuzzy.
Nuclear signaling today is taking place in uncharted political territory. New guard rails are necessary if the nuclear taboo has to be preserved.
India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, stunned the world. This was not the first; in 1974, India had tested but called it a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). This time, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared that India was now a nuclear-weapon-state. Addressing parliament on the subject on May 27, he also placed a paper – “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy” – that provided the rationale for the tests and spelt out the elements of India’s doctrine that defined India as a reluctant but responsible nuclear power.
When India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, its “nuclear option” was born. In subsequent decades, preserving the option became the primary political and diplomatic objective. Through more than three decades of domestic political changes, policy continuity was sustained.
Meanwhile, Pakistan pushed ahead with its programme and by early 1980s, it was enriching uranium at Kahuta and by late 1980s, had weaponised its deterrent with Chinese help. As the frontline state in the United States’ covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to make the U.S. turn a blind eye to its nuclear developments.
There was a growing realisation that given technological advances since the 1974 PNE, the “nuclear option” could no longer remain viable and needed to be exercised. Post Cold War global developments with tightening dual-use export controls were also squeezing the Indian option. In 1995, the NPT was extended into perpetuity, freezing a nuclear order that India had long considered arbitrary and discriminatory. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in 1994 with the Clinton administration pushing to complete it in 1996.
In 1995, France and China were still undertaking tests to validate designs and acquire data that would help sustain their capabilities with ‘zero-yield’ tests in their laboratories. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao gave the green light for tests and preparatory work began at Pokhran. In early December, days before the tests were scheduled, U.S. satellites picked up imagery of activity at Pokhran. The tests were postponed till after the general elections and meanwhile, Indian stand on the CTBT negotiations hardened.
Prime Minister Vajpayee toyed with the idea of the tests in 1996 but decided against it as his tenure was a mere 13 days. The next opportunity arose when he became PM again in 1998, and the die was cast.
The 1998 declaration of India as a nuclear-weapon-state marked a decisive break. It generated its own challenges, both domestic and external. A new kind of policy continuity was crafted. Domestically, it related to the nuclear doctrine and the configuration of the nuclear arsenal into the defence and decision-making structures. Externally, it was to gain acceptance as a responsible nuclear power and second, to stabilise deterrence relations with India’s adversaries.
After 25 years, the domestic challenge is still a work in progress. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad was considered necessary. The land-based missile force has now inducted Agni IV with an estimated range of 3500 kms. Agni V and Agni VI are expected to extend the ranges to beyond 6000 kms. The nuclear submarine programme has made slow progress with Arihant having undertaken its firs patrol last year. However, it currently carries K-15 (Sagarika) missile that has a limited range of 700 kms. Longer range missiles are under development.
Though India has no intention of embarking on a nuclear arms race with any other country, it must factor in technological developments that can have an impact on the credibility of its deterrent. Increasing use of dual use systems like hypersonics and cruise missiles, conventional precision global strike weapons blur the dividing line between nuclear and conventional systems. Digitisation renders both early warning systems and command and control systems vulnerable to counter-space and offensive cyber action.
These developments have led to questions as to how to define the ‘minimum’ and whether the no-first-use policy needs review. Some critics point to Kargil in 1999 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 as evidence of failure of nuclear deterrence and would advocate a more robust posture. However, such criticism is ill founded. Indian doctrine is intended to deter threat and use of nuclear weapons. Dealing with Kargil-type attacks or terrorist strikes requires building conventional and intelligence capabilities that can offer a range of response options.
The external diplomatic challenge of gaining acceptance as a responsible nuclear power has been achieved in great measure. The Vajpayee government was proactive in reaching out to key countries, particularly the U.S. since it had taken the lead in condemning the tests and calling for sanctions.
The dialogue between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh between 1998 and 2000 remains the most intense phase of bilateral engagement with 18 rounds of talks in 24 months. It remained inconclusive in not meeting either side’s stated objectives; yet, it was immensely productive in clearing the path towards the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and eventually the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement following the exceptional waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008 – another milestone that completes 15 years in 2023. The NSG waiver legitimised India’s civilian nuclear trade and has enabled over a dozen cooperation agreements to be concluded.
This has been possible because the post-1998 policy too has been marked by a similar continuity that characterised it in its early years. Today, changing geopolitics has revived rivalries among major nuclear powers even as the geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Navigating these challenges may need policy adjustments that will be strengthened by consensus and continuity.
Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered the State-of-the-Nation address last week. Coming two days before the first anniversary of the Ukraine war, Kremlin watchers expected to hear about a new war strategy. Instead, Putin shocked everyone by announcing that Russia was suspending its participation in the US-Russia New START (a 2010 agreement for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms). Putin’s announcement made it clear that the 20th century model of nuclear arms control was dead.
New START limited each country to 1550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 launchers (heavy bombers and long-range missiles). In reality, each has more than three times as many warheads, categorised as reserves and those awaiting dismantlement. In addition, Russia is estimated to have over 2000 tactical nuclear weapons and the US, a few hundred. These two still account for over 90 percent of global nuclear arsenals.
New START, the sole bilateral nuclear arms control agreement in force, was to expire in February 2026. It would have lapsed in 2021 because Donald Trump was determined to bring China into the negotiations, a suggestion Beijing rejected. President Joe Biden’s election enabled the five-year extension but discussions on a follow-up treaty have proved elusive.
On-site inspections (each state is allowed 18 annually) under the treaty had been suspended since 2020, initially due to COVID-19 and then the Ukraine war. Last November, Russia postponed the scheduled meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Putin claimed that his decision was a result of the US wanting to inflict ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia and under the circumstances, the idea of nuclear inspections was ‘a theatre of the absurd’. He blamed Ukraine for mounting drone attacks against Russian airbases that host nuclear capable strategic bombers, aided by NATO intelligence. At least three such strikes have taken place in December 2022 at Engels and Dyagilevo bases, though no significant damage was reported. Putin also hinted that the US was preparing to resume nuclear testing and declared that Russia would soon follow.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has stated that Russia will continue to abide by the (numerical) restrictions. This has quelled apprehensions that Putin was triggering a new nuclear arms race with the US. However, since compliance mechanisms stand suspended and trust is at an all-time low, both states will now be willing to believe the worst about the other. Both are engaged in extensive nuclear modernisation programmes exploring hypersonic missiles, glide vehicles, and low yield warheads. Offensive cyber capabilities and AI developments create new risks for the integrity of nuclear command and control systems.
So far, China had been content with a minimum nuclear deterrent of approx. 300 warheads. In recent years, it is shifting to a more robust deterrent. Satellite imagery has revealed the existence of four new missile silo sites. It has tested hypersonic glide vehicles and a ‘fractional orbital bombardment system’, indicating that it now seeks to manage nuclear escalation in order to blunt US’ nuclear coercive edge. In 2021, Pentagon concluded that Chinese arsenal will cross 1000 warheads by 2030, now a widely accepted view. The expectation is that as China enhances its early-warning satellite capabilities, it will transition from its current no-first-use posture to a launch-on-warning mode.
Last year, North Korea accelerated its missile programme, undertaking nearly 90 launches, unveiling the Hwasong-17, with an estimated range of 15000 kms. Activity at the testing site has led to speculation that North Korea may be planning to undertake a seventh nuclear test. Meanwhile, media reports indicate that in Iran, IAEA inspectors have discovered traces of uranium enriched up to 84 percent that is just short of the 90 percent level used to produce a nuclear bomb. Iran has denied enrichment beyond 60 percent and blamed IAEA for media leaks and unprofessional conduct.
New START is not the first casualty. In 2002, the US unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with USSR which limited deployment of ABM systems thereby ensuring mutual vulnerability, a key ingredient of deterrence stability in the bipolar era. In 2019, the US accused Russia of violating the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and declared its withdrawal.
Today’s political disconnect is also evident in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the most successful example of multilateral arms control that has become a victim of its success. It succeeded in delegitimizing nuclear proliferation but not nuclear weapons. This is why NPT Review Conferences in recent years have become increasingly contentious and fail to reach any consensus. Another multilaterally negotiated agreement, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter century.
Major power rivalry is not new but the difference is that it is no longer a bipolar world and the old model of nuclear arms control established during the Cold War, shaped by the bipolar politics of two nuclear superpowers is untenable in the 21st century nuclear multipolar world. There are multiple nuclear equations – US-Russia, US-China, US-North Korea, India-Pakistan, India-China, but not strictly stand-alone. Further, nuclear rhetoric is on the rise raising the spectre of growing nuclear risks.
During the bipolar era, there was a perception that with the advent of nuclear weapons, wars between major powers were disincentivised. The real problem is that nuclear weapons did not create any incentives for conflict resolution. Putin’s speech is merely a reflection of this reality.
RAKESH SOOD 