On the Razor’s Edge

Publication for Observer Research Foundation

As the world reels under the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic with the epicentre moving from China to Italy to USA, India stands on the razor’s edge. At one level, India seems far less impacted – approx. 750 active cases on 28 March spread over less than one-fifth (132 districts) out of 720 districts in the country. Given that the first confirmed case was registered on 30 January in Kerala, this spread is far less rapid compared to models in other countries. Yet exponentials have a way of exploding quickly and there is an uncomfortable increase in daily number of infections being registered through March, even after the nationwide lockdown in place since 24-25 March midnight.

The lockdown is unprecedented. China’s lockdown was widely described as “draconian”, possible only in an authoritarian system and yet it covered 760 million people (approx. half the population) at its peak. Democratic India has gone much beyond with its entire 1.3 billion population under lockdown for 21 days. With this, the government has gained a window of opportunity of 21
days.

India’s earlier window was the month of February which India got through with only three cases limited to Kerala, all of whom recovered. But that window was squandered because of lack of coordination within government both at the centre and states, mixed messaging particularly by the ICMR, absence of a national policy and task force which mean that priorities and action points remained ill defined and fuzzy. That is why this 21-day period is the razor’s edge during which India has to do what it failed to do during February.

What was done and how
India issued its first travel advisory on 18 January, asking passengers from China and Hong Kong to self-declare if they had been to Wuhan in the previous fortnight and introduced thermal screening for them at seven Indian airports. Gradually, a few other countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore etc were added and e-visas stopped in China even as India undertook evacuation flights from early February out of Wuhan.

Universal screening was introduced on 4 March and a week later, all visas for India were suspended. The following week, on 18 March, all international flights were banned. Incidentally, human to human transmission was confirmed by China on 20 January; by 31 January, 50 cases from 14 countries had been reported and on 6 March, the global number of cases had crossed 100000.

Many other countries had tightened entry during this period and taken measures for tracing and testing of possible cases because by end January, it was clear that even infected persons who did not show visible signs of infection could also be transmitting it to others. The virus had been decoded by 24 January by different labs around the world and later baptised as 2019- nCoV. On 31 January, WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

Yet ICMR kept emphasising that large scale testing was not needed. As late as 6 March, ICMR notified that “only symptomatic individuals who returned from affected countries (China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Italy, Iran), who had close contacts with confirmed cases and those evacuated from China and the Diamond Princess ship from Japan, should be considered for COVID-19 testing”. The number of accredited test labs was increased from 15 to 57 for real-time Reverse Transcription Polymerase Reaction test (rRT-PCR). Ten days later, 51 private labs were also added but they were asked to procure testing kits themselves and “urged” to do free tests. Expectedly, they remonstrated. It took another couple of days for price fixing. (In US, the initial test cost was pegged by private companies at $3000, reduced to $320 and then made free).

On 21 March, ICMR broadened its guidelines to test all patients with severe acute respiratory illness and even asymptomatic persons with a history of contact. Till then 15701 samples had been tested over the seven weeks. Over 12000 additional samples have been tested during the past week. Meanwhile, 3.4 million test probes are expected from Germany and from WHO. Compare this to South Korea which had 28 cases on 15 February, initiated a crash programme for ramping up production of test kits and was undertaking 20000 tests a day as the production level went up to 100000 kits a day. Germany is currently testing 75000 samples a day. The contrast between these countries and Italy or USA which delayed introduction of large-scale testing reveals a lot.

Even when domestic testing kit producers were asked to come forward, ICMR initially stipulated that the kits would be certified by the US FDA or EU authorities. Only on 26 March was it clarified that Indian agencies (NIV and three other government labs) would do the needful. So far, three domestic kit producers have been cleared. Tests do cost and early testing may not necessarily save lives because most patients recover but testing does help in identifying carriers of infection early thereby controlling onward transmission.

After the evidence of the growing outbreak, Commerce Ministry imposed an export ban on all Personal Protective Equipment. The ban was subsequently relaxed on 8 February to allow exports of most kinds of gloves and masks and a further relaxation for more items provided on 25 February including the raw materials for these products. Belatedly, on 19 March Commerce Ministry reversed its February orders when Indian doctors took to media to complain about shortages of protective gear in hospitals across the country. This was followed up on 24 March with an export ban on sanitisers and ventilators, after the seven Indian ventilator manufacturers had received large export orders from EU nations. WHO had issued an advisory about shortages of such equipment and disruption in supply chains in view of exploding demand as early as 27 February but WHO notices are unlikely to have been referred to Commerce Ministry. Indian authorities are now placing orders with Indian manufacturers and roping in PSUs to double the number of ventilators in public and private hospitals to 80000. US has about 170000 ventilators though only two-thirds can be used due to lack of trained medical personnel. Technological solutions to enable two patients to be connected to one ventilator are also being explored since both patients will be suffering from the same infection.

State governments in Maharashtra and Gujarat advised units to shut down leading to apprehensions among the migrant labour thus sparking a rush for catching trains back home. With 80 districts shut down on Sunday midnight, the rush on trains became a deluge assuming larger humanitarian proportions when the lockdown commenced, shutting down all trains and buses, leaving millions stranded en route. A viable solution for this is yet to found.

Even providing food for 4 lakh poor people as CM Kejriwal announced led to large crowds gathering putting paid to the idea of social distancing. Realising that the rabi crop harvesting season is upon us, the central authorities will need to issue guidelines which are practical and have the flexibility to be adapted to the requirements in different states.

What we need to do and how
These were a few examples of how the window of opportunity in February was squandered. Hopefully, we have learnt appropriate lessons and can make better use of the window that has been provided by the three-week lockdown.

So far, we have seen a top down approach but one that has failed to take into account the competing priorities, diversity across states and adequate consultations with multiple stake holders so that resilience is built into the top down approach to address the unexpected challenges that are bound to come up. For example, even as a list of essential services was notified, so ought to have been details for ‘movement passes’ for providers of essential services by anticipating its need. This could have prevented the scenes of panic buying that were witnessed on the night of 24 March.

Just as greater coordination is needed between different parts of the government structures, there is also greater need to involve the private sector and civil society organisations. The shortcomings in the public health system are too well known to be recounted; suffice to say that dealing with this will require mobilisation across networks with government taking the lead for consultative planning. A national task force with linkages going down to all states and administrative units is vital.

Even as the spread of the disease remains under constant monitoring, we need to prepare for what happens on 14 April when the 21 days get over. The district level mapping will yield pictures of clusters that indicate where partial relaxation of lockdown can be attempted. This will also release resources for where these are most needed. It is an exercise that is delicate but if exercised with care and planning, will send a message of assurance pushing other districts to step up their efforts.

The health system has to be geared up, especially the widespread distribution of testing kits. In addition to the PCR test, there is now an antibody-based test which is cheaper and faster though less accurate. Yet, protocols for where this can be used need to be worked out and relevant professionals sensitised with enough lead time.

Coupled with testing is the need for temporary facilities for quarantine of patients. Ideas of using train carriages and stadiums have been floated but need to be implemented. Medical workers appreciate the recognition of ‘taali’ but also need protective gear. Numbers need to be augmented by bringing in those in medical and nursing colleges who are close to completing their training. Aanganwadi workers and the Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) can provide a network of nearly 2 million persons, concentrated in rural and semi-urban areas.

Efforts for ramping up production of HazMat suits, protective equipment, hospital beds, disposables and ventilators is already underway but needs to undertaken on a war footing. The logistics system for movement, storage and distribution of these materials along with the medicines and drugs needs to be tweaked to reduce response times.

Coordinated research to investigate the virus and its attributes that can lead to development of therapeutics has to be focused but not replicated. This needs a network-based approach that ICMR and Deptt of Biotechnology can deliver together.

Society will be called upon to contribute to the safety net that the government has belatedly announced. This will need to be beefed up considerably as the situation evolves and holes become apparent. As it is, the pandemic has imposed a huge economic cost on society. Further aggravation if the safety net fails to alleviate economic stress among the most vulnerable sections of society has social consequences that strain the very fabric of society.

The defence forces are an institution that has both a culture and training for organisational functioning and has been used to mitigate humanitarian tragedies inflicted by natural disasters. Managing the back end of logistics for supply of essential products could be handed over to defence services, particularly in badly affected areas where civilian administrative systems are under strain.

Whatever the debate about the economic costs or about the credibility of the numbers of cases of infection, the lockdown is now a reality. Any debate about it is now passe. The challenge now is to make the most efficient use of the three weeks to ensure that the lockdown delivers, that it visibly demonstrates a government that is transparent, works with a humane touch and a sense of solidarity with the people.

For there is not going to be another window of opportunity.

NPT @ 50: Celebration or Midlife Crisis

Published in Hindustan Times on 12th March, 2020

Last week, on 5 th March, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) turned 50. Often described by its supporters as the ‘cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’, the NPT is among the most widely adhered to global treaties. All countries except four (India, Israel and Pakistan that never joined, and North Korea that withdrew in 2003) are parties to the NPT.

Yet NPT’s golden anniversary passed without much notice. A statement issued in New York by the Spokesman for the UN Secretary General was notable for its brevity and anodyne character. There are suggestions that the NPT Review Conference due to open in New York on 27th April be postponed, ostensibly on account of the coronavirus outbreak, but actually to avoid a potentially bruising showdown.

In 1963, President Kennedy voiced an apprehension that by 1975, there could be as many as 20 countries with nuclear weapons. USSR shared similar concerns. This convergence of interests between the two Cold War adversaries enabled the negotiations for an NPT.

To make it attractive, it was initially conceived as a three-legged stool – non-proliferation, obliging those without nuclear weapons to undertake never to acquire them and accept full-scope safeguards; disarmament, obliging the five countries with nuclear weapons (US, USSR, UK, France and China) to negotiate to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons; and, third, to ensure that non-nuclear weapon states would enjoy full access to peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

By the time the negotiations concluded in 1968, India had concluded that the disarmament leg was too weak and the definition of a nuclear weapon state (one that had exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967) was one that created a permanent division between nuclear haves and have-nots; it chose to stay away.

Among the oft-cited successes of the NPT is the dramatic reduction in the number of nuclear weapons from a peak of 70300 warheads in 1986 to around 14000 at present, with US and Russia accounting for over 12500. What is overlooked is that nearly all the reductions happened between 1990 and 2010 and the process has now dwindled to a halt. More significantly, these reductions were a result of bilateral talks between US and Russia reflecting their state of relations and no negotiations have ever been held in the NPT framework. In fact, during the first fifteen years of the NPT, the US-Soviet arsenals went up from below 40000 to over 70000, making it abundantly clear that the NPT nuclear-weapon-states have blithely ignored the disarmament leg of the NPT.

The NPT has successfully prevented proliferation. Since 1970, only four countries have acquired nuclear weapons bringing the total number of nuclear-weapon-states to nine, much less than Kennedy’s apprehensions in 1963. However, it brings out the uncomfortable reality that the NPT has no means of dealing with these four states.

The five nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT (N-5) are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) giving rise to the inevitable conclusion that nuclear weapons remain the currency of political and military power. This conclusion can only encourage potential proliferators by making nuclear weapons more attractive as the ultimate security guarantor.

NPT supporters also claim credit for strengthening the taboo against nuclear weapons by pointing out that nuclear weapons have never been used since 1945. However, a closer examination of recently declassified papers indicates that since 1970, there were over a dozen instances where US and USSR came close to initiating a nuclear exchange, often based on misperceptions about the intentions of the other or plain system errors. Even today, US and Russia maintain over 1000 nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert, increasing the risks of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange.

Today, the nuclear taboo is being challenged as major nuclear powers undertake R&D for more usable low-yield nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defence, hypersonic systems that carry both conventional and nuclear payloads and growing offensive cyber capabilities further blur the line between conventional and nuclear.

Frustrated by the lack of responsiveness on the part of the N-5, 120 countries party to the NPT joined hands with civil society to push negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (TPNW), concluded in 2017. These countries had concluded that despite near universal adherence, the NPT could never be the vehicle for nuclear disarmament. It had delegitimised proliferation but done little to delegitimise nuclear weapons. And in the process, the NPT had reached the limits of its success. The N-5 and their allies boycotted the negotiations but the existence of the TPNW exposes the inherent imbalance in the NPT’s three-legged stool.

The uncomfortable truth is that the old nuclear arms control model reflected the political reality of the Cold War. Today’s reality reflects multipolarity, marked by asymmetry. It is hardly surprising that US-USSR treaties of the bipolar era, like the ABM Treaty or the INF Treaty are already dead and others like New START and Open Skies Treaty are being challenged.

The NPT faces a similar challenge, of continued political relevance. Unless the NPT members, especially the N-5 realise this, its golden anniversary may well mark the onset of NPT’s mid-life crisis.

The Sum & Substance of the Afghan Deal

Published in The Hindu on 5th March, 2020

The long-awaited deal between the US and Taliban was finally signed in Doha last Saturday by US Special Envoy Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and former Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader. On the same day, US Defence Secretary Mark Esper visited Kabul to conclude the Joint Declaration for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the two governments. Gaps and inconsistencies between the two only add to the confusion. But two facts are clear – the US is on its way out and second, this does not ensure peace for the Afghan people. As former US Defence Secretary Gen Mattis put it, “The US doesn’t lose wars, it loses interest”. But since a major power cannot be seen to be losing a war, certainly not in an election year, a re-labelling of the withdrawal becomes necessary.

Shades of Vietnam
Nearly a half century ago, President Richard Nixon had faced a similar dilemma. With more than half a million US soldiers deployed in Vietnam, it was clear that a military solution was out of question. Seeking an exit, his NSA Dr Henry Kissinger, during his secret visit to Beijing in July 1971, assured Premier Zhou Enlai that US was prepared to withdraw completely from Vietnam in return for release of US POWs and a ceasefire lasting “a decent interval”. Kissinger and Nixon knew that the deal would leave their ally, the South Vietnamese government led by President Thieu, vulnerable. In the declassified 1972 White House tapes, Nixon and Kissinger acknowledge that “South Vietnam is not going to survive and the idea is to find a formula that can hold things together for a year or two”. The ploy worked.

President Nixon was re-elected with a record margin in November 1972 on the platform that peace was at hand. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed and by end March, US had completed its withdrawal ending direct military involvement. US POWs were released but by end-1973, the ceasefire was in tatters. Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese forces on 30 April 1975. Approximately 20000 US soldiers died during 1972-73 (Nixon cemented the understanding during his visit to China in February 1972) and 80000 South Vietnamese soldiers died after the collapse of the ceasefire, following the decent interval. To win his re-election, Nixon had promised an honourable peace and delivered a delayed defeat but by then, the world had moved on. Dr Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. The secret assurances of 1971-72 only surfaced after four decades.

Khalilzad is no stranger to Washington politics having served in Republican administrations since the Reagan era. He understood his job perfectly when Secretary Pompeo appointed him the Special Envoy for Afghan Reconciliation in September 2018. An Afghan by birth (he came to US in his teens) and having served as US ambassador in Afghanistan, he knew full well that he was not negotiating an Afghan peace deal, he was negotiating a ‘managed’ US exit. The time line too was clear. President Trump had repeatedly declared that “great nations do not fight endless wars” and his re-election was due in the fall of 2020.

The road to Doha
President Trump’s 2017 policy aimed at breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional 5000 soldiers, giving US forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Within a year, it was clear that the policy was not working because no insurgency can be defeated as long as it enjoys safe havens and secure sanctuaries. Pakistan’s help was necessary to get the Taliban to the negotiating table.

A three-way negotiation ensued. First was the Doha track with the Taliban, a second was with Islamabad/Rawalpindi and the third was with Kabul to ensure that the Afghan government would accept the outcome. The dice was loaded because Taliban and Pakistan negotiated as a team. Within six months, they had whittled down Ambassador Khalilzad’s four objectives – a ceasefire, an intra-Afghan peace dialogue, cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, and finally, US troop withdrawal – to just the last one, with some palliatives regarding the third.

The deal was ready to be signed last September when Trump abruptly called it off stalling the process. NSA John Bolton’s dismissal (he was opposed) and the release of three high level Taliban militants including Anas Haqqani (Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother) in November helped smoothen issues.

The key features of the Doha deal are:

a. US troops to be reduced from current 14000 to 8600 by 15 June (in 135 days).

b. Withdrawal of all remaining US and foreign forces by 29 April 2021 (in 14 months).

c. Removal of Taliban from UN Security Council sanctions list by 29 May.

d. Upto 5000 Taliban prisoners and 1000 Afghan security forces prisoners to be released from Afghan and Taliban custody respectively by 10 March.

e. US sanctions against Taliban leaders to be lifted by 27 August.

f. Intra-Afghan talks to begin on 10 March.

Whither Afghanistan
Nothing reflects the fragility of the deal signed between US and Taliban in Doha better than the title – Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the US as a state and is known as the Taliban and the USA! This is repeated more than a dozen times in the Agreement. Ironically, US has committed to getting UN Security Council endorsement for the deal with an entity that it doesn’t recognise!

The leader of the Haqqani network and No. 2 of Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani who recently wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, remains on the US wanted list with a reward of $10 million for information leading to his capture or death. This hardly squares with the notion that Taliban is now a US counter- terrorism partner against the IS.

The Kabul Declaration states that Afghan government will “participate in US facilitated discussion with Taliban on CBMs, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant number of prisoners on both sides”. There is no reference to numbers to be released or a deadline of 10 March linking it to commencing intra-Afghan talks, as in the Doha deal. No wonder President
Ghani angrily declared a day later that release of prisoners will be part of the agenda for the intra-Afghan talks, provoking the Taliban to declare that the truce would no longer cover Afghan security forces, creating the first of many obstacles ahead.

There is no mention of what will happen to the Taliban fighters whose numbers have suddenly inflated from earlier range of 30000 to 50000 to 60000 to 150000! Are they to be disarmed and demobilised; prepared for civilian life or integrated with the Afghan security forces? Who is expected to provide stipends to those opting for peace? Trump maintains that it is ‘time that the
war on terror is fought by someone else’ so it won’t be the US. US has described itself as a “facilitator”, a responsibility that it will be glad to share with others.

The idea of a ceasefire, which is normally the starting point for any peace process, has been made an outcome of the intra-Afghan dialogue, together with a political roadmap for the future, but without any timeframe. There is no reference to preserving the gains of the last eighteen years and with the Taliban intent on reviving the Islamic Emirate, the shape of things is clear.

Remember the duck test – if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck.

A US-Taliban Deal or an Afghan Peace Deal

Published in Hindustan Times on 1st March, 2020

On Saturday, 29 th February, an agreement will be signed between the US and the Taliban in Doha. Widely welcomed as a ‘peace deal’, it will be claimed by US President Donald Trump as further proof of his uncanny deal-making prowess. But while the deal may well mark the end of the US war in Afghanistan whether it actually ends conflict in Afghanistan remains an open question.

Road to the deal
Negotiations began in September 2018 with the appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to initiate direct talks with Taliban. It marked a reversal of Trump’s 2017 policy based on breaking the military stalemate in Afghanistan by authorising an additional 5000 soldiers, giving US forces a freer hand to go after the Taliban, putting Pakistan on notice and strengthening Afghan capabilities. Since it was soon clear that the policy was not working and the Taliban insurgency could not be defeated as long as it enjoyed safe havens and secure sanctuaries, US changed track and sought Pakistan’s help to get Taliban to the negotiating table.

While US maintained that Doha talks covered four issues – cessation of hostilities, cutting ties with terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, an intra- Afghan peace dialogue, and finally, US troop withdrawal, Taliban made it clear that their priority was the last issue. They rejected the idea of a ceasefire, and any talks with the Afghan government describing it as a puppet regime, lacking
legitimacy. Taliban provided some assurances on the second issue but focused on a firm date for US troop withdrawal.

A deal was ready to be signed on 8th September, with a Taliban delegation scheduled to travel to Camp David, when there was a hiccup. A US soldier was killed in a car bomb attack; coupled with the negative optics of welcoming a Taliban delegation in Camp David during the week marking the 9/11 attacks anniversary led Trump to call off the deal.

Within a month, talks were revived. US demanded a ceasefire for a month as a sign of Taliban commitment but Taliban demurred. Taliban felt that too long a ceasefire would make it difficult for them to regroup their fighters once they returned to their villages. Eventually, US settled for ‘significant reduction in violence’ for a week. The week long period began in the early hours of 22nd February, setting the stage for the Doha signing.

Echoes of Vietnam
The deal provides a timetable for reducing US troops from 14000 to 8600, possibly by the end of 2020 and the kick-starting of intra-Afghan peace talks. It is unclear if there is a date for complete withdrawal of US troops or for concluding the intra-Afghan dialogue or for how long the truce will hold. What is clear is that the US war in Afghanistan will come to an end permitting Trump to deliver on his promise of bringing the soldiers home in his re-election year.

Around fifty years ago, US pursued a similar strategy in Vietnam. President Nixon had taken over in 1969 when US troop presence in Vietnam was over half a million. It was clear that a military solution was not possible. During his secret visit to Beijing in 1971 July, Nixon’s NSA Dr Kissinger told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that US would agree to a complete withdrawal of troops in return for Hanoi’s releasing US POWs and a ceasefire for “a decent interval, say 18 months or more, before a Communist takeover in Vietnam”. He assured Zhou that if the Saigon government was overthrown following “a decent interval”, US would not intervene. Neither the US public nor the South Vietnamese were privy to this exchange.

And this is exactly how it unfolded. Nixon visited China in February 1972, describing it a visit to bring about “a lasting peace in the world” and won his re-election handsomely in November 1972 promising that “peace was at hand”. In January 1973, the Paris Peace Accord was signed ending direct US military involvement and withdrawal, release of POWs, ceasefire and a reunification through peaceful means. Full scale fighting erupted before end-1973. South Vietnam lost another 80000 soldiers till 30th April 1975 when Saigon finally fell. US did not intervene as its war had been over two years earlier. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Nixon resigned in 1974, facing impeachment in the Watergate scandal.

Crafting a peace deal
Many things have changed but US still cannot be seen to be losing the war in a re-election year and so the US withdrawal needs repackaging as a peace process for Afghanistan. The problem is that nobody really knows what the Taliban want and reconciling an Emirate and Shariat based system with the existing Constitution is not easy. How would Taliban fighters be demobilised? How would an amnesty and reintegration package be worked out and who pays? Would an early US withdrawal encourage the Taliban to improve their bargaining position on the battlefield? Are the major powers only ‘facilitators’ or are they collectively prepared to act as ‘guarantors’?

Addressing these is necessary for a good deal but if the search is only for “a decent interval”, the Taliban who have waited two decades can also wait out “a decent interval”.