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My Interview to India’s World on India’s ambitious goals for nuclear power

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Published in India’s World on February 23, 2025

“Realising 100 GW of Nuclear Power by 2047 Depends on…” Former Diplomat Rakesh Sood

‘Realising 100 GW of Nuclear Power by 2047 Depends on Building the Right Framework’, says, former Indian Diplomat Rakesh Sood.

Hely Desai

February 23, 2025

India has indicated a significant shift in its nuclear energy strategy with the Union Budget 2025-26. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s announcement of the Nuclear Energy Mission outlines ambitious targets, modest financial allocations, and significantly, some amendments to the Atomic Energy Act (1962) and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010), aimed at accelerating private sector participation. With the country’s rapidly growing industrial sector and rising energy demands, the Finance Minister emphasised the urgent need to diversify India’s energy mix, positioning nuclear power as a crucial pillar in the low-carbon development strategy for realising the vision of a “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) by 2047 and a “net zero” by 2070.

In this interview, Hely Desai sits down with Rakesh Sood, former Indian diplomat and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, to decode the implications of these potentially transformative nuclear developments following the budget announcement.

Hely Desai: In the Union Budget 2025, nuclear energy received significant attention once again. The Finance Minister set an ambitious target of 100 gigawatts (GW) by 2047—nearly 12 times the current capacity. Given that this goal has been revised several times over the years, do you think it is now achievable? What key challenges have hindered progress so far?

Amb. Rakesh Sood: To put it in context, in the 1970s, India set a target of 10 GW to be achieved by 2000. We are at 8.2 GW today. Each time a new target has been set, it has become more ambitious and, understandably, more difficult to achieve. So, while the targets of 22 GW by 2031 and eventually 100 GW by 2047 are ambitious targets, their realisation will depend on how we prepare the framework to achieve it. 

The budget for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) for 2025-26 is INR 24,049 crores. Last year, it was INR 24,450 crores, and the year before that, INR 25,882 crores. These are in the same ballpark range and do not reflect either the urgency or the priority to the sector. In the budget speech, the Finance Minister also mentioned an additional INR 20,000 crores for nuclear power, but with no clarity about the time frame for this allocation to materialise. If this amount is spread over the next five years, it would mean an additional INR 4,000 crores per year, which doesn’t significantly address the funding gap, given that the average cost of nuclear power per megawatt in India at $2 million is approx. Rs 17 crores! Therefore, this amount is unlikely to help meet the ambitious targets if the government is the only source of funding. This is why I believe the Finance Minister also mentioned the need to amend existing legislation.

The Atomic Energy Act (1962) places all nuclear energy activities, including materials and technology, under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). As a result, all nuclear facilities are under the DAE and all nuclear power reactors are operated by nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), a wholly government-owned Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) and a subsidiary of the DAE. To involve the private sector, existing legislation will need to be amended. However, the exact form this will take remains unclear. 

One indication is the Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by NPCIL in December 2024, inviting private industries to build two 220 MWe PHWR Bharat Small Reactors. The RFP suggests that “the reactors are planned to be set up with private sector investment, operating within the existing legal framework and approved business models.” The intention is to replace captive power plants, which are currently coal-based, with the DAE-indigenised PHWR models. However, the investor/user/industrial party would construct the project under the supervision and control of the NPCIL, which would take over the plant as the operator. Capital costs, all operating expenses during the life cycle, and decommissioning expenses would be borne by the ‘user’ who can utilise the captive power and/or sell it according to tariffs approved by the government.

However, we still don’t know what the response to the RFP has been. The RFP was issued two months before the amendment announcement and emphasises that it is “within existing legal framework.” 

How is India’s energy profile expected to evolve as India pursues the twin goals of Viksit Bhat by 2047 and net-zero by 2070?

Currently, India’s annual per capita income is approximately $2500, and to reach Viksit Bharat (developed country standard according to World Bank), it has to grow to approximately $ 22,000. In 2022-23, India’s per capita annual energy consumption was 1208 kWh while China was 4600kWh, Singapore was 9220 kWh and the US is stable at 80000 kWh. National energy consumption is approx. 10000 TWH; taking into account rising energy efficiencies, it still needs to rise to 35000 TWH by 2047 to achieve Viksit Bharat. India has committed to the target of ‘net-zero’ by 2070. This imposes restrictions on sources for energy growth. In absolute numbers, with the energy composition changing with growing urbanisation, India’s power generation needs to grow from current installed capacity of approx. 450 GW (consisting of 200 GW from renewables covering solar, wind and hydroelectric, 8 GW from nuclear and the balance from fossil fuels) to 4000 GW. Solar, wind, hydel, and biomass can contribute to approximately 1300-1500 GW, leaving a large shortfall of 2500-2700 GW to be met from fossil fuels and nuclear power.   Given the net-zero goal, it is clear that nuclear power has to play a much larger role in India’s economic development. Against this backdrop, the Finance Minister’s target of 100 GW of nuclear generation by 2047 seems critical and may need to grow much more by 2070 to achieve net-zero. This would require significant investment in both nuclear power plants and renewable infrastructure, meaning the private sector must play a key role, as the government alone cannot shoulder this energy transition. 

Given the potential amendments that may also be in part aimed at advancing Small Modular Reactors (SMR) development, the announcement also sets a target of having five operational SMRs by 2033. Do you think financial and technological challenges could pose significant obstacles for India in achieving this goal?

Yes, absolutely. When discussing these amendments in the context of advancing SMRs, a key driving force is India’s commitment to meeting clean energy targets while ensuring scalability. SMRs are projected to be beneficial for supporting urbanisation, providing power in remote locations, and meeting dedicated industrial energy needs, thus driving sustainable growth across diverse regions. 

Now, small modular reactors, typically under 300 MW and modular in design, are projected to play a crucial role in this transition. However, to make this work, it is essential to reach a consensus on a specific SMR design. Only then can it be mass-produced, potentially reducing costs through economies of scale. 

Globally, around 80 different SMR designs (variants of Molten Salt Reactors, Pressurised Water Reactors, Molten Metal Reactors and High-Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors) are under development, with only two having reached operational stages. If we look at Russia, they have an operational floating nuclear power plant with an SMR based on the pressurised water reactor (PWR) design, and China has a land-based High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR). Apart from these two, no other country has reached the operationalisation stage for SMRs yet. 

For India, most of our existing nuclear power plants are limited to PHWR technology, which, while effective, is not the most efficient. Post 1974, after India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, India was excluded from international exchanges and cooperation, and PHWR was the only option available at the time. Now, the government is looking to explore more secure and advanced technologies for the future. Collaboration and external expertise will be crucial. This was also one of the primary objectives behind the nuclear deal with the U.S., which aimed to foster international cooperation. This context underpins the Finance Minister’s announcement that India aims to have five operational SMRs by 2033. 

Assuming this announcement for amendments is intended to incentivise private sector involvement in nuclear energy, what significant changes do you anticipate in the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, and how might they affect private sector participation?

First, the Atomic Energy Act would need to create a role for the private sector. What this role is intended to be is unclear. Second is the Liability Act. According to the NPCIL RFP (issued a month before the Finance Minister’s budget speech), the private sector role is only that of the investor. If NPCIL is the operator and the project is built to NPCIL’s designs and specifications and under its supervision, then physical protection and nuclear safety will also become NPCIL’s responsibility. The private sector will insist on complete indemnity through a “hold harmless” clause. However, if the private sector entity’s role is to be greater, then it will need to be legally defined as also the sharing of the liability responsibility. In Western countries, private companies are allowed to build and operate nuclear power plants (though designs and operations are regulated by governments), and they are held liable according to their respective liability laws. 

The general principle is that, in the event of a nuclear accident, the first priority is to provide immediate relief and assistance to those affected. This is operator liability under the principle of “economic channelling” In India, under our liability law, this assistance is capped at INR 1,500 crores, and if damages exceed that, the government must intervene. This means the operator is required to have an insurance pool for immediate assistance. Under the CLNDA, even if the NPCIL holds a supplier responsible, it can pursue the claim through “legal channelling” but without delaying immediate relief.

Currently, NPCIL, an entirely government-owned agency, acts as the operator, and the government essentially serves as its insurer. After the CLNDA, the ambiguities created by unclear definitions made private players (both foreign and domestic) hesitant to enter the sector.  For the private sector to play any significant part in the development of nuclear power, some of these ambiguities in the CLNDA would need to be clarified. So far, the government has relied on Explanations provided through Frequently Asked Questions posted on government department websites, but this has failed to satisfy the private entities. 

Ahead of the budget announcement, there was a report in the Economic Times suggesting that civil nuclear energy could be moved from the DAE’s oversight to the Ministry of Power, with fuel handling remaining under the DAE. How likely do you think this shift is, and what challenges might arise from such a transfer?

For a shift like this, I think one of the first things needed is an independent regulator. Currently, we have the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). There was a draft bill proposed to make the AERB a statutory body but it didn’t see the light of day. Today, even though the AERB is autonomous in name, it remains part of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), meaning it lacks the independence of regulators like the RBI, SEBI, or TRAI that were established through specific acts of Parliament, granting them the necessary autonomy to regulate both government and private sector activities. For example, the RBI supervises even government-owned banks like the SBI, while the SEBI regulates stock exchanges such as the BSE and NSE.

In this context, the nuclear sector would benefit from a similar independent regulator, one that can oversee activities regardless of whether these are carried out by the government or private sector entities. This is a crucial step as we explore private sector participation in nuclear power generation. There would, of course, be mandatory safety and security guidelines. And even if the nuclear material remains under the DAE’s ownership, certain protocols would need to be in place to ensure the DAE can retain ownership without assuming liability in the event of an accident. Establishing these clear boundaries will present legal challenges if the private sector is to play a role in nuclear power generation.

Another important issue would be land acquisition for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Often, communities resist having NPPs near their towns or villages, fearing potential accidents. The question then becomes—who will handle resistance, outreach communication, and compensation? While the government can acquire land to some extent, it typically sets up an industrial zone and allocates it to private companies. But with public resistance, it raises the issue of who will acquire land for private companies looking to build NPPs. For private companies, acquiring land and establishing facilities would be even more challenging. 

Additionally, Indian private companies lack the necessary expertise in designing and operating nuclear power plants, as they have never been involved in this sector. So, will they form joint ventures with foreign technology entities like Westinghouse, GE, or Électricité de France? If so, how would these joint ventures be structured? Will the government insist NPCIL be involved as an operator, as with previous deals like the French reactors at Jaitapur? These are questions that remain to be answered as the situation develops.

To conclude, developing a strong, independent regulatory framework and managing land acquisition, safety protocols, and private sector involvement will be key to successful private sector participation in India’s nuclear power generation. These challenges, particularly around regulatory independence and the acquisition of land amidst public resistance, will require clear legal structures and government support to ensure the safe, efficient, and sustainable development of nuclear energy in the country. 

How these issues are addressed will likely shape the future of India’s nuclear energy sector as India pursues the twin goals of Viksit Bharat by 2047 and net-zero by 2070.

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R Chidambaram compared nuclear option to marriage option. They cannot be open-ended

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I remember my teacher Dr R Chidambaram for The Print on Jan 6, 2025

https://theprint.in/opinion/r-chidambaram-nuclear-option-marriage-option-not-open-ended/2432386/

Remembering Dr R Chidambaram

From right: Dr M R Srinivasan (1987-1990), Dr R Ramanna (1983-87), Dr P K Iyengar (1990-93), Dr H N Setha (1972-83), Dr R Chidambaram (1993-2000), Author (32 years ago)

I first met Dr Chidambaram in May 1972 at BARC where he was heading the Neutron Physics Division and I had just finished my B.Sc (Hons) in Physics in Delhi University and registered for my M.Sc. As a national science scholar, I was expected to do two months of summer school and had picked BARC out of the options. That Dr Chidambaram was my supervisor was pure chance but it marked the beginning of a lasting relationship. In 1973, I was again back at BARC and this time he was again my supervisor, this time not by chance. As I learnt later, some of the work in the division on ‘high pressure physics’ and ‘equations of state’ was key to the Smiling Budha test the following year on 18 May.

In 1976, I told him about joining the Indian Foreign Service, and received a warm congratulatory letter. I returned to Delhi in 1992, having done stints in Geneva working on multilateral disarmament negotiations (the primary focus during the 1980s was Chemical Weapons) followed by Islamabad where tracking Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme was a subject of special interest.

In Delhi, I took over the newly created Disarmament & International Security Affairs division where my responsibilities included the IAEA, negotiations in Geneva and New York, dual use technology export controls and bilateral talks with France, UK and the U.S. The Cold War had ended, Soviet Union had broken up, India had exchanged ambassadors with Israel, a Look East policy was around the corner, and economic liberalisation was under way; in short, India’s world was changing.  

Dr Chidambaram was heading BARC and in 1993, took over as Atomic Energy Commission chief. We had begun to meet during his regular trips to Delhi and would often end up for lunch, at Dasaprakasa at the Ambassador hotel. At times, Dr. Abdul Kalam, who was heading DRDO would also join us. Conversations revolved around the missile development programme (Prithvi and Agni were first tested in 1993 and 1994 respectively), upgrading the indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor and coping with the expanded and tightened export controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Similar concerns were being voiced separately by Dr U R Rao, then heading ISRO.

At MEA’s initiative, an Eminent Persons Group, consisting of serving and former senior members of the scientific departments, was set up to assess these developments and devise approaches to cope with these restrictions, with author serving as the member secretary. Interaction with the DAE intensified with the commencement of negotiations in 1994 on a nuclear test ban treaty in Geneva.

Two key developments took in 1995. In May, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. India had never joined the NPT, labelling it as a discriminatory treaty, and now it was clear that India would always be outside it. In August 1995, the US put forward ‘a zero-yield’ definition of a test ban in Geneva that would make it impossible for India to retain a viable ‘nuclear option’ unless it upgraded its capabilities by undertaking additional tests. As Dr Chidambaram put it, a ‘nuclear option’ cannot be open ended, just as a ‘marriage option’ cannot last indefinitely.

Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao designated Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and then Governor (Gujarat) to put together a small group to examine options. The members were Dr Chidambaram, Dr Kalam, K.Santhanam (DRDO) and the author. PM Narsimha Rao gave the green light for a limited number of tests. Regular meetings were held to assess nuclear preparations and monitor international sentiment even as India played an active role in Geneva, Vienna and New York where high-level meetings were being held to commemorate 50 years of the establishment of the United Nations. However, less than a fortnight before the scheduled date, the tests were called off.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. India tried, unsuccessfully, to tighten the language in the test ban negotiations. Even as India went for elections in 1996, it was clear to Dr Chidambaram that India needed time and could not go along with Geneva negotiations. Accordingly, in June, India withdrew from the negotiations, causing much consternation in Geneva and Vienna. Dr Chidambaram was a relieved man. We continued our meetings in Delhi and Mumbai to exchange views on the emerging nuclear initiatives such as a fissile-material-cutoff-treaty. In Mumbai, our dinner venue would be Khyber in the Fort area.

The story about Op Shakti Diwas and the tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 is well documented. Simultaneously, nuclear diplomacy with the US, France and other countries intensified. Our interactions too became more frequent; it was imperative for MEA and DAE to be on the same page as to how India’s position regarding the doctrinal aspects of the credible minimum deterrent, a nuclear triad, no-first-use and assured retaliatory capability, were presented and perceived. In short, we had to ensure a growing acceptance of India as responsible nuclear power. Though not directly involved, he played a significant role in the negotiations leading to the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. He instinctively understood that as a nuclear-weapon-state, there would need to be a separation between the civilian and the military nuclear fuel cycles and that India must maintain an exemplary non-proliferation record.

At the end of 2000, I left to take over as Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and in 2001, Dr Chidambaram took over as Principal Scientific Adviser. We continued our meetings, though gradually less frequent. His tenure as PrScAdv was marked by many successes, among them the high speed national Knowledge Network, the National Supercomputing Mission and Rural Technology Action groups.

It was serendipity that I met him in 1972, and decades later, after some difficult negotiations, he told me, “I trusted your instinct because after all, you are one of us.” That ‘trust’ gave me the good fortune to walk beside him on India’s nuclear journey. Thank you, Dr Chidambaram. Om shanti.

How and Why D&ISA Division was Created in MEA

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I write for India’s World Vol 1 Issue 1

How and Why D&ISA Division Was Created in MEA 

In early 1992, after five and a half years posted abroad, I returned to India with a growing realization of the shifting geopolitical equations, its impact on South Asia, and the challenges it would pose for Indian foreign policy that had been crafted during the Cold War years. These realisations were also shared by the Foreign Secretary and the political leadership, eventually leading to the birth of the Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.

A faraway view

My five and a half years were split between two postings: Geneva, where I served as First Secretary (Disarmament) at the Permanent Mission of India, and then Islamabad, where I was Counsellor (Political) at the High Commission of India.

Both postings provided a ringside view of changing geopolitics and its impact on South Asia.

In Geneva, the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention began to register progress as the Soviet delegation softened its position on on-site and challenge inspections. Mandatory and consultative verification was accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilaterally concluded 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989 and in November, the Berlin Wall came down. In Vienna, talks began on for setting limits on conventional forces leading to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty the following year.

In 1990, tensions between India and Pakistan began to rise with growing incidents of violence and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The camps in Pakistan that had trained the mujahideen for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan were ready for new recruits. Following a crisis in summer of 1990, talks between the Foreign Secretaries were initiated to develop Confidence Building Measures, the first such talks since the Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities, concluded in 1988. This led to the operationalising of the Hotline between the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) and another was set up between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Two significant conventional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) concluded in 1991 were the Agreement on Advance Notices on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres, and Troop Movements and an Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircrafts.

Coming home

By early 1992, I was back in Delhi and took charge as Director in the United Nations Division, responsible for dealing with Disarmament issues (UND). The work related to the UN in New York (General Assembly, Disarmament Commission), Geneva (negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other review conferences), and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). However, the world was changing rapidly, with new challenges and opportunities.

In December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen states with Russia as the successor state. The bipolar world of the Cold War, came to an end. For the first time since its creation in 1945, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met at summit level (Prime Minister Narsimha Rao participated as India was a non-permanent member) to take stock of the global security environment and concluded, inter-alia, that proliferation posed a major threat to regional and global security.

On the margins of the UNSC meeting in New York, Prime Minister Rao and President George H W Bush held a bilateral meeting, concluded that the end of the Cold War provided India and the U.S. an opportunity to overcome their differences, agreeing to open a dialogue on strategic and nuclear issues that had been a source of friction since the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India.

 The dialogue commenced a few months later and continued through various ups and downs, culminating in the 123 Agreement permitting civilian nuclear cooperation in 2008.

Meanwhile restrictions on dual use items began to get tightened. In 1991, the Nuclear Suppliers Group convened after more than a decade and the following year, added Part 2 to their Guidelines covering nuclear-related-dual-use items and technologies that, in addition to having non-nuclear applications, could also contribute to the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1992, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) met to add to its Category 2 lists by adding more dual-use items and technologies, as also Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) above a certain threshold. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had concluded an agreement with a Russian entity Glavkosmos, for transfer of technology relating to cryogenic rocket engines. Despite the fact that cryogenic technology is for satellite launches and not for missiles, the U.S. sanctioned both ISRO and Glavkosmos, reflecting the focus on non-proliferation.

In 1992, India announced full diplomatic recognition to Israel with the opening of embassies in Delhi and Tel Aviv. Under the multi-track Arab-Israeli peace process underway, India became an extra-regional participant in the Arms Control and Regional Security track that worked on CBMs.

Within weeks of returning from Islamabad as Director (UND), I found that nearly three-fourths of my time was devoted not to UN related disarmament agendas but national and regional security and strategic dialogues as well as handling non-proliferation related sanctions and licensing issues for dual use items, especially relating to civilian nuclear and space programmes.

To take stock of the changes under way, an Eminent Persons Group was set with Prime Minister Rao’s approval in mid-1992, with serving and former heads of nuclear, space and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) departments.

Around this time, I put up a note to Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, explaining that the designation UND no longer described the changing nature of the work and proposed the establishment of a new division that would, in addition to the disarmament negotiations and the UN and IAEA related work, also deal with national security, non-proliferation and access to dual-use technology related issues. The proposal found acceptance and following some discussions, the new division was named Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division (D&ISA Division).

The nuclear dialogue with the U.S. was the first of many that followed. Discussing threat perceptions was a novel challenge for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and required much closer coordination with the Ministry of Defence. Soon, D&ISA Division had to get a Military Advisor and a Science Adviser deputed from the Services and DRDO respectively.

The evolution of an idea

Over the years, D&ISA Division also became the nodal division for handling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, a security dialogue platform, that India was invited to join as part of our “Look East” policy. As the global norm of non-proliferation gained greater traction, D&ISA division began to highlight the need for sensitising our private sector entities as some of them had been found exporting dual-use chemicals that led to adverse commentary in international media and US sanctions, even though these companies had not violated any Indian laws. An empowered group was established to develop lists of dual-use materials, equipments and technologies whose exports should be licensed only after due diligence and end-use assurances, laying the foundation for non-proliferation related export controls administered by the Ministry of Commerce.

India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and D&ISA Division became responsible for coordinating industry outreach with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers and with DRDO about winding down our chemical weapons programme.

The opening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations in Geneva added the responsibility of developing the national negotiating position in close coordination with the Department of Atomic Energy. By 1995, it became clear that in order to keep India’s nuclear option viable, India could not rely on the 1974 PNE and needed to carry out a new series of nuclear tests. Withdrawing from the CTBT negotiations in 1996 followed by the nuclear tests in 1998 and working the negotiating strategy for India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power added to D&ISA Division’s work load. Together with the concerned territorial divisions, it handled the strategic dialogues with a number of countries including France, UK, Israel etc. that eventually led to the establishment of long-standing strategic partnerships.

An institution in itself

In late 2000, after nearly a nine-year stint, I left Delhi on a new assignment. India had established a new position of an Ambassador for Disarmament in Geneva and it was my privilege to set up the new office.

Over a quarter century later, it is gratifying to see that D&ISA Division has thrived as has the position of Ambassador for Disarmament. Many of my young colleagues who I had the privilege to work with, went on to serve in Geneva and Vienna, and head the D&ISA Division, (D B Venkatesh Verma, Suchitra Durai, G Dharmendra, Amandeep Singh Gill) with great distinction.

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